UFP INDUSTRIES, INC. (UFPI): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $92.74, UFP INDUSTRIES, INC. (UFPI) is priced for +13.3% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/UFPI

Headline

FieldValue
TickerUFPI
CompanyUFP INDUSTRIES, INC.
Current price$92.74/sh
CompositionRetail - ProWood 32% / Retail - Deckorators 5% / Retail - UFP Edge 2% / Packaging - Structural Packaging 16% / Packaging - PalletOne 8% / Packaging - Protective Packaging 1% / Construction - Factory Built 13% / Construction - Site-Built 11% / Construction - Commercial 4% / Construction - Concrete Forming 3% / All Other 4% / Corporate 0%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.2%
Operating margin today5.4%
Margin compression (value-band)-2.2pp
Implied growth13.3%
Multiple paid14x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 10.4% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~6pp.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~6.3%/yr; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.16σ
sustained it ~5 years at this level48%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple; asset-based/growth-DCF land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.88x5expensive
Earnings1.45x3expensive
Relative0.86x3justifies
Growth1.59x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Relative Families that call it expensive: Asset, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=14)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$58.321.59xyesFCF base $0.3B, growth -7% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 8.7%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$89.421.04xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 8.3x / 10.3x / 12.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelative$94.930.98xyesP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.2x / 18.0x / 20.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$51.071.82xyesBV/sh $54.53, ROE (TTM) 8.7%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$49.431.88xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$47.271.96xyesRev $6.2B, growth -7% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.7x / 0.8x / 1.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$103.210.90xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.62B × (1−24%) / WACC 8.7% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$49.161.89xyesBV $54.53 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 8.7% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 5.6%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$74.961.24xyes√(22.5 × EPS $4.58 × BVPS $54.53) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$107.410.86xyesEBITDA $0.48B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$63.751.45xyesFCF $300.6M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$3.8424.15xyesEPS $4.58 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$11.258.24xyesBV $54.53 × (ROIC 1.8% / WACC 8.7%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$273.820.34xyesRevenue $6.19B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$49.511.87xyesEPS $4.58 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Alloperatingenterprise2433.6B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$520.2m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-2.03x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-1.55x (net cash)
Interest coverage30.9x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-2.8%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Start with what the market is pricing in against what the company actually holds, because the gap is the bull case. UFP just reported a weak quarter, and the stock reflects a business whose earnings are cyclically depressed. What it does not fully reflect is the balance sheet behind those earnings. UFP carries net cash of about $520 million, with interest coverage above 30 times and gross debt of only $234 million. This is a manufacturer with essentially no leverage, sitting on cash through a downturn, which is exactly when balance-sheet strength compounds: it can buy assets cheaply, fund its own growth, and shrink the share count while weaker competitors retrench.

Management is using that strength rather than hoarding it. In the quarter UFP completed a $56 million acquisition of MoistureShield composite assets, announced a roughly $20 million pallet acquisition, repurchased $30 million of shares, raised the quarterly dividend to $0.36, and authorized a new $300 million share-repurchase program. Buying back stock when earnings are down and the price is depressed retires more shares per dollar than buying at the peak, and the share count has already been shrinking about 3% a year. Acquiring composite-decking and packaging assets in a soft market is the countercyclical playbook of a company that has been through lumber cycles before.

The structural quality is the diversification and the move toward value-added products. UFP's packaging business has, in the filing's words, "added additional products and services to this business unit to meet the increasing demand of our customers to provide a wider array of innovative solutions", the shift from commodity wood toward engineered, higher-margin solutions. New product sales were 7.8% of net sales in the quarter, a steady contribution that lifts the mix above raw lumber economics. The price implies mid-single-digit operating margins and modest growth, against a company that has historically delivered both across cycles and has the cleanest balance sheet in its peer group to fund the next leg.

Bear Case

The price leans on a recovery narrative, and the most fragile assumption inside it is that all three of UFP's end markets turn back up. Right now they are doing the opposite. Q1 2026 saw retail sales fall 12.5%, construction down 9.8%, and packaging down 3.9%, a broad-based decline rather than one weak segment dragging the others. The diversification that is supposed to cushion the company did not cushion this quarter, because the common driver, weak residential construction, hit all three. Management now expects 2026 demand near the low end of prior guidance, which means the recovery the price assumes is being pushed out rather than arriving.

Lumber is the variable that turns a soft demand quarter into a margin problem, and the company is explicit about it. The 10-K states UFP experiences "significant" exposure to lumber-price fluctuations, and the filing's own data shows lumber prices rising in 2025 "despite overall weak demand in the end markets" that consume softwood lumber. That combination, input costs up while end demand is down, is the worst case for a wood-products manufacturer: it cannot easily pass higher lumber costs through to customers who are already buying less. Adjusted EBITDA margin compressed to 7.6% from 8.9% a year earlier, and that is the squeeze showing up in the numbers.

The narrative also depends on the housing cycle cooperating, which is outside management's control. UFP's filing concedes its growth is "dependent, in part, upon the growth of the markets we serve", and if those markets "do not achieve anticipated growth" the results are impaired. New housing, repair, and remodel demand all hinge on mortgage rates, affordability, and consumer confidence. The price embeds roughly 8% growth and a return to better margins, but if rates stay high and residential construction remains weak through 2026, the depressed quarter is a trend, not a trough. The balance sheet protects against ruin, not against a multiple paid for a recovery that keeps slipping.

Valuation

UFP sits in the middle of the methods we use to triangulate, which is the signature of a quality cyclical caught at a soft point in its cycle. The peer-multiple lens lands modestly above the price, the earnings-power anchor is close to it, and the growth-cash-flow methods sit below, reflecting that current earnings are depressed. Inverted, the price embeds roughly 8% growth and a forward operating margin in the mid-single digits, a touch above the 5.4% the company earns at this trough. The within-range read is appropriate: the price is not betting on a boom, it is betting on a normalization back toward UFP's through-cycle economics.

The concrete question is whether that normalization arrives on the timeline the price assumes. The three segments are all contracting now, and lumber costs rose into the weakness, so the margin recovery the price pays for requires both end demand to stabilize and the lumber-cost squeeze to ease. The asset-value methods read the stock as expensive relative to book, which is normal for an asset-light, value-added manufacturer, while the peer and earnings lenses read it as roughly fair. The methods together say this is a fairly priced quality name whose value hinges on the cycle turning, not on a structural re-rating.

The balance sheet is the decisive strength and belongs at the close. Net cash of about $520 million, interest coverage above 30 times, and $754 million of liquid assets give UFP the rare ability to act offensively through a downturn, funding acquisitions, a raised dividend, and a $300 million buyback simultaneously. The company is not at any solvency risk; the risk is entirely about earnings power and the cycle. For an investor, the bet is that a debt-free, cash-rich manufacturer compounds through the soft patch and emerges with a smaller share count and more assets, which is precisely what the current capital deployment is engineering.

Catalysts

Q1 2026 was a clear miss driven by demand weakness. Net sales fell 8% to $1.46 billion, missing the $1.55 billion consensus, on a 1% price decline and a 7% drop in organic units, and diluted EPS fell to $0.89 from $1.30 a year earlier. Adjusted EBITDA was $111.4 million, 7.6% of sales versus 8.9% a year ago, with management citing a weaker residential construction market, adverse weather, and higher healthcare and fuel costs. All three segments declined.

Capital deployment was the offsetting story. UFP completed a $56 million MoistureShield acquisition, announced a roughly $20 million pallet acquisition, repurchased $30 million of stock, raised the quarterly dividend to $0.36, and authorized a new $300 million buyback. New product sales held at 7.8% of net sales, the value-added mix continuing to contribute.

The forward picture is cautious: management now expects 2026 demand near the low end of prior guidance. The catalysts to watch are the residential-construction trajectory that drives all three segments, the path of lumber prices against that demand, and whether the new-product and acquisition strategy can grow the mix faster than the cyclical end markets contract. Each quarter's segment trends and EBITDA margin are the readout on whether the trough is forming or deepening.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

All (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

UFPI Q1 2026 results, April 29 2026

View the full interactive UFPI report on boothcheck