URBAN EDGE PROPERTIES (UE): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $22.02, URBAN EDGE PROPERTIES (UE) is priced for +8.9% AFFO growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.

Generated: 2026-08-08 · Exported: 2026-08-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/UE

Headline

FieldValue
TickerUE
CompanyURBAN EDGE PROPERTIES
Current price$22.02/sh

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basisreit
Implied FFO growth8.9%
Price-to-FFO11.9x
FFO yield8.4%

Solve inputs: computed at a 10.1% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of equity moves the implied AFFO growth ~4pp.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.07σ
cohort percentile (of 105 peers)76
sustained it ~5 years at this level59%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.48x4expensive
Earnings2.98x4expensive
Relative0.90x4justifies
Growth0.92x5justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=17)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$43.210.51xyesFCF base $0.2B, growth 7% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 6.9%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$23.910.92xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 27.5x / 29.5x / 31.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelative$29.310.75xyesP/E 25.76x (blended: static sector reference 35x + trailing (TTM) 12x), scenarios: 21.5x / 25.8x / 30.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 20x
Simple DDMGrowth$63.110.35xyesDPS $0.84, g=7.8% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3%
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$11.971.84xyesStage 1: -2% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$9.262.38xyesBV/sh $10.96, ROE (TTM) 7.8%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$8.502.59xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$15.521.42xyesRev $0.5B, growth 7% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 4.8x / 5.7x / 6.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAsset$8.382.63xyesBV $10.96 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 7.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 5.1%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$21.361.03xyes√(22.5 × FFO/share $1.85 × BVPS $10.96) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$11.981.84xyesEBITDA $0.13B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$7.073.11xyesFCF $189.3M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$5.983.68xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.18B (FCF $0.19B − SBC $0.01B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$7.752.84xyesFFO/share $1.85 × (8.5 + 2×-1.8%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelative$23.160.95xyesRevenue $0.49B × sector P/S 6.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$20.001.10xyesFFO/share $1.85 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelative$25.960.85xyesFFO/share $1.85 × 14.1x P/FFO (route cohort median, n=85); FFO $0.23B (FFO incl. D&A + impairments, FY2025, companyfacts), shares 126M
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Solvency

FieldValue
Funds from operations (trailing)$232.6m
Share count CAGR (dilution)2.8%
Burning cashno

REIT basis: leverage is read against funds from operations (FFO), not depreciation-gutted operating income. The header's implied growth runs on ADJUSTED FFO — FFO minus recurring maintenance capex — so the header's multiple and this leverage ratio use bases that differ by that capex; neither substitutes for the other. Net debt could not be resolved from the corporate debt tags in the filings (REIT notes and mortgage debt are often tagged outside the corporate ladder), so the leverage ratio is withheld rather than rendered from incomplete tags. Interest expense is not separately reported in the cached statements, so fixed-charge coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Location is the entire thesis. Urban Edge owns open-air shopping centers packed into the New York metropolitan corridor, some of the densest and most supply-constrained retail real estate in the country. You cannot easily build a new grocery-anchored center in the suburbs of New York, because the land is taken, the entitlements are brutal, and the existing tenants are not leaving. That scarcity is the moat, and it shows up not as expansion but as pricing power on space the company already controls.

The leasing numbers are where the moat becomes cash. In the first quarter Urban Edge signed 84,000 square feet of new leases at a 52% cash spread and renewed 335,000 square feet at a 15% blended cash spread, on 419,000 square feet of total leasing activity. A cash spread is the increase in rent on a re-let space versus what the prior tenant paid, and a 52% jump on new leases tells you the in-place rents were well below what the market will now bear. That gap, the difference between what tenants pay today and what the space is worth when it turns over, is embedded upside that converts to NOI on a schedule the company largely controls.

Occupancy gives that re-leasing room to run. The portfolio sat at 96.4% occupied in the first quarter, and management expects to reach 97% to 98% by year-end. Those last points of occupancy are high-margin: the fixed cost of the center is already being carried, so incremental rent from filling the remaining space drops almost straight to NOI. Combine rising occupancy with double-digit re-leasing spreads and you get the high-single-digit cash-flow growth the company is guiding to, FFO as adjusted raised to $1.48 to $1.52 per share, roughly 5% growth at the midpoint and up 3% year over year in the quarter.

Management is backing the operating confidence with the payout and the portfolio. The board raised the quarterly dividend 11% to $0.21 per share, an $0.84 annualized rate, a move a REIT makes when it expects the cash flow behind the check to keep growing rather than merely holding. And the company is still adding to the base where it makes sense, closing a $54 million shopping-center acquisition in the quarter. The bull case is not complicated: irreplaceable centers, rents marked well below market, and a runway to lease the gap.

Bear Case

The price has already hired the growth before the company has fully delivered it. At about 21 times the cash flow left after recurring capital, Urban Edge trades at a multiple that only holds together if that after-capital cash flow keeps compounding at close to ten percent a year. That is the rate the price requires. What the company has actually shown is FFO as adjusted up 3% year over year in the first quarter, with full-year guidance pointing to roughly 5% growth at the midpoint. The demonstrated pace is real and respectable, and it is still only about half of what the multiple is paying for. The bear case lives in that gap.

The gap matters because of what happens to the multiple if it does not close. A 21-times multiple is a high-single-digit-to-double-digit-grower's price, and the moment the market decides Urban Edge is a mid-single-digit grower, the multiple compresses toward what mid-single-digit growers fetch. The re-leasing spreads are the bridge the bull is counting on to lift growth from 5% toward the 10% the price wants, and they are genuinely strong, but they convert to NOI only as leases roll, occupancy is already at 96.4% with limited headroom to 98%, and a softening consumer or a single anchor going dark in a concentrated portfolio can stall the climb. The price is underwriting the optimistic path, not the demonstrated one.

Concentration cuts both ways, and the bear takes the downside of it. The same New York-metro density that makes the centers irreplaceable also means the portfolio's fate is tied to one regional economy and a tenant roster where individual anchors carry weight. Open-air retail has been resilient, but it is still retail: tenants fail, e-commerce keeps pressuring certain categories, and a vacancy in a top center is felt across the whole NOI line in a way a diversified national landlord would absorb more quietly.

The balance sheet is the quieter constraint. Fixed charges were covered about 4.2 times in the period, thinner cushion than the best-capitalized residential REITs carry, and the share count has grown at roughly 2.8% a year, so some of the headline FFO growth is being funded by issuing equity rather than by the existing portfolio alone. The leverage figure could not be cleanly read from the corporate debt tags, but the coverage ratio is the honest tell: this is a REIT with adequate, not abundant, room to absorb higher refinancing costs. None of this says the centers are not valuable. It says the price is paying for a growth rate the company has so far delivered at half speed, and a 21-times multiple does not forgive a miss.

Valuation

For a shopping-center REIT the lens that matters is the cash flow that survives after the recurring capital it takes to keep the centers leasable, AFFO, and Urban Edge trades at about 21 times it. That is the headline, and it is not a cheap one. Inverted, the price requires that after-capital cash flow to compound at close to ten percent a year to earn the multiple. The market is paying Urban Edge as a grower, and a fairly aggressive one, which is the single most important thing to understand about the quote.

Two figures sharpen that demand. The price hands the buyer an after-capital cash yield of roughly 4.7%, slim for a retail landlord, which is the yield-side expression of the same growth bet. And the growth the price requires from AFFO runs well ahead of the growth it requires from the gross figure: plain funds from operations, before maintenance capital is netted out, trades at a much lower multiple of about 12 times and implies essentially flat to slightly negative growth. The wedge between those two is the point. The price is leaning on AFFO and on the high-single-digit-plus growth AFFO has to deliver, not on the gross FFO line, which looks placid by comparison precisely because it ignores the capital the centers consume to keep producing.

Where the price sits against the methods is, oddly, not stretched on every lens. The forward-growth framing actually reads the price as cheaper than the growth would warrant, and peer multiples against the broader retail-REIT group land below the price too. It is the asset-value lens, anchoring on book equity and the buildings, and the trailing earnings-power lens that call it rich, and earnings power is the wrong tool for any REIT, since depreciation guts reported earnings in a way the cash economics never feel. The honest read of the pattern: this is a growth-priced name where the forward methods, which credit next-period growth, sit near or below the price, while the static asset lens cannot see the re-leasing upside at all.

The concrete "what has to be true" is the re-leasing engine converting to NOI fast enough to hit that high-single-digit pace. The first quarter signed new leases at a 52% cash spread and renewals at 15%, with occupancy guided from 96.4% toward 97% to 98% by year-end, and FFO as adjusted up 3% in the quarter against full-year guidance near 5% growth. That guided pace is roughly half what the AFFO multiple is paying for, which is the tension the price has to resolve through the spreads. On solvency, fixed charges were covered about 4.2 times, adequate rather than generous, and the clean corporate-debt leverage figure was not resolvable from the filings' tags, so leverage reads as a moderate, not a headline, risk. The sell-side average target near $22.86 sits just above today's quote with an In Line consensus, UBS and Evercore both at $22, crediting the same re-leasing runway the after-capital multiple is paying for, and waiting on the spreads to show up in the NOI line.

Catalysts

The near-term driver is the leasing-to-NOI conversion, and the next quarterly print is where it shows up. The first quarter already raised the bar: 84,000 square feet of new leases at a 52% cash spread, 335,000 square feet of renewals at a 15% blended spread, and a full-year FFO-as-adjusted guidance lifted to $1.48 to $1.52 per share, roughly 5% growth at the midpoint. The signed-but-not-yet-open leases are a visible pipeline of future rent, so the catalyst is occupancy climbing from 96.4% toward the 97% to 98% year-end target and that signed rent commencing.

The dividend move is the second marker. The board raised the quarterly payout 11% to $0.21 per share, an $0.84 annualized rate, an 11% hike that signals management's read on the durability of the growth. Continued increases would reinforce the high-single-digit cash-flow story the price is paying for.

External growth is the third. Urban Edge closed a $54 million shopping-center acquisition in the first quarter; further accretive purchases in its supply-constrained New York-metro footprint would add to the base without diluting the re-leasing thesis. On the sell-side, UBS lifted its target to $22 and Evercore ISI to $22, both at neutral-equivalent ratings, with an average target near $22.86. The rating itself sits roughly at the price, so the spreads and occupancy, not an upgrade, are what would move the stock.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Core business (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Urban Edge Q1 2026 results, April 28 2026 · Urban Edge dividend declaration, 2026 · Urban Edge disclosures, Q1 2026 · Investing.com analyst data; UBS and Evercore ISI notes, 2026

View the full interactive UE report on boothcheck