Tesla, Inc. (TSLA): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $348.12, Tesla, Inc. (TSLA) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~38.2 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-08-07.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/TSLA

Headline

FieldValue
TickerTSLA
CompanyTesla, Inc.
Sector / IndustryConsumer Cyclical
Current price$348.12/sh
CompositionAutomotive sales 69% / Automotive regulatory credits 2% / Energy generation and storage sales 13% / Services and other 13% / Automotive leasing 2% / Energy generation and storage leasing 1%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Must persist for38.2y
Multiple paid314x operating income

Solve inputs: computed at a 13.3% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.16σ

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset14.12x1expensive
Earnings0
Relative0
Growth2.10x3expensive

Families that call it expensive: Asset, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=4)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$49.597.02xyesFCF base $14.1B, growth 12% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.1%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$193.801.80xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 138.2x / 140.2x / 142.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 44x (blended: static sector reference 20x + trailing (TTM) 317x), scenarios: 36.3x / 44.0x / 51.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 28.6x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$11.8929.28xyesBV/sh $21.99, ROE (TTM) 5.0%, ke 9.3% (excluded from median)
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$8.1442.77xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% (excluded from median)
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$165.682.10xyesRev $103.6B, growth 12% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 9.9x / 12.0x / 14.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$10.6332.75xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $8.08B × (1−15%) / WACC 9.1% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median)
Residual IncomeAsset$7.7245.09xyesBV $21.99 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 5.0% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 3.2%/yr (excluded from median)
Graham NumberAsset$24.6614.12xyes√(22.5 × EPS $1.23 × BVPS $21.99) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $9.81B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$15.6322.27xyesFCF $5762.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median)
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$5.2366.56xyesSBC-adj FCF $1.96B (FCF $5.76B − SBC $3.80B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median)
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$1.03337.98xyesEPS $1.23 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$0.93374.32xyesBV $21.99 × (ROIC 0.4% / WACC 9.1%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $103.62B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$13.2926.19xyesEPS $1.23 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) (excluded from median)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Material operating units span distinct economics, so a single sector multiple or target margin is not representative. Consolidated cash-flow lenses may remain as secondary checks, while segment SOTP is primary.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Automotiveoperatingenterprise$82.1b$79.8b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value
Energy generation and storageoperatingenterprise$12.8b$65.8b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Secondary Optionality Overlay

Conditional scenarios only; this does not substitute for unresolved unit coverage.

Build Of Price (Sum Of The Parts)

The price decomposes into a demonstrated fundamentals base plus a segment premium. Each segment is an additive contributor to the premium at peer-cohort economics, not an independent defender of an allocated target.

ComponentPer share
Fundamentals base$36.70
Forward-optionality premium$311.42
= Current price$348.12

Discount rate: 10.0% cost of equity.

Core Pieces (The Demonstrated Base, By Reportable Segment)

Core pieceRevenueTrendMarginFloor/shOwn optionality/sh
Automotive$82.1b16%$20.11
Energy generation and storage$12.8b30%$16.59

Floor shares sum to the base. Each piece carries its own forward optionality on top of its demonstrated value; these draw on the same premium the named bets below also draw on, not a separate pool.

Named Segments (Standalone Central Values)

SegmentCategoryCentral value/shScenario range/shStrategic floor/shPeer cohort
FSD subscription + licensingsoftware-platform$217.57$33.87 – $1399.67MSFT, ADBE, CRM, MBLY
Robo-taxi fleettransport-rideshare$191.35$29.78 – $1230.98UBER, LYFT, GOOGL
Optimus humanoid robotindustrial-oem$77.96$12.13 – $501.51ABB, FANUY, ROK, ISRG

The standalone values sum to $486.88, more than the $311.42 premium: the market discounts the segments' standalone sum by 36%. The over-sum is the signal that the segments were never the premium's sole burden; the core carries its own optionality besides.

At central scale the combined named-segment contribution spans $302.31 – $784.12 as timing varies (an honest range, not a point).

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$34.2b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-9.21x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-7.82x (net cash)
Interest coverage13.1x
Share count CAGR (dilution)0.5%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The most useful fact in the June 2026 quarter is one that does not fit the way almost everyone models this company. Services and other revenue grew 50% year over year to 4,581 million dollars, faster than vehicles, faster than energy, and the company reported it as the quarter's record for profitability. Energy storage deployments reached 13.5 gigawatt-hours, up 41%. Deliveries did grow, by 25% to a record second quarter, but they grew more slowly than the two lines that nobody underwrites when they buy the shares. A car company whose non-car businesses compound faster than its cars is a different asset from the one in most spreadsheets.

Energy is the clearest version of the argument. It sells into a market where the good operators earn real money and the bad ones do not: FSLR converted 5.4 billion dollars of trailing revenue into an operating margin near 34% while growing 24%, and ENPH turned 1.4 billion dollars of revenue at a positive operating result. Tesla's storage business is competing on manufacturing scale in a category where the constraint is cells and factories rather than software, which is the kind of contest a company with four U.S. plants tends to win. The annual filing lists them plainly: We currently have manufacturing facilities in the U.S. in California, New York, Texas and Nevada.

Then there is the software line, which is unlike anything else in the vehicle industry because the hardware has already been sold. Active subscriptions to the supervised driving product reached 1.48 million, up 56% on the year, and the robotaxi service is now running in seven major metropolitan areas with three Florida cities added in July. The company has told shareholders where it thinks the next leg comes from, stating in the annual filing that The next phase of production growth will be initiated by advances in autonomy and the introduction of new products, including those built on our next generation vehicle platform, as well as our ability to efficiently manufacture our own cells. Note the ordering: autonomy first, then products, then cells.

Against the companies it actually competes with for a customer, the operating comparison is not close. F carried an operating margin around negative 4% on 189.9 billion dollars of trailing revenue, and GM converted 185.5 billion dollars into an operating margin near 1% with revenue slightly down on the year. Tesla is earning a positive operating result on revenue that grew, in an industry where the incumbents are not. Further down the size range the picture is starker still: RIVN ran an operating margin near negative 60% on 5.9 billion dollars of revenue, and LCID is further from breakeven than that.

The balance sheet is what makes the whole programme optional rather than forced. Cash and investments finished the June quarter at 43.5 billion dollars, and interest is covered roughly 13 times over. Free cash flow went negative in that quarter, but it went negative because capital expenditure jumped to 5,789 million dollars, not because the operating business stopped producing: cash from operations was 4,697 million dollars, up 85% year over year. A company with that much on hand gets to be wrong about a launch date without being wrong about its survival.

The bear is right that the spending is currently outrunning the earnings, and that is the honest cost of the position. The bull's answer is not that the spending is small. It is that the four things being built are the only reason anyone would pay this price, and they are being built now rather than promised.

Bear Case

The single external variable with the most leverage over this business is not demand, and it is not competition. It is policy. In fiscal 2025 the company booked 1,993 million dollars of automotive regulatory credits, a line the annual filing describes as sales of regulatory credits to other automotive manufacturers and which carries almost no cost of its own. Set that against operating income of 4,355 million dollars for the same year and roughly two of every five dollars of operating profit came from a market that exists only because governments require it. That line has already started to go: it fell 770 million dollars, or 28%, in fiscal 2025 against the prior year.

The exposure runs the other way too, through costs. The annual filing is explicit that changes in government and economic incentives or tariffs may also impact our sales, cost structure and the competitive landscape, and it names the mechanism: import tariffs by the US government and the provisions of the OBBBA could significantly increase battery cell expenses and impact costs for our consumers. Cells are the input the company itself calls the limiting factor on near-term production. A policy change can therefore raise the cost of the constraint and cut the revenue of the credit line in the same fiscal year, and neither move requires a single customer to change their mind.

Today's price does not appear to hold room for that. It sits at roughly 290 times company-wide operating income for the twelve months ended June 30, 2026, and every family of method that produced a usable read lands well below it. What that price requires, on a single calculation that should be read as a direction rather than a measurement, is operating growth held at its self-funding ceiling for something like 37 years. Historically only about 14% of comparable fast-growers held such a pace even for a decade, and following the path to its end would make the business roughly 230% of its own generously grown market. That last figure is not a forecast; it is a boundary condition, and the bet runs past it.

The near-term numbers are moving away from the requirement rather than toward it. Operating income in the June 2026 quarter was 398 million dollars, down 57% from the same quarter a year earlier, while revenue rose 26%. Growth is arriving; the profit attached to it is not. Part of that is deliberate spending on Optimus, Cybercab and Semi, and the annual filing is candid about how early that is: Growth of our business is also dependent upon our ability to develop and commercialize Bots, including Optimus, which is in a nascent industry that has yet to develop commercially. A nascent industry that has yet to develop commercially is not a description of a business. It is a description of a hope with a factory attached.

The compute bill behind the autonomy story is its own open item. The company warns that such innovation demands exponentially greater compute, memory, energy and thermal resources, which may prove insufficient in scale or affordability to meet our requirements, and it expects the car market to get harder, stating that The worldwide automotive market is highly competitive today and we expect it will become even more so in the future.

There is a useful way to see how much of today's cash generation is real. Capitalising the trailing free cash flow gets you one number; subtract the 3.8 billion dollars of stock-based compensation that the same period paid out in shares rather than currency and the identical calculation returns roughly a quarter as much. Both are honest. They just disagree about who is paying the engineers.

Valuation

Start with where the methods land, because that is where the disagreement is sharpest. Not one family of valuation approach reaches today's quote. The closest is the group that projects the business forward and prices it on a revenue multiple, and even that lands with the price sitting about 1.9 times above it. The book-value methods are far below, with the most conservative of them, a floor built from reported earnings and book value, sitting at roughly a thirteenth of the price. This is the pattern that says the quote is a bet beyond what any standard approach encodes rather than a premium a growth lens can defend.

Look at how the nearest method gets even that close and the point sharpens. It holds the revenue multiple exactly where it stands now, rolls it forward across its whole projection, and grows revenue about 12% a year off a 103.6 billion dollar base. That is not a conservative construction, and the price is still nearly double it. The cash-flow approach, which projects free cash flow from a 14.1 billion dollar base at 12% growth, reaches a figure under a sixth of the price. Between those two sits most of what a buyer is being asked to believe.

The trailing arithmetic underneath is thin by design. Operating income for the twelve months ended June 30, 2026 was 4.372 billion dollars on 103.6 billion dollars of revenue, an operating margin of about 4.2%, which puts the price near 290 times company-wide operating income. Read that as a direction, not a measurement: a small earnings base makes the calculation sensitive, and the underlying rarity read rests on three of the four references rather than all four, with no usable read on where peer multiples sit. What survives the hedging is that the price implies operating growth held at its self-funding ceiling for something on the order of 37 years, and that only about 14% of comparable fast-growers have held such a pace even for a decade.

Peers give the trailing figures some scale. F ran an operating margin around negative 4% on 189.9 billion dollars of revenue and GM near 1% on 185.5 billion dollars, so Tesla is the profitable one in its own cohort. It is also being valued at a multiple of trailing operating income that no member of that cohort would survive being asked to justify. Both of those statements are true at once, and the reconciliation is that the market is not pricing the car business. In the energy cohort, FSLR converted 5.4 billion dollars of revenue into an operating margin near 34%, which is roughly the shape the storage business would need to hold at scale for the segment story to carry weight.

Downside is bounded by the balance sheet rather than by earnings. Cash and investments stood at 43.5 billion dollars at the end of June 2026, and interest is covered about 13 times over, so nothing about the current spending programme threatens solvency. What it does threaten is the timing. Capital expenditure of 5,789 million dollars in a single quarter against operating cash flow of 4,697 million dollars means the reserve is now funding the build, and the reserve is the thing that has been buying management the freedom to be late.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results, published July 22, 2026, showed revenue of 28,236 million dollars, up 26% on the year, with deliveries of 480,126 vehicles, a record for a second quarter and 25% above the same period of 2025. GAAP operating income was 398 million dollars, down 57%, and GAAP net income attributable to common stockholders was 1,114 million dollars. Operating expenses rose 47% year over year to 4,353 million dollars. The 10-Q followed on July 23, 2026.

The operational detail is where the year's decisions are visible. Energy storage deployments reached 13.5 gigawatt-hours, up 41% and the second-best quarter on record, and services and other revenue rose 50% to 4,581 million dollars. Active supervised full-self-driving subscriptions reached 1.48 million, up 56%. Robotaxi operations expanded to seven major metropolitan areas, with three Florida cities added in July, and Cybercab entered production at Gigafactory Texas.

Four things are scheduled to start this year and they are the near-term milestones worth tracking: Semi production at the new Nevada plant, Megafactory Texas, Optimus production at Fremont following the decommissioning of the Model S and X lines, and the continued ramp of Cybercab. Management also named battery pack capacity as the main limiting factor on near-term vehicle production volume, which makes cell output the constraint to watch behind all four. Capital expenditure ran 5,789 million dollars in the June quarter, up 142% year over year, and free cash flow was negative 1,092 million dollars as a result.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Automotive (reported)

Energy generation and storage (reported)

FSD subscription + licensing (speculative)

Robo-taxi fleet (speculative)

Optimus humanoid robot (speculative)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q2 2026 shareholder update, July 22, 2026

View the full interactive TSLA report on boothcheck