TRONOX HOLDINGS PLC (TROX): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $5.85, TRONOX HOLDINGS PLC (TROX) is priced for -1.9% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-11.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/TROX

Headline

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~7.6pp (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 6.2% sits below it).

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~14%/yr; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple value, while growth-DCF lands below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative Families that call it expensive: Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 10.4%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=7)

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 7.7%); the trailing year was depressed.

Bullet Takeaways

• Tronox is one of the few titanium dioxide producers that owns its own ore, with its 10-K citing the processes that "maximize the benefit of our vertical integration and global footprint", and the stock trades at 0.33x sales and below its $8.11 book value while antidumping tariffs redirect market share toward Western producers.
• The cheapness has a cause: four consecutive quarterly losses totaling a $460 million trailing net loss, negative free cash flow, and $3.2 billion of net debt against a $976 million market cap, with even mid-cycle operating income covering interest only about 1.1 times.
• Watch the August 5 second-quarter report against guidance of $65 to $85 million in adjusted EBITDA, with TiO2 and zircon pricing expected up mid-single digits on announced increases and surcharges.

Bull Case

Here is the number that does not fit the story: in the worst titanium dioxide downturn in years, with the company posting quarterly losses, revenue rose 3% year over year in the March quarter to $760 million on higher TiO2 and zircon volumes. Volumes growing through a trough means share is moving, and it is moving for a policy reason: antidumping tariffs on Chinese TiO2 have now been implemented across multiple jurisdictions, including measures in Saudi Arabia and Brazil that Tronox itself pursued, and management credited improving share in tariff-protected regions for stronger-than-expected volumes. Meanwhile pricing inflected during the first quarter, with additional increases and cost surcharges rolling into the second, and both TiO2 and zircon prices are expected up mid-single digits, supporting guidance for adjusted EBITDA of $65 to $85 million versus $62 million just printed.

The self-help is structural rather than cosmetic. Tronox closed its Fuzhou pigment plant in China and is idling the 90,000-ton Botlek plant in the Netherlands, targeting about $30 million of annual savings from Botlek alone, removing high-cost capacity exactly as the industry consolidates around the tariff walls. What remains is the asset the market is not paying for: vertical integration from titanium mineral mines through pigment, the "business processes that allow us to maximize the benefit of our vertical integration and global footprint" in the filing's words, which means Tronox keeps the miner's margin its unintegrated competitors pay away. The geographic mix adds a quiet growth line, with the United Kingdom operations growing revenue 63.8% over roughly three years to a third of the total.

The entry price prices almost none of this. At $6.14 the stock trades at a third of annual sales and below its $8.11 book value per share, and the valuation methods anchored to assets, demonstrated earnings power, and peer multiples all land at or far above the price, with peer-multiple approaches supporting several times the current quote. Unwound into assumptions, today's price implies operating income declining about 1.9% a year from mid-cycle levels; the business needs less than a 1% long-run operating margin to justify it against the roughly 7.7% it earns through the cycle. The bull case is not that Tronox becomes a great business. It is that the cycle turns before the balance sheet matters, and the market is paying trough prices for mid-cycle assets.

Bear Case

The structural truth is that this stock is cheap because the business is losing money and owes $3.2 billion. Four consecutive quarters of losses, per-share deficits of $0.53, $0.63, $1.11, and $0.65, add up to a trailing net loss of $460 million; free cash flow ran negative $270 million over the same period; and net debt of $3.2 billion stands more than three times the entire $976 million market value of the equity. Trailing EBITDA of roughly $70 million means the debt currently towers over the cash generation meant to service it, and even on normalized mid-cycle operating income the interest bill is covered only about 1.1 times. The dividend has already given its verdict, with the common rate now running at $0.20 annualized against $0.35 declared for the last fiscal year.

What is deteriorating has a named cause the filing states outright: the industry is "characterized by excessive production capacity, particularly in China". The tariff shield now redirecting share is policy, not moat; antidumping duties can lapse, be circumvented through re-routing, or be traded away in broader negotiations, and the underlying Chinese capacity does not disappear because the West taxed it. Demand sits on the other side of the vise, since TiO2 is a coatings input levered to housing and construction cycles that remain soft. Even the quarter management called an inflection produced a 5.8% gross margin and an operating loss, and the restructuring that supports the recovery math carried $15 million of charges in the quarter for the Botlek and Fuzhou closures.

The clock is the balance sheet. The composite distress gauge sits deep in its warning zone, and the equity here is effectively an option on the cycle turning before refinancing terms do. The 10-K's own liquidity discussion notes that a significant portion of liquidity is "concentrated in trade accounts receivable that arise from sales of our products to customers", working capital that tightens exactly when customers slow. Tellingly, the one valuation family that says the stock is expensive is the one that discounts actual forward cash flows, because there currently are none to discount. Cheap-on-assets with negative cash flow and 3-to-1 debt-to-equity-value is the classic shape of a value trap, and the only thing that distinguishes it from a bargain is timing the bull does not control.

Valuation

Two versions of Tronox's earnings exist, and the valuation question is which one is the business. The trailing four quarters show an operating loss, depressed by the trough; the framework therefore normalizes to the company's own through-cycle margins on current revenue, roughly $226 million of mid-cycle operating income. On that basis, $6.14 (July 10, 2026) pays about 19x mid-cycle operating income and implies operating income declining about 1.9% a year for five years. The margin requirement is nearly nothing: about 0.8% long-run against the roughly 7.7% the business earns mid-cycle. The market, in short, is pricing permanent semi-decline for a cyclical at its trough.

The method families split along exactly the trough-versus-normal line. Asset-based methods put the price at 0.8x their read and earnings-power methods at 0.6x, both saying the stock trades below what the assets and normalized profits support, and peer multiples land far above the price, at roughly five times it. Only the cash-flow-based growth family calls the price expensive, at 1.8x, because it discounts what the business is actually generating right now, which is negative. That spread is the whole bet: buyers of the value families' read are underwriting the filing's vertical integration, the mines-to-pigment chain that lets Tronox "maximize the benefit of our vertical integration and global footprint", returning to mid-cycle economics against an industry the same filing admits is "characterized by excessive production capacity, particularly in China".

Solvency is the constraint that keeps the discount honest. Net debt of $3.2 billion against a $976 million market cap means the enterprise is mostly a bond, mid-cycle operating income covers interest only about 1.1 times, and the trailing year burned $270 million of free cash. The common dividend runs at $0.20 annualized, a 3.3% yield, already down from the $0.35 declared last fiscal year, and $56 million of total cash dividends including preferred still went out the door against negative free cash flow. The equity works if pricing recovers on the tariff-assisted schedule management guided; it is impaired if the trough runs longer than the credit does. The price, at a third of sales, is the market splitting that difference.

Catalysts

The dated event is August 5, when Tronox reports second-quarter results against specific guidance: adjusted EBITDA of $65 to $85 million, up from $62 million in the first quarter, on TiO2 and zircon pricing expected to rise in the mid-single digits from announced increases and cost-related surcharges. The first quarter framed the test, with revenue up 3% to $760 million on higher volumes but a $103 million net loss including $15 million of restructuring charges for the Botlek and Fuzhou plant closures. Management called the quarter a pricing inflection; August shows whether the increases actually stuck through the seasonally important coatings season.

The policy and restructuring threads run through year-end. Antidumping measures on Chinese TiO2 continue to spread, with duties implemented in Saudi Arabia and Brazil following earlier actions elsewhere, and each new jurisdiction shifts share toward Western producers while the closures of the Fuzhou plant and the 90,000-ton Botlek facility, the latter targeting about $30 million of annual savings, take high-cost supply out of Tronox's own network. The balance-sheet arithmetic is the standing catalyst in both directions: with $3.2 billion of net debt, every quarter of EBITDA recovery disproportionately moves the equity, and every quarter of delay tightens the coverage math. The board declared the second-quarter dividend at the reduced rate, so the payout signal to watch is simply whether it survives further quarters of negative free cash flow.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Tronox (TiO2, whole company) (reported)

• EMN (EASTMAN CHEMICAL CO)
• FY2025 10-K: …expenses, other components of post-employment (benefit) cost, net, and other (income) charges, net. (2) Other is not considered an operating segment. Other includes sales and costs from growth initiatives and businesses, R&D costs, pension and other postretirement benefit plans income (expense), net, and other income…
• FY2025 10-K: …to Appendix A of the Company's 2021 Annual Meeting Proxy Statement dated March 25, 2021 as amended on April 13, 2021) ** 10.19 Amended 2021 Director Stock Compensation Subplan of the 2021 Omnibus Stock Compensation Plan and Form of Restricted Stock Award Notice (incorporated herein by reference to Exhibit 10.01 to…
• WLK (Westlake Corporation)
• FY2025 10-K: …Agreement dated as of June 9, 2022, by and among Westlake Corporation, the lenders from time to time party thereto, the issuing banks party thereto and JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, as Administrative Agent, relating to a $1.5 billion senior unsecured revolving credit facility (incorporated by reference…
• FY2025 10-K: (2) 3,396,853 ______________________________ (1) Includes shares reserved for issuance pursuant to restricted stock units, stock options and performance stock units. (2) Price applies only to the stock options included in column (a). Exercise price is not applicable to the other awards included in column (a). Other…
• ALB (Albemarle Corporation)
• FY2025 10-K: …of technical and battery-grade lithium hydroxide Owned Greenbushes, Australia (b) Production of lithium spodumene minerals and lithium concentrate Owned (e) Kemerton, Australia (c) Production of technical and battery-grade lithium hydroxide Owned Kings Mountain, NC Production of technical and battery-grade lithium…
• FY2025 10-K: …dated March 30, 2021, among Albemarle Corporation, Albemarle New Holding GmbH, and U.S. Bank National Association, as trustee [filed as Exhibit 4.1 to the Company's Current Report on Form 8-K (No. 1-12658) filed on March 31, 2021, and incorporated herein by reference]. 4.6 Form of Global Security for the 5.450%…
• HUN (Huntsman Corporation)
• FY2025 10-K: 12 chemical companies whose valuations are influenced by similar financial measures and against whom we compete for market share and investor capital ("2025 Performance Peers"). The comparison assumes $100 was invested on December 31, 2020 in our common stock as well as in the S&P 500 Index and our 2025 Performance…
• FY2025 10-K: …Anhydride Manufacturing Facility Ashtabula, Ohio Advanced Materials Formulating and Synthesis Facility Duxford, U.K. Advanced Materials Formulating and Synthesis Facility McIntosh, Alabama Advanced Materials Formulating and Synthesis Facility Monthey, Switzerland Advanced Materials Formulating and Synthesis Facility…
• CE (CELANESE CORPORATION)
• FY2025 10-K: ® , Tarnoform ® , Tecnoprene ® , TufCOR ® , Tynex ® , Vamac ® , VAntage ® , Vectra ® , Vinac ® , Vinamul ® , VitalDose ® , Zenite ® , Zytel ® and certain other branded products and services named in this document are registered or reserved trademarks or service marks owned or licensed by Celanese. The foregoing is not…
• FY2025 10-K: Yncoris GmbH & Co. KG 22 Intellectual Property We attach importance to protecting our intellectual property, including safeguarding our confidential information and through our patents, trademarks and copyrights, in order to preserve our investment in research and development, manufacturing and marketing. Patents may…
• OLN (Olin Corporation)
• FY2025 10-K: …selling, general and administrative expenses and earnings (losses) from non-consolidated affiliates. Segment assets include only those assets which are directly identifiable to an operating segment. Assets in the corporate/other segment primarily include cash and cash equivalents, deferred taxes and other assets.…
• FY2025 10-K: …28, 2020 * 3.2 Bylaws of Olin Corporation as amended effective August 13, 2025-Exhibit 3.1 to Olin's Form 8-K filed August 13, 2025 * 4.1 Description of Olin Corporation Securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act-Exhibit 4.1 to Olin's Form 10-K filed February 20, 2025 * 4.2 Indenture dated as of…
• CBT (Cabot Corporation)
• FY2025 10-K: …impact of our relationship with Dow on our operations in Barry, Wales, and demand for our products; the sufficiency of our cash on hand, cash provided from operations and cash available under our credit and commercial paper facilities to fund our cash requirements in both the next twelve months and the foreseeable…
• FY2025 10-K: …in the table below are based on market prices as of September 30, 2025 which may differ from actual market prices at the time of purchase. The Company has also entered into long-term purchase agreements primarily for services related to information technology, which are included in Other in the table below. Payments…
• AVNT (AVIENT CORPORATION)
• FY2025 10-K: Corporation, the subsidiaries of Avient Corporation party thereto, the existing lenders under the Term Loan Agreement, Citibank, N.A, as administrative agent, and Truist Bank, as the Amendment No. 10 Additional Term Lender (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 10.1 to the Company's Current Report on Form 8-K, filed…
• FY2025 10-K: …or identify all risk factors. Consequently, you should not consider any such list to be a complete set of all potential risks or uncertainties. 1 AVIENT CORPORATION ITEM 1. BUSINESS Business Overview We are an innovator of materials solutions to help our customers succeed, while enabling a sustainable world. Our…

Methodology Note

• Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
• Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
• Economic-unit decomposition (SOTP): each disclosed business unit is assigned its native valuation basis before any multiple is applied. Operating units are valued on enterprise value; funded financial units are valued on their own common equity, because their borrowings fund earning assets rather than levering the parent. A company total is stated only once every material unit carries a supported value and the parent capital bridge reconciles.
• Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
• Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.