HANOVER INSURANCE GROUP, INC. (THG): what the price requires
At today's price, HANOVER INSURANCE GROUP, INC. (THG) is priced for 13.7% return on equity. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/THG
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | THG |
| Company | HANOVER INSURANCE GROUP, INC. |
| Sector / Industry | Financial Services / Insurance |
| Current price | $216.49/sh |
| Composition | Core Commercial 37% / Specialty 23% / Personal Lines 41% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | financials |
| Return on equity needed | 13.7% |
| Return on equity now | 18.5% |
| ROE gap | -4.8pp |
| Price-to-book | 2.12x |
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.6% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage, on common book equity (FY2026); each 1pp of cost of equity moves the implied ROE ~2.1pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +1.13σ |
| cohort percentile (of 80 peers) | 59 |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 64% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.00x | 3 | justifies |
| Earnings | 0.67x | 2 | justifies |
| Relative | 0.87x | 3 | justifies |
| Growth | 1.26x | 1 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.4%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=9)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Bank Fair Value (P/TBV) | — | $337.81 | 0.64x | yes | TBVPS $94.47 × 3.58x (ROE (TTM) 20.2% / CoE 9.3%, g=5.0% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption)) |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $248.06 | 0.87x | yes | P/E 11x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 9.2x / 11.0x / 12.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 10x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $217.15 | 1.00x | yes | BV/sh $99.45, ROE (TTM) 20.2%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $317.71 | 0.68x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $172.45 | 1.26x | yes | Rev $6.7B, growth 6% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.0x / 1.2x / 1.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $238.32 | 0.91x | yes | EPS $19.86, growth 1% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=10.12 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | $210.81 | 1.03x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $19.86 × BVPS $99.45) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $640.82 | 0.34x | yes | EPS $19.86 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $744.75 | 0.29x | yes | EPS $19.86 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $214.70 | 1.01x | yes | EPS $19.86 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -0.1% |
Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).
Bullet Takeaways
- Hanover just printed first-quarter records on both sides of the underwriting ledger, a 91.7% combined ratio and 85.4% excluding catastrophes, with the FY2025 10-K showing Specialty underwriting profit of $197.3 million as the fastest-compounding piece of the franchise.
- The cyclical trap is the specific risk: the price assumes a sustained return on equity of about 13.7% while the company currently earns around 18.5%, so the question is not whether Hanover is good today but whether record-cycle underwriting margins mean-revert before the multiple adjusts.
- Watch the July 28, 2026 second-quarter report and the pace of the new $700 million buyback, which covers roughly 9% of the market value at today's price.
Bull Case
A screen reads Hanover as an ordinary cheap insurer, 10.7x trailing earnings against an 11x sector median, and stops there. What the multiple misses is what the company has been quietly building underneath it. The FY2025 10-K describes it directly: "We have developed a robust, diversified and profitable Specialty segment that we believe represents a distinct competitive advantage, with nine dedicated businesses and 18 distinct product areas". That segment produced $197.3 million of underwriting profit in 2025, up $22.1 million from the prior year, while its catastrophe losses actually fell from $37.5 million to $34.1 million, and it entered 2026 running an 84.2% combined ratio. Specialty insurance is where underwriting skill, not commodity pricing, sets the margin, and Hanover's mix keeps shifting toward it.
The earnings trajectory is doing what a bull wants to see. Quarterly EPS marched from $4.30 to $4.90 to $5.46 to $5.20 over the last four quarters, with the March 2026 quarter up 48.6% year over year on revenue growth of 6.1%. First-quarter net income reached $186.8 million with operating return on equity of 20.3%, all three segments underwriting profitably, and net investment income up 19.6% to $126.9 million as the portfolio reprices into higher yields. The earnings-power reading agrees with the tape: the methods that simply capitalize what Hanover currently earns land above today's price, which is rare for a stock that just beat estimates by a wide margin.
Capital is coming back to holders at an accelerating clip. The board approved a fresh $700 million repurchase authorization in June, replacing a nearly exhausted program, on top of a $0.95 quarterly dividend that marks the twenty-second consecutive year of payments and the fifth straight annual raise. About 39.2% of earnings went back as dividends and buybacks in the latest fiscal year, leaving ample retention to fund growth, and the share count is already shrinking. A company earning around 18.5% on equity, priced as if it will earn 13.7%, that is also retiring its own shares, is compounding the gap in the holder's favor.
Bear Case
The valuation methods mostly defend this price, and that is precisely what should make a buyer careful about when they are buying. Asset-based, earnings-power, and peer-multiple frames all land at or above $213.90; only the forward-growth frame reads the price as slightly ahead of what it supports. But every one of those supportive readings capitalizes trailing earnings that were just described, by the company itself, as first-quarter records. Property and casualty insurance is a pricing cycle wearing a balance sheet, and combined ratios at record levels are the top of that cycle by definition. The conservative way to read a cheap multiple on record margins is that the market is not mispricing the company; it is pricing the reversion.
The 10-K is candid about the volatility underneath: "The incidence and severity of catastrophes are volatile and difficult to predict". The 2025 loss year included the California Palisades and Eaton wildfires, following a 2024 dominated by convective storms across the Midwest and hurricanes Helene and Beryl, per the filing's own accounting of its catastrophe experience. The reinsurance backstop has real limits; the filing describes the 2025 catastrophe agreement as providing up to $200 million of coverage through June 30, 2028. Two other supports under current earnings deserve attention: reported results benefited from $70.4 million of net favorable development on prior years' reserves in 2025 per the 10-K, a tailwind that exists only until it doesn't, and net investment income growth of 19.6% rides a rate environment the company does not control.
The priced-in requirement is modest but not free. Sustaining a roughly 13.7% return on equity for years puts Hanover in company where only about 64% of comparable earners held that level for a decade, and the balance sheet runs at about 4.6x equity, standard insurance leverage that amplifies both good and bad underwriting years. The sell side has started to split on exactly this question, with BMO downgrading to Market Perform on May 19, 2026 even as others raised targets. If pricing softens across commercial lines while catastrophe frequency stays elevated, the record margins compress, the reserve releases fade, and a 2.1x book multiple, upper half of the peer group, has to be defended by an ROE moving in the wrong direction.
Valuation
An insurer's price is a statement about the return it will earn on its capital. At $213.90 (July 11, 2026), the market pays about 2.1x book value, which works out to an assumed sustained return on equity of roughly 13.7%. Hanover has recently been earning about 18.5%, so the price is asking for less than the company currently delivers, a cushion most richly priced financials do not have. The assumption sits within reach of its own record and in the upper half of the peer group on price-to-book; among firms earning at this level, about 64% sustained it for a decade. The bet is not heroic. It is a bet that a very good underwriting stretch is mostly structural rather than mostly cyclical.
The methods read the same price generously. Asset-based and peer-multiple approaches land right around it, the earnings-power frame lands above it, and only the growth-crediting frame reads the price as modestly ahead of support. At 10.7x trailing earnings against an 11x sector median, with the filing-level inputs underneath it, Specialty underwriting profit of $197.3 million in 2025 per the FY2025 10-K, and $70.4 million of favorable prior-year reserve development supporting the reported loss ratio, the valuation carries no optionality premium to defend. What it does carry is earnings-quality sensitivity: the reserve tailwind and record combined ratios are inside the trailing numbers every supportive method capitalizes.
The balance-sheet frame for an insurer is capital and payout rather than net debt, and Hanover's is straightforward: about 39.2% of earnings returned as dividends and buybacks in the latest fiscal year, a $0.95 quarterly dividend running twenty-two consecutive years, a fresh $700 million repurchase authorization, and a falling share count. Debt is modest at 0.24x equity, issued at fixed rates between 2.50% and 8.207% per the 10-K. The decisive variable is the combined ratio: at the current 91.7% the price is comfortably supported, and each point of reversion toward the industry's ordinary cycle takes a bite out of the return-on-equity assumption the multiple rests on.
Catalysts
Second-quarter results are expected July 28, 2026, and they carry a specific comparison burden: the first quarter set records with a 91.7% combined ratio, 85.4% excluding catastrophes, and $5.20 of diluted EPS, up from $3.50 a year earlier. The second quarter is seasonally the heavy convective-storm period, the same weather pattern the 10-K blames for the elevated 2024 loss year, so the ex-catastrophe margin and the Personal Lines result will say more about the franchise than the headline number. Net premiums written grew 3.2% to $1,559.7 million in the first quarter; whether growth accelerates as the new business pipeline builds is the other axis to watch.
Capital deployment is the second live thread. The board approved a $700 million repurchase authorization in June 2026, terminating the prior program with roughly $63 million remaining, and the pace of buying against a $7.68 billion market value will show up in share count within a couple of quarters. The $0.95 quarterly dividend was paid June 26. Analyst positioning has diverged into the print: Piper Sandler lifted its target from $212 to $220 on May 26, 2026, while BMO Capital downgraded to Market Perform on May 19, a split that maps exactly onto the peak-margin question. Rate movements matter on both sides of the house, since a 19.6% jump in net investment income was a meaningful part of the first-quarter beat and softening commercial pricing would pressure the underwriting side through 2026.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core Commercial (reported)
- SIGI (SELECTIVE INSURANCE GROUP, INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- WRB (W. R. BERKLEY CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CNA (CNA FINANCIAL CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CINF (CINCINNATI FINANCIAL CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- HIG (The Hartford Insurance Group, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TRV (Travelers Companies, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AFG (AMERICAN FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Specialty (reported)
- WRB (W. R. BERKLEY CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AFG (AMERICAN FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MKL (MARKEL GROUP INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- RLI (RLI Corp)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- KNSL (KINSALE CAPITAL GROUP, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ACGL (Arch Capital Group Ltd.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Personal Lines (reported)
- MCY (MERCURY GENERAL CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- KMPR (Kemper Corporation)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- HMN (HORACE MANN EDUCATORS CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CINF (CINCINNATI FINANCIAL CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ALL (ALLSTATE CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TRV (Travelers Companies, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 2026 earnings release · Q1 2026 earnings release, April 2026 · Investing.com, June 2026 · dividend declaration coverage, May 2026 · analyst coverage, May 2026 · dividend declaration, May 2026