TENET HEALTHCARE CORP (THC): what the price assumes
boothcheck covers TENET HEALTHCARE CORP (THC) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-11.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/THC
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | THC |
| Company | TENET HEALTHCARE CORP |
| Sector / Industry | Healthcare |
| Current price | $261.83/sh |
| Composition | Hospital Operations - Medicare 10% / Hospital Operations - Medicaid 7% / Hospital Operations - Managed care 46% / Hospital Operations - Uninsured 0% / Hospital Operations - Indemnity and other 3% / Hospital Operations - Other revenues 10% / Ambulatory Care 24% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 13.0% |
| Operating margin today | 20.8% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -7.8pp |
| Multiple paid | 7x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.93σ |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 0.64x | 5 | justifies |
| Earnings | 0.93x | 5 | justifies |
| Relative | 0.40x | 5 | justifies |
| Growth | 1.00x | 2 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=17)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $404.99 | 0.65x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 4.1x / 6.1x / 8.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $592.58 | 0.44x | yes | P/E 13.57x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 7x), scenarios: 11.3x / 13.6x / 15.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $408.67 | 0.64x | yes | BV/sh $55.48, ROE (TTM) 68.1%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $1637.33 | 0.16x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $193.36 | 1.35x | yes | Rev $21.8B, growth 5% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.8x / 1.0x / 1.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $907.55 | 0.29x | yes | EPS $25.93, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.20 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $420.95 | 0.62x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $3.79B × (1−21%) / WACC 6.2% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $676.67 | 0.39x | yes | BV $55.48 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 68.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $179.91 | 1.46x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $25.93 × BVPS $55.48) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $644.40 | 0.41x | yes | EBITDA $5.43B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $257.29 | 1.02x | yes | FCF $3023.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $240.29 | 1.09x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $2.89B (FCF $3.02B − SBC $0.13B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $836.67 | 0.31x | yes | EPS $25.93 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $67.11 | 3.90x | yes | BV $55.48 × (ROIC 7.5% / WACC 6.2%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $649.45 | 0.40x | yes | Revenue $21.81B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $972.38 | 0.27x | yes | EPS $25.93 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $280.32 | 0.93x | yes | EPS $25.93 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $11.5b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 3.22x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 2.54x |
| Interest coverage | 5.5x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -6.3% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- The number that defines Tenet is the ambulatory margin: its USPI surgery-center business generated a 36.7 percent adjusted EBITDA margin in the first quarter of 2026 on $484 million of adjusted EBITDA, a returns profile that reframes the whole company from levered hospital operator to surgery-center compounder.
- The persistent risk is reimbursement: the 10-K notes that a large share of Hospital Operations revenue comes "from the Medicare program and various state Medicaid programs", which are subject to statutory and regulatory change the company cannot control.
- Watch capital allocation and deleveraging: management is prioritizing buybacks at current valuations, repurchased $318 million of stock in the quarter, and reaffirmed full-year 2026 adjusted EBITDA guidance of $4.485 to $4.785 billion.
Bull Case
One metric organizes the entire Tenet thesis: the 36.7 percent adjusted EBITDA margin its USPI ambulatory-surgery arm posted in the first quarter of 2026. That is not a hospital margin. Hospitals run high fixed costs and thin returns; ambulatory surgery centers, where physicians co-own the facility and steer higher-acuity cases through it, earn like specialty operators. USPI produced $484 million of adjusted EBITDA in the quarter, up 6 percent year over year, and the 10-K describes the structure that makes it durable: the segment operates "through the formation of joint ventures with physicians and/or health system partners," with USPI holding ownership and running the facilities day to day. The physician is a partner, not a vendor, which is why the volume keeps coming.
The operating results underneath are strong across both segments. First quarter net operating revenues reached $5.4 billion with consolidated adjusted EBITDA of $1.16 billion at a 21.6 percent margin, and adjusted diluted EPS of $4.82 beat expectations by roughly 16 percent. The mix is shifting exactly where the margin is best: USPI net operating revenues grew 10.6 percent, and the company reported double-digit same-store volume growth in total joint replacements within its surgery centers, the higher-acuity procedures that carry more revenue per case. This is a business moving up the acuity curve on purpose.
The capital story turns the cheap valuation into an engine. Tenet generates significant free cash flow, has deleveraged to the point of no major debt maturities until 2027, and is now pointing that cash at its own shares: $318 million repurchased in the first quarter, with management explicitly prioritizing buybacks at current valuations. The share count has already fallen about 6 percent a year over four years, the fastest retirement pace of any name a value investor is likely to find at 7 times operating income. When a business earning a 55 percent return on equity trades this far below its own cash-flow value and spends that cash buying stock, every repurchased share compounds the discount into per-share value.
Bear Case
A hospital company priced at 7 times operating income is not cheap by accident; the market is discounting something, and here the something is policy. The uncomfortable qualitative truth is that Tenet does not set its own prices. The 10-K states that much of its Hospital Operations revenue comes "from the Medicare program and various state Medicaid programs," and that those programs are subject to "statutory and regulatory changes, administrative and judicial rulings, executive" action, adding that the company "cannot predict the impact healthcare policy risks and uncertainties may have on the trading price of our common stock." A single adverse reimbursement change, a Medicaid rate cut, a shift in the payer mix, hits the largest and lowest-margin part of the business first, and the low multiple is the market pricing that tail rather than mispricing the company.
The balance sheet is the second reason the discount persists. Net debt of $10.7 billion sits against interest coverage of about 4.7 times, and interest expense ran about $821 million over the trailing period per the 10-K's own reconciliation. That leverage is serviceable while volumes and margins hold, but it is real: a hospital operator with $13.7 billion of gross debt has far less room to absorb a demand or reimbursement shock than an unlevered peer, and the aggressive buyback, funded rather than deleveraging further, is a choice to lean into the equity rather than the debt. In a downturn that preference reverses fast.
Even granting all of that, note where the bear actually has to stand. Nearly every valuation family reads the stock as cheap, not expensive, so this is not an overvaluation case; it is a case about why the market may rightly discount. The honest bear is narrow: the earnings are real but partly cyclical and policy-exposed, the leverage amplifies any miss, and the two operating segments serve different economics, so a blended read flatters the hospital half. If reimbursement tightens or acuity-driven volume growth slows, the same low multiple that looks like a bargain becomes a value trap, cheap because of exposures that are structural rather than temporary.
Valuation
The unusual thing about Tenet's valuation is not a gap between price and value; it is that almost every method agrees the price is low and the market has kept it there anyway. At $204.14 (July 10, 2026) the price sits below the earnings-power read, below the peer-multiple read, below the asset and book-value-plus-profitability reads, and roughly at the forward-growth read. Inverted, the price pays about 7 times operating income, a multiple so low it sits below what even a 5 percent-a-year operating-profit decline would warrant. That is a bound, not a forecast: the market is not paying for growth, it is paying for less than steady-state, which for a business posting a 55 percent trailing return on equity is a strong statement about perceived risk rather than about earnings power.
The reason the methods cluster below the price is the quality of the trailing numbers. Free cash flow of about $3.35 billion capitalized with no growth already lands well above the price; normalized earnings power does the same. The single lens that reaches up toward the price is the discounted future market-cap read, which is what happens when a low-multiple, cash-generative business is measured against modest forward growth. The blend of two different businesses complicates the read: the Hospital Operations segment carries the reimbursement and leverage exposure, while USPI's ambulatory segment, at a 36.7 percent margin, deserves a materially higher multiple than the consolidated 7 times implies. A sum-of-the-parts investor would price the surgery-center franchise well above where the whole company trades.
Solvency is the load-bearing constraint on the discount. Net debt of $10.7 billion is about 2.8 times trailing operating income on a pre-tax basis, interest is covered about 4.7 times, the company is not burning cash, and there are no major maturities until 2027. Against that backdrop the share count has fallen about 6 percent a year over four years, so the capital-return math is doing what a low multiple invites: converting a persistent discount into per-share value one buyback at a time. What the price rests on is not a growth assumption but a judgment about whether the reimbursement and leverage risks the low multiple encodes actually materialize.
Catalysts
The reported quarter set the near-term tone. On April 30, 2026 Tenet posted first-quarter net operating revenues of $5.4 billion, consolidated adjusted EBITDA of $1.16 billion at a 21.6 percent margin, and adjusted diluted EPS of $4.82 against roughly $4.16 expected, a nearly 16 percent beat. USPI carried the mix, with net operating revenues up 10.6 percent and $484 million of adjusted EBITDA at a 36.7 percent margin. Management reaffirmed full-year 2026 adjusted EBITDA guidance of $4.485 to $4.785 billion, so the next two prints are read against that range and against same-facility volume trends, particularly the double-digit total-joint-replacement growth in the surgery centers.
Capital allocation is the more distinctive catalyst. The company repurchased 1.35 million shares for $318 million in the quarter and has said it will prioritize buybacks at current valuations, supported by free cash flow and a balance sheet with no major maturities until 2027. Alongside that, it plans roughly $250 million a year of USPI acquisitions and had already committed about half of the 2026 target through seven surgery-center purchases in the first quarter. The pace of both, buyback dollars and ASC deals, is the signal to watch, because they are how a business trading at 7 times operating income converts its own discount into shareholder value. On the risk side of the calendar, any federal or state reimbursement developments remain the exogenous variable that moves the Hospital Operations segment most.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- HCA (HCA Healthcare, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …in licensure or other regulations and recognition of new provider types or payment models could also impact our competitive position. If our competitors are better able to attract patients, make capital expenditures and maintain modern and technologically upgraded facilities and equipment, recruit physicians, expand…
- FY2025 10-K: …We believe our hospitals and other facilities compete within local communities on the basis of many factors, including the quality of care, ability to attract and retain quality physicians, skilled clinical personnel and other health care professionals, location, breadth of services, technology offered and quality…
- UHS (UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …in operations and capital expenditures is, therefore, highly competitive in these states. In those states that do not have CON laws or which set relatively high levels of expenditures before they become reviewable by state authorities, competition in the form of new services, facilities and capital spending is more…
- FY2025 10-K: …In all of the geographical areas in which we operate, there are other facilities that provide services comparable to those offered by our facilities. In addition, some of our competitors include hospitals that are owned by tax-supported governmental agencies or by nonprofit corporations and may be supported by…
- ARDT (Ardent Health, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …subject to various federal, state and local statutes and ordinances regulating their operation. Management does not believe that compliance with such statutes and ordinances will materially adversely affect our financial position or results of operations. Competition The hospital industry is highly competitive, and…
- FY2025 10-K: …including its geographic coverage, and access to patients. A location convenient to a large population of potential patients or a wide geographic coverage area through a hospital network can significantly benefit an acute care hospital's competitive position. Another important factor is the scope and quality of…
- SGRY (Surgery Partners, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …we compete with hospitals and operators of other surgical facilities to attract physicians and patients. We believe that the competitive factors that affect our surgical facilities' ability to compete for physicians are convenience of location of the surgical facilities, quality of care offered, convenience of…
- FY2025 10-K: …in multiple markets, each with a different competitive landscape, shifts within our payor mix or case mix may not be uniform across all of our affiliated facilities. Rather, these shifts may be concentrated within certain markets due to local competitive factors. In addition, we are unable to predict the results of…
- SEM (SELECT MEDICAL HOLDINGS CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …Competition Critical Illness Recovery Hospitals and Rehabilitation Hospitals Our critical illness recovery hospitals and our rehabilitation hospitals both compete on the basis of the quality of the patient services we provide, the outcomes we achieve for our patients, and the prices we charge for our services. The…
- FY2025 10-K: …illness recovery hospital, rehabilitation hospital, and outpatient rehabilitation businesses, our ability to retain customers and physicians, or maintain or increase our revenue growth, price flexibility, control over medical cost trends, and marketing expenses may be compromised and our revenue and profitability may…
- EHC (Encompass Health Corporation)
- FY2025 10-K: …contract labor. See Item 1A, Risk Factors , for further discussion of competition for staffing, shortages of qualified personnel, and other factors that may increase our labor costs and constrain our ability to take new patients. We remain confident in the prospects of our business based on the increasing demands for…
- FY2025 10-K: …competition from local or national entities with longer operating histories or other competitive advantages, such as acute-care hospitals who provide post-acute services similar to ours or other post-acute providers with relationships with referring acute-care hospitals or physicians. Aggressive payment review…
- DVA (DAVITA INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …and operations in light of evolving marketplace dynamics or broader changes to the regulatory landscape, including changes related to the antitrust and competitive environment or changes resulting from new business activities in the dialysis or pre-dialysis space by our existing competitors, other market…
- FY2025 10-K: , regulations and other requirements...;" and "We are subject to risks associated with our participation in government healthcare programs." Medicare Advantage revenue Medicare Advantage (MA, managed Medicare or Medicare Part C) plans are offered by private health insurers who contract with CMS to provide their…
- FMS (FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE AG)
- FY2025 20-F: … Segment and corporate information in € K Care Care Total Inter-segment Delivery Value-Based Care Enablement Segment eliminations Corporate Total 2025 Revenue from healthcare…
- FY2025 20-F: …Corporate (Corporate). Interest income, interest expense, and tax expense are neither included within the measure of segment profit or loss reviewed by the chief operating decision maker nor otherwise regularly provided to the chief operating decision maker by segment and are therefore not included in the presented…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 2026 results, April 2026