TELEFLEX INCORPORATED (TFX): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $136.94, TELEFLEX INCORPORATED (TFX) is priced for +7.1% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-11.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/TFX

Headline

FieldValue
TickerTFX
CompanyTELEFLEX INCORPORATED
Sector / IndustryHealthcare
Current price$136.94/sh
CompositionVascular 46% / Interventional 33% / Surgical 21% / Other 0%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)9.9%
Operating margin (mid-cycle)16.6%
Margin compression (value-band)-6.7pp
Trailing margin (depressed year)3.0%
Implied growth7.1%
Multiple paid25x mid-cycle operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~8.5pp.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~23.1%/yr; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.43σ
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.07x2expensive
Earnings3.57x1expensive
Relative0.71x3justifies
Growth1.07x2expensive

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=8)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$0.00noNegative/zero FCF — equity value floored at $0
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$0.00noNegative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0
Relative ValuationRelative$192.220.71xyesP/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 4.0x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$69.691.96xyesBook value floor: BV/sh $69.69, ROE negative
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$62.722.18xyesBook value with convergence: BV/sh $69.69, ROE converges to ke
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$175.120.78xyesRev $2.1B, growth 25% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.3x / 2.8x / 3.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$0.00noNegative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0
Margin TrajectoryGrowth$100.511.36xyesMargin ramp: -47% → 12% over 7yr, rev growth 25% (input: historical growth; tapered)
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$38.333.57xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.35B × (1−21%) / WACC 6.6% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAssetno
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$38.223.58xyesEBITDA $0.26B × sector EV/EBITDA 16.0x
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsno
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$3.0445.05xyesBV $69.69 × (ROIC 0.3% / WACC 6.6%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelative$192.220.71xyesRevenue $2.13B × sector P/S 4.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarningsno
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$2.4b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)8.75x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)6.91x
Interest coverage3.3x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-1.7%
Burning cashno

Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 16.6%); the trailing year was depressed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Follow the capital and the company's view of where value lives becomes unusually explicit. Teleflex paid a net initial $825.2 million for Biotronik's vascular intervention business in the third quarter of 2025, adding drug-coated balloons, stents, and catheters to an interventional line the FY2025 10-K describes as "a diverse portfolio of coronary catheters, structural heart support devices" built for the cath lab. At the same time it agreed to sell three businesses that never fit that story: the OEM unit to Montagu and Kohlberg for roughly $1.5 billion, and Acute Care plus Interventional Urology to Intersurgical for $530 million, about $1.8 billion net of tax in combined proceeds. Buy the category with procedure growth, sell the slower ones, use the proceeds to repair the balance sheet. Portfolio surgery, performed on itself.

The early evidence supports the direction. Americas net revenues rose from $1,156.9 million in 2024 to $1,279.2 million in 2025 per the 10-K's segment results, and management expects the acquired vascular products to deliver constant currency growth of 6 percent or better beginning in 2026. The international engine was already running: EMEA, roughly 38 percent of revenue, has compounded around 5.5 percent a year over recent years, with Asia close behind near 6 percent. On the first quarter call, management pointed to improving momentum in the second half of 2026 as the Biotronik integration expands the company's cath-lab presence and cross-selling starts to register. This is also a company its rivals treat as a fixture: Merit Medical's own 10-K names Teleflex first among its primary competitors, ahead of Cook Medical, Medtronic, Boston Scientific, and Becton Dickinson.

The quiet tell is capital returned while the reshape was underway. The share count has declined about 1.7 percent a year over the past four years, so holders have been accumulating a slightly larger claim on the business through the noisiest stretch of its restructuring. And the bet the price asks for is not heroic. At about 24 times mid-cycle operating income, the market wants roughly 6.8 percent annual operating growth for five years, a pace within the range the business has recently delivered. On revenue, meanwhile, the price sits at about half what sector sales multiples would defend, so a recovery toward the company's own 16.6 percent through-cycle margin does the heavy lifting without requiring any re-rating of the sales the company already books. If the divestitures close on schedule and the interventional mix grows into its margin, the requirement starts to look ordinary.

Bear Case

The advantage being chipped away is pricing power over the hospital customer. Teleflex's own 10-K concedes where the leverage sits: adverse reimbursement decisions can discourage customers from selecting its products, and group purchasers act "as a result of their purchasing power" to push prices down. Peer filings describe the same dynamic from the other side; Penumbra's 10-K notes that "Manufacturers of medical devices have a history of price competition". The erosion is visible in Teleflex's own ledger. The Interventional Urology North America unit absorbed a "$240.0 million non-tax deductible goodwill impairment charge" in 2024 before being marked for sale, and the North American vascular franchise, about a fifth of revenue, has been flat to slightly negative over three years. The businesses being divested are not spare parts; they are the parts that stopped defending their prices.

The valuation only works if the reader agrees to look past the reported numbers. Trailing operating income on the EDGAR quarterly series is negative, roughly $220 million below zero, dragged down by impairment and separation charges; the price instead capitalizes a through-cycle margin of 16.6 percent, near $466 million of normalized operating profit, at about 24 times, and asks for roughly 6.8 percent annual growth for five years. The rate is not exotic. The persistence is the stretch: five uninterrupted years of it from a company whose net cash provided by operating activities from continuing operations fell to $96.7 million in 2025 from $301.9 million a year earlier, per the 10-K's cash flow statement. If the growth does not persist, the multiple on normalized earnings compresses toward what the earnings-power and book-value lenses already say, and those sit at half the price or less.

The bridge to a repaired balance sheet runs through regulators and buyers, not just execution. Net debt is $2.4 billion against interest coverage of about 4.3 times, leverage that runs a bit over five times mid-cycle operating income, and the deleveraging plan leans on roughly $1.8 billion of net divestiture proceeds. The Federal Trade Commission issued a second request in March 2026 on the Acute Care and Interventional Urology sale, the kind of review that can delay a close or change its conditions. Smaller irritants stack on top: the 10-K discloses that a foreign tax authority denied the company's request in October 2025 to reassess previously filed returns tied to the Palette acquisition. None of these alone breaks the thesis. Together, against 4.3 times coverage and a first half spent absorbing an $825 million acquisition, they leave little room for the second half of 2026 to disappoint.

Valuation

Two versions of Teleflex's operating income exist at the moment, and the market has picked one. The trailing twelve months on the EDGAR quarterly series show operating income around negative $220 million, a figure dominated by impairment and separation charges rather than product economics; the company's segment ledger, which excludes those items, shows positive operating profit, and the FY2025 10-K presents results "on a continuing operations basis to reflect the impact of the Strategic Divestitures". At $135.63 (July 10, 2026) the price pays about 24 times mid-cycle operating income, applying the company's own 16.6 percent through-cycle margin to roughly $2.8 billion of trailing revenue, near $466 million of normalized operating profit. That price embeds roughly 6.8 percent annual operating growth sustained for about five years. The pace itself sits within what the business has recently delivered; the demand is that it persist.

The methods split along an unusual line. On revenue, the price looks cheap: sector price-to-sales reads land at roughly double today's price. On what that revenue currently earns, the price looks expensive: it sits about 2.7 times above the earnings-power read (normalized earnings capitalized with no growth credit), about double the book-value-based reads, and about 1.8 times what the EBITDA-at-sector-multiple lens defends. The one growth path that runs, a tapered revenue trajectory near 8 percent with the terminal sales multiple held flat at today's level, still lands about a fifth below the price. Read together, the pattern describes a margin-recovery bet. The market is not paying for growth the company lacks; it is paying for profitability the company used to have, on sales it already books, such as the Americas revenue the 10-K reports rising from $1,156.9 million in 2024 to $1,279.2 million in 2025.

The balance sheet can carry that bet, but with less slack than the sector norm. Net debt of $2.4 billion runs a bit over five times mid-cycle operating income on a pre-tax basis, interest is covered about 4.3 times, the company is not burning cash, and the share count has fallen about 1.7 percent a year over four years. The agreed divestitures, about $1.8 billion net of tax if both close, would reset that leverage in a single step, which is why the second-half 2026 closing calendar matters as much to this valuation as any quarterly print.

Catalysts

The second half of 2026 is where this story resolves or stalls. Teleflex reports second quarter results on July 30, 2026. Behind the print sit two closings: the OEM sale to Montagu and Kohlberg, roughly $1.5 billion and targeted to close in the third quarter of 2026, and the $530 million Acute Care and Interventional Urology sale to Intersurgical, expected in the second half. The second transaction has been under a Federal Trade Commission second request since March 2026, so the review's pace, not management's calendar, sets the real timeline. Roughly $1.8 billion of net proceeds and the resulting deleveraging hang on those dates.

The operational watch item is the Biotronik integration. Management has guided the acquired vascular intervention products to constant currency growth of 6 percent or better in 2026 and pointed to improving momentum in the second half as the expanded cath-lab presence opens cross-selling opportunities. First quarter growth leaned on the ligation clip line and some order timing in instruments, so the July print is the first clean test of whether the interventional thesis is producing organic acceleration rather than acquisition arithmetic. Commentary on tariffs and remediation costs, which management has flagged as variables for 2026 margins and leverage, will signal how much of the divestiture proceeds arrive intact.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Core business (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Teleflex press releases, 2025 · company disclosure, March 2026 · Teleflex FY2025 results release, February 2026 · Teleflex acquisition close release, 2025 · Teleflex divestiture announcement, 2025 · Teleflex FY2025 results, February 2026 · Q1 2026 earnings call, May 7, 2026 · company earnings calendar, July 2026 · Yahoo Finance divestiture preview, July 2026

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