TIDEWATER INC (TDW): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $77.42, TIDEWATER INC (TDW) is priced for +18.4% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-11.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/TDW

Headline

FieldValue
TickerTDW
CompanyTIDEWATER INC
Sector / IndustryIndustrials / Marine Shipping
Current price$77.43/sh
CompositionVessel revenues 99% / Other operating revenues 1%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)5.0%
Operating margin today19.8%
Margin compression (value-band)-14.8pp
Implied growth18.4%
Multiple paid17x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 5: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 10.5% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~6.5pp.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~10.7%/yr; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.02σ
cohort percentile (of 221 peers)28
sustained it ~5 years at this level40%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and relative-multiple value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.20x5expensive
Earnings1.28x3expensive
Relative0.59x2justifies
Growth0

Families that justify the price: Asset, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=10)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$65.051.19xnoFCF base $0.3B, growth -1% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 8.5%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$76.471.01xnoExit EV/EBITDA: 5.5x / 7.5x / 9.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelative$127.410.61xyesP/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.9x / 20.0x / 23.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$64.671.20xyesBV/sh $27.54, ROE (TTM) 21.7%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$98.480.79xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$46.731.66xnoRev $1.3B, growth -1% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.4x / 2.9x / 3.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$207.550.37xnoEPS $5.93, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.37 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$27.422.82xnoNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.16B × (1−21%) / WACC 8.5% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$92.850.83xyesBV $27.54 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 21.7% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$60.621.28xyes√(22.5 × EPS $5.93 × BVPS $27.54) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$136.210.57xyesEBITDA $0.53B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$60.311.28xyesFCF $287.5M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$57.271.35xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.27B (FCF $0.29B − SBC $0.01B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$191.340.40xyesEPS $5.93 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$10.267.55xyesBV $27.54 × (ROIC 3.2% / WACC 8.5%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$54.001.43xnoRevenue $1.35B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$222.380.35xnoEPS $5.93 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$64.111.21xnoEPS $5.93 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$117.8m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)0.56x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)0.44x
Share count CAGR (dilution)4.7%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Valuing an offshore-supply-vessel operator is really about reading a supply cycle, and this one is tightening for structural reasons that favor the incumbent. The fleet of vessels that service offshore rigs was built years ago; almost no new ones have been ordered because a new vessel costs tens of millions and takes years to deliver, so when offshore drilling demand recovers, the supply cannot respond quickly. That is why Norwegian anchor-handler spot rates set records above $350,000 per day in Q1 2026 on continued supply constraints, and why management believes the imbalance supports day-rate increases of $3,000 to $4,000 per vessel per day annually, with the market tightening significantly into late 2026 through 2028. In this industry, scarcity is the moat.

Tidewater is positioned to harvest that scarcity. It runs the largest OSV fleet, and the FY2025 10-K notes that "fleet, economies of scale and experience level in many areas of the world are competitive advantages in our industry", reinforced in the Americas by Jones Act protections under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 that limit foreign-flagged competition. Scale lets the company move vessels toward the tightest regional markets, which is exactly what it did as Europe/Mediterranean and APAC led the sequential day-rate gains. The balance sheet supports patience through the cycle: debt-to-equity of 0.48, a current ratio of 3.33, and an Altman score of 6.8 deep in safe territory.

Management is deploying capital while the cycle is still building. Tidewater announced a $500 million cash acquisition of Wilson Sons Ultratug Offshore, adding 22 platform supply vessels in Brazil, with closing targeted by the end of Q2 2026, expanding into one of the highest-growth offshore basins. The company already has $1.1 billion of 2026 revenue contracted against guidance of $1.43 billion to $1.48 billion, and it returns cash through a growing dividend and $50.8 million of trailing buybacks. Free cash flow converts at 96% of net income. The bull case is a scale leader in a supply-starved market buying more capacity ahead of a multi-year tightening it can already see in the day-rate data.

Bear Case

The valuation methods disagree on Tidewater, and for a cyclical the disagreement is a warning, not a bargain. The relative-multiple lens reads the stock as cheap, trading at about 60% of where comparable multiples would place it, while the asset-based and earnings-power lenses land slightly above the price. The catch is that both the cheap-looking multiple and the earnings-power read rest on current earnings, and current earnings sit near what may be a cyclical high. An OSV operator capitalized on peak-cycle day rates always looks inexpensive right before the cycle turns; the conservative asset-based read, which values the vessels rather than the earnings they are throwing off today, is usually the more honest one at this point in a cycle.

The recent trajectory already shows the earnings quality softening. Operating margin compressed from 23.7% to about 18% over the last four quarters, and Q1 2026 net income fell to $6.1 million from $42.7 million a year earlier as higher dry-dock days, crew wages, insurance, and operating costs weighed on results. Revenue was down 2.2% year over year. The quarterly net income is also distorted by below-the-line items (the December 2025 quarter printed a 65% net margin on a one-time basis), so any single quarter overstates or understates the true run rate. A business whose reported profitability is this volatile is exactly the kind the earnings-power method mis-prices.

The demand side is entirely outside the company's control. The FY2025 10-K is candid that "higher commodity prices will not necessarily translate into increased demand for offshore support services or sustained higher pricing", and lists the forces that swing offshore activity, including climate-driven pressure on the oil and gas sector and "U.S. trade policies that include substantial tariffs". It also warns that changes allowing foreign-built or foreign-controlled vessels into U.S. coastwise trade "could also result in excess vessel capacity and increased competition". The market is paying about 15x company-wide operating income and assuming roughly 14.5% growth sustained for years, a pace only about 45% of comparable fast-growers held for even five, in a business where the last decade taught investors how brutal the downside of the offshore cycle can be.

Valuation

Tidewater is a cyclical, and the right way to read its valuation is to separate the methods that lean on today's earnings from the one that values the assets. At $73.29 (July 11, 2026), the relative-multiple lens reads the stock as cheap, around 60% of where comparable multiples land, while the asset-based and earnings-power lenses sit slightly above the price at roughly 1.2x and 1.3x. For most companies that spread would say undervalued; for an OSV operator it says the earnings-based methods and the asset-based method are pricing different points in the cycle, and the reader should weight the asset value more heavily because vessel earnings are the volatile input here.

Inverting the price frames the bet in cyclical terms. The market is paying about 15x company-wide operating income and implicitly assuming roughly 14.5% annual operating growth for five years. The margin requirement is undemanding, the business only has to hold a small fraction of the roughly 20% operating margin it earns today, so the bet is not on margin expansion but on the day-rate cycle staying elevated long enough. That is the crux: management sees the OSV supply-demand imbalance driving day rates up $3,000 to $4,000 per vessel annually into 2028, and the price is essentially underwriting that view. The FY2025 10-K's own hedge, that higher commodity prices "will not necessarily translate into increased demand for offshore support services or sustained higher pricing", is the counterweight the price does not fully credit.

Solvency is not the concern, which is why this is a cycle bet rather than a survival bet. Leverage is moderate and well covered, debt-to-equity is 0.48, the current ratio is 3.33, and free cash flow converts at 96% of net income, so the company can fund the $500 million Wilson Sons acquisition and ride a downturn if one comes. The valuation therefore reduces to a single cyclical question: are today's day rates closer to a durable new level, as management argues from the tight vessel supply, or closer to a peak the earnings-based methods are naively extrapolating? The asset-based read counsels caution; the day-rate data and the contracted backlog argue the tightening has further to run.

Catalysts

Q1 2026 was a margin-pressure quarter inside a rising cycle. Revenue of $326.2 million reflected higher utilization and day rates, but net income fell to $6.1 million from $42.7 million a year earlier as higher dry-dock days, crew wages, insurance, and operating costs weighed on the bottom line. Global average day rates rose 1% sequentially, led by Europe/Mediterranean and APAC, and record-high spot rates for large anchor-handlers in Norway exceeded $350,000 per day on supply constraints.

The forward setup is about the supply-demand tightening and one large acquisition. Management reaffirmed 2026 revenue guidance of $1.43 billion to $1.48 billion with a 49% to 51% gross margin target, and $1.1 billion of the year is already contracted. It expects the OSV market to tighten significantly in late 2026 through 2028, supporting annual day-rate increases of $3,000 to $4,000 per vessel. The near-term catalyst is the $500 million cash acquisition of Wilson Sons Ultratug Offshore, adding 22 platform supply vessels in Brazil, with closing targeted by the end of Q2 2026. The items to watch are whether day rates keep climbing across regions, how quickly the higher operating costs that pressured Q1 margins normalize, the close and integration of the Brazil acquisition, and any shift in offshore drilling demand that would validate or undercut the multi-year tightening thesis. The next quarterly report is the immediate checkpoint.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Europe/Mediterranean (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 earnings call · Q1 2026 earnings release

View the full interactive TDW report on boothcheck