TELEPHONE AND DATA SYSTEMS, INC. (TDS): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $35.43, TELEPHONE AND DATA SYSTEMS, INC. (TDS) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~8.4 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-11.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/TDS

Headline

FieldValue
TickerTDS
CompanyTELEPHONE AND DATA SYSTEMS, INC.
Sector / IndustryCommunication Services / Telecom
Current price$35.43/sh

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)14.6%
Operating margin today6.4%
Margin expansion (value-band)+8.2pp
Must persist for8.4y
Multiple paid34x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 10% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~1.9 years.

How unusual the bet is: elevated

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.90σ
sustained it ~8.4 years at this level18%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.91x5expensive
Earnings4.13x2expensive
Relative3.68x4expensive
Growth1.12x2expensive

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=13)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$58.290.61xyesReference only (OCF-based, capex excluded): OCF $0.5B
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$0.00noNegative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0
Relative ValuationRelative$6.005.91xyesP/E 17.84x (blended: static sector reference 12x + trailing (TTM) 31x), scenarios: 15.0x / 17.8x / 20.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 15.4x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$12.172.91xyesBV/sh $42.21, ROE (TTM) 2.7%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$7.114.98xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$21.821.62xyesRev $1.8B, growth -1% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.9x / 2.3x / 2.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$6.365.57xyesEPS $0.53, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=15.73 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAsset$5.246.76xyesBV $42.21 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 2.7% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 1.7%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$22.441.58xyes√(22.5 × EPS $0.53 × BVPS $42.21) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$1.7120.72xyesEBITDA $0.01B × sector EV/EBITDA 7.0x (excluded from median)
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$17.102.07xyesEPS $0.53 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$13.502.62xyesBV $42.21 × (ROIC 2.3% / WACC 7.2%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$23.201.53xyesRevenue $1.80B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$19.871.78xyesEPS $0.53 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$5.736.18xyesEPS $0.53 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Array / TDS (whole-company)operatingenterprise2.1B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$538.0m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-8.72x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-6.69x (net cash)
Interest coverage0.9x
Share count CAGR (dilution)0.1%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The bull case starts with the balance sheet, because TDS just completed one of the cleaner capital-allocation resets in telecom. In August 2025 it closed the sale of the UScellular wireless operations and certain spectrum to T-Mobile for $4.3 billion after adjustments, exiting a subscale wireless business that could not win against national carriers. The result is a company with a net-cash balance sheet, a debt-to-equity ratio of just 0.13, a current ratio of 3.43, and an Altman score deep in safe territory at 6.68. TDS turned a losing hand into cash and optionality, and it still holds a residual stake in the renamed tower business, Array Digital Infrastructure, which carries colocation revenue with contractual escalators.

Management is redeploying that firepower into fiber, and the early execution is strong. In Q1 2026, TDS Telecom delivered 40,000 new marketable fiber service addresses, up nearly 180% year over year and the highest first-quarter deployment in company history, lifting total marketable fiber addresses to 1.102 million. Fiber revenues rose 13% year over year, enough to offset the decline in legacy copper and cable. The FY2025 10-K frames this as a deliberate multi-year program, noting that "changes in technology have required substantial investments in TDS' networks" with continued fiber deployment expected through 2026 and beyond. Fiber is the one wireline technology that competes on quality rather than price, and TDS is building it where the incumbent copper is weakest.

The company is also consolidating adjacent territory. It announced an agreement to acquire Granite State Communications in New Hampshire, adding about 11,000 fiber service addresses contiguous to existing TDS markets, expected to close in the third quarter of 2026. Tuck-in acquisitions of nearby fiber footprint are exactly how a regional operator builds density and improves returns on its network spend. The bull case is a recapitalized, debt-light operator pointing all of its cash at the highest-quality access technology in the markets it knows best, while collecting tower revenue on the side.

Bear Case

The advantage TDS is spending billions to build is one that better-resourced competitors are eroding from every direction. The FY2025 10-K names the field bluntly: competition to the wireline and cable businesses comes from "other cable companies, fiber overbuilders, incumbent carriers, wireless communications providers, resellers of local exchange services, interexchange carriers, satellite broadband" and more. A rural and suburban fiber operator is not building into empty territory; it is building into markets where cable already offers broadband, national carriers push fixed-wireless access, and satellite reaches the hardest-to-serve homes. Fiber is higher quality, but quality does not guarantee the share gains the valuation assumes when the customer already has three adequate options.

The legacy base is melting while the fiber base is still small. Fiber addresses reached 1.102 million and fiber revenue grew 13%, but that growth is fighting a steady decline in copper and cable, so consolidated revenue barely moved (up 6.5% year over year in Q1 2026, and the reported figure missed consensus). The economics of the transition are cash-hungry: the company posted negative trailing free cash flow of about $50 million because fiber construction consumes capital years before it earns a return, and the 10-K is explicit that heavy capital expenditure "is expected to continue in 2026 and future years". The residual tower business faces its own erosion, with the 10-K warning that larger competitors have "more advantageous tower locations than Array" and more national scale.

The valuation gives none of this room. Only the growth-oriented method reaches today's price; the asset, earnings-power, and peer-multiple lenses all read the stock as richly valued, the price sitting two to four times where they land. To justify the price the business would have to reach roughly a 13.9% operating margin, a 7.5-point jump from the 6.4% it earns today that it has not demonstrated, and it would have to hold near-peak growth for close to eight years, a persistence only about 19% of comparable fast-growers have managed. The recapitalization was smart, but the market is now pricing the fiber build as a near-certainty in a business where scale, not quality, usually wins.

Valuation

TDS is priced as a growth story, and only one family of methods agrees with that price. At $34.15 (July 11, 2026), the asset, earnings-power, and peer-multiple lenses all read the stock as richly valued, sitting two to four times where they land; only the growth-oriented method reaches the price. That configuration says the market is paying a durability and reinvestment premium the static methods cannot frame, a bet that the fiber build compounds into materially higher profitability. The premium is the entire valuation, and it rests on execution that has only just begun.

Inverting the price sharpens the demand. The market is paying about 32x company-wide operating income and, in effect, assuming the company holds growth near its self-funding ceiling for roughly eight years. The margin math is the harder version of the same statement: to justify the price the business has to reach about a 13.9% operating margin, more than double the roughly 6.4% it earns today, a 7.5-point improvement it has not shown. Two trailing operating-income bases are in play (a record basis near $111 million and an EDGAR trailing basis near $80 million, about 38% apart), and the quarterly numbers are distorted by the T-Mobile divestiture accounting, so any single-quarter margin is close to meaningless here. The honest read is that the price assumes the fiber transition works and lifts margins structurally.

Solvency is the reassuring counterweight, and it is why the bet is patient rather than pressured. Post-sale the balance sheet is net cash, debt-to-equity is 0.13, and the current ratio is 3.43, so the company can fund years of fiber capital expenditure and the Granite State acquisition from its own resources without refinancing risk. Free cash flow is negative today because construction precedes returns, which is normal for a fiber build but means the cash cushion, not current cash generation, is what buys the time. The price is not stretched against solvency; it is stretched against the assumption that a regional fiber operator earns a premium margin in markets crowded with cable, fixed-wireless, and satellite competitors.

Catalysts

The defining event was the August 2025 close of the UScellular wireless and spectrum sale to T-Mobile for $4.3 billion after adjustments, which recapitalized TDS and left it as a fiber-and-broadband operator plus a residual interest in the renamed tower company, Array Digital Infrastructure. Q1 2026 results were shaped by the aftermath: earnings of $1.11 per share came in far above a consensus loss estimate, boosted by spectrum-sale gains, while revenue of $309.5 million rose 6.6% year over year but slightly missed the consensus mark.

The forward story is entirely about fiber. TDS Telecom deployed a record 40,000 new marketable fiber service addresses in the quarter, up nearly 180% year over year, taking total marketable fiber addresses to 1.102 million, with fiber revenue up 13%. The company also agreed to acquire Granite State Communications in New Hampshire, adding roughly 11,000 fiber addresses contiguous to existing markets, expected to close in the third quarter of 2026. The items to watch are the pace of fiber address deployment and penetration, whether fiber revenue growth continues to outrun the legacy copper and cable decline enough to grow consolidated revenue, the timing and integration of the Granite State deal, and how management deploys the remaining sale proceeds between fiber capital, acquisitions, and shareholder returns. The next quarterly report is the immediate checkpoint.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Array / TDS (whole-company) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 earnings release

View the full interactive TDS report on boothcheck