TAL Education Group (TAL): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $12.12, TAL Education Group (TAL) is priced for +15.1% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-08-08.

Generated: 2026-08-08 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/TAL

Headline

FieldValue
TickerTAL
CompanyTAL Education Group
Sector / IndustryConsumer Cyclical
Current price$12.12/sh
CompositionLearning services and others 65% / Learning content solutions 35%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)1.5%
Operating margin today9.2%
Margin compression (value-band)-7.7pp
Implied growth15.1%
Multiple paid20x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 5: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~7pp.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.19σ
sustained it ~5 years at this level44%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.04x5expensive
Earnings1.12x3expensive
Relative1.15x2expensive
Growth0

Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=10)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$27.290.44xnoFCF base $0.5B, growth 14% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.7%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$17.700.68xnoExit EV/EBITDA: 16.2x / 18.2x / 20.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelative$14.130.86xyesP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 14.9x / 18.0x / 21.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13.86x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$9.911.22xyesBV/sh $6.52, ROE (TTM) 14.1%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$12.091.00xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$11.571.05xnoRev $3.0B, growth 14% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.9x / 2.3x / 2.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$11.001.10xnoEPS $0.92, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=6.61 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAsset$12.490.97xyesBV $6.52 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 14.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$11.601.04xyes√(22.5 × EPS $0.92 × BVPS $6.52) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$8.431.44xyesEBITDA $0.34B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$10.771.12xyesFCF $508.3M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$9.971.22xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.47B (FCF $0.51B − SBC $0.04B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$29.580.41xyesEPS $0.92 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$5.382.25xyesBV $6.52 × (ROIC 7.2% / WACC 8.7%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$13.000.93xnoRevenue $3.01B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$34.380.35xnoEPS $0.92 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$9.911.22xnoEPS $0.92 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Exercisable as of February 28, 2026operatingenterprise0.0B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$3.2b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-14.85x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-11.74x (net cash)
Share count CAGR (buyback)-2.7%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Three fiscal years carry this argument better than any description of the business. In the year to February 2024 the operating line ran a $69.2 million loss. The next year it landed within a rounding error of breakeven, a $3.2 million loss. In the year to February 2026 it produced $276.0 million of operating profit. The revenue underneath moved the same way, and the filing states it plainly: "Our net revenues increased from $1,490.4 million in the fiscal year ended February 29, 2024 to $2,250.2 million in the fiscal year ended February 28, 2025, and further increased to $3,008.9 million in the fiscal year ended February 28, 2026".

Nothing about the cost base got smaller. Revenue simply outran it. Selling and marketing expenses rose 18.7% to $889.1 million in the year to February 2026, against revenue growth of about 34%. That gap is the whole mechanism: the company is spending a shrinking share of each new dollar on winning the customer who brings it. Operating expenses fell from 53.4% of revenue to 46.2% across those two years. When a business with heavy fixed teaching capacity fills that capacity, the incremental margin is very high, and that is what the last twelve months look like.

The faster half of the mix is also the lighter one. "Revenues from learning content solutions increased by 48.4% to $1,061.9 million for the fiscal year ended February 28, 2026", roughly a third of the total and growing about half again as fast as the company overall. Learning content solutions sells products, courseware and devices. It does not need another building or another teacher in another city to serve the next buyer. The classroom side grew too, and the filing attributes it to "the year-over-year enrollment growth of Xueersi Peiyou as a result of the expansion of our capacity", which is the harder, more capital-hungry kind of growth. Having both is better than having either.

The profit turned into money, which is not automatic. Operating activities generated 601.5 million dollars in the year to February 2026, up from 397.9 million and 306.2 million in the two preceding years. Some of that has gone back to holders. On July 28, 2025 the board authorised a new repurchase plan of up to 600 million dollars of common shares, the latest in a sequence running since April 2021. The share count has fallen about 2.7% a year since February 2022, which is buyback deployment showing up where it cannot be dressed up.

Set against listed education peers, the margin is the bull case rather than the objection. LRN earns a 15.8% operating margin on $2,535.7 million of revenue and LAUR earns 24.4% on $1,830.1 million, while this business earns 9.2%. One reading is that education in China is structurally thinner. The other is that a company one year past breakeven has not yet reached the margin its industry demonstrably supports, and that the two years of losses behind it are the reason the current figure looks modest rather than evidence of a ceiling.

Bear Case

For part of what this company sells, the price is not a commercial decision. Chinese rules place fees for compulsory-subject tutoring under state supervision: "fees charged for academic subjects tutoring in compulsory education shall be included into government-guided price management", alongside a separate prohibition under which "the provision of overseas education courses by PRC after-school tutoring institutions is strictly prohibited". That is not a risk factor filed at the back of the document out of caution. It is a standing claim by the state on the revenue line.

The company does not treat the question as settled either. It writes that "We have been closely monitoring the evolving regulatory environment and are making efforts to seek guidance from and cooperate with the government authorities" on compliance with the compulsory-education burden rules. A business still asking the regulator what it is allowed to sell is a business whose forward revenue is a policy variable first and an execution question second. The 2021 rewrite of that policy is the precedent, and it is described in the same filing: online tutoring institutions were told to "suspend enrollment of students and charging fees" until they held the required permit.

Then there is what a share actually is. The operating schools sit inside contractual structures, and the annual report is unusually direct about the consequence: "neither TAL Education Group nor its investors have an equity ownership in, direct foreign investment in, or control through such ownership or investment of, the VIEs". Economic benefit reaches the listed company because "we rely on the performance by the VIEs and their respective equity holders of their obligations under the contracts". Every valuation method applied here quietly assumes those contracts hold and remain enforceable. That assumption has no market price attached to it, which is not the same as it being free.

Against that backdrop, look at what today's level requires. The market is capitalising the operating profit of the year to February 2026 at roughly twenty times, and that embeds operating profit compounding around 15% a year across a five-year stretch. The rate itself is not the stretch. Revenue grew about 34% last year and about 51% the year before, and the company's own multi-year growth average sits above the required pace. The stretch is persistence. Of comparable fast growers, only about 44% held that kind of pace over a similar stretch, and this particular one has produced exactly one profitable year against two loss-making ones. If growth fades toward the education sector's ordinary pace, there is no discount to absorb it: the peer-multiple comparisons already sit about 15% under the price, and the asset-value methods about 4% under.

Concentration compounds it. The filing warns that "We derive a significant portion of our revenues from a limited number of cities", which means a municipal policy decision, not only a national one, can move the number. The balance sheet does bound the downside, though it is worth being precise about what is in it: holdings of cash and short-term investments totalled 3,239.3 million dollars at February 28, 2026, a large part of it wealth-management products rather than operating assets, and a further 555.8 million dollars sits in equity stakes held outside the operating business. That floor is real. It is also the reason the reported bottom line flatters the schools, a point the valuation section takes up.

Valuation

Strip the story out and the arithmetic is short. Enterprise value works out to roughly twenty times the operating profit earned in the year to February 2026, and inverting that at a 9% cost of capital with 4% long-run growth gives operating profit compounding around 15% a year over a five-year stretch. That is the bet in one sentence. It is worth holding lightly: this is a single solve, and moving the cost of capital by one percentage point moves the implied growth by about seven points, so the figure describes a shape rather than a measurement.

What makes the setup unusual is how tightly the methods agree. The price sits about 4% above where the asset-value methods land, about 12% above the earnings-power methods, and about 15% above the peer-multiple comparisons. No family is far away in either direction. Companies whose price depends on a story do not look like this; the gap between the methods and the market is normally measured in multiples, not in low double-digit percentages. Within the earnings-power group, the least demanding method is worth naming: capitalising last year's free cash flow at the cost of equity with no growth assumed at all still reaches within about 12% of today's level. The forward-growth methods do not appear in that comparison, because a three-year record containing two operating losses gives a projection method nothing stable to project from.

So the concrete requirement is modest by the company's recent standards and severe by its longer record. About 15% a year in operating profit, sustained, is well under the roughly 34% revenue growth just delivered and under the company's own multi-year average. Against the three prior fiscal years it is a different proposition, since two of them produced operating losses. The margin is the pivot. The business earned 9.2% at the operating line in the year to February 2026, and among listed education peers LRN sits at 15.8% and STRA at 14.0%. Closing part of that distance is what the required growth mostly consists of, and it does not require the top-line pace to continue.

One number deserves care before it is used as an anchor. Holdings of cash and short-term investments totalled 3,239.3 million dollars at the year end against a market value near seven billion dollars. A meaningful share of the reported bottom line is therefore the yield on that portfolio rather than the output of the schools. An investor anchoring on net income is valuing a tutoring business and an investment fund together and calling the total one multiple.

Capital deployment says something about how management reads its own position. Payments for long-term investments were $406.8 million in the year to February 2026 against $101.8 million the year before, while the repurchase authorisation runs to 600 million dollars. Money is flowing to securities and to buybacks at a similar order of magnitude to what the operating business earned. That is a rational posture for a company whose reinvestment opportunity is capped by regulation, and it is also a quiet statement about how much operating growth management believes it can buy with its own money.

Catalysts

The annual report for the fiscal year ended February 28, 2026 was filed on June 12, 2026. It is the first one covering a full year of operating profit, and it sets the base every subsequent comparison runs against: $3,008.9 million of revenue and $276.0 million of operating profit. The next fiscal year closes on February 28, 2027, with the annual report following in the middle of that year, so the reporting calendar puts a long gap between confirmations. For a company whose profit history is one year long, that gap matters more than it would for a mature filer.

Capital return has its own dated schedule. The repurchase programme launched in April 2021 was extended by twelve months on April 22, 2025 and ran through April 30, 2026, and on July 28, 2025 the board authorised a separate new plan permitting repurchases of up to 600 million dollars of common shares. Those two authorisations overlap, which is why the share count has been falling steadily rather than in one visible block. The live question is the pace of use rather than the existence of the authority.

The regulatory calendar is the one that cannot be scheduled. The company describes itself as still seeking guidance from PRC authorities on compliance with the compulsory-education burden rules. Guidance of that kind arrives when it arrives, and the 2021 precedent is that it can land between reporting periods and change what a business is permitted to sell before the next set of accounts is drawn.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Exercisable as of February 28, 2026 (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

FY2026 20-F consolidated statements of operations · FY2026 20-F consolidated statements of cash flows · FY2026 20-F · FY2026 20-F, filed June 12, 2026 · FY2026 20-F, risk factors

View the full interactive TAL report on boothcheck