Synchrony Financial (SYF): what the price requires
At today's price, Synchrony Financial (SYF) is priced for 17.5% return on equity. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/SYF
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | SYF |
| Company | Synchrony Financial |
| Sector / Industry | Financial Services |
| Current price | $72.98/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | financials |
| Return on equity needed | 17.5% |
| Return on equity now | 22.3% |
| ROE gap | -4.8pp |
| Price-to-book | 1.61x |
Solve inputs: computed at a 12.4% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage, on common book equity (FY2026); each 1pp of cost of equity moves the implied ROE ~1.6pp.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~12.5%; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.73σ |
| cohort percentile (of 72 peers) | 18 |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 55% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 0.55x | 4 | justifies |
| Earnings | 0.23x | 3 | justifies |
| Relative | 0.54x | 5 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.39x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=15)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $720.50 | 0.10x | yes | FCF base $9.8B, growth 3% (input: historical growth), terminal g 3.1%, WACC 7.1%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $185.29 | 0.39x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 145.7x / 147.7x / 149.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $84.39 | 0.86x | yes | P/E 13.6x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 7x), scenarios: 11.4x / 13.6x / 15.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 26.4x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $112.48 | 0.65x | yes | BV/sh $47.62, ROE (TTM) 21.8%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $171.84 | 0.42x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $52.42 | 1.39x | yes | Rev $18.6B, growth 3% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.1x / 1.4x / 1.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $324.93 | 0.22x | yes | EPS $9.66, growth 34% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.21 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $161.70 | 0.45x | yes | BV $47.62 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 21.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $101.74 | 0.72x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $9.66 × BVPS $47.62) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $16.90 | 4.32x | yes | EBITDA $0.14B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $319.20 | 0.23x | yes | FCF $9834.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $311.70 | 0.23x | yes | EPS $9.66 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $134.66 | 0.54x | yes | Revenue $18.64B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $362.25 | 0.20x | yes | EPS $9.66 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $104.43 | 0.70x | yes | EPS $9.66 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -9.7% |
Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).
Bullet Takeaways
- Synchrony is the store-card lender behind much of American retail: its 10-K names its "five largest programs based upon interest and fees on loans for the year ended December 31, 2025" as "Amazon, Lowe's, PayPal, Sam's Club and TJX Companies, Inc." (accession 0001601712-26-000006), and it just won back the Walmart program through OnePay.
- The concentration that makes the model efficient is also the defining risk: losing any of those anchor partners moves the earnings base, and the book runs a 5.42% net charge-off rate that demands constant underwriting discipline.
- Watch credit and capital together: charge-offs improved from 6.38% a year ago, the company returned roughly 97% of earnings via dividends and buybacks last fiscal year, and a new $6.5 billion repurchase authorization plus a dividend raise to $0.34 quarterly arrive from the third quarter of 2026.
Bull Case
Consumer lenders are valued on suspicion. The market reads a cheap multiple on a card book as a forecast that credit losses are coming, so the way to test the price is not the earnings line, it is the credit data. Synchrony's credit data is moving the wrong way for the suspicion: the net charge-off rate fell to 5.42% in the first quarter from 6.38% a year earlier, over-30-day delinquencies held essentially flat at 4.54%, and the provision dropped to $1.34 billion while the allowance still covers 10.42% of the $100.1 billion receivables book. Earnings rose to $805 million with EPS up 20%. A lender priced for deterioration that is instead reporting improvement is the basic setup here, with the price at roughly 1.6 times book against a business that has recently earned about a 22% return on equity.
The franchise argument is scale plus embeddedness. The 10-K describes the playbook with its large retail partners as driving "penetration and everyday use through strong partner alignment, competitive value propositions, and embedding our products in the digital experience" (accession 0001601712-26-000006), and the partner roster now runs deeper than at any point since the company's spin-out: the June 2025 OnePay agreement returns Synchrony as the exclusive issuer of Walmart's credit cards, a role it held for almost two decades before the program moved to Capital One in 2019, while 2026 has already added an RH card and an expanded PayPal consumer-credit relationship. The filing's own outlook expects "interest and fees on loans to increase, primarily reflecting the continued impact of our product, pricing and policy changes, and growth in loan" receivables (same accession).
Then there is the shareholder arithmetic, which does not require any multiple expansion to work. The share count has shrunk 9.7% a year over the past four years, the company returned about 97% of earnings through dividends and buybacks in the latest fiscal year, bought back $900 million of stock in the first quarter alone, and holds a fresh $6.5 billion authorization with a dividend raise to $0.34 quarterly coming in the third quarter. At 7 times trailing earnings, that payout ratio retires a large slice of the float every year. A 22% ROE business that eats its own share count while credit improves is a compounding machine the price treats as a melting one.
Bear Case
Synchrony's moat was always the exclusive program agreement, and the past decade has shown the moat has a landlord. The 10-K says it directly: a substantial portion of revenue comes from "a small number of large retail partners, and the loss of any of these partners could adversely affect our business and results of operations" (accession 0001601712-26-000006), with the five largest programs, Amazon, Lowe's, PayPal, Sam's Club, and TJX, concentrated at the top of the book. Walmart's 2019 departure to Capital One proved anchor partners will move for better terms, and while winning the program back through OnePay is a commercial victory, re-won business is typically re-priced business: every renewal cycle, the retailer holds the auction and the issuer pays for exclusivity in economics. The moat erodes not by breach but by negotiation.
The second erosion front is structural. Point-of-sale credit used to mean a private-label card; it now means a crowded field of buy-now-pay-later providers, fintech installment lenders, and the retailers' own embedded-finance ambitions, OnePay itself being Walmart's fintech vehicle rather than a traditional co-brand. Synchrony's answer has been product breadth and digital integration, but the competitive reality is that the partners increasingly own the customer interface while the issuer supplies balance sheet and regulatory plumbing, a position that historically commands thinner economics over time.
And this remains a high-loss consumer book leveraged to the bottom half of the income distribution. Even improved, the 5.42% net charge-off rate is a reminder of what happens to spread income when unemployment turns; the filing notes elevated payment-rate effects still working through the portfolio (accession 0001601712-26-000006), and the price, at about 1.6 times book, assumes a roughly 17% return on equity is sustained indefinitely. The company earns about 22% today, so the cushion is real, but historically only about 55% of financials earning at this level sustained it for a decade. Meanwhile returning 97% of earnings to shareholders means almost nothing is being retained to grow book value, so if the ROE fades toward the priced-in level during a credit downturn, the multiple compresses onto a book that has not grown to catch it.
Valuation
For a financial, the price reads off capital and returns: at $72.40 the market pays about 1.6 times book value and, at the framework's cost of equity, that price assumes Synchrony sustains roughly a 17.4% return on equity. The company has recently been earning about 22.3%. That gap, a price requiring less than the business currently delivers, is why every family of method lands above the quote: earnings-power reads put the price at a small fraction of what capitalized trailing earnings would support, peer multiples land materially higher even on a blended 13.6 times earnings against today's 7 times trailing, and book-anchored approaches that credit the excess return land 40% to 60% above. The pattern is a value read, priced in the lower half of the peer group's price-to-book despite an ROE near the top of it. What the discount is charging for is cyclicality: the market treats a 22% ROE earned on subprime-adjacent consumer credit as a peak number, not a permanent one.
The filing anchors the revenue side of that debate. The five largest programs by interest and fees, "Amazon, Lowe's, PayPal, Sam's Club and TJX Companies, Inc.", headline a partner-concentrated model (accession 0001601712-26-000006), and management's disclosed outlook expects interest and fees on loans to increase on product, pricing, and policy changes plus receivables growth (same accession), now supplemented by the Walmart OnePay program going live. The capital frame carries the downside math: this is a deposit-funded balance sheet where the leverage lenses do not apply; what matters is that the allowance covers 10.42% of receivables, charge-offs are falling, and payout capacity ran about 97% of earnings last fiscal year with $6.5 billion newly authorized. The share count falling nearly 10% a year is the mechanical consequence. The one number that decides the case is the through-cycle ROE: hold it above the priced-in 17% and the discount is a gift; let a credit cycle drag it below, and 1.6 times book was the fair warning.
Catalysts
The Walmart OnePay program is the live commercial event. Synchrony became the exclusive issuer of OnePay's Walmart credit cards, powered by Mastercard, in a program announced June 2025, and each quarterly print now carries evidence of how fast the reborn program adds receivables and at what credit quality. The partnership pipeline around it keeps moving: an expanded PayPal consumer-credit agreement and a new RH card landed this spring, alongside CareCredit acceptance extending to eligible purchases on Walmart.com. Partner renewals and additions are the recurring headline risk and opportunity in both directions for a book concentrated in its largest programs.
Capital returns have a dated schedule. The company announced a $6.5 billion share repurchase authorization with no expiration and a planned quarterly dividend increase to $0.34 beginning in the third quarter of 2026, after repurchasing $900 million of stock in the first quarter. The second-quarter report, due on the company's usual mid-July cadence, updates the credit picture that anchors the whole valuation: whether net charge-offs extend their improvement from 5.42%, whether 30-plus delinquencies hold near 4.54%, and how the $100.1 billion receivables base grows as new programs ramp. First-quarter earnings of $805 million with adjusted EPS of $2.27 met expectations; the market's question from here is durability of the credit improvement into the back half, where the consumer's health, not the company's execution, will likely write the story.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Synchrony Financial (single segment) (reported)
- AXP (AMERICAN EXPRESS CO)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BFH (Bread Financial Holdings, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- COF (CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- QFIN (Qfin Holdings, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SOFI (SoFi Technologies, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ALLY (Ally Financial Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 2026 earnings release, April 2026 · OnePay-Synchrony announcement, June 2025 · company announcements, April 2026 · FinTech Futures coverage, June 2025