Savers Value Village, Inc. (SVV): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $10.89, Savers Value Village, Inc. (SVV) is priced for +6.8% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-11.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/SVV
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | SVV |
| Company | Savers Value Village, Inc. |
| Sector / Industry | Consumer Cyclical |
| Current price | $10.89/sh |
| Composition | Retail sales 95% / Wholesale sales 5% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 2.3% |
| Operating margin today | 7.4% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -5.1pp |
| Implied growth | 6.8% |
| Multiple paid | 24x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~8.5pp.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~22.7%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +1.24σ |
| cohort percentile (of 214 peers) | 74 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 8.58x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 2.41x | 1 | expensive |
| Relative | — | 0 | — |
| Growth | — | 0 | — |
Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.8%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=5)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $8.16 | 1.33x | no | FCF base $0.1B, growth 10% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 6.8%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $13.06 | 0.83x | no | Exit EV/EBITDA: 12.5x / 14.5x / 16.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | — | — | no | P/E 36.92x (blended: static sector reference 20x + trailing (TTM) 76x), scenarios: 30.8x / 36.9x / 43.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $1.54 | 7.07x | yes | BV/sh $2.78, ROE (TTM) 5.1%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $1.08 | 10.08x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $9.61 | 1.13x | no | Rev $1.7B, growth 10% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.8x / 1.0x / 1.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $1.68 | 6.48x | no | EPS $0.14, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=41.82 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $4.52 | 2.41x | no | Normalized EBIT (3y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.18B × (1−21%) / WACC 6.8% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $1.03 | 10.57x | yes | BV $2.78 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 5.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 3.3%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $2.96 | 3.68x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $0.14 × BVPS $2.78) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | EBITDA $0.21B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 1089.00x | yes | FCF $58.9M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median) |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 1089.00x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.02B (FCF $0.06B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median) |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $4.52 | 2.41x | yes | EPS $0.14 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $0.22 | 49.50x | yes | BV $2.78 × (ROIC 0.5% / WACC 6.8%) (excluded from median) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | Revenue $1.71B × sector P/S 1.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $5.25 | 2.07x | no | EPS $0.14 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $1.51 | 7.21x | no | EPS $0.14 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)
One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.
| Unit | Role | Valuation basis | Revenue | Reported profit | Value evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. Retail | operating | enterprise | $940.2m | — | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| Canada Retail | operating | enterprise | $608.1m | — | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $696.7m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 6.99x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 5.52x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 1.6% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
- Savers Value Village runs the largest for-profit thrift chain in North America's most unusual retail model: it buys secondhand goods by the pound from nonprofit partners, and its 10-K frames growth on "significant whitespace opportunity across underpenetrated markets, favorable secular trends supporting secondhand shopping and the scalability of our operating model" (accession 0001883313-26-000014).
- The price is the risk: at about 31 times operating income the market needs roughly 11% annual operating-profit growth for five years from a business earning a 7.4% operating margin, while carrying net debt at about 5.5 times trailing operating income.
- Watch whether the 6.4% U.S. comparable-store growth from the first quarter holds against the full-year guide of 2.5% to 4%, with net sales guidance of $1.76 to $1.79 billion reaffirmed in May.
Bull Case
The most surprising number in the data is not the growth rate, it is where the growth is coming from. U.S. comparable store sales rose 6.4% in the first quarter, driving net sales up 8.9% to $403.2 million, in a year when most discretionary retailers are fighting for flat comps. The engine is structural. Savers does not buy inventory from manufacturers; it acquires secondhand goods, largely through nonprofit partnerships, processes them in its own stores, and sells what does not move on the sales floor into wholesale channels, noting in its 10-K that "in support of our efforts to extend the life of reusable goods and recover a portion of the cost of acquiring our supply of secondhand items, we sell the majority of" unsold goods onward (accession 0001883313-26-000014). A supply chain built on donated goods gets cheaper, not more expensive, when consumers trade down.
The growth runway is stated plainly in the company's own filing: "Our U.S. expansion strategy is supported by significant whitespace opportunity across underpenetrated markets, favorable secular trends supporting secondhand shopping and the scalability of our operating model" (accession 0001883313-26-000014). The strategy pairs new-store expansion with a comp-growth playbook the filing describes as refining "our superior value proposition and differentiated in-store shopping experience, while maintaining disciplined execution across pricing, merchandising" (same accession). Against off-price peers, the model is differentiated at the supply end: TJX and Ross buy closeout goods from the same branded supply chains every off-pricer fights over, while Savers' supply arrives through donation flows competitors cannot easily replicate.
Profitability is inflecting off a low base, which is where the upside lives. Adjusted EBITDA ran $44.5 million in the first quarter, an 11.0% margin, and management reaffirmed full-year guidance of $1.76 to $1.79 billion in sales with EPS of $0.45 to $0.53. If comps keep running ahead of the 2.5% to 4% guided range the way they did in the first quarter, the operating leverage in a fixed-cost store base does the rest of the work. The market pays peer-level multiples on today's EBITDA; the bull case is that today's EBITDA is the trough of a maturing store fleet, not the ceiling.
Bear Case
The cycle question comes first: thrift is having its moment, and moments end. The trade-down consumer that lifted first-quarter comps 6.4% is the same consumer who returns to conventional retail when real incomes recover, which makes today's demand conditions look closer to the favorable end of the cycle than the sustainable middle. The company's own risk disclosure names the fragility in the model's beating heart, the merchandise itself: "because many of our customers desire a treasure hunt experience, a decline in the amount of desirable items displayed could have a negative effect on their shopping experience" (accession 0001883313-26-000014). Supply quality is not something management controls; it arrives in donation bins.
Costs are the second squeeze. Processing secondhand goods is labor work, store by store, and the 10-K concedes the cost of merchandise sold can rise from "increases in labor, transportation and storage costs, which may be driven by market forces outside of our control, such as inflation" (accession 0001883313-26-000014). A 7.4% operating margin does not leave much room between wage inflation and the value price point the customer shows up for. Meanwhile the filing acknowledges that "competition in the secondhand market and from sellers of new items may adversely impact our revenue, profitability, market share, and partnerships" (same accession), and the competitive set is not standing still: online resale platforms bid for the same quality supply, and off-price giants set the price ceiling on new goods.
Then the arithmetic of the price. At about 31 times operating income, the market needs roughly 11% annual operating-profit growth sustained for five years; of comparable fast-growers historically, only about half sustained that pace for the duration. The company posted a $5.3 million net loss in the first quarter, carries $697 million of net debt against $126 million of trailing operating income, about 5.5 times on a pre-tax basis, and the share count has drifted up 1.6% a year since 2022. Book-value-based methods land at a small fraction of today's price because there is little equity under the business, so if growth disappoints, there is no asset floor to catch the multiple. Two sell-side targets were cut after the last print, UBS to $15 and Piper Sandler to $11, a reminder that even the constructive camp is marking expectations down toward the price rather than up from it.
Valuation
Today's $9.76 buys a specific bet: at about 31 times operating income, the price implies company-wide operating profit compounding at roughly 11% a year for five years, against a business that earns a 7.4% operating margin today. The near-term pace is within what the company has recently delivered; the stretch is duration, since only about half of comparable fast-growers historically sustained that rate for five years. The methods split cleanly along that fault line. Peer multiples nearly reach the price: an EV/EBITDA read at the sector's 14 times lands within a few percent of the quote, while the blended earnings multiple sits about a fifth below it. Asset-value methods land far below, at a small fraction of the price, because the business runs on just $2.78 of book value per share earning a 5.1% trailing return on equity; earnings-power reads put the price at roughly double their central estimate. That pattern is a growth-and-execution premium: the market is valuing the store rollout and comp trajectory, not the balance sheet or current earnings.
The rollout is real and disclosed: the 10-K grounds expansion in "in-fill opportunities within existing markets" and underpenetrated U.S. whitespace (accession 0001883313-26-000014), and the debt structure behind it was actively managed last year, with repayments on the 2025 Term Loan Facility generating a small extinguishment loss per the same filing. What the balance sheet contributes to the downside: $697 million of net debt against $126 million of trailing operating income on the EDGAR quarterly basis, roughly 5.5 times pre-tax, with $62 million of liquid assets. The company is not burning cash, but the share count has crept up about 1.6% annually over the past four years, so the equity claim dilutes slowly while the debt stays fixed. The price only works if the comp-and-expansion engine keeps outrunning both.
Catalysts
The reaffirmed full-year outlook is the near-term scoreboard. Management guided fiscal 2026 to net sales of $1.76 to $1.79 billion, comparable store sales growth of 2.5% to 4%, and EPS of $0.45 to $0.53, reaffirming that view alongside first-quarter results in May. The first quarter itself ran ahead of the comp guide, with U.S. comparable sales up 6.4% and net sales up 8.9% to $403.2 million, though the quarter still produced a $5.3 million net loss against $44.5 million of adjusted EBITDA at an 11.0% margin. The second-quarter print, expected in the August timeframe following the company's usual cadence, will show whether the first quarter's comp strength was a trade-down surge or a run rate.
Sell-side positioning shifted after the last report: UBS trimmed its price target to $15 and Piper Sandler to $11, both still above the current $9.76 quote, which frames the street as cautious on momentum rather than negative on the model. The variables that move estimates from here are the ones management called out around the guide: whether U.S. comp strength persists into the back half, how Canadian retail performs against its softer trend, and whether labor and processing costs stay inside the guided margin structure. Store openings against the whitespace plan disclosed in the February 10-K remain the multi-year driver behind the quarterly noise.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
U.S. Retail (reported)
- TJX (THE TJX COMPANIES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …non-comp store sales, a neutral impact from foreign currency exchange rates, partially offset by a negative 2% estimated year-over-year impact from the 53rd week in fiscal 2024. Net sales from our e-commerce sites combined amounted to less than 2% of total sales for both fiscal 2025 and fiscal 2024. Comp store sales…
- FY2025 10-K: …than traditional retailers, and the design and operation of our stores and distribution centers support this flexibility. Our buyers have more visibility into consumer, fashion and market trends and pricing when we buy closer to need, which can help us buy better and reduce our markdown exposure. Our selling floor…
- ROST (Ross Stores, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …retailing in stores throughout the United States and its territories. The Company determined that the two operating segments share similar economic and other qualitative characteristics and are therefore aggregated into one reportable segment. The Company considers operating income, defined as earnings before…
- FY2025 10-K: …of Company merchandise. The Company's stored value cards do not have expiration dates. Based upon historical redemption rates, a small percentage of stored value cards will never be redeemed, which represents breakage. Breakage is estimated and recognized as revenue based upon the historical pattern of customer…
- REAL (TheRealReal, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …TheRealReal, Inc. 0001573221 2025 FY false 0.0314465 0.0955795 iso4217:USD xbrli:shares iso4217:USD xbrli:shares real:segment xbrli:pure utr:Y utr:D real:tranche real:plaintiff real:shareholder 0001573221 2025-01-01 2025-12-31 0001573221 2025-06-30 0001573221 2026-02-18 0001573221 2025-10-01 2025-12-31 0001573221…
- FY2025 10-K: …in Arizona and New Jersey. The lease to our Arizona facility expires in 2031, and leases to our three New Jersey facilities each expire in 2029, all with a right of renewal. We lease additional offices located in Los Angeles and New York City, and we have leased several retail spaces and luxury consignment offices in…
Canada Retail (reported)
- REAL (TheRealReal, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …local brick-and-mortar shops to our online marketplace and drive high repeat consignment rates. We leverage data from millions of transactions and current market data to optimize pricing and sales velocity for our consignors. • We offer buyers a vast, yet curated supply of primarily pre-owned luxury goods and instill…
- FY2025 10-K: …TheRealReal, Inc. 0001573221 2025 FY false 0.0314465 0.0955795 iso4217:USD xbrli:shares iso4217:USD xbrli:shares real:segment xbrli:pure utr:Y utr:D real:tranche real:plaintiff real:shareholder 0001573221 2025-01-01 2025-12-31 0001573221 2025-06-30 0001573221 2026-02-18 0001573221 2025-10-01 2025-12-31 0001573221…
- FCFS (FirstCash Holdings, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: Payment Solution Products Offered by AFF AFF's merchant partners may provide consumer goods and services to their customers using one of AFF's retail POS payment products to facilitate payments on such transactions. AFF's ability to customize the technology and offer a choice between retail POS payment products…
- FY2025 10-K: …inventory is acquired primarily through forfeited pawn loan collateral and, to a lesser extent, through purchases of used goods directly from the general public. The Company also acquires limited quantities of new or refurbished merchandise inventories directly from wholesalers and manufacturers. Merchandise acquired…
- EZPW (EZCORP, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …pawn loan or the net realizable value of the item. As of September 30, 2025, consolidated pawn loans outstanding was $ 307.5 million, of which $ 117.9 million ( 38 %), is attributable to stores in Texas and $ 31.6 million ( 10 %) is attributable to stores in Florida. As of September 30, 2024, consolidated pawn loans…
- FY2025 10-K: - options that are not offered by traditional lenders, such as banks and credit unions, credit card providers or installment and short-term lenders. For many of our customers, pawn transactions provide an essential and financially responsible lifeline within their own neighborhoods for meeting their unexpected…
- TJX (THE TJX COMPANIES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …to Canada in 2001. This chain operates 160 stores and offers an array of home decor, furniture, and seasonal home merchandise. Marshalls, launched in Canada in 2011, operates 109 stores and offers off-price family apparel, footwear, and home fashions. TJX INTERNATIONAL Our TJX International segment operates the TK…
- FY2025 10-K: …by third parties. 7 Store Growth Expansion of our business through the addition of new stores continues to be an important part of our global growth strategy. The following table provides store growth information for our divisions for the two most recently completed fiscal years, as well as our estimates of the…
- ROST (Ross Stores, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …for our associates and their dependents. Competition We believe the principal competitive factors in the off-price retail apparel and home fashion industry are offering significant discounts on brand name merchandise, offering a well-balanced assortment that appeals to our target customers, and consistently providing…
- FY2025 10-K: …a racetrack aisle layout. A customer can locate desired departments by signs displayed just below the ceiling of each department. We enable our customers to select among sizes and styles through prominent category and sizing markers. Our stores have shopping carts and/or baskets available at the entrance for customer…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Economic-unit decomposition (SOTP): each disclosed business unit is assigned its native valuation basis before any multiple is applied. Operating units are valued on enterprise value; funded financial units are valued on their own common equity, because their borrowings fund earning assets rather than levering the parent. A company total is stated only once every material unit carries a supported value and the parent capital bridge reconciles.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 FY2026 earnings release, May 2026 · analyst revisions reported May 2026