SUPERNUS PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. (SUPN): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $46.97, SUPERNUS PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. (SUPN) is priced for +15.3% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-11.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/SUPN

Headline

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~7pp.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=12)

Solvency

Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 14.1%); the trailing year was depressed.

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

• Supernus has rebuilt itself around growth assets: first-quarter revenue rose 39 percent to $207.7 million, led by the non-stimulant ADHD drug Qelbree (up 20 percent to $77.9 million) and $27.6 million of ZURZUVAE collaboration revenue from the Sage acquisition.
• The balance sheet is a rarity in mid-cap pharma, $384 million of cash against zero funded debt with a share count that has edged down, so the growth is self-funded and acquisition capacity remains live.
• The biggest specific risk is portfolio dependency: the 10-K notes that an approved drug "can be cited by potential competitors in support of approval of an ANDA", the generic mechanism that already hollowed out the legacy epilepsy franchise, and ZURZUVAE's economics run through a Biogen collaboration Supernus does not control; watch the reiterated $840 to $870 million full-year revenue guidance at the August print.

Bull Case

Where the price lands against the valuation methods is unusually telling here: the peer-multiple read on sales actually sits about 10 percent above today's $48.48, the forward-growth lenses land essentially at it, and only the frames that capitalize the trailing GAAP trough, which carries acquisition and restructuring charges from the Sage deal, read the stock as expensive. In plain terms, the market is paying a normal sector sales multiple for a company growing revenue 39 percent, which is not how expensive growth stories are usually priced. The premium the price does embed, roughly 19 percent annual operating growth for five years on mid-cycle margins, is a pace the business is currently beating.

The products carrying that growth are each early on their curves. Qelbree, the first novel non-stimulant for ADHD in a generation, grew net sales 20 percent to $77.9 million in the first quarter, addressing a market the 10-K sizes at "an estimated 6% to 9% of all school-age children" plus adults, where stimulant side effects and abuse potential leave a persistent underserved segment. GOCOVRI grew 15 percent to $35.2 million, the ONAPGO apomorphine infusion device added $8.4 million in its launch year, and ZURZUVAE, the postpartum-depression asset acquired with Sage, contributed $27.6 million of collaboration revenue with Biogen-reported U.S. sales roughly doubling year over year and prescriptions up 82 percent. Four growth assets, none of them yet mature, against a legacy tail that has already shrunk to a minor drag.

The financial structure lets the portfolio compound without dilution. Supernus holds $384 million of cash and current marketable securities with zero funded debt, the share count has drifted down about 1.6 percent a year, GAAP results are within a rounding error of breakeven (a $2.3 million net loss last quarter, narrowed from $11.8 million), and management reiterated full-year guidance of $840 to $870 million in revenue and $140 to $170 million of non-GAAP adjusted operating earnings. A debt-free CNS platform with five-product diversification, proven M&A execution, and guidance implying its normalized earnings power roughly doubles from the trailing base: the bull case is that this is a growth pharma priced like a value stock because the GAAP optics lag the portfolio.

Bear Case

Every product in this portfolio fights a larger, cheaper, or better-armed competitor. Qelbree's real rival is not another branded non-stimulant; it is the wall of generic stimulants, methylphenidate and amphetamine formulations that cost pharmacies dollars, own decades of prescriber habit, and work faster for most patients. Qelbree's niche is patients and parents avoiding controlled substances, a real but bounded segment, and its growth rate has already stepped down from launch pace to 20 percent. In Parkinson's, GOCOVRI and ONAPGO compete for shrinking slices of a specialist market crowded with device and infusion alternatives. And ZURZUVAE's promising trajectory belongs only partly to Supernus: the economics flow through a collaboration in which, per the 10-K, either party "may terminate the Biogen Collaboration Agreement" under specified conditions, and Biogen's commercial priorities, not Supernus's, set the field force behind the launch.

The company's own history documents the terminal mechanics of its business model. The 10-K explains that once approved, a drug "becomes a listed drug, which can be cited by potential competitors in support of approval of an ANDA", and that mechanism already consumed Trokendi XR and is eroding the legacy franchise that once funded everything else. Specialty pharma platforms like this one live on a treadmill: every marketed product is a wasting asset with a patent clock, so the 19 percent annual operating growth the price embeds must be won again each cycle through pipeline output or acquisitions. Historically only about 41 percent of comparable fast-growers sustained that pace for five years, and Supernus's pipeline behind the current four growth assets is early and thin relative to the revenue it must eventually replace.

The trailing accounts show what the treadmill costs. GAAP operating results over the trailing year are negative on the EDGAR basis (acquisition, milestone, and restructuring charges from the Sage deal), stock-based compensation consumes most of the modest free cash flow once adjusted, and the earnings-power lens on five-year average operating income reads the price at many times what a no-growth version of this company supports. None of that matters if the growth continues; all of it matters the first year it does not. A portfolio of niche CNS products, each with a defined competitive ceiling and a patent horizon, priced for five more years of near-20-percent compounding, is a bet that the M&A machine keeps hitting, and serial-acquirer pharma has a mixed record of obliging.

Valuation

Trailing earnings need normalizing before the price reads sensibly: the trailing year's GAAP operating result is a loss on the EDGAR basis, weighed down by Sage-acquisition charges, so the price is read against the company's own through-the-cycle margins (about 14 percent mid-cycle) on current revenue. On that basis, $48.48 (July 10, 2026) pays about 23 times mid-cycle operating income, which implies operating growth near 19 percent a year for five years. The pace is within what Supernus has recently delivered, first-quarter revenue grew 39 percent, but only about 41 percent of comparable fast-growers sustained it for five years, which is why the priced-in assumption sits at the demanding end of within-range.

The method families split cleanly along the trough. The sales-based peer read lands about 10 percent above the price and the forward-growth lenses sit essentially at it (their base case holds today's elevated EV/EBITDA flat for six years, a multiple inflated by the depressed trailing EBITDA denominator). The frames reading the price as rich are the ones that capitalize trailing results: normalized five-year earnings power at roughly a ninth of the price and the stock-compensation-adjusted cash yield at roughly a seventh, both anchored to years before the acquired revenue existed. The bridge is the guidance: management's reiterated $840 to $870 million of revenue and $140 to $170 million of non-GAAP adjusted operating earnings for 2026 (a company-defined measure) describe an earnings base well above anything in the trailing statements. If that guidance lands, the mid-cycle multiple compresses on its own arithmetic.

Solvency is the cleanest part of the story: $384 million of cash and equivalents, zero funded debt, no meaningful dilution (share count down about 1.6 percent annually over four years), and positive free cash flow even through the acquisition year. The downside is therefore not financial stress but multiple risk on growth disappointment. What has to be true is concentrated in two lines: Qelbree keeps compounding within the ADHD market the filing describes, and ZURZUVAE's prescription momentum (up 82 percent year over year last quarter) keeps translating into collaboration revenue. The August print against the reiterated guidance is the next arithmetic check.

Catalysts

The second-quarter report, due in early August on the company's cadence, tests the reiterated full-year guidance of $840 to $870 million in revenue and $140 to $170 million of non-GAAP adjusted operating earnings. The first quarter cleared its bar comfortably, revenue up 39 percent to $207.7 million with a GAAP net loss narrowed to $2.3 million, so the market's question has shifted from whether the Sage integration works to how fast the combined portfolio compounds.

Product-level trajectories are the quarter-by-quarter catalysts. Qelbree's growth rate (20 percent last quarter, to $77.9 million) is the single most-watched line, since it anchors the organic story; ZURZUVAE's prescription momentum, up 82 percent year over year in the first quarter with Biogen-reported U.S. sales roughly doubling, drives the collaboration revenue that justified the Sage deal; and ONAPGO's first full launch year in Parkinson's ($8.4 million in the first quarter) shows whether the device franchise adds a fourth leg.

Business development is the standing optionality. With $384 million of cash, no funded debt, and management's stated strategy in the 10-K to "continue to grow our pipeline" and advance candidates toward commercialization, further CNS acquisitions are the likeliest use of the balance sheet, and any announced deal would reframe the growth-durability math the price depends on. On the risk calendar, generic and ANDA activity against marketed products and any change in the Biogen collaboration's commercial posture are the events that would move the stock fastest in the other direction.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Core business (reported)

• HRMY (HARMONY BIOSCIENCES HOLDINGS, INC.)
• FY2025 10-K: Because a number of companies compete with us, many of which have greater resources than we do, and because we face rapid changes in science in our industry, we cannot be certain that our products will be accepted in the marketplace or capture market share. Competition from other biotechnology and pharmaceutical…
• FY2025 10-K: …diseases segment consists of the Company's commercial product, WAKIX, and its potential product candidates, that focus on patients living with rare neurological diseases who have unmet needs. The Company currently derives all of its revenue from sales of WAKIX, which is used in the treatment of EDS and cataplexy in…
• JAZZ (Jazz Pharmaceuticals plc)
• FY2025 10-K: …deploy more personnel to market and sell their products than we do, and we compete with other companies to recruit, hire, train and retain pharmaceutical sales and marketing personnel. If our sales force and sales support organization are not appropriately resourced and sized to adequately promote our products, the…
• FY2025 10-K: …an emphasis on pollution prevention. Competition The biopharmaceutical industry is highly competitive. Our products compete, and our product candidates may in the future compete, with currently existing therapies, product candidates currently under development by us and others and/or future product candidates,…
• ALKS (Alkermes plc.)
• FY2025 10-K: …which could materially adversely effect our business, financial condition, cash flows and results of operations. 44 Our success largely depends upon our ability to attract, recognize and retain key personnel. Our ability to compete and succeed in the highly competitive biopharmaceutical industry and in the disease…
• FY2025 10-K: …condition, cash flows and results of operations; • our success largely depends upon our ability to attract, recognize and retain key personnel, and the loss of key personnel may materially and adversely impact our business; • patent and other IP protection for our products is key to our business and our competitive…
• CORT (CORCEPT THERAPEUTICS INC)
• FY2025 10-K: …biologics without generic or biosimilar competition. Orphan drugs are exempted from the Medicare drug price negotiation program provided that the only approved indications (or indications) is for one or more rare diseases or conditions for which the drug received orphan designation by FDA. Decreases in third-party…
• FY2025 10-K: …us to obtain acceptable prices or adequate insurance coverage and reimbursement for our Products, which would adversely affect our results of operations and financial position. " Results of Operations Net Product Revenue - Net product revenue is gross product revenue from sales to our customers less deductions for…
• ARDX (ARDELYX, INC.)
• FY2025 10-K: …into our target markets. Many of our competitors have materially greater name recognition and financial, manufacturing, marketing, research and drug development resources than we do. Additional mergers and acquisitions in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries may result in even more resources being…
• FY2025 10-K: …manufacture IBSRELA and XPHOZAH. If they are unable to comply with applicable regulatory requirements, unable to source sufficient raw materials, experience manufacturing or distribution difficulties or are otherwise unable to manufacture sufficient quantities to meet demand, our commercialization of IBSRELA and…
• KNSA (Kiniksa Pharmaceuticals International, plc)
• FY2025 10-K: …could be delayed. Risks Related to Competition, Executing our Strategy and Managing Growth We face substantial competition, which may result in others discovering, developing or commercializing drugs before or more successfully than we do. The development and commercialization of new drugs and biologics is highly…
• FY2025 10-K: …licensing, collaboration or other strategic transactions or arrangements may require us to relinquish rights to some of our technologies, product candidates or future revenue streams, or otherwise agree to terms unfavorable to us, any of which may have a material adverse effect on our business, operating results and…
• ANIP (ANI PHARMACEUTICALS, INC)
• FY2025 10-K: …in selecting products to develop and commercialize. • Market Size and Patient Need . When determining whether to develop or acquire an individual product, we review the current and expected market size and competitive environment for that product. We endeavor to pursue products with sufficient market size to enable…
• FY2025 10-K: …our products. If competitors introduce new products with therapeutic or cost advantages, our products can be subject to progressive price reductions and/or decreased volume of sales. Generics and Others Segment The primary means of competition among generic drug manufacturers are pricing, contract terms, service…
• FOLD (AMICUS THERAPEUTICS, INC.)
• FY2025 10-K: …profits from operations. The degree of market acceptance of our product candidates, if approved for commercial sale, will depend on a number of factors, including: -31- Table of Contents • the efficacy and potential advantages compared to competitive or alternative treatments, including generics and gene therapies; •…
• FY2025 10-K: …including commercial enterprises, academic institutions, government agencies, and private and public research institutions. Any product candidates that we successfully develop and commercialize will compete with both existing and new therapies that may become available in the future. Many of our competitors may have…

Methodology Note

• Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
• Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
• Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
• Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.