SUN COMMUNITIES, INC (SUI): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers SUN COMMUNITIES, INC (SUI) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-11.

Generated: 2026-08-08 · Exported: 2026-08-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/SUI

Headline

FieldValue
TickerSUI
CompanySUN COMMUNITIES, INC
Sector / IndustryReal Estate
Current price$120.88/sh

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basisreit
Price-to-FFO8.0x
FFO yield12.6%

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr funds-from-operations decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.1% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.55σ
cohort percentile (of 105 peers)11
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0.90x1justifies
Earnings1.43x4expensive
Relative0.58x3justifies
Growth1.03x5expensive

Families that justify the price: Asset, Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=13)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$146.190.83xyesFCF base $0.9B, growth 4% (input: historical growth), terminal g 3.8%, WACC 8.1%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$123.120.98xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 32.1x / 34.1x / 36.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 24.24x (blended: static sector reference 35x + trailing (TTM) 8x), scenarios: 20.3x / 24.2x / 28.2x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 24.24x
Simple DDMGrowth$46.472.60xyesDPS $4.27, g=0.1% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3%
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$116.841.03xyesStage 1: 13% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$0.32377.73xyesBV/sh $53.81, ROE (TTM) 0.1%, ke 9.3% (excluded from median)
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$0.16755.47xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% (excluded from median)
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$91.241.32xyesRev $2.3B, growth 4% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 5.4x / 6.5x / 7.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$200.590.60xyesFFO/share $14.90, growth 13% (input: historical FFO/share growth, 10y median), PEG=304.54 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAsset$0.111098.86xyesBV $53.81 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 0.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 0.0%/yr (excluded from median)
Graham NumberAsset$134.320.90xyes√(22.5 × FFO/share $14.90 × BVPS $53.81) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.52B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$57.042.12xyesFCF $889.6M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$52.972.28xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.84B (FCF $0.89B − SBC $0.05B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$442.380.27xyesFFO/share $14.90 × (8.5 + 2×13.5%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $2.34B × sector P/S 6.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$300.890.40xyesFFO/share $14.90 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 13.5% (input: historical FFO/share growth, 10y median)) → PE 20.2x
Earnings YieldEarnings$161.080.75xyesFFO/share $14.90 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelative$209.580.58xyesFFO/share $14.90 × 14.1x P/FFO (route cohort median, n=85); FFO $1.87B (FFO incl. D&A + impairments, FY2025, companyfacts), shares 126M
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
MH (Manufactured Housing)operatingenterprise0.0B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value
RV (Recreational Vehicle)operatingenterprise0.0B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value
Marinaoperatingenterprise0.0B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Funds from operations (trailing)$1.9b
Share count CAGR (dilution)2.0%
Burning cashno

REIT basis: leverage is read against funds from operations (FFO), not depreciation-gutted operating income. The header's implied growth runs on ADJUSTED FFO — FFO minus recurring maintenance capex — so the header's multiple and this leverage ratio use bases that differ by that capex; neither substitutes for the other. Net debt could not be resolved from the corporate debt tags in the filings (REIT notes and mortgage debt are often tagged outside the corporate ladder), so the leverage ratio is withheld rather than rendered from incomplete tags. Interest expense is not separately reported in the cached statements, so fixed-charge coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Watch what management has done with the balance sheet over the past eighteen months, because it amounts to a controlled demolition of everything investors disliked about the old Sun Communities. The sprawling marina platform is sold; proceeds went to debt reduction and shareholders; and the 10-K states the intent plainly: "We intend to maintain our strong financial position and lower leverage profile by focusing on our core fundamentals, which are generating positive cash flows from operations, maintaining appropriate debt levels and leverage ratios, and controlling overhead costs". The follow-through is measurable: roughly $60.1 million of stock repurchased in the first quarter, then a new $1 billion buyback authorization in May 2026, effective through May 2027, against a $14.9 billion market cap. A REIT buying back its own stock in size is management telling you where it thinks the cheapest real estate is.

The remaining core is the strongest small niche in residential real estate. Manufactured-housing residents own their homes but rent the land beneath them; moving a home is expensive and disruptive, so occupancy behaves like infrastructure: the 10-K reports Same Property adjusted blended occupancy of 99.1 percent, up 40 basis points year over year, and the first quarter of 2026 showed the pricing power that comes with it, North America Same Property NOI up 6.3 percent with blended occupancy at 98.7 percent. Supply is structurally constrained because few municipalities approve new manufactured-housing communities, which the filing acknowledges from the other side when it lists "an oversupply of, or a reduced demand for, manufactured homes" as a risk that in practice rarely materializes in its markets.

The first quarter delivered Core FFO of $1.40 per share against consensus near $1.31, and management raised full-year Core FFO guidance to $6.87 to $7.07. With the price at $118.82, the market pays about 17 times the midpoint of that guided Core FFO for a landlord with 99 percent occupancy, annual-lease pricing power, mid-single-digit NOI growth, a deleveraged balance sheet, a $4.27 per-share dividend, and a billion-dollar authorization to shrink the denominator. The bull case is simply that boring, near-full, rent-raising land ownership compounds quietly while the buyback works.

Bear Case

The moat here is real, but its edges are eroding where the growth was supposed to come from. The RV side, the part of the portfolio that behaves like hospitality rather than housing, is already leaking: the FY2025 10-K reports RV Same Property NOI declining 1.4 percent, "driven by lower than anticipated real property - transient revenues". Transient RV stays are discretionary consumer spending wearing a real-estate costume, and they soften exactly when household budgets do. Meanwhile the crown-jewel MH side faces the quieter erosion the filing itself lists: "increased operating costs, including insurance premiums, real estate taxes, and utilities", cost lines that have been repricing upward across Sun Belt markets faster than annual lot-rent increases can politely absorb, plus "competition from other available MH and RV communities and alternative forms of housing (such as apartment buildings" in markets where apartment supply has surged.

The strategic bear is that Sun sold its growth engine and kept its steady state. The marina platform was the external-growth story; what remains is a portfolio whose occupancy, at 99.1 percent, has essentially nowhere to go. From full occupancy, NOI growth is rent increases minus cost inflation, full stop, and the affordability politics of raising lot rents on fixed-income homeowners put a soft ceiling on the first term just as insurance and taxes lift the second. First-quarter GAAP results printed a net loss of $8.7 million even as Core FFO beat, a reminder of how much definitional distance sits between the headline metric and the bottom line.

And the cheap-looking multiple deserves scrutiny before it is trusted. The trailing funds-from-operations base includes the divestiture year, inflated by disposal-related items, which is why backward-looking reads sit so low; on the company's own forward Core FFO guidance the price is about 17 times, a normal manufactured-housing multiple, not a distressed one. The growth-oriented lenses read the price as more than double what the divestiture-shrunk trailing trajectory supports, which is the mechanical way of saying the market is already crediting the post-sale company with a clean slate. If NOI growth fades from 6 percent toward the cost-inflation line, the re-rating case evaporates and the stock is a bond proxy with a 3.6 percent yield in a market where treasuries compete hard for that money.

Valuation

A real-estate trust is read on adjusted funds from operations, the cash the properties generate after the maintenance capex that keeps them leasable, and on that trailing basis the price looks almost implausibly low: about 8 times, below what even a 5 percent annual decline in funds from operations would warrant, and in the lower half of the REIT group. That number needs its bridge stated once: the trailing FY2025 base (FFO of $14.90 per share on the companyfacts basis) includes the marina-divestiture year with its disposal-related items, while the company's own post-sale Core FFO guidance midpoint of $6.97 puts today's $118.82 (July 10, 2026) at roughly 17 times forward Core FFO, a company-defined non-GAAP measure. The first basis says the market prices decline; the second says it prices a fair, unheroic multiple for a full-occupancy landlord. Both are true on their own bases, and the truth in between is that the post-sale Sun is neither distressed nor expensive.

The method families sort along the same seam. The asset-value and peer-multiple lenses support the price, with the cohort funds-from-operations read (a 13.5x multiple against the trailing base, cohort of 86 REITs) landing well above it. The earnings-power and growth lenses read the price as 1.5 to 2.4 times what they defend, but their inputs inherit the divestiture: trailing revenue shrank double digits because the marinas left the ledger, not because the communities weakened. The cleaner operating signals point the other way, with first-quarter Same Property NOI up 6.3 percent and occupancy at 98.7 percent.

On the balance sheet, the corporate debt could not be cleanly aggregated from the filings' tags (REIT mortgage and note structures sit outside the standard corporate ladder), so the honest statement is qualitative: the stated strategy is a "strong financial position and lower leverage profile", the marina proceeds went substantially to deleveraging, and the company funds a $4.27 per-share dividend (about a 3.6 percent yield) alongside its buyback from operating cash flow. What has to be true at today's price is modest: same-property NOI growth near the guided 4.7 percent midpoint, RV transient softness staying contained to its roughly one-seventh share of the story, and cost inflation in insurance and taxes not swallowing the rent escalators. The decisive variable is the spread between lot-rent growth and operating-cost growth, and it is printed every quarter in the same-property table.

Catalysts

The second-quarter report, due in early August on the company's cadence, gets measured against a raised bar: full-year Core FFO guidance of $6.87 to $7.07 per share (midpoint $6.97) and North America same-property NOI growth around a 4.7 percent midpoint, set after first-quarter Core FFO of $1.40 beat consensus of about $1.31 with 6.3 percent NOI growth. The internal split to watch is MH annual leases versus RV transient revenue, the line that dragged RV same-property NOI negative in fiscal 2025.

Capital deployment is the second track. The $1 billion repurchase authorization announced in May 2026 runs through May 27, 2027, following $60.1 million of buybacks in the first quarter; the pace of execution against it, and whether management supplements buybacks with acquisitions (guidance incorporates only deals completed through April 27, 2026), will define the per-share compounding rate. Any large MH portfolio acquisition would signal a pivot from shrinking the share count back to external growth.

The macro channels are the standard REIT pair: interest rates, which set both the discount on a bond-proxy income stream and the refinancing cost of the debt stack, and Sun Belt cost inflation, especially property insurance and real estate taxes, the expense lines the 10-K flags and the main threat to the NOI spread. Seasonally, the summer quarters carry the RV transient revenue, so this print and the next are the year's cleanest read on whether that softness is stabilizing.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

MH (Manufactured Housing) / RV (Recreational Vehicle) / Marina (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

company Q1 2026 results and May 2026 announcement · company announcements, May 2026 · company FY2025 10-K; Q1 2026 results · company Q1 2026 results · company 2026 guidance · company Q1 2026 results and raised guidance, May 2026 · company announcements, May-June 2026

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