Strategic Education, Inc. (STRA): what the price assumes
boothcheck covers Strategic Education, Inc. (STRA) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-11.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/STRA
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | STRA |
| Company | Strategic Education, Inc. |
| Sector / Industry | Consumer Cyclical |
| Current price | $83.52/sh |
| Composition | Tuition, net of discounts, grants and scholarships 85% / Other (academic fees, course materials, placement fees, non-tuition) 3% / Education Technology Services 12% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 2.2% |
| Operating margin today | 14.0% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -11.8pp |
| Multiple paid | 10x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.3% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.09σ |
| cohort percentile (of 214 peers) | 18 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.35x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.29x | 5 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.39x | 2 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.69x | 5 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=17)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $185.55 | 0.45x | yes | FCF base $0.2B, growth 4% (input: historical growth), terminal g 3.5%, WACC 8.5%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $120.87 | 0.69x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 6.8x / 8.8x / 10.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | — | — | no | P/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.1x / 18.0x / 20.9x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | $256.07 | 0.33x | yes | DPS $2.40, g=8.2% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3% |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $85.26 | 0.98x | yes | Stage 1: 20% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $65.48 | 1.28x | yes | BV/sh $73.56, ROE (TTM) 8.2%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $61.74 | 1.35x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $78.49 | 1.06x | yes | Rev $1.3B, growth 4% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.2x / 1.4x / 1.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $202.29 | 0.41x | yes | EPS $5.99, growth 34% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.41 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $57.57 | 1.45x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.14B × (1−28%) / WACC 8.5% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $61.14 | 1.37x | yes | BV $73.56 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 8.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 5.4%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $99.57 | 0.84x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $5.99 × BVPS $73.56) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | EBITDA $0.23B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $75.16 | 1.11x | yes | FCF $168.6M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $64.50 | 1.29x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.15B (FCF $0.17B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $193.28 | 0.43x | yes | EPS $5.99 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $17.50 | 4.77x | yes | BV $73.56 × (ROIC 2.0% / WACC 8.5%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | Revenue $1.29B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $224.63 | 0.37x | yes | EPS $5.99 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $64.76 | 1.29x | yes | EPS $5.99 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)
One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.
| Unit | Role | Valuation basis | Revenue | Reported profit | Value evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. Higher Education | operating | enterprise | $868.2m | $0 operating-income | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| Australia/New Zealand | operating | enterprise | $251.6m | $0 operating-income | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| Education Technology Services | operating | enterprise | $148.4m | $0 operating-income | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net cash | $128.8m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | -1.00x (net cash) |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | -0.71x (net cash) |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -2.5% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
- Strategic Education pairs two slow-growth universities (Strayer and Capella) with a fast lane: its 10-K reports that "ETS segment revenues increased 41.4% to $148.4 million in 2025" on Workforce Edge employer partnerships and Sophia Learning subscriptions, the piece of the business that is genuinely compounding.
- The biggest specific risk is regulatory concentration: the same filing describes the 90/10 Rule limiting how much revenue a proprietary institution may derive from federal funds, with proposals in Congress to tighten the limit to 85 percent, a lever entirely outside management's control.
- At $83.73 (July 10, 2026) the price asks very little, sitting below what even a 5 percent annual operating-profit decline would warrant, so the thing to watch is whether U.S. enrollment returns to growth by year-end as management suggested on the first-quarter call.
Bull Case
Start with the balance sheet, because it explains how much of the risk here is already defused. Strategic Education carries zero funded debt and $158 million of net cash, pays a $2.45 per-share dividend (about a 2.9 percent yield at today's price), and has shrunk its share count roughly 2.1 percent a year over the past four years. For a company whose sector's historical failures were leverage-plus-enrollment-decline spirals, running debt-free with recurring cash generation of about $174 million in trailing free cash flow (better than a 9 percent yield on the entire market cap) means management can absorb an enrollment air pocket, keep paying the dividend, and buy back stock through it. First-quarter 2026 operating cash flow of $87.4 million reinforced exactly that pattern: soft enrollment news, sustained buybacks, dividend intact.
The operating business is quietly improving underneath. The 10-K records revenue of $1,268.2 million in 2025 against $1,219.9 million in 2024, with income from operations rising to "$174.2 million in 2025 compared to $155.6 million in 2024, primarily driven by higher revenue in our USHE and ETS segments". The growth engine is Education Technology Services: "ETS segment revenues increased 41.4% to $148.4 million in 2025 compared to $104.9 million in 2024, primarily due to an increase in Workforce Edge revenue from employer partnerships, growth in Sophia Learning subscriptions, and higher employer affiliated enrollment". That segment sells software-like education infrastructure to employers rather than degrees to consumers, and it now feeds the universities too: employer-affiliated students reached a record 34.5 percent of U.S. Higher Education enrollment in the first quarter. Every point of that mix shift lowers acquisition cost and reduces dependence on federal student aid.
And the stock is priced as if none of this compounds. At about 14.8x trailing earnings against an 18x sector median, and roughly 8.9x EV/EBITDA against a 12x sector median, most of the standard lenses land above today's price; the market is paying about 12x operating income, below what even a 5 percent annual decline path would justify. Management concedes the first quarter was the year's low point for revenue growth and expects sequential enrollment improvement, with a possible return to total U.S. enrollment growth by year-end. If that happens, the bull case does not require multiple expansion so much as the removal of a decline assumption the business is not actually exhibiting.
Bear Case
The variable with the most leverage over this business is written in Washington, not Herndon. Strategic Education's universities live inside the Title IV federal aid system, and the 10-K spells out the tripwire: a proprietary institution "is prohibited from deriving more than 90% of its revenues (as revenues are computed under the Department of Education's methodology) from federal funds on a cash accounting basis", while members of Congress have "proposed to revise the 90/10 Rule to reduce the limit on federal funding to 85% of total revenue". The filing adds, with the flatness of someone who has been through this before, that the company cannot predict how such changes will unfold. Accreditor oversight is a second, parallel dependency: Middle States must approve new Strayer locations and monitors institutions with significant enrollment growth. None of these constraints exist for the competing nonprofit and public online programs that have spent a decade taking share, which is the structural asymmetry a cheap multiple cannot fix.
The demand engine is also sputtering in the near term. First-quarter 2026 revenue of $305.9 million came in about 2.5 percent below expectations on softer U.S. enrollment and heavier discounting and scholarship activity, and management's plan to offset it, second-quarter pricing actions, tests exactly the price elasticity that for-profit education has historically failed. Revenue per student is guided merely stable for the year. When your two university brands enroll working adults, a strong labor market is a headwind, and the segment carrying the growth story (ETS at $148.4 million of 2025 revenue) is still only about 12 percent of the company.
The price is not demanding, and that is the fairest version of the bear: this is a value-priced stock that can stay value-priced. Return on equity runs 7.9 percent on trailing figures, below a reasonable cost of equity, which is why the book-return lenses land beneath today's price even as the earnings and multiple lenses sit above it. A business earning sub-cost-of-capital returns on its equity base, growing revenue at roughly 4 percent, and exposed to a single regulatory rewrite does not obviously deserve a re-rating; it deserves exactly the skeptical multiple it has. The street has been trimming as well, with Barrington cutting its target to $95 from $105 after the first-quarter report even while keeping an Outperform. The bear here is not a crash thesis. It is a decade of dead money while the dividend pays you to wait for an enrollment inflection that keeps sliding one quarter to the right.
Valuation
The market is paying about 12x company-wide operating income for Strategic Education, a multiple low enough that the price sits below what even a 5 percent annual operating-profit decline would warrant. Whatever else is debatable, the price is not embedding optimism: it is broadly consistent with plausible outcomes and arguably consistent with mild erosion, for a business whose operating income actually rose to $174.2 million in 2025 from $155.6 million in 2024 per the 10-K.
The methods mostly agree. The peer-multiple lenses sit furthest above the price: about 14.8x trailing earnings against an 18x sector median, roughly 8.9x EV/EBITDA against 12x, and the sales-based read lands similarly. The cash-flow lenses also clear it, even holding today's multiple flat. The only family that reads the price as rich is the book-return one, and its complaint is informative rather than contradictory: trailing return on equity of 7.9 percent sits below the cost of equity, so lenses that capitalize equity returns put the business's central estimate around 30 to 40 percent below the price. Reconciled, the pattern says the company earns respectable income on its revenue (13.8 percent trailing operating margin) but modest returns on a large equity base, much of it goodwill from the Strayer-Capella combination. That is a value name with a returns question, not a growth bet.
What has to be true at today's price is undemanding: operating income roughly holds. The supports are concrete. Revenue mix is tilting toward the fast-growing services segment, whose "revenues increased 41.4% to $148.4 million in 2025" per the filing; tuition remains the anchor at about 85 percent of revenue. The balance sheet carries no funded debt and $158 million of net cash, free cash flow ran about $174 million over the trailing year, the dividend costs a fraction of that, and the share count declines about 2 percent annually. The downside bound is a regulatory or enrollment shock, not a solvency event. The decisive number for the next four quarters is U.S. Higher Education enrollment, which management expects to improve sequentially from a first-quarter low.
Catalysts
The second-quarter report, due in late July on the company's usual cadence, carries the burden of proof for management's claim that the first quarter marked the low point for revenue growth. First-quarter revenue of $305.9 million missed expectations by about 2.5 percent on softer enrollment and heavier discounting, while EPS of $1.41 met the forecast; the watch items now are whether the second-quarter pricing actions hold revenue per student stable as guided, and whether U.S. Higher Education enrollment shows the sequential improvement management pointed to, with a possible return to total enrollment growth by year-end.
The employer channel is the structural trend worth tracking print by print. Employer-affiliated enrollment reached a record 34.5 percent of U.S. Higher Education students in the first quarter, and the Education Technology Services segment (Workforce Edge and Sophia Learning) grew 41.4 percent in 2025. Continued mix shift there compounds quietly: lower student-acquisition cost, lower federal-aid dependence, and a services revenue line that scales without new campuses.
Regulatory headlines are the binary risk channel. Congressional proposals to tighten the 90/10 Rule to 85 percent, or broader Higher Education Act reauthorization activity, would move the stock regardless of fundamentals. Street positioning is modestly constructive: Barrington trimmed its price target to $95 from $105 after the first quarter while maintaining an Outperform rating. Capital return remains the steady backdrop, with buybacks continuing through the soft quarter and the dividend intact.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
U.S. Higher Education (reported)
- LOPE (Grand Canyon Education, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …and, like all ED guidance, is subject to change and may impact our business model. We are also regulated (depending upon the applicable activity being regulated) by other federal agencies or departments including the SEC, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). REGULATION OF…
- FY2025 10-K: …access to and the costs of student loans remains in a state of flux. The uncertainty surrounding these issues, and any resolution of these issues that increases loan costs or reduces students' access to Title IV loans or to student extended payment plans, could reduce student demand for educational programs which…
- LAUR (Laureate Education, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …specified academic goals and that the degrees granted and plans of study are aligned with those goals; that their academic offerings are compatible with their planning goals (e.g., there is sufficient labor demand for careers offered); that there are only two regular semesters of studies per year; that they have…
- FY2025 10-K: …We believe that students' and families' willingness to allocate personal resources to fund higher education at our institutions validates our strong value proposition. • Revenue Visibility Enhanced by Program Length and Strong Retention. The length of our programs provides us with a high degree of revenue visibility.…
- PRDO (Perdoceo Education Corporation)
- FY2025 10-K: …a new earnings-based eligibility requirement for federal student loans that applies equally to all higher education institutions, and adopts new loan repayment options. The changes generally take effect beginning July 1, 2026, and apply prospectively to new borrowers. Some of the changes are the subject of current…
- FY2025 10-K: …that made broad changes to many areas of federal spending. The Act includes a number of changes to federal student aid programs under the HEA, including eliminating and replacing Grad PLUS loans for new graduate and professional students, imposing new annual and lifetime borrowing limits across multiple loan…
- GHC (GRAHAM HOLDINGS CO)
- FY2025 10-K: …of Kaplan University or the ability of KNA to contract with any client institution to provide bundled services in exchange for a share of tuition revenue could require KNA to modify the TOSA, other agreements or its practices and could impact the revenues KNA may receive under such agreements. Congress, the ED and…
- FY2025 10-K: …repayment of Title IV loans based on certain conduct of the institution, establish specific measures of financial responsibility and administrative capability, regulate the addition of new campuses and programs and other institutional changes, require compliance with state professional licensure board requirements to…
- LRN (Stride, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …and internationally, and thus, the geographic market for many of our products and services is global and indeterminate in size. Finally, our Adult Learning brands compete with post-secondary providers, both public and private, as well as other certificate and credential providers. They also compete with upskilling…
- FY2025 10-K: …behind grade level or under credited, we continually strive to achieve that objective by undertaking new initiatives and improving existing programs that support students and families. To monitor student learning progress during the school year, we use multiple equivalent assessments at the lesson, unit and semester…
Australia/New Zealand (reported)
- LOPE (Grand Canyon Education, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …Rule 405 of Regulation S-T (§232.405 of this chapter) during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to submit such files). Yes ☒ No ☐ Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a large accelerated filer, an accelerated filer, a non-accelerated filer, a smaller…
- FY2025 10-K: …into a sublease of that space for the period from January 2026 to June 2027 and entered into a new lease for a much smaller space effective January 2026. Additionally, an impairment was recorded in the amount of $1.1 million in the year ended December 31, 2025 for the two off-campus classroom and laboratory sites…
- LAUR (Laureate Education, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: 4-10-01 2024-12-31 0000912766 2025-10-30 0000912766 us-gaap:RelatedPartyMember 2025-03-13 2025-03-13 0000912766 laur:OpenMarketRepurchasesMember 2025-01-01 2025-12-31 0000912766 us-gaap:SubsequentEventMember 2026-02-19 0000912766 us-gaap:CommonStockMember 2023-10-30 0000912766 us-gaap:CommonStockMember 2023-11-30…
- FY2025 10-K: …2025-12-31 0000912766 us-gaap:AccumulatedTranslationAdjustmentMember 2024-12-31 0000912766 us-gaap:AccumulatedForeignCurrencyAdjustmentAttributableToNoncontrollingInterestMember 2024-12-31 0000912766 us-gaap:AccumulatedForeignCurrencyAdjustmentIncludingPortionAttributableToNoncontrollingInterestMember 2024-12-31…
- PRDO (Perdoceo Education Corporation)
- FY2025 10-K: Gross contract assets ( 42,446 ) ( 24,551 ) Deferred revenue, net $ 37,844 $ 36,740 Deferred Revenue Changes in our deferred revenue balances for the years ended December 31, 2025 and 2024 were as follows (dollars in thousands): For the Year Ended December 31, 2025 CTU (2) AIUS (2) USAHS (3) Total Gross deferred…
- FY2025 10-K: 10-K FY false 0001046568 http://fasb.org/us-gaap/2025#RestrictedCashCurrent http://fasb.org/us-gaap/2025#UsefulLifeShorterOfTermOfLeaseOrAssetUtilityMember http://fasb.org/us-gaap/2025#OperatingLeaseLiabilityCurrent http://fasb.org/us-gaap/2025#FinanceLeaseLiabilityCurrent…
- GHC (GRAHAM HOLDINGS CO)
- FY2025 10-K: …us-gaap:AccumulatedGainLossNetCashFlowHedgeParentMember 2024-01-01 2024-12-31 0000104889 us-gaap:ReclassificationOutOfAccumulatedOtherComprehensiveIncomeMember us-gaap:AccumulatedGainLossNetCashFlowHedgeParentMember 2023-01-01 2023-12-31 0000104889…
- FY2025 10-K: FranchiseRightsMember 2024-12-31 0000104889 us-gaap:TrademarksAndTradeNamesMember 2025-12-31 0000104889 us-gaap:TrademarksAndTradeNamesMember 2024-12-31 0000104889 us-gaap:OperatingAndBroadcastRightsMember 2025-12-31 0000104889 us-gaap:OperatingAndBroadcastRightsMember 2024-12-31 0000104889…
Education Technology Services (reported)
- LRN (Stride, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …we have high-quality, engaging coursework and content in information technology and healthcare. Instructional Services We provide a broad range of instructional services that include customer support for instructional teams, including recruitment of state certified teachers, training in research-based online…
- FY2025 10-K: …platform can be offered in an integrated package of systems, services, products, and professional expertise to support a virtual public school. Customers of these programs can obtain administrative support, information technology, academic support services, online curriculum, learning systems and instructional…
- LOPE (Grand Canyon Education, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …develop new degree programs often delivered online, has historically been characterized by a full-service, revenue-sharing model, based on the premise that most traditional institutions are not only operationally unprepared to offer these programs at scale but also are not equipped to make the significant upfront…
- FY2025 10-K: …that are issued by the federal government under the Federal Direct Loan program (the "FDL Program"), as well as grant programs for students with demonstrated financial need. To participate in the Title IV programs, a school must receive and maintain authorization by the appropriate state agency or agencies, be…
- PRDO (Perdoceo Education Corporation)
- FY2025 10-K: …Other expenses within this expense category include costs of advertising and production of marketing materials and bad debt expense. Year Ended December 31, 2025 as Compared to the Year Ended December 31, 2024 Revenue Revenue for the year ended December 31, 2025 (" current year ") increased by 24.2% or $164.8…
- FY2025 10-K: …Area Accredited (2) ABET Colorado Technical University, Colorado Springs Electrical engineering and computer engineering Accreditation Council for Business Schools and Programs AIUS: American InterContinental University (all locations), California Southern University and Trident University International; Colorado…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Economic-unit decomposition (SOTP): each disclosed business unit is assigned its native valuation basis before any multiple is applied. Operating units are valued on enterprise value; funded financial units are valued on their own common equity, because their borrowings fund earning assets rather than levering the parent. A company total is stated only once every material unit carries a supported value and the parent capital bridge reconciles.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 2026 earnings call · company Q1 2026 results, May 2026 · company Q1 2026 results and earnings call · Barrington research note, May 2026 · company Q1 2026 results and earnings call, May 2026 · Q1 2026 earnings call; company FY2025 10-K