Stagwell Inc (STGW): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $8.84, Stagwell Inc (STGW) is priced for +15.3% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-11.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/STGW

Headline

FieldValue
TickerSTGW
CompanyStagwell Inc
Sector / IndustryCommunication Services / Advertising
Current price$8.84/sh
CompositionUnited States 77% / United Kingdom 6% / Other 17%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.0%
Operating margin today4.6%
Margin compression (value-band)-1.6pp
Implied growth15.3%
Multiple paid27x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7.9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~8.2pp.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~5.3 years; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.10σ
cohort percentile (of 34 peers)65
sustained it ~5 years at this level44%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset8.42x2expensive
Earnings4.11x4expensive
Relative7.38x2expensive
Growth0.69x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=11)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$32.400.27xyesFCF base $0.3B, growth 7% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 6.9%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$12.860.69xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 10.0x / 12.0x / 14.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 39.6x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 134x), scenarios: 33.0x / 39.6x / 46.2x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$0.7112.45xyesBV/sh $2.72, ROE (TTM) 2.4%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$0.4121.56xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% (excluded from median)
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$7.071.25xyesRev $3.0B, growth 7% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.6x / 0.7x / 0.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$0.7911.19xyesEPS $0.07, growth 1% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=98.55 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$0.2831.57xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.15B × (1−21%) / WACC 6.9% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median)
Residual IncomeAsset$0.3029.47xyesBV $2.72 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 2.4% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 1.6%/yr (excluded from median)
Graham NumberAsset$2.014.40xyes√(22.5 × EPS $0.07 × BVPS $2.72) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.31B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$4.621.91xyesFCF $252.7M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$2.184.06xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.20B (FCF $0.25B − SBC $0.06B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$2.124.17xyesEPS $0.07 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$0.1655.25xyesBV $2.72 × (ROIC 0.4% / WACC 6.9%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $3.04B × sector P/S 3.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$2.473.58xyesEPS $0.07 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$0.7112.45xyesEPS $0.07 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Marketing Servicesoperatingenterprise$1.1twithheldunresolved no unit value
Digital Transformationoperatingenterprise$393.5bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Media & Commerceoperatingenterprise$690.7bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Communicationsoperatingenterprise$592.6bwithheldunresolved no unit value
The Marketing Cloudoperatingenterprise$106.5bwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$1.3b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)12.23x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)9.66x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-4.6%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The balance sheet tells you where management is placing its bets, and Stagwell is spending aggressively on its own stock. Trailing buybacks ran $163.9 million against reported net income of just $24 million, a ratio that only makes sense if you read the business through cash generation rather than GAAP earnings: trailing free cash flow was $280 million, a 14% free-cash yield on the market cap. The 10-K frames capital allocation as the point of the enterprise, a company "focused on delivering strong organic growth and free cash flow to support efficient capital allocation" with a stated track record in "acquisition execution and integration". When a company retires its share count this fast at a depressed multiple, it is telling you it thinks the equity is cheap.

The operating momentum backs the spending. Q1 2026 revenue of $704 million grew 8% year over year, and the more telling number is the pipeline: record net new business of $141 million in the quarter and $486 million on a trailing-twelve-month basis, running roughly $80 million ahead of the same point a year earlier. Stagwell signed a $60 million multi-year government contract and booked $12 million toward a $25 million first-year target for its AI and enterprise-tech products. This is a holding company winning share in exactly the parts of marketing that are growing, the digital and data-driven work the 10-K describes as where "growth in the marketing services industry now comes primarily".

The positioning is structural, not accidental. Stagwell was assembled specifically to sit on the digital, performance, and technology side of the marketing business rather than the legacy creative-agency model, and management reiterated full-year 2026 guidance for 8% to 12% net revenue growth with $475 million to $525 million of adjusted EBITDA. The share count is falling, the pipeline is at a record, and the free cash flow funds the buyback without new leverage. For a stock at $7.80 trading below one times sales, the bull case is that the market is pricing the messy GAAP income statement and ignoring the cash the business actually throws off.

Bear Case

Advertising is the first line item clients cut when the economy turns, and Stagwell's own 10-K is unusually blunt about it. The risk factors name the machinery of the threat directly: client loss driven by "consolidation, insolvency or a reduction in marketing budgets due to recessionary economic" conditions, compounded by "inflationary pressures, currency fluctuations, geopolitical uncertainty and elevated interest rates" that reduce demand for its services. This is a business whose revenue is a derivative of other companies' confidence, and it carries that macro sensitivity into a balance sheet with little slack. A downturn does not dent Stagwell at the margin; it hits the top line directly, and the top line is what services the debt.

That debt is the second problem. Debt-to-equity sits at 1.99, the current ratio is 0.83 (current liabilities exceed current assets), and the Altman score of 0.98 lands in distress territory. The 10-K discloses a covenant obligation to "maintain a Total Leverage Ratio ... below an established threshold" under its JPMorgan-led credit agreement, and warns that leverage limits flexibility "in planning for, or reacting to, changes in our business or market conditions". In a cyclical business, a leverage covenant tied to EBITDA is a trapdoor: if a recession compresses EBITDA, the leverage ratio rises mechanically toward the covenant just as the operating environment is worst.

The reported earnings quality is the tell that the story is being carried by adjustments. GAAP operating margin swung from 8.2% in the September quarter to 1.37% in the March quarter, net income turned negative in the most recent quarter, and the trailing P/E of 103 reflects a business barely profitable on a GAAP basis while the bull case leans entirely on adjusted EBITDA and free cash flow. Operating cash flow itself is lumpy, negative $26.5 million in the March quarter after positive $260 million in December, the working-capital swings typical of a project-based services model. The price is paying about 31x company-wide operating income for growth the company has to sustain for years; only about 41% of comparable fast-growers held that pace for even five, and few of them carried this much leverage into the attempt.

Valuation

The methods disagree sharply, and the disagreement is the whole story. At $7.80 (July 11, 2026), the relative-multiple and growth-oriented lenses find the stock cheap, the price sitting well below where a sales multiple or a cash-flow model would place it, while the asset-based and earnings-power lenses find it wildly expensive, more than double to many times what tangible book and normalized GAAP earnings support. That pattern is characteristic of an acquisitive holding company: the balance sheet is loaded with goodwill and intangibles from past deals, so asset-based methods read the equity as thin (book value is just $2.81 per share), while the cash the operating businesses generate reads the price as a bargain.

Inverting the price makes the bet concrete. At today's level the market is paying about 31x company-wide operating income, embedding roughly 17.5% annual operating growth for five years. The margin requirement is undemanding, the business only has to hold roughly the operating margin it already earns, so the stretch is in duration, not in a margin miracle. Two trailing operating-income bases are in play (a record basis near $257 million and an EDGAR trailing basis near $150 million, about 71% apart), which is itself a reminder that a single quarter's margin, ranging from 1.37% to 8.2% over the last four prints, tells you little. The honest read is that the price is a bet on the growth pipeline persisting, and management's reiterated guidance of 8% to 12% net revenue growth is the closest thing to a stated version of that bet.

Solvency is where the valuation debate gets settled. The framework reads leverage as moderate and well covered on trailing cash flow, but the raw ratios are less forgiving: debt-to-equity near 2.0, a current ratio below 1.0, and a covenant-bearing credit agreement the 10-K details. The bull number is the 14% free-cash yield; the bear number is the leverage that yield has to keep servicing through a cycle. The price is cheap against the cash flow and expensive against the balance sheet, and which one governs depends entirely on whether the ad cycle cooperates over the life of the growth the price assumes.

Catalysts

Q1 2026 set the tone for the year. Stagwell reported revenue of $704 million, up 8% year over year, with net revenue of $585 million up 4%, adjusted EBITDA of $90 million up 9% at a 15% margin, and adjusted earnings per share of $0.17 up 31%. The standout was demand: record net new business of $141 million in the quarter and $486 million on a trailing-twelve-month basis, running about $80 million ahead of the prior year, with several additional major assignments described as in final negotiation.

The wins that matter for the forward story are the ones that diversify the client base away from discretionary consumer advertising. Management flagged a $60 million multi-year government contract and early traction in enterprise technology, including $12 million booked toward a $25 million first-year target for its AI and enterprise product line. The company reiterated full-year 2026 guidance for 8% to 12% total net revenue growth, adjusted EBITDA of $475 million to $525 million, and free cash flow conversion of 50% to 60%. The checkpoints from here are whether the pipeline converts to billed revenue, whether free cash flow lands in the guided conversion band given the lumpy quarterly cash flows, and whether the pace of buybacks continues against that cash. The next quarterly report is the next read on all three.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Marketing Services / Digital Transformation +2 more (reported)

The Marketing Cloud (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 earnings release

View the full interactive STGW report on boothcheck