STEWART INFORMATION SERVICES CORP (STC): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $68.03, STEWART INFORMATION SERVICES CORP (STC) is priced for 11.0% return on equity. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-11.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/STC
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | STC |
| Company | STEWART INFORMATION SERVICES CORP |
| Sector / Industry | Financial Services |
| Current price | $68.03/sh |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | financials |
| Return on equity needed | 11.0% |
| Return on equity now | 7.0% |
| ROE gap | +4.0pp |
| Price-to-book | 1.26x |
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.5% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 10-year stage, on common book equity (FY2026); each 1pp of cost of equity moves the implied ROE ~1.3pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.58σ |
| cohort percentile (of 88 peers) | 28 |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 73% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.50x | 3 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.40x | 1 | expensive |
| Relative | — | 0 | — |
| Growth | 0.65x | 2 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=6)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Bank Fair Value (P/TBV) | — | $1.01 | 67.36x | yes | TBVPS $1.48 × 0.68x (ROE (TTM) 7.9% / CoE 9.3%, g=5.0% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption)) (excluded from median) |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | — | — | no | P/E 11x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 8.9x / 11.0x / 13.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 20.32x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | $169.73 | 0.40x | yes | DPS $2.12, g=7.9% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3% |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $75.24 | 0.90x | yes | Stage 1: 20% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $45.41 | 1.50x | yes | BV/sh $53.17, ROE (TTM) 7.9%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $41.90 | 1.62x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | — | — | no | Rev $3.1B, growth 21% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.5x / 0.7x / 0.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | EPS $4.49, growth 1% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=11.11 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | $73.29 | 0.93x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $4.49 × BVPS $53.17) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | — | — | no | EPS $4.49 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | EPS $4.49 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $48.54 | 1.40x | yes | EPS $4.49 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 2.9% |
Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).
Bullet Takeaways
- Stewart is a title insurer in cyclical recovery, with first-quarter revenue up about 28% to roughly $781 million, title revenue up 21%, and its faster-growing real estate solutions arm up about 66%.
- The biggest risk is structural plus cyclical: regulatory and fintech pressure on whether lender's title insurance is required at all, layered on a recovery measured off a depressed prior-year base, with trailing return on equity of about 7.9% still below its cost of capital.
- Watch mortgage rates and housing-transaction volumes that drive title revenue, the continued growth of the real estate solutions segment, and any federal moves on title-insurance requirements; the stock trades near 1.3 times book at about $68.33.
Bull Case
Where the price lands against the methods tells the Stewart story cleanly: the earnings-power and forward-growth lenses reach the current $68.33, while only the asset lens calls it rich, which is exactly the profile of a cyclical business coming off a depressed base into a recovery. Title insurance earnings collapse when housing transactions dry up and snap back hard when volume returns, and Stewart is in the snap-back phase. First-quarter 2026 net income attributable to Stewart rose to about $17.0 million, or $0.55 per diluted share, from just $3.1 million a year earlier, and operating profit jumped roughly 188%. That is operating leverage, not a new business.
The revenue mix is broadening beyond the core cycle. Total revenue rose about 27.7% year over year to roughly $781 million, with title revenues up about 21% to $603 million and, more notably, real estate solutions revenue up about 66% to $161 million. The 10-K describes the regulated core, where "Agency title insurance premiums - Premiums from title insurance policies written by independent agencies are recognized when the polic" close, a durable stream tied to real estate closings. Layering a faster-growing services business on top of the regulated title base gives Stewart a growth vector that does not depend solely on transaction volume.
The balance sheet frame for an insurer is float and reserves, not corporate leverage, and Stewart's is conservatively run. The 10-K notes title companies are "subject to comprehensive" regulation, and Stewart carries loss reserves against future claims on policies already written. The company returns about 54% of earnings to shareholders and has grown its share count only modestly. As housing activity normalizes from a cyclical trough, a title insurer with a recovering core, a fast-growing solutions arm, and conservative reserving is positioned for earnings that can keep climbing off the depressed base, which is why the forward-looking methods already reach the price.
Bear Case
The competitive and structural disruption facing title insurance is the bear's real subject, and it is more serious than the cyclical recovery suggests. Title insurance is a business regulators and technology have both targeted: federal housing agencies have piloted programs to waive or replace lender's title insurance on certain refinances, and fintech entrants keep attacking the cost and friction of the title search itself. If the requirement to buy a separate title policy erodes, even at the margin, the entire industry's premium pool shrinks, and Stewart is the smaller of the major players with less scale to absorb a structural repricing than its larger rivals.
The cyclical dependence is the near-term vulnerability. Stewart's first-quarter surge came off a genuinely depressed prior-year base, when net income was just $3.1 million, so the 451% jump in net income to common flatters the trajectory. Title revenue tracks real estate closings, and closings track mortgage rates and housing affordability, neither of which Stewart controls. If rates stay elevated and transaction volumes plateau, the operating leverage that drove the recovery works in reverse, and the earnings that the forward methods are extrapolating do not materialize.
The asset lens is already flashing on valuation. At about $68.33 (July 10, 2026), the asset-based methods land below the price, near book-adjusted levels, and while the earnings-power and growth methods reach it, they do so by crediting a recovery that is still early. Trailing return on equity is about 7.9%, below the roughly 9% an equity investor requires, so on the return it actually earns the business is not yet covering its cost of capital. Book value is about $53.17 per share, so at $68.33 the stock trades near 1.3 times book for a cyclical insurer whose returns sit below its cost of capital. The bet the price makes is that the housing recovery continues, the real estate solutions arm keeps compounding, and the structural threats to lender's title insurance stay contained, a stack of assumptions where any one slipping resets the earnings recovery.
Valuation
Stewart prices as a cyclical insurer in early recovery, where the earnings-power and growth methods reach the price and the asset methods sit below. At $68.33 (July 10, 2026), a sector earnings multiple near 11 times and the growth-DCF and two-stage dividend methods land around or above the price, supporting the level, while the excess-return and asset methods land near $42 to $45, below it. The split is characteristic of a business whose trailing return has not yet caught up to its recovering earnings: the methods that credit forward growth reach the price, the ones that charge the business for its cost of capital against a trailing return of about 7.9% do not.
The most concrete anchor is the return versus the multiple. Stewart earns a trailing return on equity near 7.9%, below the roughly 9% required, on book value of about $53.17 per share. At $68.33 that is roughly 1.3 times book, a modest premium the market extends on the expectation that the housing recovery lifts returns above the cost of capital. Trailing EPS of about $4.49 puts the stock near 15 times earnings, undemanding if the recovery continues and full if transaction volumes plateau. The first-quarter adjusted EPS of $0.78 against $0.25 a year earlier shows how fast the operating leverage works when volume returns, and how fast it could reverse.
Solvency for a title insurer is read on reserves and float, not corporate debt. The company carries loss reserves against claims on policies already written, and the 10-K frames the business as heavily regulated; net-debt and coverage math does not apply the way it would for an industrial. Stewart returns about 54% of earnings to shareholders and has grown its share count only modestly, about 2.9% a year. A buyer at today's price is underwriting a continued housing-transaction recovery and growth in the real estate solutions arm, with the asset methods below the price as the reminder that the trailing return has not yet cleared the cost of capital and the structural questions around lender's title insurance remain open.
Catalysts
The first-quarter 2026 report in late April was the key recent catalyst: net income attributable to Stewart of about $17.0 million, or $0.55 per diluted share, up from $3.1 million a year earlier, with adjusted EPS of $0.78 well ahead of the roughly $0.53 expected. Total revenue rose about 27.7% to roughly $781 million, title revenues up about 21% to $603 million and real estate solutions up about 66% to $161 million, with operating profit up roughly 188%. The next quarterly report is the test of whether the recovery in closings holds through the spring and summer selling season.
The forces that matter are largely external. Title revenue depends on real estate transaction volume, which tracks mortgage rates and housing affordability, so the rate path is the dominant swing factor. On the structural side, any federal policy change affecting whether lender's title insurance is required on certain mortgages would move the entire industry's premium pool. Analyst price targets sit near $78 to $82, implying modest upside, and the variables to watch are transaction volumes and the continued growth of the real estate solutions business that is diversifying Stewart beyond the pure title cycle.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- FAF (FIRST AMERICAN FINANCIAL CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …Due to the relatively high proportion of fixed costs in the title insurance business, pretax margins generally improve as closed order volumes increase. Pretax margins for the segment are also impacted by (1) net investment income and net investment gains or losses, which may not move in the same direction as closed…
- FY2025 10-K: …products and services is highly competitive. The number of competing companies and the size of such companies vary in the different areas in which we conduct business. Generally, in areas of major real estate activity, such as metropolitan and suburban localities, we compete with many other title insurers and agents.…
- FNF (FIDELITY NATIONAL FINANCIAL, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …volume is primarily affected by macroeconomic and seasonal factors, while commercial real estate transaction volume is affected primarily by fluctuations in local supply and demand conditions for commercial space. 9 Table of Contents Direct and Agency Operations. We provide title insurance services through our direct…
- FY2025 10-K: …to the Geographic Concentrations of our Business Segments Because we are dependent upon California and Texas for approximately 12.2% and 14.1% of our title insurance premiums, respectively, our Title segment may be adversely affected by regulatory conditions in California and/or Texas. Californi a and Texas are the…
- ORI (OLD REPUBLIC INTERNATIONAL CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: , driven by lower interest rates and strong commercial business production. Commercial premiums represented 26% of net premiums earned. Title, escrow, and other fees declined 7.1% as a result of the sale of certain technology platforms earlier in the year which was slightly offset by growth in escrow and closing…
- FY2025 10-K: 7.0 % 97.1 % __________ (a) Title loss, expense, and combined ratios are calculated on the basis of combined net premiums and fees earned. Title Insurance experienced premium growth compared to last year, however, an elevated combined ratio reflects difficult market conditions, lower favorable reserve development, a…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 2026 earnings release, April 2026 · Q1 2026 earnings release · analyst consensus, 2026