SSR MINING INC. (SSRM): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers SSR MINING INC. (SSRM) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-11.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/SSRM

Headline

FieldValue
TickerSSRM
CompanySSR MINING INC.
Sector / IndustryFinancial Services
Current price$28.96/sh
CompositionGold 71% / Silver 24% / Lead 3% / Zinc 0% / Other 2%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)5.4%
Operating margin today34.6%
Margin compression (value-band)-29.2pp
Multiple paid9x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 7: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.6% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.00σ
cohort percentile (of 17 peers)12
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.41x5expensive
Earnings1.50x5expensive
Relative1.52x2expensive
Growth0.57x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$115.060.25xyesFCF base $0.6B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.2%, 7yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$50.470.57xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 4.0x / 6.7x / 9.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 16.22x (blended: static sector reference 12x + trailing (TTM) 26x), scenarios: 13.0x / 16.2x / 19.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$12.012.41xyesBV/sh $17.50, ROE (TTM) 6.3%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$9.772.96xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$42.020.69xyesRev $1.9B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.5x / 3.2x / 3.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$12.602.30xyesEPS $1.05, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=13.04 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$11.172.59xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.20B × (1−19%) / WACC 9.2% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$9.473.06xyesBV $17.50 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 6.3% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 4.1%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$20.331.42xyes√(22.5 × EPS $1.05 × BVPS $17.50) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativeno
FCF YieldEarnings$22.181.31xyesFCF $373.3M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$19.301.50xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.32B (FCF $0.37B − SBC $0.06B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$33.880.85xyesEPS $1.05 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$15.111.92xyesBV $17.50 × (ROIC 7.9% / WACC 9.2%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $1.89B × sector P/S 3.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$39.380.74xyesEPS $1.05 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$11.352.55xyesEPS $1.05 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Copleroperatingenterprise$0withheldunresolved no unit value
Marigoldoperatingenterprise$540.6mwithheldunresolved no unit value
CC&Voperatingenterprise$450.4mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Seabeeoperatingenterprise$179.1mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Punaoperatingenterprise$459.5mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$369.3m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-0.70x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-0.56x (net cash)
Interest coverage46.6x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.8%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The counterintuitive fact about SSR Mining is that the market values it as a growth story while it just sold its single largest problem for cash. In June 2026 the company completed the sale of its 80% stake in the Çöpler mine in Turkey for $1.5 billion in cash, the same Çöpler that had been the source of its worst operational and reputational damage. Selling the troubled asset for a large cash sum, rather than spending years rehabilitating it, resets the company around four cleaner operations: Marigold in Nevada, Cripple Creek and Victor in Colorado, Seabee in Saskatchewan, and Puna in Argentina. The result is a miner with a fortress balance sheet at exactly the moment gold prices are high.

The balance sheet is the standout. SSR holds net cash of about $369 million, with liquid assets of roughly $674 million against modest debt, and trailing interest coverage above 50 times. For a gold miner, whose fortunes usually swing with a levered bet on the metal price, carrying net cash removes the financial fragility that sinks weaker producers in a downturn and lets SSR fund growth or return capital from strength. Trailing operating margin near 37% reflects the leverage of a high gold price against a largely fixed cost base.

Production guidance frames the forward story. SSR expects 450,000 to 535,000 gold-equivalent ounces in 2026 from its four continuing operations, and the Q1 result of about 110,000 gold-equivalent ounces and net income from continuing operations of roughly $253 million, or $1.16 diluted EPS, shows the cash-generation power at current prices. The 10-K describes a diverse geological base spanning "porphyry copper-gold, porphyry copper-molybdenum, skarn, placer gold, distal disseminated silver-gold, and Carlin-type gold systems", and the pending sale of the Hod Maden stake for an uncapped 4% royalty adds a cash-flow stream without capital risk. A net-cash miner, freshly simplified, generating strong margins into a high gold price, is a stronger setup than the market's growth framing implies.

Bear Case

The structural truth a holder should face is that SSR Mining is a commodity price-taker whose current earnings sit on a gold price that will not stay elevated forever. At about $28.57 (July 10, 2026), the asset-based and earnings-power methods say the stock is expensive: excess-return and residual-income methods land near $9 to $11, and a normalized earnings-power value reaches about $14, all well below the price. Trailing operating margin near 37% and the fat Q1 profit are a function of today's gold price, not a durable operating advantage, and mining margins compress fast when the metal turns. The price is justified only by relative-multiple and forward-growth methods, which is the market extrapolating peak-cycle economics.

The asset base carries the ordinary but real risks of mining. Production is spread across four operations in four jurisdictions, and any single mine can disappoint: Seabee produced only about 6,286 ounces in the first quarter against a full-year target of 60,000 to 70,000, a reminder of how uneven quarterly output can be. Consolidated all-in sustaining cost of about $2,433 per ounce in the first quarter is high relative to peers, which means SSR keeps less of each dollar of gold than a lower-cost producer and is more exposed if the price falls toward its cost curve. The 10-K notes the company's plans depend on "current financial resources being sufficient to carry out plans, commitments and business requirements", and on exploration replacing depleted reserves.

The reset itself introduces uncertainty. Selling Çöpler for cash cleans up the story, but it also removes ounces and leaves the company to redeploy $1.5 billion, and capital-allocation decisions after a windfall are where miners often stumble, whether through overpriced acquisitions or shareholder returns timed at the top of the cycle. The share count has been roughly flat, so the risk is not dilution but misallocation. And the metal exposure remains geopolitically concentrated in less than ideal jurisdictions for the continuing assets, including Argentina. The bet the price makes is that gold stays high, costs stay contained, and the post-Çöpler cash is deployed well; a gold pullback would expose how much of today's valuation rests on a peak-cycle price rather than on durable, low-cost production.

Valuation

SSR Mining is priced where the relative-multiple and forward-growth lenses justify the level and the asset and earnings-power lenses call it rich. At $28.57 (July 10, 2026), a blended earnings multiple around 16.5 times reaches about $21, and a discounted future-value approach that credits growth reaches higher, supporting the price. Against them, the excess-return methods land near $9 to $11, a normalized earnings-power value near $14, and Graham-style floors near $20. The pattern is typical of a miner at a high metal price: the methods that capitalize today's fat trailing earnings look generous, while the ones that charge the business for its cost of capital against a normalized return say the equity is worth less. Trailing return on equity is only about 6% against a roughly 9% required return, which is why the asset methods sit below the price even with margins near 37%.

The most concrete reading is that today's earnings are a gold-price artifact. Trailing EPS of about $1.05 supports the earnings-yield and Graham reads well below the price, and the Q1 profit of roughly $253 million from continuing operations reflects the current metal price against a fixed cost base, not a repeatable operating norm. Note two measurement bases in the inputs: the record-basis trailing operating income and the EDGAR trailing figure differ by more than 10% here, so any single margin or profit figure should be read as approximate rather than precise. What is not ambiguous is the direction: the price leans on the metal staying high.

Solvency is the genuine strength and bounds the downside firmly. SSR holds net cash of about $369 million, liquid assets near $674 million, and interest coverage above 50 times, so there is no financial fragility to amplify a gold downturn, and the $1.5 billion Çöpler proceeds add to that cushion. The share count has been roughly flat, so the equity is not being diluted. The downside is therefore a valuation and commodity story, not a solvency one: a buyer at today's price is underwriting a high gold price and disciplined redeployment of the post-Çöpler cash, with the asset methods sitting well below as the reminder of how much of the price is the metal rather than the mine.

Catalysts

The defining recent event was the June 24, 2026 completion of the Çöpler sale, converting the company's most troubled asset into $1.5 billion of cash. The first-quarter 2026 result, reported in early May, showed about 110,000 gold-equivalent ounces produced at a consolidated all-in sustaining cost of roughly $2,433 per ounce, with net income from continuing operations of about $253 million, or $1.16 diluted EPS. Full-year guidance calls for 450,000 to 535,000 gold-equivalent ounces at consolidated cost of sales of $1,560 to $1,640 per ounce. The next quarterly report is due August 4, 2026.

Two portfolio actions remain in motion. SSR agreed to sell its 20% interest and operatorship in the Hod Maden gold-copper project to partner Lidya Mines in exchange for an uncapped 4% net smelter royalty on 100% of future production, targeted to close in the third quarter of 2026 pending Turkish regulatory approval. The catalysts to watch are the redeployment of the Çöpler cash, quarterly production against guidance at individual mines such as Seabee, and the gold price itself, which drives the earnings the current valuation leans on.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Copler / Marigold +3 more (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

SSR Mining 8-K, 2026 · SSR Mining Q1 2026 results, 2026 · SSR Mining Q1 2026 results · SSR Mining disclosure, 2026

View the full interactive SSRM report on boothcheck