Simpson Manufacturing Co., Inc. (SSD): what the price requires
At today's price, Simpson Manufacturing Co., Inc. (SSD) is priced for +14.8% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/SSD
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | SSD |
| Company | Simpson Manufacturing Co., Inc. |
| Sector / Industry | Industrials |
| Current price | $185.83/sh |
| Composition | Wood Construction 84% / Concrete Construction 15% / Other 0% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 8.8% |
| Operating margin today | 20.9% |
| Margin compression implied | -12.1pp |
| Implied growth | 14.8% |
| Multiple paid | 17x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~6.4pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.04σ |
| cohort percentile (of 225 peers) | 28 |
| sustained it ~5 years at this level | 45% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.90x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 2.06x | 5 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.29x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 1.00x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=18)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $186.37 | 1.00x | yes | FCF base $0.4B, growth 6% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.0%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $189.16 | 0.98x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 11.7x / 13.7x / 15.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $163.37 | 1.14x | yes | P/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.0x / 18.0x / 21.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $92.89 | 2.00x | yes | BV/sh $49.77, ROE (TTM) 17.3%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $125.25 | 1.48x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $147.56 | 1.26x | yes | Rev $2.4B, growth 6% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.7x / 3.2x / 3.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $102.24 | 1.82x | yes | EPS $8.52, growth 10% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.11 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $89.44 | 2.08x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.45B × (1−24%) / WACC 9.0% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $125.60 | 1.48x | yes | BV $49.77 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 17.3% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $97.68 | 1.90x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $8.52 × BVPS $49.77) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $162.39 | 1.14x | yes | EBITDA $0.57B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $90.11 | 2.06x | yes | FCF $352.7M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $84.13 | 2.21x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.33B (FCF $0.35B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $207.41 | 0.90x | yes | EPS $8.52 × (8.5 + 2×10.3%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $22.52 | 8.25x | yes | BV $49.77 × (ROIC 4.1% / WACC 9.0%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $143.95 | 1.29x | yes | Revenue $2.38B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $131.29 | 1.42x | yes | EPS $8.52 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 10.3% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 15.4x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $92.11 | 2.02x | yes | EPS $8.52 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net cash | $44.8m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | -0.12x (net cash) |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | -0.09x (net cash) |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -1.2% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
- Simpson Strong-Tie is the code-specified leader in wood connectors and fasteners, a franchise that let it raise price enough to grow first-quarter sales about 9% even as volume slipped roughly 1% on softer housing starts.
- The biggest risk is valuation: at about 22 times trailing earnings, only the growth-DCF reaches the price, while the earnings-power methods land at less than half of it, so the stock is a durability premium exposed to a de-rating if housing keeps cooling.
- Watch 2026 U.S. housing starts, which management expects to decline in the low single digits, along with steel input costs and tariff exposure the company flags as "the effect of tariffs and international trade policies".
Bull Case
Simpson Manufacturing has done something most building-products companies cannot: earn a high, durable return on capital in a commodity-adjacent business. The company holds net cash of about $45 million against modest gross debt, converts a mid-teens share of revenue into free cash flow, and has bought back stock rather than diluted, shrinking the share count about 1.2% a year over four years. The 10-K states the position bluntly: since 1956, through the Simpson Strong-Tie brand, "the Company has led the industry in the wood connectors" category. That leadership is not a slogan; it is engineered in, because Simpson's connectors and fasteners carry building-code approvals and are specified by name in structural designs.
The moat lives in the specification. The 10-K describes Simpson working to secure "specification and use of our building material products with engineers, truss component manufacturers, builders, lumber dealers, and homeowners", which is the whole game: once a connector is written into an engineer's drawing and approved to code, switching to a cheaper alternative means re-engineering and re-approving. That stickiness let Simpson push through 2025 pricing actions that carried into 2026, driving first-quarter sales up about 9% year over year even as unit volume slipped roughly 1% on softer housing starts.
The capital-return profile is the third leg. Simpson repurchased about $50 million of stock in the first quarter and continues to pay a dividend, funded entirely from internal cash flow given the net-cash balance sheet. Return on equity runs above 17%, well over the roughly 9% an investor requires, so each retained dollar compounds. Management reaffirmed full-year guidance, with growth expected to moderate as housing softens but the margin profile intact. A business that raises price without losing the spec, funds its own buybacks, and earns 17% on equity is the kind of quiet compounder that justifies a premium.
Bear Case
The premium is the problem, and the methods make it concrete. At about $188.89 (July 10, 2026), only the growth-DCF family reaches the price. The earnings-power methods, capitalizing Simpson's actual free cash flow and normalized operating earnings, land near $84 to $92, less than half the price. The asset and Graham-style floors sit around $92 to $98. Peer multiples on sales and EV/EBITDA reach roughly $144 to $163, still below. In plain terms, every way of valuing Simpson on what it has already earned says the stock is expensive, and the price is defended only by a model that projects durable compounding forward. The bet is that the moat keeps delivering high returns for many years; the static frames structurally cannot price that, but neither can they confirm it.
The cyclical exposure is the near-term pressure on that bet. Simpson sells into residential construction, and management guided that U.S. housing starts should decline in the low single digits in 2026, with revenue growth moderating over the year. First-quarter volume already fell about 1%; the 9% sales gain came from price and favorable foreign exchange, not units. Price-led growth against falling volume is not repeatable indefinitely, because each price increase widens the gap a competitor or a substitution could exploit.
Input costs and trade policy add a second layer. Simpson's own forward-looking cautions name "the effect of tariffs and international trade policies on our business operations, the effects of inflation and labor, and supply" shortages as risks to the outlook. Steel is the dominant raw material for connectors and fasteners, and a steel-cost spike that cannot be immediately passed through compresses the very margins that justify the multiple. The balance sheet is a genuine strength here, net cash and self-funded buybacks, but a fortress balance sheet does not make an expensive stock cheap; it only means the downside is a de-rating rather than a solvency event. At more than double the earnings-power methods, the de-rating risk is the whole story.
Valuation
Simpson is a case where the valuation methods agree on the direction and disagree only on how expensive. At $188.89 (July 10, 2026), the earnings-power lens is the harshest: capitalizing free cash flow of about $353 million at the required return lands near $90, and a normalized earnings-power value on five-year average operating income reaches about $89. Both sit at less than half the price. Only the discounted cash-flow methods reach the price, and they do so by crediting mid-single-digit revenue growth and holding today's exit multiple flat. The pattern is unambiguous: this is a durability premium the static frames cannot price, not a value or turnaround setup.
The most concrete way to see the bet is the return on capital versus the multiple. Simpson earns a trailing return on equity above 17% and a return on invested capital near 4% on a large equity base, on book value of $49.77 per share and trailing EPS of about $8.52. At $188.89 that is roughly 22 times trailing earnings for a business whose 2026 guidance calls for growth to moderate as U.S. housing starts decline. The price works if the high returns persist and compound; it does not if volumes keep slipping and price increases lose their grip.
Solvency is the reassuring part and does not need dressing up. Simpson holds net cash of about $45 million, carries gross debt of only about $296 million against $341 million of liquid assets, and the 10-K notes interest expense is not even separately broken out. The share count has fallen about 1.2% a year, direct evidence that the roughly $50 million quarterly buyback is real deployment, not an announcement. The balance sheet removes financial risk entirely; what remains is valuation risk. A buyer at today's price is underwriting years of continued high returns from a company selling into a cooling housing market, with the earnings-power methods sitting a long way below as the reminder of how much of the price is forward optionality.
Catalysts
The first-quarter 2026 print, reported in late April, beat expectations: net sales of about $588 million and net income of about $88 million, with EPS of roughly $2.14 from continuing operations, up 9% year over year on 2025 pricing and favorable foreign exchange. Management reaffirmed full-year guidance while warning that revenue growth would moderate over the remainder of 2026 as U.S. housing starts decline in the low single digits and European markets stay flat to modestly higher. The next quarterly report, due in late July, is the key test of whether price can keep offsetting soft volume.
Capital return is a steady catalyst rather than an event: Simpson repurchased about $50 million of stock in the first quarter and continues to pay its dividend from internal cash flow. Sell-side sentiment is constructive, with Stifel initiating at Buy and a $205 target, citing a top-tier margin profile and robust return-of-cash, and a broader recent target near $182. The variables to watch are housing-start data through the year and steel input costs, the two forces most likely to move the margin that underpins the valuation.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- VMI (VALMONT INDUSTRIES INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MWA (MUELLER WATER PRODUCTS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AZZ (AZZ INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- LECO (LINCOLN ELECTRIC HOLDINGS INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TKR (TIMKEN CO)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- KMT (KENNAMETAL INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- GRC (The Gorman-Rupp Company)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- XYL (Xylem Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 2026 earnings release, April 2026 · Q1 2026 earnings call, April 2026 · Q1 2026 earnings call · Q1 2026 earnings release · Stifel research, 2026 · analyst consensus, 2026