Schneider National, Inc. (SNDR): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $34.44, Schneider National, Inc. (SNDR) is priced for +7.1% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-11.
Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/SNDR
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | SNDR |
| Company | Schneider National, Inc. |
| Sector / Industry | Industrials |
| Current price | $34.44/sh |
| Composition | Transportation 92% / Logistics management 4% / Other 4% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 1.4% |
| Operating margin (mid-cycle) | 6.4% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -5.0pp |
| Trailing margin (depressed year) | 3.0% |
| Implied growth | 7.1% |
| Multiple paid | 16x mid-cycle operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 11: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.21σ |
| cohort percentile (of 225 peers) | 32 |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 8.07x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 2.07x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | — | 0 | — |
| Growth | 0.94x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.8%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=12)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $41.27 | 0.83x | yes | FCF base $0.3B, growth 6% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.8%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $36.64 | 0.94x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 7.9x / 9.9x / 11.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | — | — | no | P/E 30.28x (blended: static sector reference 20x + trailing (TTM) 54x), scenarios: 25.3x / 30.3x / 35.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $6.86 | 5.02x | yes | BV/sh $17.39, ROE (TTM) 3.6%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $4.27 | 8.07x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $27.32 | 1.26x | yes | Rev $5.8B, growth 6% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.9x / 1.0x / 1.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Growth-Adjusted P/E | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $15.82 | 2.18x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.33B × (1−24%) / WACC 8.8% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $3.23 | 10.66x | yes | BV $17.39 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 3.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 2.4%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $15.83 | 2.18x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $0.64 × BVPS $17.39) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | EBITDA $0.62B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $18.63 | 1.85x | yes | FCF $312.3M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $17.61 | 1.96x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.30B (FCF $0.31B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $0.54 | 63.78x | yes | EPS $0.64 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $3.40 | 10.13x | yes | BV $17.39 × (ROIC 1.7% / WACC 8.8%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | Revenue $5.82B × sector P/S 2.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $6.92 | 4.98x | yes | EPS $0.64 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)
One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.
| Unit | Role | Valuation basis | Revenue | Reported profit | Value evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Truckload | operating | enterprise | $2.5b | $0 operating-income | $4.9b indicative EV subtotal | indicative enterprise value |
| Intermodal | operating | enterprise | $1.1b | $0 operating-income | $2.1b indicative EV subtotal | indicative enterprise value |
| Logistics | operating | enterprise | $1.3b | $0 operating-income | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $70.0m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 0.25x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 0.19x |
| Interest coverage | 11.9x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -0.4% |
| Burning cash | no |
Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 6.4%); the trailing year was depressed.
Bullet Takeaways
- Schneider pairs a spot-exposed truckload network with a structurally better core: a Dedicated fleet near 8,600 trucks plus an Intermodal segment in a market its 10-K describes as "highly consolidated among three intermodal providers" (accession 0001692063-26-000013), with $40 million of cost savings from the Cowan integration underway.
- The risk is that the price already assumes the recovery: at about 18 times normalized mid-cycle operating income (versus $160 million actually earned trailing), the quote needs roughly 11 percent annual operating growth for five years, while first-quarter EPS was $0.12 and consensus targets sit near $33, below the stock.
- Watch the second-quarter report on July 30, 2026: maintained FY2026 adjusted EPS guidance of $0.70 to $1.00, the pace of enforcement-driven capacity attrition, and whether early upcycle signs survive the quarter.
Bull Case
Schneider is a mature trucking franchise being read at the bottom of its cycle, and that framing does most of the analytical work. Trailing GAAP operating income of $160 million is trough economics, not the business: on the company's own through-the-cycle margins applied to current revenue, normalized operating income runs around $363 million, and the first quarter's numbers, $1,398.5 million of flat revenue and $0.12 of diluted EPS against $0.15 a year ago, describe a carrier holding position through disruptive weather and fuel volatility while the freight recession exhausts itself. The bull case is that you are buying mid-cycle earnings power at a trough multiple just as the cycle's supply side finally breaks: management reported capacity attrition accelerating as regulatory enforcement removes noncompliant carriers, including actions against non-domicile CDLs and ELD tampering, and called early signs of a freight upcycle taking hold.
What Schneider did with the downturn matters more than the downturn. Network Truckload revenue per truck per week rose 7 percent year over year on productivity and AI-driven efficiency rather than price, the Dedicated fleet has been built out to nearly 8,600 trucks, and the Cowan Systems integration added lightweight equipment that moves more freight per shipment while feeding a $40 million cost savings program. Dedicated contract carriage is the structural upgrade inside the mix: multi-year, customer-embedded fleets with steadier economics than spot-exposed network freight, and the FY2025 10-K discloses $278.1 million of contracted future revenue across transportation and logistics management performance obligations (accession 0001692063-26-000013). Intermodal adds a second structural position; the filing notes "The domestic intermodal market is highly consolidated among three intermodal providers, including our Intermodal segment" (accession 0001692063-26-000013), which is a far better industry structure than the fragmented truckload market it complements.
The balance sheet lets the company wait out whatever remains of the trough. Net debt is a modest $134 million, interest coverage runs 11 times even on depressed earnings, the share count has drifted down slightly over four years, and full-year adjusted EPS guidance of $0.70 to $1.00 was maintained rather than cut. The bear will say every carrier promises the upcycle is near. Fair. But the priced-in assumption here, roughly 11 percent annual operating growth off normalized earnings for five years, is the kind of recovery-plus-productivity path that about half of comparable growers have historically delivered, and Schneider is entering it with its cost base already restructured.
Bear Case
One external variable dominates this thesis: the freight cycle, and Schneider does not control it. The company's own 10-K states it plainly, operating "in a highly competitive and fragmented industry that is characterized by intense price competition which could have a materially adverse effect on our results of operations" (accession 0001692063-26-000013). Management maintained rather than raised guidance precisely because the macro remains unproven: executives flagged inflation and rate-cut uncertainty and said they need sustained demand improvement before lifting the $0.70 to $1.00 adjusted EPS range. The recovery case leans heavily on supply attrition from regulatory enforcement, which is a borrowed catalyst: enforcement priorities can change with administrations, and a capacity-driven rate recovery without demand behind it has historically been the weakest kind.
The demand side carries a quieter structural threat the filing names: "our major customers may increasingly use their own truckload and delivery fleets, which would reduce our freight volumes", including dedicated customers (accession 0001692063-26-000013). Insourcing by large shippers attacks precisely the Dedicated growth engine the bull case relies on, and the same 10-K concedes that despite heavy investment in digital offerings "there can be no assurance that our investments, technologies, or strategies will be successful" against new entrants and brokers (accession 0001692063-26-000013). Meanwhile the actual trailing numbers are thin: first-quarter net income fell to $20.4 million from $26.1 million, and EPS guidance at the midpoint implies a company earning less than a dollar a share against a $36.37 stock.
That is the valuation problem in one sentence: the price only works on normalized earnings that have not yet arrived. At about 18 times mid-cycle operating income, the market pays for roughly 11 percent annual operating growth for five years; on what the business actually earned over the trailing four quarters, the earnings-power reads sit at roughly half the price and the asset-value reads far below it. Only the peer-multiple and growth-based methods reach the quote, and both embed the recovery as a premise. If the upcycle stalls, if enforcement-driven attrition reverses, or if a large dedicated customer insources, the stock has to be re-read on trough economics it is currently allowed to look past. The street's own consensus target near $33 sits below the price, a Hold rating wearing arithmetic.
Valuation
The price reads through the cycle, so start there. Trailing GAAP operating income of $160 million is depressed by the freight recession; the analysis prices the record-basis trailing figure of about $363 million, which matches the company's normalized through-cycle margin of roughly 6.4 percent applied to current revenue (the two bases diverge widely here, both are labeled, and the normalized one is the honest denominator for a cyclical at trough). On that basis, $36.37 (July 10, 2026) pays about 18 times mid-cycle operating income, which inverts, at a 9 percent cost of capital with 4 percent terminal growth, to roughly 11.2 percent annual operating growth for five years. That assumption is within range: the pace is one Schneider has recently delivered, and about 52 percent of comparable growers sustained it over a five-year window. The solve is sensitive, with each percentage point of cost of capital moving implied growth by about 6.6 points, so treat it as a corridor rather than a point.
The methods split exactly the way a trough-cycle read should. Peer multiples and the growth-based cash-flow methods reach the price, landing at or slightly above it; the earnings-power reads sit at roughly half, and the asset-anchored reads far below, because both are staring at depressed trailing profits. The pattern is a recovery bet, not a durability premium: the market is paying normalized economics now and trusting the cycle to deliver them. The near-term evidence is mixed but real: revenue held flat at $1,398.5 million in the first quarter, revenue per truck per week rose 7 percent on productivity, and the contracted revenue disclosure shows $278.1 million of future performance obligations (accession 0001692063-26-000013).
Solvency gives the recovery time to arrive. Net debt of $134 million against $400 million gross, interest coverage of 11 times on trough earnings, no cash burn, and a share count down about 0.4 percent a year make the downside a waiting problem rather than a balance-sheet problem. The decisive number to track is simple: whether operating income closes the gap from $160 million actual toward $363 million normalized. The price has already assumed most of that journey; the quarters have to walk it.
Catalysts
The next dated event is close: Schneider reports second-quarter 2026 results on July 30, 2026. The print carries three specific reads. First, whether management still sees the freight upcycle forming; on the first-quarter call executives cited accelerating capacity attrition from regulatory enforcement against noncompliant carriers, including non-domicile CDL actions and ELD tampering, as the supply-side catalyst. Second, whether full-year adjusted EPS guidance of $0.70 to $1.00, maintained in April with a roughly 24 percent tax rate assumption, gets raised, held, or trimmed; management explicitly tied any raise to sustained demand improvement. Third, progress on the $40 million cost savings initiative, which includes headcount actions and Cowan Systems integration synergies.
The first quarter itself set a soft but stabilizing baseline: operating revenues of $1,398.5 million were roughly flat against $1,401.8 million a year earlier, net income slipped to $20.4 million from $26.1 million, and diluted EPS came in at $0.12 versus $0.15, with weather and fuel volatility weighing on profitability. Underneath, Network Truckload revenue per truck per week rose 7 percent year over year on productivity and AI-driven efficiency rather than price, which is the kind of gain that compounds if rates ever join in.
Street positioning is neutral: a Hold consensus from 11 analysts with targets around $32.69 to $33.55, essentially at or below the current price. That leaves the stock catalyst-driven: enforcement data on carrier exits, spot-rate firmness through the summer, and the Dedicated pipeline (fleet growth and retention against the insourcing risk the 10-K flags) are the items that move the thesis between now and year-end.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Truckload / Intermodal (reported)
- ODFL (OLD DOMINION FREIGHT LINE, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …drayage, truckload brokerage and supply chain consulting. More than 98% of our revenue has historically been derived from transporting LTL shipments for our customers, whose demand for our services is generally tied to industrial production and the overall health of the U.S. domestic economy. We have increased our…
- FY2025 10-K: . Our service centers are strategically located throughout the country so that we can provide the highest quality service and minimize freight rehandling costs. Although we have established primary responsibility for customer service at the local service center level, our customers may access information and initiate…
- SAIA (Saia, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …analytics for operational and profitability insights, customer service enhancements, training and streamlined business processes. In 2025, Saia generated revenue of $3.2 billion and operating income of $352.2 million compared to revenue of $3.2 billion and operating income of $482.2 million in 2024. In 2025, the…
- FY2025 10-K: …in technology has become increasingly important in the LTL category largely due to the number of transactions and number of customers served on a daily basis. Saia LTL Freight picks up approximately 35,000 shipments per day, each of which has a shipper, a consignee and sometimes a third-party payor, all of whom need…
- XPO (XPO, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: U.S. market, estimated to be $53 billion in 2024. For the full year 2025, we moved approximately 16 billion pounds of freight through our network with a customer-focused organization of truck drivers, service center teams and sales professionals, facilitated by our proprietary technology. Our network serves…
- FY2025 10-K: …of the macroeconomic environment. Our trailer manufacturing facility and commercial truck driver schools are self-reliant competitive advantages for our company, particularly when industry conditions make it difficult to source equipment or drivers. This positions us to capture profitable market share gains and drive…
- ARCB (ARCBEST CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …to obtain price increases from customers both during and following such periods. The pricing environment remains competitive, and we believe that Asset-Light pricing has stabilized at the bottom of the truckload market cycle. The impact of excess capacity in the truckload market continued during 2025; however,…
- FY2025 10-K: Corporation; the LTL segment of Knight-Swift Transportation Holdings Inc.; Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc.; Saia, Inc.; the U.S. LTL operating segment of TFI International Inc.; and the North American LTL segment of XPO, Inc. Our Asset-Based segment's U-Pack business also competes with self-move businesses that offer…
- KNX (Knight-Swift Transportation Holdings Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …loading and unloading activities, dedicated services, other specialized services, and through the collection of fuel surcharge revenue to mitigate the impact of increases in the cost of fuel. The main factors that affect the revenue generated by our Truckload segment are rate per mile from our customers, the…
- FY2025 10-K: Relevant Segment(s) Description Average Revenue per Tractor Truckload Measures productivity and represents revenue (excluding fuel surcharge and intersegment transactions) divided by average tractor count Total Miles per Tractor Truckload Total miles (including loaded and empty miles) divided by average tractor count…
- WERN (WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: 85 were company-operated and 315 were owned and operated by independent contractors. Our Werner Logistics segment operated an additional 27 drayage company trucks and 170 Final Mile delivery trucks at the end of 2025. We have historically grown organically, and more recently through a combination of organic growth and…
- FY2025 10-K: …industry. We have longer-term Dedicated customer contracts, most of which are two to five years in length (including some contracts with annual evergreen clauses) and generally may be terminated by either party typically upon a notice period following the expiration of the contract's first year. We typically…
Logistics (reported)
- KNX (Knight-Swift Transportation Holdings Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …within the LTL market. Logistics Segment The Logistics segment is less asset-intensive than the Truckload and LTL segments and is dependent upon capable non-driver employees, modern and effective information technology, and third-party capacity providers. Logistics revenue is primarily generated by its brokerage…
- FY2025 10-K: …Logistics gross margin (revenue, excluding intersegment transactions, less purchased transportation expense, excluding intersegment transactions) as a percentage of logistics revenue, excluding intersegment transactions Average Containers Intermodal Average containers in operation during the period GAAP Operating…
- WERN (WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …69% of total operating revenues, Werner Logistics revenues accounted for 29% of total operating revenues, and the remaining 2% was recorded in non-reportable segments. Our Werner Logistics segment manages the transportation and logistics requirements for customers, providing customers with additional sources of truck…
- FY2025 10-K: …we operate in the truckload and logistics sectors of the transportation industry. In the truckload sector, we focus on transporting consumer nondurable products that generally ship more consistently throughout the year. In the logistics sector, besides managing transportation requirements for individual customers, we…
- JBHT (J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: 104,474 units at December 31, 2025. The containers and chassis are uniquely designed so that they may only be paired together for optimal productivity, which we feel creates an operational competitive advantage. At December 31, 2025, JBI also managed a fleet of 5,880 company-owned tractors and contracted 308…
- FY2025 10-K: …within other segments. By leveraging the J.B. Hunt brand, systems, and network, we provide a broader service offering to customers by providing flatbed, refrigerated, and expedited, as well as a variety of dry-van and intermodal solutions. Furthermore, we offer an online multimodal marketplace via J.B. Hunt 360 that…
- ARCB (ARCBEST CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …in transporting these shipments. 8 Table of Contents Our Asset-Light segment primarily provides logistics services through the use of third-party vendors. We offer competitive pricing on these services based on market conditions, lane characteristics, equipment type, and service requirements, including through…
- FY2025 10-K: …market rebound of higher freight demand, as well as provide a more sustainable service offering by reducing "empty miles" (or the number of miles we move empty or near-empty equipment for repositioning purposes). Although we continually evaluate our business mix to ensure revenue optimization, any resulting increase…
- ODFL (OLD DOMINION FREIGHT LINE, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …was deregulated in 1980. The largest 5 and 10 LTL motor carriers accounted for approximately 56% and 81%, respectively, of the domestic LTL market in 2024 according to information reported in Transport Topics . We believe consolidation in our industry will continue due to increased customer demand for transportation…
- FY2025 10-K: …technology. In addition, we provide greater geographic coverage than most of our regional competitors. Our diversified mix and scope of regional, inter-regional and national LTL service, combined with our value-added service offerings, enables us to provide our customers with a single source to meet their shipping…
- SAIA (Saia, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …external market conditions could influence the amount and costs of letters of credit or surety bonds required under our insurance programs and thereby reduce capital available for future growth or adversely affect our financial condition, results of operations, liquidity and cash flows. We face risks related to our…
- FY2025 10-K: …analytics for operational and profitability insights, customer service enhancements, training and streamlined business processes. In 2025, Saia generated revenue of $3.2 billion and operating income of $352.2 million compared to revenue of $3.2 billion and operating income of $482.2 million in 2024. In 2025, the…
- LSTR (LANDSTAR SYSTEM, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …which are provided and coordinated by the Company. The nature of the Company's business is such that a significant portion of its operating costs varies directly with revenue. Landstar markets its integrated transportation management solutions primarily through independent commission sales agents and exclusively…
- FY2025 10-K: …and geographic regions. The Company's top 100 customers accounted for approximately 46% of consolidated revenue during both fiscal years 2025 and 2024. Management believes that the Company's overall size, ecosystem of digital technologies and applications, geographic coverage, access to equipment and diverse service…
- ZTO (ZTO Express (Cayman) Inc.)
- FY2025 20-F: …fleets, as well as technology infrastructure and people, particularly talent in overall management, business operation and information technology. We expect our continued investments to further improve our parcel handling capacity, increase market penetration, and enhance customer services and operational efficiency.…
- FY2025 20-F: …featuring express delivery, less-than-truckload logistics, cross-border business, warehousing, aviation, commerce and more. For example, we provide less-than-truckload (LTL) logistics services with a focus on heavy cargo and international express delivery services in Southeast Asia, Africa and other regions. We also…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Economic-unit decomposition (SOTP): each disclosed business unit is assigned its native valuation basis before any multiple is applied. Operating units are valued on enterprise value; funded financial units are valued on their own common equity, because their borrowings fund earning assets rather than levering the parent. A company total is stated only once every material unit carries a supported value and the parent capital bridge reconciles.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 2026 earnings call, April 2026 · Daily Political, June 2026 · Q1 2026 earnings call; StockTitan, 2026 · Q1 2026 earnings release, April 2026 · Q1 2026 earnings call and coverage, 2026 · Daily Political consensus summary, June 2026 · Q1 2026 earnings release and call, April 2026 · StockTitan, 2026 · Q1 2026 10-Q via StockTitan, 2026 · Daily Political and Public.com, June-July 2026