Sandisk Corporation (SNDK): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $1798.00, Sandisk Corporation (SNDK) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~13.8 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-08-07.

Generated: 2026-09-19 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/SNDK

Headline

FieldValue
TickerSNDK
CompanySandisk Corporation
Sector / IndustryTechnology
Current price$1798.00/sh
CompositionCloud 13% / Client 56% / Consumer 31%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)49.2%
Operating margin today40.7%
Margin expansion (value-band)+8.5pp
Must persist for13.8y
Multiple paid48x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 4: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 18.2% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 39.4% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
cohort percentile (of 192 peers)84

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.30x5expensive
Earnings2.26x4expensive
Relative1.04x5expensive
Growth0.74x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=17)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$3437.070.52xyesFCF base $13.1B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.2%, 7yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$2437.070.74xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 17.7x / 20.7x / 23.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr
Relative ValuationRelative$2083.720.86xyesP/E 28x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 22.4x / 28.0x / 33.6x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 20x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$782.432.30xyesBV/sh $107.47, ROE (TTM) 67.3%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$3089.110.58xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$2407.850.75xyesRev $20.2B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 9.6x / 12.0x / 14.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$810.882.22xyesEPS $67.57, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=12.42 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$299.266.01xyesNormalized EBIT (3y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $4.23B × (1−12%) / WACC 9.2% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$1294.571.39xyesBV $107.47 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 67.3% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$404.234.45xyes√(22.5 × EPS $67.57 × BVPS $107.47) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$1735.641.04xyesEBITDA $12.54B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$871.682.06xyesFCF $11494.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$2180.370.82xyesEPS $67.57 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$584.563.08xyesBV $107.47 × (ROIC 50.1% / WACC 9.2%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$829.732.17xyesRevenue $20.25B × sector P/S 6.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$2534.000.71xyesEPS $67.57 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$730.522.46xyesEPS $67.57 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Flash memory storage (single operating segment)operatingenterprise7.4B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$4.8b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-1.01x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-0.89x (net cash)
Share count CAGR (dilution)4.0%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The trajectory is the argument, and it is worth laying out one quarter at a time because a summary flattens it. In the September 2025 quarter Sandisk earned 176 million dollars of operating income on 2.31 billion of revenue. In the December quarter, 1.07 billion on 3.03 billion. In the March quarter, 4.11 billion on 5.95 billion. In the quarter ended July 3, 2026, 7.04 billion on 8.97 billion. Gross profit reached 84.6% of revenue in that final quarter. A year earlier the same business was reporting losses.

Two things drove it, and only one of them is pricing. The company's own quarterly disclosure attributes the improvement to a higher ASP and an increase in exabytes sold, with the higher average selling price primarily driven by favorable pricing conditions in the industry. In the fourth quarter the split was made explicit: about one third of the sequential revenue gain came from higher volumes. Volume growth inside a price spike matters, because volume is the part that survives when the spike ends.

The mix shift underneath is the more durable claim. Datacenter revenue grew 437% across fiscal 2026, and management describes datacenter as an established growth pillar rather than an opportunistic sale. Enterprise solid-state drives sold into cloud operators are qualified into a customer's platform and stay there through a product generation; retail memory cards are not. Sandisk has also signed ten of what it calls New Business Model agreements since April, five announced then and five more since, including three with new customers. Long-term supply arrangements in a commodity are the mechanism by which a commodity stops behaving like one, at least for the term of the contract.

Capital allocation has turned in the same direction and fast. The board authorized an additional 14 billion dollar repurchase, bringing remaining authorization to 15.5 billion. Set that against a company whose fiscal 2025 accounts still carried the 2.0 billion dollar term loan it drew on February 21, 2025 to fund a net distribution of approximately 1.5 billion to Western Digital at separation. By April 3, 2026 the long-term balance of that facility was nil. A company that has retired its separation borrowings and authorized a repurchase larger than its entire fiscal 2025 revenue is not managing scarcity.

Against the storage cohort the position looks strong on the operating line rather than on size. WDC turns over 11.78 billion dollars of trailing revenue and NTAP 6.93 billion, and both convert roughly 24 cents of each revenue dollar into operating profit. Sandisk converted several times that in its most recent quarter. The bull case is that some of this is structural: a datacenter mix, contracted volumes, and a technology position in high-layer flash that took a decade to build. The concession is obvious and belongs here rather than hidden: most of the current earnings rate is not structural, and the bull only needs part of it to stick.

Bear Case

Say the thing plainly. These are not earnings, they are prices. Sandisk sells a physical commodity measured in gigabytes, and the gigabytes did not become several times more valuable to make; they became several times more expensive to buy because the industry is short of supply. The company states the mechanism in its own quarterly filing, attributing the improvement to a higher average selling price primarily driven by favorable pricing conditions in the industry. In the fourth quarter of fiscal 2026, roughly two thirds of the sequential revenue increase came from pricing and about one third from volume. Anyone valuing this business on its current earnings rate is valuing a market condition and calling it a company.

The nine-month disclosure makes the point sharper still. In one end market, revenue rose on a 139% increase in average selling price per gigabyte, partially offset by a 40% decrease in exabytes sold. Fewer bits, far more money. That is what the top of a memory cycle looks like from the inside, and it has never in this industry's history been a permanent state. Every previous shortage ended the same way: the price signal pulled capacity forward, capacity arrived eighteen to thirty months later, and the pricing that funded it went away faster than the capacity did.

Sandisk's supply structure makes the downside worse rather than better. Its agreements with Kioxia require that substantially all of our flash-based memory be obtained from Flash Ventures, which limits our ability to respond to changes in the market. And the commitments are not soft: Purchase orders placed with Flash Ventures for up to three months are binding and cannot be canceled. The company made net payments to that venture of 3.4 billion dollars in fiscal 2025, 3.4 billion in 2024 and 4.2 billion in 2023, in years when the business was losing money. When demand turns, the wafer commitments do not turn with it.

Now the price. The multiple the market is paying, measured against the twelve months ended April 3, 2026, is high enough that only one family of valuation method reaches it. Asset value, earnings power and peer multiples all land far below, several of them at a fraction of the quote. The lone approach that gets there is a discounted cash-flow projection that carries growth forward at a rate drawn from the recent past, and it is the one method structurally incapable of asking whether the recent past was a cycle. That should be read as a bet on durability, and the historical base rate for durability at this level is poor: fewer than one in ten comparable fast growers sustained a comparable pace for the horizon the quote requires. Three of four available comparison checks returned usable data, so this is a directional read rather than a measured one.

The cost of being wrong is asymmetric here, and not because of the balance sheet, which is unusually clean. It is because the earnings base can fall by most of its value without anything going wrong at the company. Look at what the same business reported in the twelve months ending in March 2025: an operating loss, including a large impairment charge. The distance between that year and this one is not execution. It is price.

Valuation

Start with the window, because on this company the window is doing more work than the multiple. The trailing figures behind the standard valuation approaches cover the twelve months ended April 3, 2026: revenue of about 13.18 billion dollars and operating income of about 5.37 billion, or roughly 40.7% of revenue. Then, on August 5, 2026, the fiscal fourth quarter arrived with 8.97 billion dollars of revenue and 7.04 billion of operating income in a single three-month period, taking fiscal 2026 to 20.25 billion of revenue and 11.43 billion of net income. Any earnings-based approach anchored on the earlier window is describing a substantially smaller company than the one that just filed.

That explains most of the disagreement among the methods, and the disagreement is stark. Asset value, earnings power and peer multiples all land well under the quote. Only the forward cash-flow approach reaches it, and it does so by projecting the recent growth rate forward while assuming today's enterprise multiple never compresses at the end of the projection. When only the forward-growth family reaches the price, the premium is a bet on durability that the static frames structurally cannot encode. Here that bet has a specific and unusually testable content: it is a bet that flash memory pricing does not revert.

Working the quote backwards gives the shape of what is required. The market is paying roughly 35 times the operating income of that trailing year, which on the growth path the model can search implies the company holds growth at its self-funding limit for something close to a decade. Each percentage point of growth surrendered pulls that horizon in by about eight tenths of a year, which is a tight sensitivity: the requirement is a rate held for a long time, and small disappointments compress it quickly. Fewer than one in ten comparable fast growers have sustained a pace like that over a comparable stretch, and the multiple itself sits in the upper half of the storage cohort's range.

The peer comparison is worth making carefully because the cohort is in the same cycle. WDC carries 11.78 billion dollars of trailing revenue and STX 11.01 billion, converting roughly 24 and 28 cents of each revenue dollar into operating profit respectively; NTAP, which sells storage systems rather than the media inside them, converts about 24 cents on 6.93 billion. Sandisk's most recent quarter ran far above all of them. A memory maker out-earning the drive makers by that margin is a fact about the current shortage, not about competitive position, and it is the sort of gap that closes rather than widens.

What the balance sheet does provide is time. The term loan drawn at separation in February 2025 was carried at 1.85 billion dollars at June 27, 2025 and stood at nil by April 3, 2026, and the company has since authorized repurchases with 15.5 billion remaining. That combination means a downturn would be survived comfortably. It does not mean the earnings rate that funded it survives with it, and for a company priced on a decade of compounding, those are two different questions.

Catalysts

Fiscal fourth-quarter results, released August 5, 2026, are the dominant recent event and reset almost every number a reader might be carrying. Revenue of 8.97 billion dollars was up 51% sequentially, GAAP diluted earnings came to 43.97 dollars a share, and the full fiscal year closed at 20.25 billion of revenue and 73.76 dollars a share. Management attributed the outperformance to a mix shift toward higher-value customers, with datacenter revenue up 437% for the year, alongside higher pricing.

Guidance is where the tension between the two readings of this company becomes visible. Sandisk expects first-quarter fiscal 2027 revenue of 10.30 billion to 10.80 billion dollars and non-GAAP diluted earnings of 44.00 to 46.00 dollars a share. That is another sequential step up, and it means the pricing environment had not turned as of the guidance date. It also means the guided quarter alone would exceed the entire revenue of fiscal 2025.

Two structural items are worth tracking through the next several prints. The company has now signed ten New Business Model agreements since April, five announced at that call and five since, of which three are with customers it did not previously have under such an arrangement. Those contracts are the mechanism that would carry some of today's economics past the cycle, and the disclosure of their volume and duration in coming filings is the evidence to watch. Separately, the board approved an additional 14 billion dollar repurchase authorization, taking the remaining total to 15.5 billion. Buying back stock near a cyclical earnings peak is a decision with a wide range of outcomes, and how quickly that authorization is used will say more about management's own read of the cycle than any guidance range will.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Flash memory storage (single operating segment) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q4 FY2026 results release, August 5, 2026 · FY2025 Form 10-K · Q3 FY2026 Form 10-Q; Q4 FY2026 results release, August 5, 2026 · Q3 FY2026 Form 10-Q · FY2025 Form 10-K; Q3 FY2026 Form 10-Q · FY2025 Form 10-K; Q3 FY2026 Form 10-Q; Q4 FY2026 results release, August 5, 2026

View the full interactive SNDK report on boothcheck