SL GREEN REALTY CORP (SLG): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $54.85, SL GREEN REALTY CORP (SLG) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~15.1 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-11.

Generated: 2026-08-08 · Exported: 2026-08-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/SLG

Headline

FieldValue
TickerSLG
CompanySL GREEN REALTY CORP
Sector / IndustryReal Estate
Current price$54.85/sh
CompositionReal Estate 79% / SUMMIT 12% / DPE (Debt and Preferred Equity investments) 9%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basisreit
Top-of-range FFO growth must hold for15.1y
Price-to-FFO27.1x
FFO yield3.7%

Solve inputs: computed at a 12.7% cost of equity; growth searched up to the 15% AFFO-growth ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~3.2 years.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~6.1 years; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: extreme

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.18σ
cohort percentile (of 105 peers)96
sustained it ~10 years at this level53%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based value, while earnings-power/relative-multiple land below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.10x4expensive
Earnings3.65x2expensive
Relative1.92x1expensive
Growth1.41x2expensive

Families that justify the price: Asset Families that call it expensive: Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=9)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$0.00noFCF base $0.1B, growth 8% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.2%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$41.401.32xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 4.7x / 6.7x / 8.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 35x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 29.3x / 35.0x / 40.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14.68x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$55.140.99xyesReference only (book value floor): BV/sh $55.14, ROE negative
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$49.631.11xyesReference only (book value with convergence): BV/sh $55.14, ROE converges to ke
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$36.591.50xyesRev $1.0B, growth 8% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.2x / 3.8x / 4.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$11.414.81xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.31B × (1−21%) / WACC 7.2% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAsset$50.311.09xyes√(22.5 × FFO/share $2.04 × BVPS $55.14) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.93B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$0.015485.00xyesFCF $58.6M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median)
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$1.7132.08xyesFFO/share $2.04 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$14.123.88xyesBV $55.14 × (ROIC 1.8% / WACC 7.2%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $1.02B × sector P/S 6.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$22.052.49xyesFFO/share $2.04 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelative$28.621.92xyesFFO/share $2.04 × 14.1x P/FFO (route cohort median, n=85); FFO $0.14B (FFO incl. D&A + impairments, FY2025, companyfacts), shares 71M
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Real Estateoperatingenterprise$788.6m$651.9m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
SUMMIToperatingenterprise$122.3m-$967k operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
DPE (Debt and Preferred Equity investments)operatingenterprise$92.1m$86.6m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt (REIT basis)$3.1b
Net debt / FFO21.44x
Funds from operations (trailing)$143.9m
Share count CAGR (dilution)0.2%
Burning cashno

REIT basis: leverage is read against funds from operations (FFO), not depreciation-gutted operating income. The header's implied growth runs on ADJUSTED FFO — FFO minus recurring maintenance capex — so the header's multiple and this leverage ratio use bases that differ by that capex; neither substitutes for the other. Interest expense is not separately reported in the cached statements, so fixed-charge coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Watch what SL Green's management is doing with the balance sheet, because it is the clearest statement of confidence on offer. In the first months of 2026 the company completed a $1.65 billion five-year fixed-rate refinancing of One Madison Avenue at 5.81%, refinanced and extended $2.0 billion of its $2.4 billion corporate credit facility with the $1.25 billion revolver now running to June 2031, and lined up $2.5 billion of asset sales, including the residential and retail pieces of 7 Dey Street for $222.6 million and 10 East 53rd Street for $312.2 million. Lenders writing five-year fixed paper on Manhattan towers, and buyers paying nine-figure prices for individual buildings, are third parties underwriting the same assets the stock market prices at $48.68 (July 2026), below the company's own $55.14 book value per share.

The operating floor under that balance-sheet work is the strongest it has been since the office downturn began. The first quarter of 2026 was the largest first-quarter leasing volume in company history: 51 Manhattan office leases covering 929,264 square feet at a record average starting rent of $105.12 per square foot, with replacement leases signed 16.1% above the prior escalated rents. Same-store occupancy reached 94.4% and management raised its full-year target to 95% while reaffirming 2026 funds-from-operations guidance of $4.40 to $4.70 per share. Rising rents on expiring leases is the specific mechanic that converts a leasing recovery into cash flow growth, and it is now showing up in signed contracts, not projections.

The portfolio also carries earnings streams a generic office REIT does not. The SUMMIT attraction, which the 10-K notes "currently operates one location at One Vanderbilt Avenue in midtown Manhattan" (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001628280-26-008669), monetizes the skyline itself, and the debt-and-preferred-equity book lets the company earn lender returns on the same Manhattan market it operates in, a segment the filing carries with its own loss-reserve discipline (accession 0001628280-26-008669). The real-estate segment produced about $652 million of net operating income in fiscal 2025 per the 10-K's segment note (accession 0001628280-26-008669). An operator with record leasing, refreshed five-year debt, a sales pipeline validating asset values above the stock's implied prices, and a hardening occupancy floor is a recovery story where the recovery has already started printing.

Bear Case

The structural truth a holder has to face: on fiscal 2025's cash earnings, this company paid out roughly double what its buildings actually generated. Dividends of $3.44 per share ran about 169% of funds from operations and about 213% of adjusted funds from operations, the stricter base that subtracts the maintenance capital an office tower needs to stay leasable. Dividends per share have shrunk about 2.5% a year over the last five fiscal years, and in December the board reset the 2026 ordinary dividend to $2.47 per share, paid quarterly. The market prices the stock at a 7% trailing yield because it watched the payout get cut and is pricing the possibility it happens again. Cheap-looking income backed by uncovered cash flow is the classic description of a trap, and the burden of proof sits with the company.

The price is simultaneously more demanding than the yield makes it look. Read against adjusted funds from operations, today's $48.68 pays about 30 times, at the very top of the REIT group, and it embeds cash-earnings growth near the top of the REIT range sustained for roughly 14 years; historically only about half of REITs growing at that pace sustained it even ten. The trailing base is genuinely depressed (fiscal 2025 funds from operations of $2.04 per share carried heavy impairment charges, against management's $4.40 to $4.70 guidance for 2026), so part of that multiple is trough arithmetic. But the first quarter of 2026 still printed a net loss of $84.4 million, or $1.20 per share, and a recovery priced at the top of the group's multiple range leaves no room for the recovery to wobble.

The concentration risk is singular: one submarket, one asset class, one interest-rate regime. The 10-K says it directly: "We directly compete with all owners, developers and operators of similar space in the areas in which our properties are located", and on the debt side, "Increased interest expense on the extended or refinanced debt would adversely affect cash flow and our ability to service debt obligations and pay dividends and distributions to security holders" (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001628280-26-008669). That second sentence is not hypothetical: the company is mid-way through a $7 billion refinancing program in a market where five-year fixed money costs 5.81%, and the failed Caesars casino bid at Times Square left 1515 Broadway facing a credit downgrade tied to uncertainty over the asset's future use. Every tower refinanced at today's rates permanently transfers a slice of building cash flow from shareholders to lenders. The bear case is arithmetic, not narrative: rents must keep rising 16% on rollover for years, at 95% occupancy, just to grow into a multiple the market already pays.

Valuation

For a real-estate trust the price reads on adjusted funds from operations, cash earnings after the recurring capital that keeps buildings leasable, and on that basis SL Green trades at about 30 times, at the very top of the REIT group. Inverted into an assumption, $48.68 (July 2026) requires cash-earnings growth near the top of the REIT range sustained for roughly 14 years, a persistence only about 53% of comparably fast-growing REITs have managed even to year ten. That is the most demanding end of the scale, and it coexists with a genuinely depressed base: fiscal 2025 funds from operations came to $2.04 per share, weighed down by impairments, while management guides 2026 to $4.40 to $4.70. The multiple is partly a bet that the trailing year is the wrong denominator; on guided 2026 funds from operations the price is closer to 10 to 11 times the gross measure, which is why the same stock can look extreme on trailing cash and ordinary on forward guidance.

The method families disagree in a pattern worth naming. Asset-based reads land essentially at the price, anchored by $55.14 of book value per share. Sector-level multiples read the stock as cheap, with the broad EV/EBITDA and price-to-sales lenses landing well above the price. But against its own REIT cohort's funds-from-operations multiple (a 13.5-times median across 86 route peers), the price sits about 78% above what trailing FFO defends, and capitalizing trailing cash earnings supports less than half the price. The split is trailing-versus-forward, not method quirks: everything anchored to fiscal 2025's cash flows finds the price rich, and everything anchored to asset values or normalized sector pricing finds it fair. The income facts frame the wait: fiscal 2025 dividends of $3.44 per share (about a 7% trailing yield) ran roughly 169% of funds from operations and 213% of adjusted funds from operations, dividends per share have declined about 2.5% a year over five years, and the board set the 2026 ordinary dividend at $2.47, a level the guided 2026 funds from operations would cover with room.

The balance sheet is the live variable. Corporate net debt does not resolve cleanly from the filings' standard tags (REIT mortgage structures sit outside the corporate ladder), so the honest statement is directional: the company is executing a $7 billion refinancing and $2.5 billion disposition program, with One Madison refinanced at 5.81% fixed for five years and the revolver extended to 2031. Each closed sale funds the transition; each refinancing locks today's rates into the cost base. The decisive fact: this price already assumes the occupancy recovery, the 16% rent spreads, and the guidance all hold, and it pays top-of-group multiples on trailing cash for the privilege.

Catalysts

The first quarter, reported April 15, 2026, defined the year's tension: a net loss of $84.4 million ($1.20 per share) and funds from operations of $0.84 per share against the largest first-quarter leasing volume in company history, 51 Manhattan leases for 929,264 square feet at record $105.12 average starting rents with 16.1% positive replacement spreads. Management raised the full-year occupancy target to 95% and held 2026 funds-from-operations guidance at $4.40 to $4.70 per share. The quarterly prints from here are pass-fail tests of that guidance; the leasing pipeline and occupancy line are the two numbers that decide whether the trailing year's depressed cash earnings were trough or trend.

The transaction calendar is dense and dated. The 7 Dey Street residential and retail sale ($222.6 million) is expected to close in the second quarter, the 10 East 53rd Street sale to Meadow Partners ($312.2 million) in the third. Both sit inside a stated $2.5 billion disposition program running alongside $7 billion of refinancings, of which the One Madison Avenue $1.65 billion five-year 5.81% fixed-rate deal and the $2.0 billion corporate facility extension (revolver to June 2031) are already done. Each closing is a mark on Manhattan asset values that either supports or undercuts the stock's discount to book.

Two loose threads carry asymmetric news risk. The failed Caesars casino bid left 1515 Broadway with a credit downgrade tied to uncertainty over the asset's future use, and any resolution (re-leasing, restructuring, or sale) removes a standing question mark. And the dividend, reset to $2.47 for 2026 and paid quarterly since April, is now the covenant with shareholders: guided funds from operations cover it, so any guidance cut would put it back in play, while a year of delivery at the $4.55 midpoint would make the current 30-times trailing multiple retroactively cheap.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Real Estate (reported)

SUMMIT (reported)

DPE (Debt and Preferred Equity investments) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

SL Green Q1 2026 disclosures and transaction announcements, 2026 · Q1 2026 earnings release, April 15, 2026 · SL Green dividend announcement, December 2025 · One Madison refinancing disclosure, 2026 · press reports on 1515 Broadway, April 2026 · SL Green transaction disclosures, 2026 · SL Green transaction announcements, 2026 · SL Green disclosures, 2026 · press reports, April 2026

View the full interactive SLG report on boothcheck