STIFEL FINANCIAL CORP (SF): what the price requires

At today's price, STIFEL FINANCIAL CORP (SF) is priced for +12.5% earnings growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.

Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/SF

Headline

FieldValue
TickerSF
CompanySTIFEL FINANCIAL CORP
Current price$74.99/sh
CompositionGlobal Wealth Management 65% / Institutional Group 35%

What The Price Requires (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basisfee-financial
Implied earnings growth12.5%
Price-to-earnings19.0x
Earnings yield5.3%

A hybrid: a fee franchise alongside a sizeable balance sheet, valued here on the fee annuity.

Solve inputs: computed at a 11.8% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage, on a 5-year median GAAP earnings base; each 1pp of cost of equity moves the implied earnings growth ~3.4pp.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~3%/yr; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.32σ
cohort percentile (of 49 peers)33
sustained it ~5 years at this level46%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.09x4expensive
Earnings1.12x4expensive
Relative0.84x4justifies
Growth0.84x2justifies

Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=14)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$146.120.51xyesFCF base $0.9B, growth 9% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.0%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$0.00—noNegative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0
Relative ValuationRelative$70.561.06xyesP/E 12x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 10.0x / 12.0x / 14.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax
Simple DDMGrowth——no—
Two-Stage DDMGrowth——no—
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$58.351.29xyesBV/sh $36.61, ROE (TTM) 14.7%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$72.821.03xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$64.201.17xyesRev $6.5B, growth 9% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.6x / 1.9x / 2.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$61.601.22xyesEPS $5.13, growth 1% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=10.87 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowth——no—
Earnings Power ValueEarnings——no—
Residual IncomeAsset$74.851.00xyesBV $36.61 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 14.7% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$65.031.15xyes√(22.5 × EPS $5.13 × BVPS $36.61) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative——no—
FCF YieldEarnings$72.981.03xyesFCF $892.3M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$61.601.22xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.72B (FCF $0.89B − SBC $0.17B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$165.640.45xyesEPS $5.13 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset——no—
P/Sales SectorRelative$120.120.62xyesRevenue $6.54B × sector P/S 3.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$192.500.39xyesEPS $5.13 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$55.501.35xyesEPS $5.13 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelative——no—
Clinical Phase NPVGrowth——no—
MertonAsset——no—
V5 Mechanical———no—

Solvency

FieldValue
Share count CAGR (buyback)-2.0%

Custody and consolidated-fund balance sheet: deposits, client cash, and fund-level debt are not corporate leverage, and operating cash flow follows client flows. Net-debt, coverage, and cash-burn lenses are suppressed as misleading; share-count CAGR is kept. The fee-earnings read above is the valuation basis.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Valuing a broker-dealer is awkward because two very different businesses sit under one ticker, and the blended multiple hides both. Stifel runs a Global Wealth Management arm, the steady fee-and-advice engine, alongside an Institutional Group that lives off investment-banking and trading revenue, which is lumpy by nature. The company describes the split in its own 10-K: the Global Wealth Management segment consists of "the Private Client Group and Stifel Bancorp", with the Private Client Group running "branch offices and independent contractor offices of our broker-dealer subsidiaries". The right way to read Stifel is as a recurring wealth business with a banking call option attached, and in the first quarter of 2026 both halves fired at once.

The wealth engine is the ballast. Global Wealth Management produced record first-quarter net revenue of $932.1 million, with record asset-management revenue of $459 million, on client assets that reached $538.7 billion, up 11% year over year. That is the part of Stifel that compounds quietly: more advisors, more client assets, more fee revenue, less dependent on a hot deal market. Tangible book value per share grew to $24.89, up 12% year over year, which is the cleanest measure of value building inside a financial.

The banking option is what turns a good quarter into a record one. Investment-banking revenue rose 44% year over year, with advisory up 59%, lifting consolidated net revenue 17.7% to $1.48 billion and net income to common shareholders to $242.1 million. Return on tangible common equity hit 24.8%, an exceptional figure for a financial. Crucially, the methods agree the price is reasonable for this: every family of valuation lens lands at or above today's $73.64 (June 28, 2026), with the cash-flow capitalization, the relative-multiple read, and the asset-based excess-return model all clustered around the price. A firm earning a high-20s return on tangible equity, growing book value double digits, and buying back stock is not asking the buyer to pay ahead of the evidence.

Bear Case

The methods barely disagree on Stifel, and that is precisely where the bear case has to be honest. Almost every family lands at or near today's price rather than above it, which means there is no cheapness to point at; the price already credits a strong quarter. The cluster of conservative reads is the more reliable guide here. The relative-multiple lens places the price slightly above the sector earnings multiple, and the asset-based excess-return model lands a touch below it. When the value-oriented methods say fairly priced rather than cheap, the bull case loses its margin of error, and the burden shifts to whether the recent earnings power is durable.

It may not be, because the part of Stifel that drove the record was the part that is least repeatable. Investment-banking revenue up 44% and advisory up 59% reflect a strong deal environment, and deal environments turn. The first-quarter return on tangible equity of 24.8% is not a through-cycle number; it is a peak-conditions number, and a buyer paying near the methods' central estimates is implicitly assuming conditions like these persist. Strip the banking surge back toward a normal year and the consolidated revenue line softens, the blended multiple looks fuller, and the cash-flow read that currently sits near the price drifts below it.

The other structural risk is the one Stifel names itself: it is a people business, and the people can leave. The 10-K is blunt that if it cannot "retain our senior professionals or recruit additional professionals, our reputation, business, results of operations, and financial condition will be adversely" affected. Advisor and banker teams move, and they take client relationships and deal pipelines with them. Add the cyclicality of capital-markets revenue to the mobility of the talent that generates it, and the bear case is not that Stifel is overvalued today, but that today's earnings are flattered by a deal cycle and a buyer is paying for them as if they were the baseline.

Valuation

Stifel is best valued the way a financial should be, on the return it earns on equity rather than on a single operating margin. It earns a return on equity around 14.7% on a book value of $36.61 per share, and the fee-earnings read of what the price assumes lands within the range its history supports. This is not a stretched bet; it is a quality financial priced roughly for its quality.

The striking feature of the method spread is how tight it is. The relative-multiple lens reads the price near the sector earnings multiple. The asset-based excess-return model lands close to the price, as does the free-cash-flow capitalization on $892 million of trailing free cash flow. Even the residual-income read, which credits the gap between Stifel's return on equity and its cost of equity, lands essentially at the price. When this many independent methods converge near the current level, the message is that the market has the business about right: not a discount to exploit, not a premium to fear. The one cross-check worth naming is the segment quality. Where a pure asset manager's value rests on fund fees exposed to passive competition, Stifel's wealth arm is anchored in advisory relationships and a growing bank balance sheet, a stickier base, and its institutional arm adds banking upside that the steady methods do not fully capture in a strong year.

The balance-sheet frame for a broker-dealer is not net debt or interest coverage; client cash, deposits, and fund-level borrowings are the plumbing of the business, not corporate leverage. What matters is capital-return capacity, and Stifel has it: a falling share count, about 2% a year, and growing tangible book value are the direct evidence that earnings are converting into per-share value rather than leaking away. What the buyer underwrites at this price is durability: paying near the methods' central estimates for a firm whose recent earnings were lifted by a strong banking cycle, and betting the wealth engine carries the multiple when the deal market cools.

Catalysts

Stifel's first quarter of 2026 was a record across the franchise. Consolidated net revenue rose 17.7% to $1.48 billion, net income to common shareholders climbed to $242.1 million, and return on tangible common equity reached 24.8%. The Global Wealth Management arm set a first-quarter record at $932.1 million of net revenue, including record asset-management revenue of $459 million, while client assets grew 11% year over year to $538.7 billion. Tangible book value per share rose 12% year over year to $24.89.

The swing factor was the institutional business. Investment-banking revenue jumped 44% year over year, with advisory up 59%, marking a record first quarter for the institutional group. The result beat consensus, with reported EPS landing above the forecast, though the stock's muted reaction suggests the market was already crediting a strong banking environment. The next earnings print is the test of whether the banking momentum holds or normalizes; the wealth-management trajectory, more stable by nature, is the line that determines how much of the multiple rests on durable fee income versus a favorable deal cycle.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Global Wealth Management (reported)

Institutional Group (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 earnings release, April 2026

View the full interactive SF report on boothcheck