SEI INVESTMENTS COMPANY (SEIC): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $104.83, SEI INVESTMENTS COMPANY (SEIC) is priced for +9.3% earnings growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/SEIC

Headline

FieldValue
TickerSEIC
CompanySEI INVESTMENTS COMPANY
Current price$104.83/sh
CompositionInvestment management fees from pooled investment products 18% / Investment management fees from investment management agreements 20% / Investment operations fees 37% / Investment processing fees - PaaS 14% / Investment processing fees - SaaS 5% / Professional services fees 1% / Account fees and other 4%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basisfee-financial
Implied earnings growth9.3%
Price-to-earnings23.0x
Earnings yield4.3%

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.7% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage, on a 5-year median GAAP earnings base; each 1pp of cost of equity moves the implied earnings growth ~4.3pp.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.09σ
cohort percentile (of 51 peers)59
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.65x5expensive
Earnings1.71x5expensive
Relative1.47x2expensive
Growth0.68x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$173.720.60xyesFCF base $0.7B, growth 11% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.2%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$154.160.68xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 15.9x / 17.9x / 19.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 12x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 9.9x / 12.0x / 14.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$63.671.65xyesBV/sh $20.83, ROE (TTM) 28.3%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$113.740.92xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$112.950.93xyesRev $2.5B, growth 11% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 4.2x / 5.1x / 6.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$68.041.54xyesEPS $5.67, growth 9% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.02 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$46.172.27xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.55B × (1−21%) / WACC 9.2% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$96.181.09xyesBV $20.83 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 28.3% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$51.552.03xyes√(22.5 × EPS $5.67 × BVPS $20.83) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativeno
FCF YieldEarnings$61.301.71xyesFCF $686.8M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$56.221.86xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.63B (FCF $0.69B − SBC $0.06B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$123.970.85xyesEPS $5.67 × (8.5 + 2×8.8%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$13.687.66xyesBV $20.83 × (ROIC 6.0% / WACC 9.2%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $2.45B × sector P/S 3.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$74.791.40xyesEPS $5.67 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 8.8% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 13.2x
Earnings YieldEarnings$61.301.71xyesEPS $5.67 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Investment Managersoperatingenterprise$815.0m$320.7m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Private Banksoperatingenterprise$572.9m$98.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Investment Advisorsoperatingenterprise$577.4m$265.7m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Institutional Investorsoperatingenterprise$282.5m$134.4m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Investments in New Businessesoperatingenterprise$49.5m-$10.7m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$366.8m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-0.66x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-0.52x (net cash)
Interest coverage518.0x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-2.7%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Where the price sits against the methods tells the bull story before any single number does. The forward-growth and peer-multiple lenses both land at or above today's $89.49 (June 28, 2026), and the earnings-based reads that credit SEI's cash generation, the free-cash-flow capitalization and the earnings-yield model, sit above the price too. The only family that calls SEI expensive is the no-growth earnings-power floor, which by construction assumes the company stops growing. For a business compounding fees on a rising asset base, that is the wrong anchor, and the spread between it and the live methods is the bull case in one picture.

The engine underneath is unusually efficient. SEI earns a return on equity around 30%, which is exceptional for a fee business, and it does it with almost no leverage: gross debt of roughly $32 million against $400 million of liquid assets. Its 10-K describes the recurring core directly, the platform fees from clients "that outsource their entire investment operation and back-office processing functions". That is the part of SEI that behaves less like an asset manager and more like enterprise software, sticky revenue that scales with client growth rather than with markets alone. The first quarter showed both engines working: assets under management reached $554.1 billion, up 14% year over year, and assets under administration hit $1.29 trillion, up 19.3%.

Capital allocation closes the case. SEI threw off $662 million of free cash flow on the trailing year and returned it aggressively, buying back 2.554 million shares for $208.3 million and paying $63.7 million in dividends in the first quarter alone. The share count has fallen about 2.8% a year, which is direct evidence of capital return compounding per-share value rather than diluting it. A 30%-return business with no debt, recurring platform revenue, and a falling share count is the kind of compounder where the forward methods, not the no-growth floor, are reading the price correctly.

Bear Case

The competitive pressure on SEI is the same tide pulling at the entire active-management industry, and it is structural. The shift of investor dollars from active funds to low-cost passive products compresses the fees SEI's asset-management arm can charge. A direct peer names the dynamic in its own filing: T. Rowe Price warns that competitors emphasizing passive products "have gained and may continue to gain market share from active managers like us", and that competition can "compel us to reduce the fees we charge to clients, thereby reducing our revenues and net income". SEI runs the same exposure on the roughly two-fifths of its revenue that comes from investment-management fees. A rising AUM number can mask a falling fee rate, and the fee rate is what the multiple ultimately capitalizes.

The flow data carries an early warning. In the first quarter, advisor channels added about $1.6 billion of net inflows, but institutional outflows ran close to $1 billion, driven by a defined-benefit annuitization. One client decision moved the institutional line by nearly the size of the advisor gains. That is the concentration risk inside a business that looks diversified at the top: large institutional mandates can leave in a single transaction, and the processing-platform clients, while stickier, take years to implement and are correspondingly slow to replace.

The valuation has to clear a real bar. The price requires SEI to keep compounding fees at a healthy clip, and the earnings-power lens, valuing the current profit with no growth, lands well below the price. That gap is the growth the buyer is paying for. If passive competition compresses the asset-management fee rate, or if a few large institutional clients follow the DB annuitization out, the growth that justifies the relative and forward multiples slows, and the price drifts toward the no-growth floor rather than away from it. The balance sheet is pristine, so this is not a solvency risk. It is a multiple risk: a high-quality compounder priced for continued compounding, where the compounding faces a real industry headwind.

Valuation

SEI is best read the way a fee business should be, on the durability of its return on equity rather than on a single operating margin. It earns a return on equity near 30% against a book value of $19.68 per share, and the price embeds continued fee growth from there. The fee-financial read of what the price assumes lands within the range SEI's own track record supports, so this is not a stretched bet so much as a quality compounder priced as one.

The methods cluster in an informative pattern. The peer-multiple lens reads the price as reasonable, roughly in line with where comparable financials trade. The forward-growth lens lands above the price, crediting the continued growth in AUM and platform fees. The cash-flow reads, the free-cash-flow capitalization and the earnings yield, also sit above the price on the strength of $662 million of trailing free cash flow. The lone dissent is the earnings-power lens, which values the current profit assuming zero growth and lands far below the price. The distance between that floor and the live methods is precisely the growth premium: the market is paying for SEI to keep expanding fees, and every method that credits growth agrees the price is supported, while the one that denies growth does not. Among peers, the contrast with a pure active manager is the useful one. Where T. Rowe Price's filing frames the industry around defending against passive share loss, SEI's own 10-K leans on recurring platform revenue from clients that "outsource their entire investment operation", a more software-like and stickier base than fund fees alone.

Solvency is barely a question here. With roughly $32 million of gross debt against $400 million of liquid assets and interest coverage in the hundreds, SEI carries no leverage risk; the balance-sheet frame for a business like this is capital-return capacity, and the answer is ample. The first quarter alone returned $272 million through buybacks and dividends. What the buyer underwrites at this price is not whether SEI survives a downturn, but whether its fee growth outruns the passive headwind long enough to justify paying above the no-growth value of today's earnings.

Catalysts

SEI's first quarter of 2026 delivered broad-based growth. Total revenue rose to $622.2 million from $551.3 million a year earlier, split between $498.0 million of asset-management, administration, and distribution fees and $124.2 million of information-processing and software-servicing fees. Net income climbed to $176.8 million from $151.5 million, lifting diluted EPS to $1.40 from $1.17. Assets under management ended the quarter at $554.1 billion, up 14% year over year, and assets under administration reached $1.29 trillion, up 19.3%. The flow mix was the nuance: advisors added about $1.6 billion of net inflows while institutional channels saw close to $1 billion of outflows from a single defined-benefit annuitization.

The sell side has turned more constructive. The consensus rating sits at Buy with an average price target near $105, and the spring brought a cluster of target increases, with Keefe Bruyette and Piper Sandler both raising on April 23 and Raymond James lifting its target on April 29. Capital return continued at pace: SEI repurchased 2.554 million shares for $208.3 million in the quarter and the board declared a semi-annual dividend of $0.52 per share on May 27. The next earnings print is the read on whether the advisor-channel momentum and the platform fee growth keep outrunning institutional lumpiness and the broader fee-compression backdrop.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Investment Managers (reported)

Private Banks (reported)

Investment Advisors (reported)

Institutional Investors (reported)

Investments in New Businesses (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 earnings release, April 2026 · analyst notes, April 2026 · SEI dividend declaration, May 27 2026

View the full interactive SEIC report on boothcheck