StandardAero, Inc. (SARO): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $31.00, StandardAero, Inc. (SARO) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~5.6 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-01.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/SARO

Headline

FieldValue
TickerSARO
CompanyStandardAero, Inc.
Current price$31.00/sh
CompositionCommercial Aerospace 60% / Military & Helicopter 18% / Business Aviation 19% / Other 4%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.4%
Operating margin today9.0%
Margin compression (value-band)-5.6pp
Must persist for5.6y
Multiple paid22x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 10: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 10.3% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~1.7 years.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~20.2%/yr; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: elevated

ReferenceValue
cohort percentile (of 221 peers)56
sustained it ~5.6 years at this level27%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset3.00x5expensive
Earnings3.26x3expensive
Relative1.94x2expensive
Growth1.01x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=13)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$13.712.26xyesFCF base $0.2B, growth 15% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.7%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$37.420.83xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 18.8x / 20.8x / 22.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 25.93x (blended: static sector reference 22x + trailing (TTM) 35x), scenarios: 21.1x / 25.9x / 30.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$9.553.25xyesBV/sh $8.07, ROE (TTM) 10.9%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$10.353.00xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$30.671.01xyesRev $6.3B, growth 15% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.3x / 1.7x / 2.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$10.562.94xyesEPS $0.88, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=17.55 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$4.506.89xyesNormalized EBIT (3y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.39B × (1−24%) / WACC 7.7% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$10.512.95xyesBV $8.07 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 10.9% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 7.1%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$12.642.45xyes√(22.5 × EPS $0.88 × BVPS $8.07) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.61B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$0.013100.00xyesFCF $148.5M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median)
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$0.013100.00xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.13B (FCF $0.15B − SBC $0.01B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median)
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$28.391.09xyesEPS $0.88 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$2.2613.72xyesBV $8.07 × (ROIC 2.2% / WACC 7.7%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $6.25B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$33.000.94xyesEPS $0.88 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$9.513.26xyesEPS $0.88 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Engine Servicesoperatingenterprise$5.4bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Component Repair Servicesoperatingenterprise$630.2mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$2.1b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)4.97x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)3.78x
Interest coverage3.4x
Share count CAGR (dilution)7.0%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Start with what the company does with its cash, because it tells you where management thinks the value is. In the first quarter of FY2026 StandardAero bought back about 2.0 million shares for $60.1 million and, in the same breath, announced the acquisition of Unified Turbines to add hot-section component-repair capability. Both moves point the same direction: deeper into the aftermarket. The company is not buying growth in new markets; it is buying more of the recurring repair work it already does and retiring a few shares at the edges. That is a management team that treats its own service franchise as the asset worth owning.

The franchise itself is unusually sticky. An aircraft engine cannot skip its scheduled overhaul, and the schedule is not set by StandardAero or its customers. The 10-K puts the driver plainly: "Manufacturer specifications, government regulations and military maintenance regimens generally require" the work, which means demand is written into the certification and the maintenance manual rather than into a sales pitch. A large piece of that demand comes through the OEMs, where StandardAero operates as an authorized shop performing "services we provide on behalf of OEMs as a subcontractor and authorized" contractor. Being inside the OEM's authorized network is a barrier a new entrant cannot buy; it has to be granted.

The engine side is where the operating leverage shows. Engine Services segment adjusted EBITDA rose to $706.9 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, up 15.7% from a year earlier "Engine Services Segment Adjusted EBITDA increased $96.0 million, or 15.7%, to $706.9 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, from $610.9 million for the year ended December 31," 2024. The growth came with real investment, not just volume: the segment is carrying LEAP and CFM transformation costs as it builds capacity on newer engine platforms alongside "growth on our mid-size and super mid-size business aviation platforms and select military transport programs." Those next-generation platforms are the installed base that feeds future shop visits as the fleet matures, and the company is paying now to be positioned to service them. Management guided Engine Services margins above 14% for the balance of the year and raised the business-aviation end-market growth outlook to a high-single-digit to low-double-digit range. Demand across all three end markets grew double digits in the quarter. For a business whose revenue arrives on a maintenance schedule, that is the bull case in one line: the fleet keeps flying, the engines keep coming in, and StandardAero is the shop with the authorizations to open them.

Bear Case

Aftermarket demand looks recession-proof from a distance, but it still rides a cycle, and this one is running warm. Shop-visit volumes track fleet utilization and fleet age, both near the strong end of their range right now: management is raising end-market growth guidance and flagging that fleet growth "is expected to drive a continued increase in demand for business jet engine maintenance services," while noting that supply-chain disruption across its end markets has been a live issue. The bear reading is that today's double-digit growth sits closer to peak throughput than to a sustainable baseline. When new-aircraft deliveries eventually catch up and the oldest engines retire, the volume of overhauls normalizes, and a business priced for continued acceleration re-rates on the way down.

The price is where that risk concentrates. At today's level the market is paying about 21 times company-wide operating income, and that multiple is defended by only one family of valuation methods. The asset-based and earnings-power lenses both land at roughly a third of the current price; peer-multiple methods land well below it; only the forward-growth methods, which credit tomorrow's compounding, reach it. Put plainly, the price requires StandardAero to hold operating growth at close to its self-funding ceiling for about five years, and among comparable fast-growers only about 30% sustained a pace like that even over a five-year window. The bet is not that the company is bad. It is that the market has already priced several years of uninterrupted execution, and the base rate for delivering it is roughly one in three.

Underneath the multiple sits leverage that the growth has to service. Net debt is about $2.1 billion, or roughly 3.8 times a year's operating profit, and interest coverage is about 3.4 times, which is adequate but not comfortable. Most of the debt is variable-rate: the company refinanced its senior secured term loans in 2024, replacing the "$2,562.1 million existing senior secured term loans then-outstanding" and pricing the facilities off floating benchmarks with an applicable margin. That structure means interest expense moves with rates the company does not control, and it competes directly with the buyback for the same free cash flow. The share count, meanwhile, has grown around 7% a year, so the repurchase announced this quarter is offsetting dilution rather than shrinking the base. And the demand that anchors the whole thesis runs partly through the OEMs: a significant portion of revenue is earned as an authorized subcontractor performing work "on behalf of OEMs," which means the same partners who supply the authorizations also set terms and could, over time, choose to keep more of that aftermarket for themselves. The customer contracts carry their own teeth, with provisions that "could cause us to incur penalties, be liable for liquidated or actual damages and incur unanticipated expenses" on delivery and performance. None of these is a crisis today. Together they are the reasons the required five years of clean compounding might not arrive intact.

Valuation

The clearest way to read StandardAero's price is to ask what it assumes and then check that assumption against the company's own economics. At $27.73 (July 1, 2026) the market is paying about 21 times company-wide operating income, and inverting that price yields a specific bet: operating growth held at close to the self-funding ceiling for roughly five years. This is a five-year durability assumption, not a longer one, and it is demanding. Against the history of comparable fast-growers, only about 30% sustained a pace like that over a window of that length. The price is not pricing a certainty; it is pricing a bet that has come true for roughly one company in three.

The valuation methods split cleanly on whether that bet is worth the price, and the split is the whole point. Group them into families and only one reaches the current level. The asset-based methods, built on a book value of about $8.07 a share and a trailing return on equity near 10.9%, land at roughly a third of the price. The earnings-power methods, which capitalize normalized profit with no growth, land lower still. Peer-multiple methods, anchored on sector medians, sit well below the price as well. Only the forward-growth methods reach it, and the way they get there is instructive: the exit-multiple cash-flow model holds today's EV/EBITDA multiple flat for the projection, and the future-market-cap model tapers 15% revenue growth. The price is defensible only if you credit years of compounding that the static frames, by construction, cannot see. That spread between the value lenses and the growth lenses is the premium the market is paying for durability.

Solvency is where the downside gets its shape. Net debt of about $2.1 billion runs to roughly 3.8 times a year's operating profit on a pre-tax basis, interest coverage is about 3.4 times, and the company is not burning cash. The refinanced term loans that replaced the prior "$2,562.1 million" facility carry variable rates, so debt service floats with the rate environment rather than sitting fixed. The share count has grown around 7% a year, which means the buyback works against dilution rather than compounding a shrinking base. The balance sheet can carry the business as it stands; what it does not do is add a cushion to a price already leaning entirely on the growth family. For context on where the street sits, analyst price targets cluster in the mid-thirties, with a consensus near $37. That range credits more of the forward growth than the static methods here do, which is the same disagreement the method families already map, now voiced by sell-side desks rather than models.

Catalysts

The near-term calendar is anchored by a leadership transition on a fixed date. Russell Ford, CEO for the past thirteen years, will hand the role to Paul McElhinney on October 1, 2026 and move to executive chairman, with McElhinney set to add the chairman title in January 2027. McElhinney arrives with three and a half decades in the industry, including senior roles at GE Aviation Services and GE Power Services, and the board affirmed the full-year outlook alongside the announcement, signaling continuity rather than a strategic reset. Succession at a company this dependent on OEM relationships is worth watching precisely because those relationships are personal as well as contractual.

The operating story going in is one of raised guidance. First-quarter FY2026 revenue grew 13.3% to $1.63 billion with double-digit growth across all three end markets, and management lifted the full-year targets to revenue of $6.325 to $6.45 billion, adjusted EBITDA of $875 to $905 million, and free cash flow of $270 to $300 million. The business-aviation end market saw its growth outlook raised to a high-single-digit to low-double-digit range, and Engine Services margins are guided above 14% for the balance of the year. The Unified Turbines acquisition announced in the quarter adds hot-section component-repair capability, extending the aftermarket footprint rather than diversifying away from it.

Sell-side sentiment is constructive but not uniform, which is itself worth watching as the next prints land. UBS upgraded the stock to Buy with a $34 target, and CIBC raised its target to $39 on an outperform rating; against that, Jefferies moved to Hold and trimmed its target to $30. The spread between the bulls in the high-thirties and the more cautious desks near $30 tracks the same question the valuation work raises: how much of the next several years of compounding is already in the price. The next quarterly report is the near-term test of whether the raised guidance holds.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Engine Services (reported)

Component Repair Services (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

StandardAero press release, June 1, 2026 · Q1 FY2026 earnings release, May 2026 · Q1 FY2026 earnings call, May 2026 · analyst consensus via MarketBeat, June 2026 · analyst actions via MarketBeat, June 2026

View the full interactive SARO report on boothcheck