Ryerson Holding Corp (RYZ): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $27.61, Ryerson Holding Corp (RYZ) is priced for +5.4% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/RYZ

Headline

FieldValue
TickerRYZ
CompanyRyerson Holding Corp
Current price$27.61/sh
CompositionUnited States 90% / Other (foreign) 10%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)1.8%
Operating margin (mid-cycle)3.7%
Margin compression (value-band)-1.9pp
Trailing margin (depressed year)0.3%
Implied growth5.4%
Multiple paid13x mid-cycle operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~5.5pp.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.20σ
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.25x3expensive
Earnings1.12x1expensive
Relative0.10x3justifies
Growth0.97x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Earnings, Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=10)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$0.00noNegative/zero FCF — equity value floored at $0
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$0.00noNegative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0
Relative ValuationRelative$277.500.10xyesP/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 2.5x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus
Simple DDMGrowth$6.104.53xyesDPS $0.74, g=-2.5% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3%
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$0.03920.33xyesStage 1: -96% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual (excluded from median)
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$24.491.13xyesBook value floor: BV/sh $24.49, ROE negative
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$22.041.25xyesBook value with convergence: BV/sh $24.49, ROE converges to ke
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$28.420.97xyesRev $5.8B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.2x / 0.2x / 0.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$0.00noNegative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0
Margin TrajectoryGrowth$391.000.07xyesMargin ramp: -1% → 12% over 7yr, rev growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered)
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$24.671.12xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.24B × (1−27%) / WACC 8.1% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAssetno
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$3.258.50xyesEBITDA $0.04B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsno
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$4.665.92xyesBV $24.49 × (ROIC 1.5% / WACC 8.1%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$277.500.10xyesRevenue $5.84B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarningsno
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Metals Service Centers (consolidated)operatingenterprise4.6B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$913.3m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)5.79x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)4.21x
Share count CAGR (dilution)8.1%
Burning cashyes

Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 3.7%); the trailing year was depressed.

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Capital allocation is the clearest read on where management sees value, and Ryerson has been spending it on consolidation. The defining move is the Olympic Steel combination, which contributed $272.7 million of net sales and $4.1 million of net income in its first partial quarter inside Ryerson and carries a target of roughly $120 million in annual synergies by early 2028 (web research). For a metals service center, scale is the moat: the FY2025 10-K describes the business as "closing the gap between metal producers' supply and end-users' demand" by "aggregating end-users' demand and purchasing metal in bulk to take advantage of economies of scale" (accession 0001193125-26-062397). A larger combined purchasing footprint buys metal cheaper and spreads fixed processing and logistics cost over more tons, which is exactly the lever a low-margin distributor needs. Management is also paying a $0.90 dividend and runs a modest 2.4% share count growth, so the cash deployment is consolidation plus a steady payout rather than dilutive empire-building.

The valuation supports that capital story rather than fighting it. The price sits almost on top of book value per share at $29.71, the two excess-return reference floors land at roughly $27 and $30, and the earnings-power value, normalizing five years of operating income, marks $36 against a $27.72 (June 28, 2026) quote (accession 0001193125-26-062397). Three of the four families say the price is at or below fair on an asset and earnings-power basis; only the growth-DCF family reads expensive, which is appropriate for a cyclical that is not supposed to be a compounding growth story. The blended X-ray lands near $28, essentially at the quote, so the buyer is paying close to the replacement-and-earnings value of the assets.

The cycle is turning in the company's favor at the same time the scale is arriving. First-quarter 2026 net sales reached $1.57 billion, up 37.9% year over year, with tons shipped up 31.2% and average selling prices up 5.2%, and on a same-store basis tons rose 4.6% and prices 8.9% (web research). Earnings of $0.30 per share beat the estimate, and management guided to further revenue and earnings growth in the second quarter on full-period Olympic contributions and continued margin expansion. The price assumes about 11% mid-cycle operating-profit growth for five years, a pace inside the company's own history, so the embedded assumption is within range rather than heroic, and the synergy program is the mechanism that can deliver it.

Bear Case

A metals distributor sits at the mercy of a cycle it cannot control, and that is the first crack in the bull read. The FY2025 10-K states the obvious risk in plain terms: the company operates "in an industry that is subject to cyclical fluctuations," and metal purchases are "generally at prevailing market prices in effect at the time we place our orders" (accession 0001193125-26-062397). Margin is the spread between the price of metal bought and the price of metal sold, and in a falling-price environment a service center can be caught long inventory it acquired at a higher cost. The current strength in shipments and selling prices is the upswing of that cycle, not a permanent margin level, and the price already capitalizes mid-cycle earnings rather than the trough, so there is limited cushion if steel and aluminum prices roll over. Only about half of comparable companies sustained the assumed pace for even five years.

The earnings the price leans on are normalized, and the gap between normalized and reported is wide. Trailing operating income was roughly negative $10 million, while the mid-cycle normalization the inversion uses sits near $186 million, a divergence the data flags explicitly. That is the cyclicality made numeric: the business swung from a normalized $186 million to a trough near breakeven within the measured window. A buyer paying 14x mid-cycle income is betting the company climbs back to mid-cycle and holds there, but the same volatility that produced the trough can return, and at the trough the asset-value floor is the only thing left supporting the price.

Leverage compounds the cyclicality. Net debt is about $883 million against a business whose operating income just touched breakeven, and the 10-K is explicit that indebtedness "under the Ryerson Credit Facility, which could adversely affect our financial position," stood at $463.2 million at year-end 2025 before the combination layered on more (accession 0001193125-26-062397). Interest coverage cannot even be computed cleanly because interest expense is not separately reported. The Olympic Steel integration adds both the debt to fund it and the execution risk of merging two distribution networks, and the $120 million synergy target is a 2028 promise, not a 2026 fact. If the cycle weakens before the synergies land, a leveraged distributor with thin liquidity has less room to maneuver than its asset-supported valuation suggests.

Valuation

The price is read on a whole-company basis against operating income, because the trailing line is depressed by the cycle and a trough quarter would mislead. Using the company's own through-the-cycle margins on current revenue, the quote works out to roughly 14x mid-cycle operating income, which inverts to about 11% annual operating-profit growth over a five-year stage at a 10% cost of capital. That near-term pace is within Ryerson's own history, so the assumption is within range. The stretch, as the inversion notes, is in how long the recovery must persist rather than the rate.

The X-ray is the picture of a cyclical at a low point. Models that need positive trailing earnings, DCF, FCF yield, Graham number, residual income, are all gated off by the negative trailing operating result, which is why the per-share point estimates from the relative and EV/EBITDA methods are unreliable here (they divide by a near-zero trough EBITDA and blow up). The meaningful marks are the asset family and earnings-power: book value per share $29.71, excess-return reference floors near $27 and $30, and an earnings-power value of $36 that normalizes five years of operating income (accession 0001193125-26-062397). The blended mark is about $28, at the current price.

The honest read is that this is an asset-and-earnings-power value name where the buyer pays close to book and mid-cycle earnings power, and the variable that decides the outcome is the cycle: whether selling prices and shipments hold long enough for the normalized earnings, and the Olympic synergies, to actually arrive.

Catalysts

The dominant catalyst is the Olympic Steel integration. In the first quarter of 2026 Olympic contributed $272.7 million of net sales and $4.1 million of net income, and Ryerson is targeting roughly $120 million in annual synergies by early 2028 (web research). The pace of those synergies, and whether the combined network delivers the promised purchasing and processing scale, is the swing factor for earnings over the next two years.

The near-term operating trend is favorable. First-quarter 2026 net sales reached $1.57 billion, up 37.9% year over year, with tons shipped up 31.2% and average selling prices up 5.2%, and same-store volume and pricing both rose (web research). Earnings of $0.30 per share beat the $0.28 estimate, though revenue of $1.57 billion came in below the consensus near $1.72 billion. Management guided to further revenue and earnings growth in the second quarter on full-period Olympic contributions and continued margin expansion.

The variables to watch are the metal-price cycle and the balance sheet against it. Selling prices and shipment volumes set the gross margin spread, so a reversal in steel or aluminum pricing would pressure both the top line and the inventory carried against it. Net debt near $883 million and the funding of the combination are the second watch item: the synergy realization needs to outrun the integration cost and any cyclical softening. Watch quarterly average selling prices, same-store tons, the cadence of synergy capture, and net debt as the merged entity settles.

Sources: Ryerson Q1 2026 earnings transcript (fool.com, theglobeandmail.com); Ryerson Q1 2026 earnings coverage (quiverquant.com, stocktitan.net); Ryerson Q1 2026 results presentation (seekingalpha.com).

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Metals Service Centers (consolidated) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

View the full interactive RYZ report on boothcheck