Rush Street Interactive, Inc. (RSI): what the price requires
At today's price, Rush Street Interactive, Inc. (RSI) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~14.8 years. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/RSI
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | RSI |
| Company | Rush Street Interactive, Inc. |
| Current price | $33.94/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 7.7% |
| Operating margin today | 8.6% |
| Margin compression implied | -0.9pp |
| Must persist for | 14.8y |
| Multiple paid | 33x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 5, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 13.3% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~2.4 years.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~6.7 years; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: elevated
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| cohort percentile (of 32 peers) | 75 |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 14% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 7.63x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 2.68x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 2.28x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.73x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=16)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $66.91 | 0.51x | yes | FCF base $0.2B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.0%, 7yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $46.16 | 0.74x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 19.0x / 22.0x / 25.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $16.78 | 2.02x | yes | P/E 30.8x (blended: static sector reference 14x + trailing (TTM) 98x), scenarios: 24.6x / 30.8x / 37.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12.89x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $3.75 | 9.05x | yes | BV/sh $1.49, ROE (TTM) 23.3%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $5.94 | 5.71x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $46.52 | 0.73x | yes | Rev $1.2B, growth 28% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.3x / 2.9x / 3.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $4.08 | 8.32x | yes | EPS $0.34, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=48.92 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $5.46 | 6.22x | yes | BV $1.49 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 23.3% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $3.38 | 10.04x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $0.34 × BVPS $1.49) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $14.91 | 2.28x | yes | EBITDA $0.16B × sector EV/EBITDA 9.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $17.43 | 1.95x | yes | FCF $155.5M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $14.99 | 2.26x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.13B (FCF $0.16B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $10.97 | 3.09x | yes | EPS $0.34 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $23.25 | 1.46x | yes | Revenue $1.24B × sector P/S 2.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $12.75 | 2.66x | yes | EPS $0.34 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $3.68 | 9.22x | yes | EPS $0.34 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net cash | $333.8m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | -5.74x (net cash) |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | -3.29x (net cash) |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -12.9% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
- Rush Street runs an online-casino-first model under BetRivers rather than chasing sportsbook share, and it has reached profitability while still growing fast, with Q1 2026 revenue up 41% and net income up 134%.
- The balance sheet funds the growth internally: about $334 million of cash against almost no debt, so the company is scaling without diluting or borrowing against the bet.
- The watch item is durability against giant competitors; the price embeds operating growth held at its self-funding ceiling for roughly 13 years, a pace only about one in seven fast-growers has sustained even a decade.
Bull Case
Rush Street made a contrarian bet that is now paying off in cash. While the largest online operators led with sportsbook to grab headlines, Rush Street led with online casino, the higher-margin, more recurring product, and built BetRivers around it. Q1 2026 showed the model working at scale: revenue grew 41% to $370.4 million, adjusted EBITDA grew 81% to $60.2 million, and net income rose 134% to $26.2 million. Profitable while growing 40% is rare in this industry, and it is the direct consequence of leading with the product that actually makes money.
The engagement metrics show the customer base deepening, not just widening. Monthly active users reached about 839,000, up 51% year over year, with North American casino users up 62%, and average revenue per monthly active user was $317 in the United States and Canada. A $317 annualized-feeling per-user revenue figure with users still growing more than 50% is the combination that compounds: more players, each worth more, on a fixed platform. The Latin America business, monetizing at a lower $54 per user, is the optionality layer on top of a proven North American core.
The capital structure lets all of this happen without an asterisk. Rush Street holds about $334 million of cash against almost no debt, so it funds its own growth, and its high return on equity says the capital it does deploy works hard. Management raised full-year 2026 guidance to revenue of $1.49 billion to $1.54 billion and adjusted EBITDA of $230 million to $250 million, implying 50% to 63% EBITDA growth. A self-funded, profitable, fast-growing operator in a still-expanding market is the bull case in one sentence.
Bear Case
Rush Street competes against companies many times its size, and that is the erosion risk the price has to outrun. The filing does not soften it: "Competition in the online and retail sports betting and online gaming industry is intense and, as a result, we may fail to attract and retain customers". The two largest operators spend on marketing and promotions at a level Rush Street cannot match dollar for dollar, and in a business where customer acquisition is the cost of growth, a smaller player has to be sharper, not just present, to keep taking share. The casino-first strategy has carved out a profitable niche, but niches in winner-take-most digital markets can get squeezed when the giants decide to press.
The competitive set is also widening in ways the moat does not cover. The filing flags new entrants introducing "sports-based prediction markets" and ongoing consolidation among competitors, both of which can change the economics of the category faster than an incumbent can adjust. Prediction-market platforms in particular reach the same customer with a different regulatory posture, and consolidation gives rivals more scale to fund promotions. A regulated state-by-state operator, present in 15 US states, has to win each market against a moving competitive field.
The valuation prices the optimistic path. At about 27 times operating income, the market is paying for operating growth held at its self-funding ceiling for roughly 13 years, against a current operating margin of about 9%. The asset-value methods land far below the price, several times below, and the earnings-power and peer-multiple methods below it as well; only the forward-growth methods reach it. That means the entire price rests on a long durable runway, and durability is exactly what intense competition threatens. The $334 million cash cushion is a genuine strength that removes financing risk, but it does not narrow the gap between a 9% margin today and the decade-plus of compounding the price assumes. If growth decelerates as competition intensifies, there is no value-method floor anywhere near the current price.
Valuation
The price makes a long-duration bet on a young, newly profitable company. At about 27 times operating income, inverting the price implies operating growth held at its self-funding ceiling for roughly 13 years, against a current operating margin of about 9%. The rate is within what a fast-growing online operator can post for a while; the stretch is entirely in the duration, and only about one in seven comparable fast-growers has sustained that kind of pace even a decade. The bet is that Rush Street is early in a long compounding curve, not late in a growth spurt.
The methods describe a classic high-growth profile. The asset-value methods sit far below the price, the earnings-power and peer-multiple methods below it, and only the forward-growth methods reach it. The relative lens blends a sector multiple near 14 times against a much richer trailing figure, which is what a recently-profitable, fast-growing name looks like through a peer screen. The signal is unambiguous: this is a durability and optionality premium that the static frames structurally cannot price, so a buyer is underwriting the growth runway rather than buying a discount to current value.
Solvency is the clean part of the story and bounds the downside. Rush Street holds about $334 million of cash against almost no debt, so it cannot be forced into distress and it funds growth without leaning on capital markets. The decisive question is not the balance sheet; it is whether the casino-first model can sustain its growth against far larger competitors long enough to grow into a multiple priced for over a decade of compounding. At a 9% operating margin and a 13-year implied runway, the return depends on duration holding, and duration is what the competition is built to attack.
Catalysts
Q1 2026 was a record quarter that validated the strategy. Revenue grew 41% to $370.4 million, adjusted EBITDA grew 81% to $60.2 million, and net income rose 134% to $26.2 million, new quarterly records for the company. The growth came with deepening engagement: monthly active users reached about 839,000, up 51% year over year, with North American casino users up 62%, and average revenue per monthly active user of $317 in the United States and Canada against $54 in Latin America.
On the strength of the quarter, management raised full-year 2026 guidance to revenue of $1.49 billion to $1.54 billion and adjusted EBITDA of $230 million to $250 million, implying 50% to 63% EBITDA growth. The raise signals confidence that the casino-first model keeps scaling profitably through the year, across its 15 US states and the BetRivers, PlaySugarHouse, and RushBet brands.
What to watch is user growth and per-user monetization against competitive intensity, since both feed directly into the long-duration growth the price assumes. New state launches and Latin America expansion are the upside levers; an acceleration in competitor promotional spend or the rise of prediction-market alternatives is the most direct risk. The next quarterly active-user and EBITDA print tests whether the profitable-growth combination holds.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Rush Street Interactive (single segment) (reported)
- DKNG (DRAFTKINGS INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CHDN (Churchill Downs Inc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Rush Street Interactive Q1 2026 earnings release, April 2026