RYMAN HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES, INC. (RHP): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $127.62, RYMAN HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES, INC. (RHP) is priced for +6.6% AFFO growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.

Generated: 2026-08-08 · Exported: 2026-08-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/RHP

Headline

FieldValue
TickerRHP
CompanyRYMAN HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES, INC.
Current price$127.62/sh
CompositionHotel group rooms 21% / Hotel transient rooms 10% / Hotel food and beverage - banquets 26% / Hotel food and beverage - outlets 12% / Hotel other 14% / Entertainment admissions/ticketing 7% / Entertainment food and beverage 6% / Entertainment retail and other 4%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basisreit
Implied FFO growth6.6%
Price-to-FFO15.4x
FFO yield6.5%

Solve inputs: computed at a 11% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of equity moves the implied AFFO growth ~3.5pp.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~0%/yr; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.35σ
cohort percentile (of 105 peers)59
sustained it ~5 years at this level65%

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.33x4expensive
Earnings2.23x5expensive
Relative1.29x3expensive
Growth0.99x4justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=16)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$389.260.33xyesFCF base $0.7B, growth 11% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 6.7%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$173.670.73xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 12.5x / 14.5x / 16.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 27.18x (blended: static sector reference 35x + trailing (TTM) 15x), scenarios: 22.6x / 27.2x / 31.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 20x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$102.311.25xyesStage 1: 7% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$42.982.97xyesBV/sh $11.61, ROE (TTM) 34.2%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$87.801.45xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$99.871.28xyesRev $2.7B, growth 11% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.5x / 3.0x / 3.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$99.121.29xyesFFO/share $8.26, growth 7% (input: historical FFO/share growth, 9y median), PEG=4.66 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$23.295.48xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.38B × (1−9%) / WACC 6.7% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$66.781.91xyesBV $11.61 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 34.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$46.462.75xyes√(22.5 × FFO/share $8.26 × BVPS $11.61) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.80B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$57.182.23xyesFCF $661.7M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$54.732.33xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.65B (FCF $0.66B − SBC $0.01B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$154.230.83xyesFFO/share $8.26 × (8.5 + 2×6.9%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$5.0925.07xyesBV $11.61 × (ROIC 2.9% / WACC 6.7%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $2.65B × sector P/S 6.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$85.361.50xyesFFO/share $8.26 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 6.9% (input: historical FFO/share growth, 9y median)) → PE 10.3x
Earnings YieldEarnings$89.301.43xyesFFO/share $8.26 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelative$116.221.10xyesFFO/share $8.26 × 14.1x P/FFO (route cohort median, n=85); FFO $0.52B (FFO incl. D&A + impairments, FY2025, companyfacts), shares 63M
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Hospitalityoperatingenterprise2.1B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value
Entertainmentoperatingenterprise0.4B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt (REIT basis)$3.5b
Net debt / FFO6.80x
Fixed-charge coverage (FFO basis)3.1x
Funds from operations (trailing)$521.5m
Share count CAGR (dilution)5.3%
Burning cashno

REIT basis: leverage is read against funds from operations (FFO), not depreciation-gutted operating income. The header's implied growth runs on ADJUSTED FFO — FFO minus recurring maintenance capex — so the header's multiple and this leverage ratio use bases that differ by that capex; neither substitutes for the other.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The market is paying about 16 times adjusted funds from operations for Ryman, which embeds an assumption that the trust grows that cash measure roughly 6.6 percent a year. The fundamentals it just reported are running ahead of the steady-state version of that bet. First-quarter consolidated revenue was a record $664.6 million, with same-store Hospitality revenue of $511.5 million and same-store RevPAR up 2.1 percent to about $188, Total RevPAR up 2.8 percent to about $498. Management raised full-year guidance across the board, lifting Adjusted EBITDAre toward $883 million and Adjusted FFO toward $592 million. The price assumes growth; the prints and the raised guidance are delivering it.

What makes the bet more defensible than a typical hotel owner is the booking model. These are convention-scale properties where corporate and association groups commit rooms and meeting space well ahead of the stay, which smooths demand against the leisure cycle. The FY2025 10-K describes the Entertainment side as the Opry Entertainment Group, "the Grand Ole Opry, the legendary weekly showcase of country music's finest performers for 100 years; the Ryman Auditorium, the storied live music venue", a set of irreplaceable assets that monetize the same Nashville-centered brand the hotels trade on. Even where leisure-leaning properties softened, the core group business held: the filing notes the decline at Gaylord Opryland was a modest 2.3 percent in total revenue, not a collapse.

The forward setup is a self-help story the market can underwrite. Several flagship properties, Gaylord Texan, Gaylord National, and the JW Marriott Hill Country, dragged the quarter because they were mid-renovation, and management expects same-store RevPAR growth to accelerate as those rooms come back online, with the Gaylord Texan renovation completing in August. The implied growth the price requires sits within what the trust has historically delivered and in the upper half of its REIT peer group, but a wave of completed renovations into a strengthening corporate-group calendar is exactly the kind of near-term driver that turns an in-range assumption into a beat.

Bear Case

The bear case starts with how Ryman funds itself and what management chooses to do with capital. Net debt is about 6.8 times funds from operations, and fixed-charge coverage of roughly 3.1 times leaves a structure that works in good times and tightens quickly in bad ones. The trust is also a serial issuer of equity: the share count has been growing at about 5.3 percent a year, so per-share growth in funds from operations has to clear that dilution before a holder sees any of it. The 10-K's debt language shows a balance sheet that is actively managed rather than paid down, citing refinanced Term Loan B margins of 2.00 percent over SOFR under an incremental agreement. Leverage plus dilution means the equity is a geared claim on a cyclical asset, and the price gives little room for that gearing to work against the holder.

The cyclicality is real even with the group-booking smoothing. The most recent quarter showed the Entertainment segment revenue down 11.6 percent and its Adjusted EBITDAre down 25.1 percent, and three flagship Gaylord properties posted year-over-year declines in revenue and margin. Renovations explain part of that, but a REIT priced in the upper half of its cohort on adjusted funds from operations is priced for the renovations to pay off on schedule and for group demand to stay firm; any slip on either turns the premium into a liability. Peer disclosure underscores that the supply backdrop is not benign. Host Hotels' FY2025 10-K notes that conversions of independent properties "to upscale or luxury brands caused an increase in the supply for upscale and luxury properties in 2025", adding rooms in exactly the segment Ryman competes in.

The valuation methods split on whether the price is earned, and the split is the bear's evidence. The asset-based and earnings-power lenses read the stock as expensive, with earnings-power value landing far below the price and the asset methods clustered well under it; only the relative-multiple and growth-cash-flow methods reach the price, and they get there by crediting the growth the trust is assuming for itself. When the conservative, demonstrated-value methods say expensive and only the growth-dependent ones say fair, the price is leaning on the part of the thesis that has to be delivered, not the part that is already in the ground. A leveraged, equity-issuing REIT priced on growth it must still produce is the cleanest version of a cyclical bet wearing a defensive label.

Valuation

A real-estate trust is read on its adjusted funds from operations, cash earnings plus property depreciation, less the maintenance capital that keeps the buildings leasable, not on an operating multiple. At about 16 times that measure, Ryman's price implies it grows adjusted funds from operations roughly 6.6 percent a year. That pace is within what the trust has delivered before, and it sits in the upper half of the REIT peer group on price-to-adjusted-funds-from-operations, so the bet is not extreme, but it is not a discount either.

The methods divide cleanly along the line between demonstrated value and assumed growth. The asset-based and earnings-power lenses read the price as rich: earnings-power value lands well below the price, and the asset methods cluster under it. The relative-multiple and growth-cash-flow methods are the ones that reach the price, which is the signature of a name whose valuation rests on the growth it is forecast to produce rather than on the value already demonstrated. That is a coherent way to value a REIT with real growth drivers, but it means the margin for error lives entirely in the growth assumption.

Solvency is where the growth bet meets its constraint. Net debt is about 6.8 times funds from operations, with fixed-charge coverage near 3.1 times, and the share count is growing about 5.3 percent a year, so the trust funds expansion partly through new equity. The raised 2026 guidance, Adjusted EBITDAre toward $883 million and Adjusted FFO toward $592 million, is what services that structure comfortably; a shortfall against it is what would make the leverage and the dilution bite. The price is underwriting both the renovation-led acceleration and continued access to capital on terms that keep coverage where it is.

Catalysts

The first quarter set a positive tone and management used it to raise the year. Ryman reported record first-quarter consolidated revenue of $664.6 million, record consolidated net income of $69.4 million, and record Adjusted EBITDAre of $219.3 million, with same-store RevPAR up 2.1 percent and Total RevPAR up 2.8 percent. On the back of that, the company lifted midpoints for same-store RevPAR and Total RevPAR growth and raised consolidated Adjusted EBITDAre to $883.0 million, net income to $275.0 million, and Adjusted FFO to $592.1 million.

The near-term swing factor is the renovation calendar. The Entertainment segment was weak, with revenue down 11.6 percent and Adjusted EBITDAre down 25.1 percent, and three flagship Gaylord properties posted year-over-year revenue and margin declines, much of it tied to rooms out of service for renovation. Management expects same-store RevPAR growth to accelerate through the year as those projects finish, specifically pointing to the Gaylord Texan room renovation completing in August and a strengthening corporate-group mix. The next several quarters test whether the completed renovations and the group calendar deliver the acceleration the raised guidance now assumes.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Hospitality (reported)

Entertainment (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

RHP Q1 2026 results, April 30 2026 · RHP Q1 2026 earnings call, April 2026

View the full interactive RHP report on boothcheck