ROBERT HALF INC. (RHI): what the price assumes
boothcheck covers ROBERT HALF INC. (RHI) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/RHI
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | RHI |
| Company | ROBERT HALF INC. |
| Current price | $40.54/sh |
| Composition | Contract talent solutions 56% / Permanent placement talent solutions 8% / Protiviti 36% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 3.5% |
| Operating margin (mid-cycle) | 10.0% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -6.5pp |
| Trailing margin (depressed year) | 1.4% |
| Multiple paid | 8x mid-cycle operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.39σ |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 2.79x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.91x | 3 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.62x | 3 | expensive |
| Growth | 1.75x | 4 | expensive |
Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=15)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $22.46 | 1.80x | yes | FCF base $0.2B, growth -6% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 8.6%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $42.21 | 0.96x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 32.9x / 34.9x / 36.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $25.00 | 1.62x | yes | P/E 22.21x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 32x), scenarios: 18.8x / 22.2x / 25.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 18.88x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $7.67 | 5.29x | yes | Stage 1: -32% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $13.68 | 2.96x | yes | BV/sh $12.04, ROE (TTM) 10.5%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $14.55 | 2.79x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $23.89 | 1.70x | yes | Rev $5.3B, growth -6% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.7x / 0.8x / 0.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Growth-Adjusted P/E | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $34.85 | 1.16x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.47B × (1−40%) / WACC 8.6% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $14.71 | 2.76x | yes | BV $12.04 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 10.5% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 6.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $18.76 | 2.16x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $1.30 × BVPS $12.04) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $12.79 | 3.17x | yes | EBITDA $0.12B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $21.28 | 1.91x | yes | FCF $217.7M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $1.09 | 37.19x | yes | EPS $1.30 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $2.21 | 18.34x | yes | BV $12.04 × (ROIC 1.6% / WACC 8.6%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $130.18 | 0.31x | yes | Revenue $5.33B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $14.05 | 2.89x | yes | EPS $1.30 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net cash | $278.4m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | -1.19x (net cash) |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | -0.52x (net cash) |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -2.5% |
| Burning cash | no |
Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 10.0%); the trailing year was depressed.
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
- Robert Half is a cyclical placement business: it earns its margin matching temporary and permanent staff to employers, plus a consulting arm in Protiviti that booked $1.95 billion of revenue in FY2025, so its profits swing with the hiring cycle rather than holding a steady line.
- The central risk is the cycle itself, and the filings name it plainly: a downturn in any region or served industry "may severely reduce the demand for the Company's services and thereby significantly decrease the Company's revenues and profits," which is exactly what trough-quarter operating margins of roughly 1.4% reflect against through-cycle margins closer to 10%.
- Watch the sequential turn in Talent Solutions: management reported a second consecutive quarter of positive sequential growth and guided second-quarter revenue to $1.275 billion to $1.375 billion, so the next print tells whether the staffing recovery is taking hold or stalling.
Bull Case
What the standard valuation methods miss about Robert Half is the difference between a company that is structurally impaired and one that is sitting in the trough of its cycle. Run every model against today's price and the picture looks uniformly expensive: asset-based, earnings-power, peer-multiple, and even forward-growth methods all read the price as rich. But that reading uses trailing operating margins near 1.4 percent, and staffing margins at the bottom of a hiring downturn tell you almost nothing about the business's earning power across a full cycle. On through-the-cycle margins closer to 10 percent, the same price sits below what even a 5-percent-a-year decline in operating profit would justify. The bull case is that the cycle, not the company, is what the depressed numbers describe.
The recovery has already begun to show in the data the company controls. Talent Solutions delivered a second consecutive quarter of positive sequential growth, and international revenue grew 8.1 percent in the most recent quarter, a sharp reversal from the prior-year decline. That matters because the international business is where the prior-year weakness was concentrated; the FY2025 10-K records international revenue falling 5.4 percent to $1.21 billion, about 22 percent of the total, so a swing back to growth there is a direct unwind of last year's drag. Protiviti adds a different kind of revenue, consulting work billed on a time-and-material, fixed-fee, or unit basis that the filing reports at $1.95 billion for FY2025, broadening the company beyond pure placement into advisory work that carries its own demand drivers.
The balance sheet is what lets an investor wait for the cycle to turn. Robert Half carries no funded debt and roughly $278 million of net cash, so there is no leverage clock running against it during a soft patch. Management keeps returning capital and reinvesting at the same time: the filing details $82 million of capital expenditure in 2025, including $29 million tied to cloud-computing implementations, with about 65 percent of the total going to software and technology infrastructure. The share count has been shrinking at about 2.5 percent a year. A company that retires its own stock through a downturn, funds its technology build from cash flow, and carries no debt is one positioned to compound when placements recover rather than one forced to defend itself.
Bear Case
Read the valuation methods honestly and the bear case starts with a fact the bull has to explain away: not one family of method reaches today's price. The asset-based lens, the earnings-power lens, peer multiples, and the forward-growth methods all land below where the stock trades, and the conservative methods, the ones anchored on demonstrated book value and trailing profit, are usually the more honest read of a business whose forward path is uncertain. The earnings-power value, built on five-year-average operating income, lands near $36.55, only modestly above the price, while the asset-based methods cluster well below. The price is leaning entirely on a cyclical recovery that has not yet shown up in reported profit.
The reason that recovery is not guaranteed is the same reason the numbers are depressed: this is a demand-taking business with no control over its own volumes. The 10-K is blunt that a deterioration "in the economic condition of any region of any of the foregoing, or in any specific industry served by the Company may severely reduce the demand for the Company's services and thereby significantly decrease the Company's revenues and profits." Staffing demand is among the first line items companies cut when hiring slows and among the last they restore, so the trough can persist longer than a single guidance window suggests. The competitive structure compounds the problem; the filing describes the talent-solutions business as "highly competitive" and notes that any shortage of candidates could materially affect results, meaning the company is squeezed on both the client side and the supply side at once.
Protiviti is not the offset it might appear to be. Its consulting work is also cyclical, billed by time and project, and the most recent quarter showed gross-margin dollars of $89 million, down slightly from the prior year, with a one-time severance charge of three cents a share embedded in second-quarter guidance. That severance line is itself a tell: a business cutting staff is a business managing a demand shortfall, not riding a recovery. If hiring stays soft, the current price requires the operating margin to climb back toward its mid-cycle level on a timeline the data does not yet support, and the absence of leverage that protects the downside also means there is no financial engineering to manufacture growth the business cannot generate on its own.
Valuation
The whole valuation question for Robert Half collapses into one distinction: is the price reading depressed trough earnings or a permanently smaller business? At today's price the market is paying roughly 6 times company-wide through-the-cycle operating income, a multiple so low that the price actually sits below what even a 5-percent-a-year decline in operating profit would warrant. That is the inverted bet. It is not a demanding assumption about growth; it is close to an assumption that the business shrinks from here.
Set against that, the methods disagree in a revealing pattern. Every family reads the price as expensive when the math runs on trailing margins near 1.4 percent, because that figure is a trough, not a baseline. The forward-growth methods are where the gap is widest, which fits a cyclical name: those methods extrapolate the recent decline, while the earnings-power value, built on five-year-average operating income with one-time charges added back, lands at $36.55, the closest any method comes to the price. The exit-multiple cash-flow method, holding today's EV/EBITDA flat, reaches $35.47. In other words, the methods that average across the cycle land near the price; the methods that extrapolate the trough land well below it. The spread between them is the cyclical question stated in numbers.
Solvency removes the time pressure from that question. Robert Half carries no funded debt and roughly $278 million of net cash, and the FY2025 10-K shows the company still reinvesting through the soft patch, with $82 million of capital expenditure including $29 million for cloud implementations. A staffing firm with a clean balance sheet can absorb several quarters of trough margins without dilution or distress, which is precisely the condition under which the through-cycle methods, rather than the trough-extrapolating ones, become the better guide to what the price is actually underwriting.
Catalysts
The most direct catalyst is the sequential turn in Talent Solutions. Management reported a second consecutive quarter of positive sequential growth on a same-day constant-currency basis, with trends strengthening through the quarter and into early April, and international revenue up 8.1 percent after a 13.6 percent decline a year earlier. First-quarter global enterprise revenue was $1.3 billion, down about 4 percent reported and 6 percent on an adjusted basis.
Guidance frames the next two prints. The company guided second-quarter revenue to $1.275 billion to $1.375 billion and income per share of $0.20 to $0.30, or $0.23 to $0.33 excluding a one-time severance charge of three cents. For the consulting arm, management pointed to third-quarter Protiviti sequential revenue gains of 0 to 3 percent and adjusted segment margins of 7 to 9 percent on a lower cost structure. The severance charge and the lower Protiviti cost base both signal cost discipline ahead of a recovery rather than a business expanding; whether the staffing rebound outpaces the consulting drag is the swing factor for the coming quarters.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- MAN (ManpowerGroup Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …permanent recruitment business, partially offset by a decrease in our selling and administrative expenses as a percentage of revenue. Other Americas OUP margin remained flat at 4.4% in 2025 compared to 2024. Southern Europe In Southern Europe, revenues from services increased 2.7% (-2.0% in constant currency and…
- FY2025 10-K: …our growth strategy in Experis may be impeded due to the scarcity of talent in the IT field, which is particularly in demand, and which may restrict our ability to fulfill customer requirements. Similarly, another aspect of our strategy to expand beyond our core staffing and employment services is through the sale of…
- ASGN (Everforth, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …revenues were $1.3 billion, up 14.4 percent year-over-year. Federal Government Segment revenues, which are all consulting revenues, were $1.2 billion, down 3.3 percent year-over-ye a r mainly related to the loss of certain contracts as a result of initiatives associated with DOGE. Assignment revenues, which totaled…
- FY2025 10-K: …and maintain an intimacy and institutional knowledge with our clients that enables us to successfully compete in the market, we expect competition to continue to increase particularly as we grow our IT consulting footprint. Nevertheless, the larger total addressable market in IT consulting offers us greater revenue…
- KFY (KORN FERRY)
- FY2025 10-K: /or require us to charge lower prices for our services, which could adversely affect our operating results and future growth. We continue to face significant competition within each of our services and product offerings. The human resource consulting market has been traditionally fragmented and a number of large…
- FY2025 10-K: …may not be successful. When actual or projected fee revenues are negatively impacted by weakening customer demand, we have and may again find it necessary to take cost cutting measures so that we can minimize the impact on our profitability, such as the restructuring initiated in the first half of fiscal 2024.…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
RHI Q1 2026 earnings call, May 2026 · RHI Q1 2026 results · RHI Q2 2026 guidance