Rexford Industrial Realty, Inc. (REXR): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $37.04, Rexford Industrial Realty, Inc. (REXR) is priced for +0.7% AFFO growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.

Generated: 2026-08-08 · Exported: 2026-08-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/REXR

Headline

FieldValue
TickerREXR
CompanyRexford Industrial Realty, Inc.
Current price$37.04/sh

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basisreit
Implied FFO growth0.7%
Price-to-FFO13.7x
FFO yield7.3%

Solve inputs: computed at a 10.3% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of equity moves the implied AFFO growth ~3.6pp.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~-3.2%/yr; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.78σ
cohort percentile (of 105 peers)41
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset4.42x4expensive
Earnings2.46x4expensive
Relative1.13x6expensive
Growth1.26x5expensive

Families that justify the price: Relative Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.8%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=19)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$20.801.78xyesFCF base $0.5B, growth 1% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.6%, WACC 6.8%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$33.161.12xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 35.8x / 37.8x / 39.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelative$48.830.76xyesP/E 26.49x (blended: static sector reference 35x + trailing (TTM) 14x), scenarios: 22.4x / 26.5x / 30.6x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 25.35x
Simple DDMGrowth$29.341.26xyesDPS $1.76, g=3.1% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3%
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$38.680.96xyesStage 1: 8% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$11.193.31xyesBV/sh $33.70, ROE (TTM) 3.1%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$6.715.52xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$21.971.69xyesRev $1.0B, growth 1% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 6.8x / 8.0x / 9.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$32.401.14xyesFFO/share $2.70, growth 8% (input: historical FFO/share growth, 10y median), PEG=4.38 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAsset$4.997.42xyesBV $33.70 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 3.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 2.0%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$45.240.82xyes√(22.5 × FFO/share $2.70 × BVPS $33.70) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$12.762.90xyesEBITDA $0.30B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$10.163.65xyesFCF $509.3M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$6.036.14xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.42B (FCF $0.51B − SBC $0.09B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$56.230.66xyesFFO/share $2.70 × (8.5 + 2×8.2%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelative$26.591.39xyesRevenue $0.99B × sector P/S 6.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$33.111.12xyesFFO/share $2.70 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 8.2% (input: historical FFO/share growth, 10y median)) → PE 12.3x
Earnings YieldEarnings$29.191.27xyesFFO/share $2.70 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelative$38.030.97xyesFFO/share $2.70 × 14.1x P/FFO (route cohort median, n=85); FFO $0.61B (FFO incl. D&A + impairments, FY2025, companyfacts), shares 224M
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Rexford Industrial (consolidated REIT)operatingenterprise1.0B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Funds from operations (trailing)$605.2m
Share count CAGR (dilution)7.9%
Burning cashno

REIT basis: leverage is read against funds from operations (FFO), not depreciation-gutted operating income. The header's implied growth runs on ADJUSTED FFO — FFO minus recurring maintenance capex — so the header's multiple and this leverage ratio use bases that differ by that capex; neither substitutes for the other. Net debt could not be resolved from the corporate debt tags in the filings (REIT notes and mortgage debt are often tagged outside the corporate ladder), so the leverage ratio is withheld rather than rendered from incomplete tags. Interest expense is not separately reported in the cached statements, so fixed-charge coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

There is no more vacant land in the places Rexford owns. Southern California's infill industrial markets, the warehouse and last-mile distribution space crammed between the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, the rail yards, and the freeways, were built out decades ago. You cannot manufacture a new fifty-acre logistics site in Vernon or the San Gabriel Valley because there is nowhere to put it and no jurisdiction that will permit it. That scarcity is the whole bull case, and it is the kind of moat that does not erode in a quarter of soft demand. The tenants who need to be within an hour of twenty million consumers and the two largest container ports in the country have nowhere else to go.

That structural advantage has historically shown up as a yawning gap between what Rexford's tenants pay and what the space is worth at market. The leasing machine ran at record volume even in a soft quarter: 4.1 million square feet executed in Q1 2026. The headline re-leasing spread looked ugly at negative 15.4%, but that figure was dominated by a single large renewal, the Tireco extension, which carried a roughly 30% negative spread on its own; strip that one lease out and net effective rents on the rest of the quarter's leasing rose 5.5%. The underlying portfolio still re-prices upward when an average lease rolls; one outsized renewal distorted the average.

The more important story this quarter was the capital pivot, and it is a genuinely good use of a cheap stock. Rather than keep buying property into a soft market, management authorized a $500 million buyback and is funding it partly by selling non-core assets, with about $300 million of dispositions targeted for 2026. In the first quarter alone it repurchased 5.53 million shares for $200 million at an average of $36.14. For a company that grew for years by issuing equity to fund acquisitions, turning around to retire shares below where management thinks the assets are worth is the right move at the right time, and it directly attacks the per-share growth problem.

The balance sheet gives management the room to play this hand. Debt of about $3.3 billion carries a weighted-average interest rate of just 3.7% with a three-year average term and no material maturities until 2027, and net debt runs a conservative 4.5 times adjusted EBITDA. Total liquidity sits near $1.3 billion. A REIT that locked in low-cost, long-dated debt before rates rose, and that holds irreplaceable assets in the tightest industrial market in the country, can wait out a soft patch and buy back its own stock while it does. That is the bet: scarcity plus a fortress balance sheet plus a management team finally buying low.

Bear Case

The Southern California industrial cycle has turned, and Rexford is a pure-play bet on exactly the wrong half of it right now. After years in which infill SoCal was the tightest, fastest-appreciating industrial market in the country, the first quarter of 2026 showed the market giving ground: negative net absorption, a 20-basis-point rise in vacancy, higher tenant concessions, and elevated bad-debt expense. Same-property NOI grew just 0.9%, and on a cash basis it actually slipped 0.4%. Cash re-leasing spreads were negative 15.4% for the quarter. Even setting aside the one large Tireco renewal that dragged the average, the direction is unmistakable: the mark-to-market tailwind that defined this company's growth has flattened, and core FFO per share fell 1.6% year over year. The engine is not just slowing. For a quarter, it ran in reverse.

Now read what the price assumes against that backdrop. At about 13 times adjusted funds from operations, the cash the portfolio throws off after the recurring capital it takes to keep the buildings leasable, for an adjusted-FFO yield near 7.7%, the price embeds a slightly negative path for that cash from here. So the market has already marked down the growth assumption, which is honest. The problem is that even at a modest multiple, every standard way of valuing the assets and the earnings lands below today's price. Peer multiples and a growth-aware cash-flow read come closest, but they too sit a step under the quote, and the asset-value and trailing-earnings lenses sit far below. There is no valuation method that reaches up to today's price; the price is a bet that the SoCal scarcity story reasserts itself before the soft patch becomes a soft year.

The dilution history is the structural wound under all of it. Share count compounded at roughly 9% a year through the acquisition era, which means a great deal of the portfolio growth never reached existing holders on a per-share basis, it was bought with their own diluted ownership. The $500 million buyback is the right correction, but $200 million repurchased in a quarter against years of heavy issuance is a turn of the wheel, not a reversal of the trip. If the SoCal market stays soft, the buyback competes for capital with a dividend that already consumes much of the cash flow, and the per-share recovery slows.

The mitigants keep this from being a solvency story. Net debt at about 4.5 times adjusted EBITDA is conservative, the 3.7% weighted-average cost of debt is enviable, term is laddered with nothing material due until 2027, and fixed-charge coverage near 6.8 times leaves real room. Rexford is not financially fragile. The bear case is narrower and sharper than that: a richly located portfolio in a market that has stopped cooperating, priced above every valuation method, with a per-share track record the new buyback is only beginning to repair. The assets are irreplaceable. The cycle is not on their side this year.

Valuation

Adjusted funds from operations is the honest lens for an industrial REIT, the cash the buildings generate after the recurring capital it takes to keep them leasable, and on that lens Rexford trades at about 13 times for an adjusted-FFO yield near 7.7%. Plain funds from operations, the gross figure before that maintenance capital, sits a touch lower at about 12.3 times for an 8.1% yield, and it is the starting point the adjusted number refines rather than a valuation of its own. The adjusted multiple is the cheapest of the high-quality coastal industrial names, which is the market's way of pricing in the soft patch.

What the price assumes is a mild decline. Inverted, today's level embeds a slightly negative path for adjusted funds from operations from here, which lines up with the quarter just reported: core FFO per share fell 1.6% year over year, and same-property NOI on a cash basis slipped. So the market is not asking the SoCal scarcity story to keep compounding; it has already priced the deceleration. The question the multiple poses is narrower, whether the cash holds roughly flat or keeps eroding, and the answer depends almost entirely on when infill Southern California stops loosening.

Here the methods that triangulate the price line up in an unusual way for this portfolio. Against asset value and against trailing earnings power, the price looks expensive, both lenses land far below today's level, the familiar REIT pattern where depreciation guts reported earnings and book value lags. But unlike a name the market prices comfortably on peer multiples, Rexford's price sits modestly above where peer multiples and a growth-aware cash-flow read land too. No standard method reaches up to the quote. The growth and peer lenses come closest, which says the residual premium is a bet on the scarcity value of irreplaceable infill land reasserting itself, the one thing no trailing method can capture and no soft quarter disproves. That is the premium the buyer is paying, and it is smaller than it was, but it is still there.

Solvency is the reassuring part and bears directly on whether Rexford can wait out the cycle. Net debt runs about 4.5 times adjusted EBITDA, conservative, with a 3.7% weighted-average cost of debt, a laddered maturity profile carrying nothing material due until 2027, and fixed-charge coverage near 6.8 times. The one blemish is the share count, which compounded near 9% a year through the acquisition era and diluted the per-share growth the asset growth might otherwise have delivered; the new $500 million buyback is the deliberate correction, retiring stock below where management values the assets. The balance sheet buys time. What it cannot buy is a faster turn in the Southern California rent cycle, which is the variable the whole price rests on.

Catalysts

The Q1 2026 print was a study in two stories at once. Rexford reported company-share core FFO of $139.8 million, or $0.61 per diluted share, down 1.6% per share from a year earlier, with net income of $0.38 per share. Same-property NOI rose just 0.9% and slipped 0.4% on a cash basis, and cash re-leasing spreads came in at negative 15.4%, dragged by the large Tireco renewal. Yet leasing volume set a record at 4.1 million square feet, and management raised the full-year core FFO per share midpoint by $0.02 on first-quarter outperformance and the accretion from buybacks. The softening Southern California market, negative net absorption and a 20-basis-point vacancy increase, is the backdrop against which both the strong leasing volume and the weak spreads have to be read.

The capital strategy is where the real news sits. Management authorized a $500 million share repurchase program running through April 2028 and bought back 5.53 million shares for $200 million during the quarter at an average price of $36.14. It is funding that partly through dispositions, having sold five properties for $127.4 million in Q1 with roughly $300 million of total disposition proceeds targeted for the year. The pivot from acquisition-led growth to capital recycling and buybacks is the most consequential change in the story, and the next several quarters will show whether it stabilizes per-share funds from operations.

On capital returns, the board declared a second-quarter 2026 dividend of $0.435 per share, payable in July. The next earnings report is the event to watch, both for the trajectory of re-leasing spreads once the Tireco distortion is behind the comparison and for any sign that infill Southern California vacancy has stopped rising.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Rexford Industrial (consolidated REIT) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 earnings release · Q1 2026 disclosures · Q1 2026 earnings release, 8-K April 2026 · Q1 2026 earnings call, April 2026 · Q1 2026 earnings disclosures · Q1 2026 guidance · company dividend declaration, April 2026

View the full interactive REXR report on boothcheck