DR. REDDY’S LABORATORIES LIMITED (RDY): what the price assumes
boothcheck covers DR. REDDY’S LABORATORIES LIMITED (RDY) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/RDY
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | RDY |
| Company | DR. REDDY’S LABORATORIES LIMITED |
| Current price | $12.15/sh |
| Composition | Sales 97% / Service income 2% / License fees 1% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 3.8% |
| Operating margin today | 22.1% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -18.3pp |
| Multiple paid | 12x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7.9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~0.4%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -1.23σ |
| cohort percentile (of 117 peers) | 16 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple; earnings-power/growth-DCF land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.32x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 2.56x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.03x | 2 | expensive |
| Growth | 2.01x | 3 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Relative Families that call it expensive: Earnings, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=14)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $3.64 | 3.34x | yes | FCF base $0.2B, growth 10% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.2%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $6.83 | 1.78x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 10.2x / 12.2x / 14.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | — | — | no | P/E 24x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 19.8x / 24.0x / 28.2x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 16x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $8.71 | 1.39x | yes | BV/sh $4.74, ROE (TTM) 17.0%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $11.65 | 1.04x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $6.05 | 2.01x | yes | Rev $3.8B, growth 10% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.2x / 2.7x / 3.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $9.80 | 1.24x | yes | EPS $0.79, growth 12% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.22 (Fair) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $3.28 | 3.70x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.61B × (1−25%) / WACC 9.2% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $11.72 | 1.04x | yes | BV $4.74 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 17.0% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $9.18 | 1.32x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $0.79 × BVPS $4.74) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | EBITDA $0.84B × sector EV/EBITDA 16.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $2.74 | 4.43x | yes | FCF $223.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $22.06 | 0.55x | yes | EPS $0.79 × (8.5 + 2×12.4%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $7.92 | 1.53x | yes | BV $4.74 × (ROIC 15.4% / WACC 9.2%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | Revenue $3.81B × sector P/S 4.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $14.70 | 0.83x | yes | EPS $0.79 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 12.4% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 18.6x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $8.54 | 1.42x | yes | EPS $0.79 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)
One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.
| Unit | Role | Valuation basis | Revenue | Reported profit | Value evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Global Generics | operating | enterprise | 34.8B reported-currency | — | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| PSAI | operating | enterprise | 2.1B reported-currency | — | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net cash | $117.5m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | -0.19x (net cash) |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | -0.14x (net cash) |
| Interest coverage | 28.2x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 0.1% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
Dr. Reddy's earns a strong 22.3 percent operating margin on a generics-heavy revenue base, and at $13.30 per ADR the price is supported by peer multiples while the earnings-power and growth-DCF lenses call it expensive. The disagreement is the whole story.
The near-term problem is concrete: North America revenue fell 22 percent in fiscal 2026 as the high-margin lenalidomide generic, the company's authorized version of Revlimid, rolled off. That single product cliff dragged a fourth quarter that otherwise sat on record annual revenue.
The offset is the pipeline, led by generic semaglutide. Approval in Canada and an oral version moving through India regulators give Dr. Reddy's a shot at a very large market, but the unit ramp is being pushed out, so this is a reload bet, not a sure thing.
Bull Case
The competitive question for a generics maker is whether it owns anything durable, and Dr. Reddy's answer is scale, vertical integration, and a complex-generics pipeline that commodity players cannot match. The company runs a 22.3 percent operating margin, which is unusually high for an industry whose core product economics race to zero, and that margin is the evidence of a real moat: the ability to be first or early on hard-to-make molecules where competition is thin and pricing holds. A generic that anyone can manufacture earns nothing; a generic that requires specialized chemistry, regulatory know-how, and manufacturing scale earns a spread, and Dr. Reddy's repeatedly lands in the second category.
The base business is healthy beneath the headline. Fiscal 2026 set record annual revenue, with global generics up 3 percent to roughly ₹299 billion, driven by emerging markets and India even as North America fell. The company launched 38 new products across the year, seven in the fourth quarter alone, which is the renewable fuel of a generics franchise: each launch replaces older products fading on price. Double-digit growth in the base business shows the engine works when you strip out the one-time lenalidomide effect.
The valuation supports the price on the methods that fit the business. Relative valuation lands near $19, EV/EBITDA relative near $16, the price-to-sales sector model near $18, and the Ben Graham formula near $19, all above the $13.30 ADR price. These peer-multiple methods are the right frame for a profitable, established pharma name, and they say the stock is cheap against its sector. The optionality on top is generic semaglutide: approval already secured in Canada, an oral formulation advancing through Indian regulators, and a multi-year volume ramp that, if it lands, opens one of the largest drug markets in the world to a company that knows how to manufacture at scale.
Bear Case
Start with the structure of the business model itself, because it is more fragile than a 22 percent margin suggests. Dr. Reddy's earnings are concentrated in a handful of high-value generics, and when one of them rolls off, the whole result swings. That is exactly what happened in fiscal 2026: North America revenue fell 22 percent as lenalidomide, the authorized generic of Revlimid, came down from peak contribution, and fourth-quarter consolidated revenue dropped 6.3 percent year over year while EBITDA fell 42.6 percent. A business whose profitability hinges on a small number of limited-competition products carries a built-in cliff every time exclusivity or scarcity ends, and the working capital tied up in launching the next wave can rise even as the current wave fades.
The second concern follows from the first: the offsets are uncertain and back-end loaded. The semaglutide opportunity that anchors the bull case is being pushed out, with the company now guiding 6 to 7 million units by the end of calendar 2026 and the larger 12-million-unit expectation slipping toward the start of fiscal 2028. Regulatory approvals, manufacturing scale-up, and patent litigation all stand between today's price and that volume. The Revlimid franchise itself has drawn antitrust litigation over the timing of generic entry. A pipeline bet whose payoff keeps moving right is a pipeline bet the market should discount, not extrapolate.
Third, the earnings-based valuation methods are flashing caution for a reason. The earnings-power-value lens lands near $3.28 and the FCF-yield method near $2.74, both far below the $13.30 price (June 28, 2026), which says that if you value Dr. Reddy's on the cash it sustainably generates today rather than on peer multiples, the stock looks rich. The growth-DCF lands near $4.22. Analyst sentiment captures the tension: some carry a Buy with targets in the high teens, while AI-driven and quantitative reads have moved to Neutral on margin and ROE compression, higher debt despite growth, and near-term profitability risk. The bear case is simply that the peer multiples holding the price up assume a recovery in fiscal 2027 that has not yet been earned.
Valuation
Dr. Reddy's valuation is a standoff between two ways of looking at a profitable but cyclical generics maker. At $13.30 per ADR, the relative-multiple methods say the stock is cheap and the earnings-power methods say it is expensive, and both are looking at the same 22.3 percent operating margin.
The peer-multiple frame is generous. Relative valuation lands near $19.17, the Ben Graham formula near $19.19, the price-to-sales sector model near $18.30, and EV/EBITDA relative near $16.02, all above the price. These methods value Dr. Reddy's against its pharma sector, and on that basis it trades at a discount. The asset-based methods land closer to the price, with two-stage excess return near $11.65 and residual income near $11.72. The earnings-power and cash-flow methods are the dissenters: earnings-power value near $3.28, FCF yield near $2.74, and the DCF perpetual-growth near $4.22, which together say that the cash the business throws off today does not justify the price without a recovery.
The blended X-ray central estimate sits near $9.26, below the price, and the priced-in read is that only the relative-multiple family reaches the price while earnings power and growth-DCF call it expensive. The honest framing is that the methods disagree because the business is mid-cycle: the lenalidomide cliff has cut current cash generation, so the earnings methods look harsh, while the peer multiples assume the base business and the semaglutide pipeline restore the run-rate. Whether the stock is cheap or rich depends entirely on whether fiscal 2027 delivers the margin recovery the multiples are already pricing.
Catalysts
Fourth-quarter fiscal 2026 results, reported in May, showed the lenalidomide cliff working through the numbers. Consolidated revenue fell 6.3 percent year over year and EBITDA dropped 42.6 percent, dragged by lower lenalidomide sales and a shelf-stock adjustment, even as the full year set record annual revenue with double-digit base-business growth. Global generics rose 3 percent for the year on emerging markets and India, while North America fell 22 percent.
The pipeline catalyst is generic semaglutide. Dr. Reddy's received approval in Canada in late April 2026 and is among the first to bring a generic semaglutide injection there, with an oral version advancing through India's CDSCO. The company guides 6 to 7 million units by the end of calendar 2026 across approved markets, with the larger 12-million-unit target now extending toward the start of fiscal 2028. The Revlimid generic franchise carries ongoing antitrust litigation tied to the timing of generic entry.
Near-term catalysts to watch: the cadence of new product launches that replace fading high-margin products, semaglutide approvals and the actual unit ramp across markets, fiscal 2027 commentary on the margin and ROE recovery management has pointed to, and working-capital trends. Analyst sentiment is split, with some carrying a Buy and price targets in the high teens while quantitative and AI-driven reads have moved to Neutral on near-term profitability and leverage concerns. Dr. Reddy's also scheduled analyst and investor meetings in Mumbai and Hyderabad for June 2026.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- XRAY (DENTSPLY SIRONA Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …sales and profitability. We have implemented and continue to evaluate additional strategies that would mitigate such impacts, including competitive pricing strategies to offset tariffs and evaluating potential sourcing options that work with our vendors and merchants to seek to minimize products sourced from high…
- FY2025 10-K: …industry and the regions in which the Company operates. The impact that these tariffs and changes in trade policy will ultimately have on our financial results remains uncertain, including the impact on demand for our products in certain markets if prices rise as a consequence of import tariffs. Specifically, the…
- CRL (CHARLES RIVER LABORATORIES INTERNATIONAL, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: DSA business, which continued to experience lower volume driven by more cautious client spending as a result of the biopharmaceutical demand environment; partially offset by higher revenue in our RMS business, primarily driven by the increase in large research model product revenue when compared to fiscal year 2024.…
- FY2025 10-K: …trend to continue to increase for the next several years (although with different growth rates for different phases of drug discovery and development), decreases in such outsourcing may result in a diminished growth rate in the sales of any one or more of our service lines and may adversely affect our financial…
- ALGN (ALIGN TECHNOLOGY, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …loss on inventory recorded in our Systems and Services segment. We also experienced a decline in ASPs in both reportable segments. These decreases were partially offset by lower Cost of net revenues, excluding the items noted previously, from operational efficiencies. Clear Aligner The gross margin percentage…
- FY2025 10-K: …or 7.8% year-over-year; ◦ Imaging Systems and computer-aided design and computer-aided manufacturing ("CAD/CAM") services revenues of $789.6 million, an increase of 2.7% year-over-year; ◦ Income from operations of $545.8 million and operating margin of 13.5%; ◦ Effective tax rate of 29.9%; ◦ Net income of $410.4…
- PRGO (Perrigo Company plc)
- FY2025 10-K: …factors give us a competitive advantage and provide value to our customers and consumers: • A diverse product portfolio, leadership in first-to-market product development, and product life cycle management; • Experienced research and development ("R&D"), innovation and regulatory capabilities to develop and launch…
- FY2025 10-K: …previously disclosed lost distribution of lower-margin products as the business focused on enhancing margin while balancing the unfavorable impacts of tariffs; • Skin Care: Net sales of $214.9 million decreased 2.4% due primarily to lower distribution of Minoxidil at one customer, partially offset by growth in the…
- COO (The Cooper Companies, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …of competitive products or services, such as new silicone hydrogel products or contraceptive technologies, into the market by our competitors; and the emergence of newer and more competitive products or services. We operate in the highly competitive health care industry, and we cannot be assured that we will be able…
- FY2025 10-K: …appearing in this report are the property of their respective holders. DEPENDENCE ON CUSTOMERS No customer accounted for 10% or more of our consolidated net revenue in fiscal 2025 and 2024. See Note 12. Business Segment Information of the Consolidated Financial Statements for additional information. SEASONALITY…
- ACHC (Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …state or U.S. territory accounted for more than 14% of revenue for the year ended December 31, 2025. We believe that our increased geographic diversity will mitigate the impact of any financial or budgetary pressure that may arise in a particular state or market where we operate. Financial position to execute our…
- FY2025 10-K: …or develop and maintain new relationships in existing or new markets. If we lose existing relationships with our referral sources, the number of people to whom we provide services may decline, which may adversely affect our revenue. If we fail to develop new referral relationships, our growth may be restrained. We…
- WST (WEST PHARMACEUTICAL SERVICES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: . We compete with several companies across our major product lines. Because of the special nature of these products, competition is based primarily on product design and performance, although total cost is becoming increasingly important as pharmaceutical companies continue with aggressive cost-control programs across…
- FY2025 10-K: …quality standards customers require and expect. This focus on quality includes a commitment to excellence in manufacturing, scientific and technical expertise and management, which enables us to partner with our customers in order to deliver safe, effective drug products to patients quickly and efficiently. Our…
- JAZZ (Jazz Pharmaceuticals plc)
- FY2025 10-K: …deploy more personnel to market and sell their products than we do, and we compete with other companies to recruit, hire, train and retain pharmaceutical sales and marketing personnel. If our sales force and sales support organization are not appropriately resourced and sized to adequately promote our products, the…
- FY2025 10-K: …could cause us to incur significant expense and could distract us from the operation of our business and execution of our strategy. Any such investigation or hearing could also result in reduced market acceptance and demand for our products, could harm our reputation and our ability to market our products in the…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Economic-unit decomposition (SOTP): each disclosed business unit is assigned its native valuation basis before any multiple is applied. Operating units are valued on enterprise value; funded financial units are valued on their own common equity, because their borrowings fund earning assets rather than levering the parent. A company total is stated only once every material unit carries a supported value and the parent capital bridge reconciles.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.