RED CAT HOLDINGS, INC. (RCAT): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $8.65, RED CAT HOLDINGS, INC. (RCAT) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~19.9 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/RCAT
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | RCAT |
| Company | RED CAT HOLDINGS, INC. |
| Current price | $8.65/sh |
| Composition | Contract related 7% / Product related 93% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | revenue-multiple |
| EV / sales paid | 36.4x |
| Steady-state operating margin assumed | 28.0% |
| Must persist for | 19.9y |
Solve inputs: computed at a 10.4% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~2.7 years.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~16.9 years; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: elevated (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 15% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 4.62x | 2 | expensive |
| Earnings | — | 0 | — |
| Relative | 2.40x | 2 | expensive |
| Growth | 3.45x | 2 | expensive |
Families that call it expensive: Asset, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=6)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero FCF — equity value floored at $0 |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0 |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $3.61 | 2.40x | yes | P/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 8.0x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $1.98 | 4.37x | yes | Book value floor: BV/sh $1.98, ROE negative |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $1.78 | 4.86x | yes | Book value with convergence: BV/sh $1.98, ROE converges to ke |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $5.23 | 1.65x | yes | Rev $0.1B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 10.5x / 15.0x / 19.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 15x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0 |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | $1.65 | 5.25x | yes | Margin ramp: -50% → 22% over 7yr, rev growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered) |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $3.61 | 2.40x | yes | Revenue $0.05B × sector P/S 8.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)
Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.
| Unit | Role | Valuation basis | Revenue | Reported profit | Value evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Red Cat Holdings (consolidated) | operating | enterprise | 0.0B reported-currency | — | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $29.0m |
| Burning cash | yes |
Operating profit is negative or near zero and the company has no demonstrated through-cycle (mid-cycle) operating margin to normalize against, so years-to-repay cannot be computed honestly.
Operating profit is negative or near zero and there is no demonstrated through-cycle (mid-cycle) operating margin to normalize against, so interest coverage cannot be computed honestly.
Bullet Takeaways
Read Red Cat as an early-stage speculative defense story, because that is what the numbers say. Quarterly revenue scaled to about $15.5 million from $1.6 million a year earlier as Army drone deliveries began, but the company posted an operating loss near $27 million in the same quarter. This is a company at the very start of trying to scale, not an established business.
The price reflects pure optionality. At $11.44 the stock trades around 47 times revenue, which implies the business eventually reaches a roughly 28% operating margin and grows at its self-funding ceiling for about 18 years. No valuation family reaches the price; the model's reasonable-value band is in the low single digits and is flagged low-reliability.
The entire thesis rides on one customer relationship: the U.S. Army's Short Range Reconnaissance program. A $35 million production contract and follow-on orders are the proof points, and management targets $150 to $180 million of revenue in 2026. Whether that ramp arrives is the whole story.
Bull Case
Frame Red Cat by its stage and the case becomes legible: this is a speculative, early-scalability defense-technology company, and the numbers should be read as optionality on a ramp, not as the steady-state economics of a mature business. Through its Teal Drones subsidiary, Red Cat builds American-made small unmanned aircraft systems led by the Black Widow platform, aimed at military, government, and public-safety customers. The pivotal development is that it is now delivering into the U.S. Army's Short Range Reconnaissance Program of Record, the inflection that turns a story into revenue.
The early scaling is visible in the top line. Quarterly revenue jumped to about $15.5 million from $1.6 million a year earlier as SRR deliveries began, a roughly tenfold increase, and the company secured a $35 million production contract with the Army for SRR Black Widow systems plus a follow-on $9.5 million purchase order with deliveries expected in the second quarter. Management is targeting full-year 2026 revenue of $150 million to $180 million, framing the period as the early scalability phase of a multi-year defense ramp.
The macro backdrop is a genuine tailwind. Defense spending on small drones has accelerated sharply as the battlefield value of low-cost unmanned systems has become clear, and the U.S. military's push toward domestically-made drones (away from Chinese suppliers) favors an American manufacturer with a Program of Record win. The balance sheet supports the gamble: net cash near $134 million and liquid assets near $168 million give the company runway to fund losses while it scales production. For the bull, Red Cat is an option on a domestic-drone procurement wave, anchored by a real Army program, with the cash to chase it.
Bear Case
The external variable with the most leverage on this thesis, by a wide margin, is U.S. defense procurement, and the price assumes that variable breaks almost entirely in Red Cat's favor. Government order flow is lumpy, subject to annual appropriations, program timing, competitive re-competes, and policy shifts that the company does not control. A defense supplier whose revenue depends on the cadence of a single Army program is exposed to delays, funding gaps, and the risk that a future contract goes to a competitor. The price embeds none of that risk: at roughly 47 times revenue it requires an 18-year runway of self-funding growth and an eventual 28% operating margin, an assumption the model flags as elevated and low-reliability because no standard valuation family reaches the price.
The current economics are the structural truth a holder must face. The business is deeply unprofitable, with an operating loss near $27 million on about $15.5 million of quarterly revenue, an operating margin well into negative triple digits. Revenue is tiny relative to the market value, so the multiple is not measuring a business; it is measuring hope. The model's reasonable-value band sits in the low single digits (roughly $1.50 to $3.40), versus an $11.44 price (June 28, 2026), and even that band is marked low-reliability because there is so little profitable history to anchor on.
The execution risk compounds the procurement risk. Scaling drone manufacturing to the $150 million to $180 million revenue target management has set requires building production capacity, managing a supply chain, and converting contract awards into delivered units profitably, none of which a company at this stage has demonstrated. The cash balance funds the attempt, but continued losses and any need to raise capital would dilute holders, and the share count has been expanding. This is a binary, optionality-driven name: if the Army ramp materializes and margins eventually arrive, the upside is large, but if procurement slows or competition intensifies, the price has no support from any method that values the business on what it earns or owns today.
Valuation
Because Red Cat is far from earning a normal operating profit, the price is set against sales, and even that is a stretch. At $11.44 the stock trades around 47 times revenue, which the inversion solves to an eventual operating margin around 28% and growth at the self-funding ceiling for about 18 years, computed at a 9% cost of capital. Each one-point change in the cost of capital moves the implied horizon about 2.7 years. The priced-in assumption is elevated and, importantly, flagged low-reliability because there is almost no profitable operating history to calibrate against.
The methods confirm there is no conventional support. The characterization is blunt: no valuation family reaches the price; it is rich on assets, earnings power, peers, and even forward growth. The growth-DCF and exit-multiple methods floor at zero on negative cash flow, the earnings and asset methods are unusable on negative book and negative operating profit, and the relative price-to-sales method lands near $3 against the $11 price. The model's reasonable-value band runs from roughly $1.50 to $3.40, all far below the price, and is explicitly marked low-reliability.
The reconciliation is that this is not a valuation in the usual sense; it is a price for an option on a defense-procurement ramp. The balance sheet (net cash near $134 million) tells you the company can fund the attempt, but it does not tell you the attempt succeeds. A holder is paying for the probability-weighted value of Red Cat winning and profitably executing a multi-year wave of Army and allied drone orders. That can be a reasonable bet for risk-tolerant capital, but it should be sized as a speculative option, not anchored to any computed fair value, because no method produces one that supports the price.
Catalysts
The catalysts here are contract awards and the production ramp. The pivotal recent development was scaling deliveries into the U.S. Army's Short Range Reconnaissance Program of Record, which lifted quarterly revenue to about $15.5 million from $1.6 million a year earlier. Red Cat secured a $35 million production contract for SRR Black Widow systems and a follow-on $9.5 million Army purchase order with deliveries expected in the second quarter of 2026. Each new order and each delivery milestone is a direct catalyst.
The key swing factor is whether management hits its full-year 2026 revenue target of $150 million to $180 million. That target implies a steep ramp from the current run rate, so quarterly progress toward it, and any guidance change, will move the stock more than any other single data point.
The principal risks to monitor are defense-procurement timing and appropriations, competitive dynamics in domestic small drones, the path of operating losses and any need to raise capital (which would dilute holders), and execution on scaling manufacturing. Geopolitical demand for military drones and the policy push toward domestically-made systems are the macro tailwinds that could accelerate orders.
Sources: Red Cat Holdings Q1 2026 results and Army contract announcements (stocktitan.net, sec.gov 8-K filings), Seeking Alpha, Simply Wall St.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- QUBT (QUANTUM COMPUTING INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …and reputation, customer support and differentiated capabilities, including ease of administration and use, scalability and reliability, data governance and security. Many of our competitors have substantially greater brand recognition, customer relationships, and financial, technical and other resources than we do,…
- FY2025 10-K: …reportable segment at the consolidated level. Accordingly, our CODM uses consolidated net income (loss) to measure segment profit or loss, allocate resources and assess performance. Further, the CODM reviews and utilizes natural expenses, such as employee wages and benefits at a consolidated level, to manage the…
- PONY (Pony AI Inc.)
- FY2025 20-F: …of our technology. Such increase was partially offset by the decrease in direct operating and material costs of US$8.9 million as we did not incur significant material costs for specific licensing and applications projects in 2024, in contrast to 2023. Gross profit and gross margin As a result of the foregoing, our…
- FY2025 20-F: …to materials and supplies and R&D support and other third-party professional services in relation to the provision of our services and solutions to customers, (iii) employee compensation representing salaries, welfare and bonuses for our engineers, safety drivers and other personnel in relation to the provision of…
- RUM (RUM)
- FY2025 10-K: …products and services relative to those of our competitors; 14 ● the return our advertisers receive from our advertising products and services, and those of our competitors; and ● our reputation and the strength of our brand relative to our competitors. Our cloud services business competes primarily with large,…
- FY2025 10-K: Rumble Inc. Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements (Expressed in U.S. Dollars) For the years ended December 31, 2025 and 2024 20. Segment and Geographic Information The Company operates as one operating segment. The Company's chief operating decision maker ("CODM") is its chief executive officer , who reviews…
- BBAI (BigBear.ai Holdings, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …competition in our markets, and we may lack sufficient financial or other resources to maintain or improve our competitive position. The markets for our software are very competitive, and we expect such competition to continue or increase in the future. A significant number of companies are developing products that…
- FY2025 10-K: …growth may not be achieved. 16 Table of Contents Because we derive, and expect to continue to derive, a substantial percentage of our revenue from customers purchasing our software, market acceptance of these products, and any enhancements or changes thereto, is critical to our success. The competitive position of…
- QBTS (D-WAVE QUANTUM INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …reduced margins, losses or the failure of our platform to achieve or maintain more widespread market acceptance, any of which could negatively impact our overall business, results of operations and financial condition. Moreover, larger organizations, which are a primary focus of our direct sales efforts, may demand…
- FY2025 10-K: …software, will be critical to our future success. In addition, to the extent we hire personnel from competitors, we may be subject to allegations that such personnel have been improperly solicited or have divulged proprietary or other confidential information. The loss of service of senior management or other key…
- AI (C3.AI, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …for our products is intensely competitive and characterized by rapid changes in technology, customer requirements, and industry standards, and frequent new platform and application introductions and improvements. We anticipate continued competitive challenges from current competitors who address different aspects of…
- FY2025 10-K: …that industry consolidation may impact customers' perceptions of the viability of smaller or even mid‑size software firms and consequently customers' willingness to purchase from such firms. We may not compete successfully against our current or potential competitors. If we are unable to compete successfully, or if…
- RGTI (Rigetti Computing, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …loss, our CODM reviews and utilizes natural expenses such as employee wages and benefits at a consolidated level to manage the Company's operations and strategic growth initiatives. The measure of segment assets is reported in the balance sheet as total consolidated assets. The following table sets forth our segment…
- FY2025 10-K: …will come from other companies building or seeking to build universal, gate-model quantum computing systems that can meet the requirements for solving commercial problems. We believe competition will be based on a number of factors, including: different approaches to building quantum computers; quantum computer…
- TUYA (TUYA)
- FY2025 20-F: Our cost of revenue has been and will continue to be affected by a number of factors, including economies of scale, improved efficiency achieved through effective R&D, and product mix, among other things. Gross Profit and Gross margin The following table sets forth a breakdown of our gross profit and gross margin for…
- FY2025 20-F: …well as the ability to ensure data security and privacy. Some of our existing and potential competitors might have substantial competitive advantages, including larger scale, longer operating history, greater brand recognition, more established relationships with customers, suppliers, manufacturers and other business…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Economic-unit decomposition (SOTP): each disclosed business unit is assigned its native valuation basis before any multiple is applied. Operating units are valued on enterprise value; funded financial units are valued on their own common equity, because their borrowings fund earning assets rather than levering the parent. A company total is stated only once every material unit carries a supported value and the parent capital bridge reconciles.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.