PVH CORP. (PVH): what the price assumes
boothcheck covers PVH CORP. (PVH) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/PVH
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | PVH |
| Company | PVH CORP. |
| Current price | $87.11/sh |
| Composition | Tommy Hilfiger 53% / Calvin Klein 44% / Heritage Brands 2% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 3.8% |
| Operating margin today | 7.6% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -3.8pp |
| Multiple paid | 10x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~-3.8%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.18σ |
| cohort percentile (of 214 peers) | 18 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 3.31x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.75x | 5 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.61x | 5 | justifies |
| Growth | 1.07x | 2 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 4.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=17)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $121.72 | 0.72x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 6.1x / 8.1x / 10.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $143.52 | 0.61x | yes | P/E 22x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 18.6x / 22.0x / 25.4x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $36.84 | 2.36x | yes | BV/sh $105.49, ROE (TTM) 3.2%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $22.31 | 3.90x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $61.03 | 1.43x | yes | Rev $9.0B, growth 3% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.4x / 0.4x / 0.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $55.93 | 1.56x | yes | EPS $3.30, growth 17% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.51 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $226.57 | 0.38x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.85B × (1−19%) / WACC 4.7% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $16.68 | 5.22x | yes | BV $105.49 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 3.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 2.1%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $88.50 | 0.98x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $3.30 × BVPS $105.49) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $209.39 | 0.42x | yes | EBITDA $0.95B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $49.72 | 1.75x | yes | FCF $550.5M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $39.47 | 2.21x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.51B (FCF $0.55B − SBC $0.04B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $106.48 | 0.82x | yes | EPS $3.30 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $26.28 | 3.31x | yes | BV $105.49 × (ROIC 1.2% / WACC 4.7%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $387.57 | 0.22x | yes | Revenue $8.99B × sector P/S 2.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $83.90 | 1.04x | yes | EPS $3.30 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 16.9% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 25.4x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $35.68 | 2.44x | yes | EPS $3.30 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $1.7b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 3.04x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 2.46x |
| Interest coverage | 7.3x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -9.3% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- The counterintuitive fact is how cheap the price is. At about $77 the stock trades near 10 times mid-cycle operating income, low enough that the price sits below what even a modest ongoing decline in operating profit would warrant.
- The company owns two globally recognized brands, Tommy Hilfiger and Calvin Klein, and is buying back stock aggressively, shrinking the share count by roughly 9% a year.
- The risk is the apparel cycle and the macro. First-quarter 2026 revenue rose 2% as reported but fell 2% in constant currency, and the company trimmed full-year guidance to roughly flat, leaning on tariff refunds to absorb a prolonged Middle East conflict drag.
Bull Case
The most surprising thing about PVH is the gap between the strength of its brands and the cheapness of its stock. This is the owner of Tommy Hilfiger and Calvin Klein, two of the most recognized apparel brands in the world, yet the market is pricing it at roughly 10 times mid-cycle operating income, a multiple so low it sits below what even a steady decline in operating profit would justify. For a business with durable, globally licensed brands that throw off real cash, that is an unusually pessimistic price, and the disconnect between brand value and market value is the heart of the bull case.
The model is more resilient than the multiple implies. PVH operates a mix of owned retail, wholesale, and a global licensing network, and the 10-K describes how the company relies on partners whose "licensees' expertise can better serve our brands" alongside its "directly operated businesses" (FY2025 10-K, accession 0000078239-25-000018). Licensing is a high-margin, capital-light royalty stream layered on top of the product business, and the brand equity behind it is hard to replicate. The recent quarter showed the more profitable channels growing: direct-to-consumer revenue rose 6% and e-commerce climbed 11% as reported, with growth in both brands and across all three regions. A shift toward owned digital and retail channels is a margin-accretive trend.
Capital allocation makes the cheap price compound in shareholders' favor. PVH has been buying back stock aggressively, shrinking the share count by roughly 9% a year, which means every dollar of mid-cycle earnings is spread over fewer and fewer shares. With interest coverage around 7.6 times and moderate leverage, the company can keep returning capital while executing its PVH+ growth plan. When a business with strong brands trades near a trough multiple and management is retiring nearly a tenth of the shares annually, the combination of a low entry price and a shrinking share base is the kind of setup that can produce strong per-share returns without needing the multiple to expand much.
Bear Case
The cyclical question to lead with is whether PVH's earnings are near a sustainable level or a fading one, and the recent results lean toward fading. First-quarter 2026 revenue rose only 2% as reported and fell 2% in constant currency, with Calvin Klein down 3% and Tommy Hilfiger down 2% in constant currency. The company cut its full-year revenue guidance to roughly flat from a prior slight increase, and it is leaning on tariff refunds to hold its margin guidance while absorbing the prolonged effects of the Middle East conflict. A business that needs one-time refunds to protect margins, with constant-currency sales declining, is not obviously earning at a trough that is about to recover; it may be at a plateau that drifts lower.
Apparel is a structurally difficult, demand-cyclical business. Branded clothing is discretionary, sensitive to consumer confidence and weather, and prone to promotional cycles that crush margins when inventory builds. PVH competes on its ability to "promote our brands and products" and "effectively utilizing data and technology," and the 10-K warns of "the failure to compete effectively" (FY2025 10-K, accession 0000078239-25-000018). Fashion brands also carry relevance risk: a brand that is hot today can cool, and reviving it is expensive and uncertain. The Heritage Brands segment, now a small piece, is a reminder that brands fade and have to be pruned.
The macro exposure is broad and outside the company's control. PVH generates a large share of revenue internationally, so currency swings move reported results, which is why the as-reported and constant-currency figures diverged this quarter. Tariffs, supply-chain costs, and geopolitical disruption all feed into a global sourcing-and-distribution model. Leverage of roughly two-and-a-half times mid-cycle operating income is manageable but adds risk in a downturn, and the aggressive buyback uses cash that could otherwise cushion a weak year. The bear case is that the low multiple is low for a reason: a mature apparel company facing soft demand, currency headwinds, and the constant cost of keeping two big brands relevant, where cheap can stay cheap if earnings keep grinding lower.
Valuation
PVH is priced for decline, and the inversion frames it as a bound rather than a precise solve. At about $77 (June 28, 2026) the stock trades near 10 times mid-cycle operating income, a multiple so low that the price sits below what even a 5% annual decline in operating profit would warrant. In other words, the market is not asking the business to grow; it is pricing in shrinkage. Because the price falls below the level a modest decline would justify, the inversion produces a floor rather than a single implied growth rate, which is itself the signal: the bar embedded in the price is very low.
The family pattern is the classic value split. The relative-multiple and growth-DCF frames support the price, while the asset-based and earnings-power frames read it as expensive on current depressed economics. The current operating margin is 7.6%, against a mid-cycle margin around 8%, so the company is not far below its normal profitability, which makes the low multiple more striking. The reverse-DCF band is degenerate at the current price, reflecting that the stock is sitting right at the lower bound of what the methods consider reasonable, not above it.
The honest framing is that this is a value name where the upside is mean reversion and the downside is continued erosion. The brands have real, durable equity, and the aggressive buyback amplifies the effect of any stabilization in earnings on a per-share basis. The risk is that apparel demand and currency keep pressuring results, in which case a cheap stock stays cheap. A buyer at this price is paying a trough-like multiple for a mature branded business and being compensated for the cyclical and competitive risk, with the share count shrinking in the background. The methods say the price is at or below fair value on conservative assumptions; realizing the upside depends on demand stabilizing.
Catalysts
The recent quarter set the near-term tone. First-quarter 2026 revenue of $2.025 billion rose 2% as reported and beat guidance, though it fell 2% in constant currency, with Calvin Klein down 3% and Tommy Hilfiger down 2% in constant currency. Direct-to-consumer revenue rose 6% and e-commerce climbed 11% as reported across both brands and all regions. The company trimmed full-year revenue guidance to roughly flat while maintaining its operating margin guidance, helped by tariff refunds. The next earnings reports are the checkpoints for whether the brands return to constant-currency growth.
Execution of the PVH+ Plan is the company-specific catalyst. Management is steering toward higher-margin direct and digital channels, investing in the two core brands, and pruning the portfolio, so progress on direct-to-consumer growth, margin expansion, and brand momentum is what the bull case watches. The aggressive share buyback is a continuing support, since shrinking the count lifts per-share value even if revenue is flat. Any stabilization or reacceleration in Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger constant-currency sales would be a meaningful positive given how low the multiple is.
The risks are macro and cyclical. Apparel demand is discretionary and sensitive to consumer confidence, and a weaker consumer would pressure both revenue and margins through heavier promotion. Large international exposure means currency swings move reported results, and geopolitical disruption, including the Middle East conflict the company cited, can weigh on specific regions. Tariffs and sourcing costs are an ongoing variable, and the benefit from tariff refunds is not a recurring driver. A soft holiday season, a step down in brand relevance, or a worsening macro would each weigh on a stock that is cheap but priced that way for cyclical reasons.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Licensing (reported)
- RL (RALPH LAUREN CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …orders are generally subject to broad cancellation rights. Further, the size of our order backlog depends on several factors, including the timing of the market weeks for our particular lines during which a significant percentage of our orders are received and the timing of shipments, which varies from year-to-year…
- FY2025 10-K: …partners from entering into licensing arrangements with our competitors, our licensing partners generally are not precluded from offering, under other non-competitor brands, the types of products covered by their license agreements with us. A substantial portion of sales of our products by our domestic licensing…
- VFC (V. F. CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: 2025. All VF brands are marketed online. We continue to expand our omni-channel approach and integrated marketplace strategies in the Europe and Asia-Pacific regions, in order to engage with consumers at every touch point with innovative assets and by focusing on local relevance. We also continue to increase focus on…
- FY2025 10-K: Dickies ® brand that have longer terms. Each licensee pays royalties to VF based on its sales of licensed products, with most agreements providing for a minimum royalty requirement. Royalties generally range from 4% to 10% of the licensing partners' net licensed product sales. Royalty income was $62.3 million in…
- KTB (KONTOOR BRANDS, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …purchases. Under the program, the Company estimates the standalone selling price of the loyalty rewards and allocates a portion of the consideration for the sale of products to the loyalty points earned. This deferred amount is recorded as a contract liability, and recognized as revenue when the points are redeemed…
- FY2025 10-K: …through a joint venture arrangement. The majority of the International Wholesale business is located in EMEA and APAC, where we sell our products to outdoor and sporting goods stores, department store and specialty store wholesale customers, online, including digital marketplaces, as well as through our distribution…
- LEVI (LEVI STRAUSS & CO)
- FY2025 10-K: , and postemployment benefit plans and cause volatility in the net periodic benefit cost and future funding requirements of the plans. Plan liabilities may impair our liquidity, have an unfavorable impact on our ability to obtain financing and place us at a competitive disadvantage compared to some of our competitors…
- FY2025 10-K: …Agreement, effective January 1, 2003, between the Registrant and Boston Safe Deposit Trust Company S-1 333-229630 10.18 2/13/2019 10.26* Employment Offer Letter, dated December 10, 2012, between the Registrant and Harmit Singh S-1 333-229630 10.25 2/13/2019 10.27* Form of Amended and Restated Indemnification…
- COLM (COLUMBIA SPORTSWEAR COMPANY)
- FY2025 10-K: …time of sale within retail stores and concession-based arrangements and generally upon shipment to the consumer with respect to e-commerce transactions. The amount of consideration the Company expects to be entitled to receive and recognize as Net sales across both wholesale and DTC channels varies with changes in…
- FY2025 10-K: …for our products, identify our company and differentiate our products from competitors' products. We own many trademarks, including Columbia Sportswear Company®, Columbia®, SOREL®, Mountain Hardwear®, prAna®, the Columbia diamond shaped logo, the Mountain Hardwear nut logo, the SOREL polar bear logo, and the prAna…
- GIII (G III APPAREL GROUP LTD /DE/)
- FY2025 10-K: …companies and designers. In entering into these license agreements, we plan our products to be targeted towards different market segments based on consumer demographics, design, suggested pricing and channel of distribution. In addition to granting us licenses to produce and sell products, our licensors typically…
- FY2025 10-K: …and Tommy Hilfiger brands, both of which are owned by PVH. Net sales of products under the Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger brands constituted approximately 34.0% of our net sales in fiscal 2025 and approximately 41.0% of our net sales in fiscal 2024. The licenses for Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger products expire…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.