ProPetro Holding Corp. (PUMP): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $11.01, ProPetro Holding Corp. (PUMP) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~18.4 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/PUMP
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | PUMP |
| Company | ProPetro Holding Corp. |
| Current price | $11.01/sh |
| Composition | Hydraulic Fracturing 73% / Wireline 16% / Cementing 10% / Power Generation 0% / Elimination of intersegment service revenue 0% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Trailing margin (depressed year) | -1.0% |
| Must persist for | 18.4y |
| Multiple paid | 246x mid-cycle operating income |
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.1% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~2.9 years.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~21.7 years; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: elevated
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.10σ |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 15% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.49x | 2 | expensive |
| Earnings | — | 0 | — |
| Relative | 1.26x | 2 | expensive |
| Growth | — | 0 | — |
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.8%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=4)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $20.68 | 0.53x | no | Reference only (OCF-based, capex excluded): OCF $0.2B |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0 |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $11.34 | 0.97x | yes | P/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 1.2x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $7.80 | 1.41x | yes | Reference only (book value floor): BV/sh $7.80, ROE negative |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $7.02 | 1.57x | yes | Reference only (book value with convergence): BV/sh $7.80, ROE converges to ke |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $4.41 | 2.50x | no | Rev $1.2B, growth -15% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.9x / 1.2x / 1.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0 |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $3.37 | 3.27x | no | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.03B × (1−21%) / WACC 5.8% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $7.13 | 1.54x | yes | EBITDA $0.16B × sector EV/EBITDA 6.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $11.34 | 0.97x | no | Revenue $1.16B × sector P/S 1.2x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $16.3m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 3.56x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 2.81x |
| Interest coverage | 0.6x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 4.2% |
| Burning cash | no |
Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 0.5%); the trailing year was depressed.
Bullet Takeaways
- The single number that matters is utilization, and it is turning up. ProPetro expects about 12 active frac fleets in the second quarter, up from 11, with its next-generation electric and Tier 4 fleets sold out as the Permian completions market tightens.
- The reported valuation looks absurd only because trailing earnings are near zero at the cycle bottom. The standard frames cannot price a company whose normalized margin is currently a fraction of a percent, so this is an activity-recovery bet, not a multiple story.
- The balance sheet is a net-cash position, which lets ProPetro fund its fleet transition. The risk is the cycle: a $4 million net loss in the first quarter shows how thin the margins are until activity and pricing recover.
Bull Case
The number that decides ProPetro is fleet utilization, and it is the cleanest lever in the story. The company expects to run about 12 active frac fleets in the second quarter, up from 11 in the first, and its next-generation Tier 4 dual-fuel and FORCE electric fleets are currently sold out. In pressure pumping, sold-out premium equipment is the leading edge of pricing power, because once the high-spec fleets are committed, operators have to pay up for the next available capacity. That single shift, from idle to fully utilized premium fleets, is what flips the economics of a frac company from breakeven to strongly profitable.
The positioning is concentrated in the right place. ProPetro is a Permian-focused completions specialist, and the 10-K states the company believes its "substantial market presence in the Permian Basin positions us well to capitalize on drilling, completion activity and power demand in the region" (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001680247-26-000028). The Permian is the most active US basin, and a pure-play with scale there avoids the dilution of operating across weaker regions. The fleet transition reinforces the edge: the company is moving toward lower-emissions, natural-gas-burning equipment, noting it is "working with our customers and equipment manufacturers to transition our equipment into a lower emissions profile" (accession 0001680247-26-000028), with roughly three-quarters of the fleet now next-generation gas units that benefit from the wide diesel-to-gas price spread.
The supply side is tightening structurally. Management points to equipment attrition and limited spare capacity among smaller competitors, which means the industry is retiring old fleets faster than it adds new ones. In a capital-starved oilfield-services sector, that attrition is the friend of the survivors, because it caps the supply response that usually kills every up-cycle. ProPetro holds a net-cash balance sheet, which lets it fund the planned buyouts of its leased FORCE fleets between late 2026 and 2028 without strain. A Permian completions leader with sold-out premium fleets, a tightening market, and the balance sheet to invest is the bull case, and the first quarter showed early signs of the recovery taking hold.
Bear Case
The qualitative reality is that pressure pumping is one of the toughest businesses in energy, a capital-devouring, commoditized service where pricing power is fleeting, and that is the frame for the bear case. ProPetro is at the bottom of a cycle now, with a first-quarter net loss of $4 million on $271 million of revenue and a trailing operating margin that is slightly negative. Frac equipment wears out fast and requires constant maintenance and capital, so even in good years a large share of cash flow goes back into the fleet just to stand still. The buyouts of the leased FORCE fleets between late 2026 and 2028 are a reminder that the capital demands keep coming. This is not a business that compounds cash; it is one that consumes it.
The earnings disconnect proves the point. The trailing economics are so weak that the standard valuation frames cannot anchor to them, and on a normalized basis the implied multiple is enormous, an artifact of a through-cycle margin currently near zero. No valuation family reaches the price on current economics. The price is therefore entirely a bet on a strong recovery, and pressure pumping recoveries are notoriously short and self-defeating: as soon as pricing improves, idle capacity comes back and competitors reactivate fleets, capping the upside. The sold-out premium fleets are encouraging, but the diesel and older Tier 2 capacity in the industry is a standing reserve that can flood back.
The demand side is entirely outside the company's control. Completion activity depends on operators' capital budgets, which depend on commodity prices, and any weakening in oil and gas would pull activity down quickly. Customer concentration in the Permian means a few large operators drive the order book, and they have the leverage to push pricing. Interest coverage is only about 0.6 times on trailing earnings, so the margin for error is thin until the recovery is firmly in hand. The bear case is not that ProPetro is poorly run; it is that the price requires a durable, sustained up-cycle in one of the most cyclical and competitive corners of the market, and history says those cycles rarely last as long as the price assumes.
Valuation
ProPetro cannot be valued on a normal multiple because trailing earnings are at a cycle trough, and the inversion makes that obvious. Applying the company's through-cycle margin, which is currently a fraction of a percent, produces an implied multiple near 294 times and an implied duration around 32 years, computed at a 12% cost of capital. Those figures are not a meaningful read on the business; they are the mathematical consequence of dividing the price by a near-zero normalized profit. The reliability of the solve is flagged low for exactly this reason, and the reasonable-value band it produces is not usable. The honest takeaway is that the standard valuation machinery breaks down at the bottom of a deep cycle.
What the family pattern does show is that no current-economics frame reaches the price. The asset frame sits below the price, and the relative-multiple frame as well, which tells you the market is paying for a recovery rather than for current assets or earnings. For a pressure-pumping company, the right way to think about value is the mid-cycle earnings power of a fully utilized premium fleet, and that depends on assumptions about utilization, pricing, and how long the up-cycle lasts, none of which the methods can pin down at the trough.
The practical framing is that this is an activity-and-pricing bet on the Permian completions market, backstopped by a net-cash balance sheet. The upside case is real: sold-out premium fleets, structural supply attrition, and a tightening market could drive a sharp earnings recovery that the trough numbers entirely miss. The downside is equally real: a weak commodity environment would keep the company near breakeven and the capital demands of the fleet would keep eating cash. A buyer at this price is underwriting a recovery the methods cannot quantify, and should size the position to the wide range of outcomes rather than to any single fair-value number.
Catalysts
The near-term catalyst is the recovery in completions activity. First-quarter 2026 revenue was $271 million, down 7% from the prior quarter, with a net loss of $4 million and adjusted EBITDA of $36 million, but the forward signal was positive: management expects about 12 active frac fleets in the second quarter, up from 11, with next-generation electric and Tier 4 fleets sold out. The next earnings reports are the checkpoints for whether utilization and pricing keep improving as the Permian market tightens.
The fleet transition and supply dynamics are the structural catalysts. ProPetro is moving its fleet toward lower-emissions natural-gas-burning units, capitalizing on the wide diesel-to-gas price spread, and roughly three-quarters of the fleet is now next-generation. The planned buyouts of the five leased FORCE fleets from late 2026 through 2028 will shift those from lease to owned, changing the cost structure. On the supply side, ongoing equipment attrition and limited spare capacity among smaller competitors are tightening the market, which supports pricing for the operators that remain.
The risks are the commodity cycle and capital intensity. Completion activity tracks operators' capital budgets and commodity prices, so any softening in oil and gas would pull demand down quickly. Pressure pumping is highly competitive, and improved pricing tends to draw idle capacity back into the market, capping recoveries. The capital demands of maintaining and buying out the fleet are continuous, and with interest coverage thin at the trough, the margin for error is small until the recovery is firmly established. A drop in commodity prices or a stalled recovery would weigh on a stock that is priced for the up-cycle to arrive and persist.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- LBRT (Liberty Energy Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …of activity in the industry. Any prolonged and substantial reduction in oil and natural gas prices would likely affect oil and natural gas production levels and therefore affect demand for our services. A material decline in oil and natural gas prices or U.S. activity levels could have a material adverse effect on…
- FY2025 10-K: …domestic and global oil and natural gas inventories; • the supply of and demand for completions services and equipment in the United States and Canada; • federal, tribal, state and local laws, regulations and taxes, including the policies of governments regarding hydraulic fracturing, oil and natural gas exploration,…
- RES (RPC, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …competition as companies seek to keep assets utilized; ● our belief that there is potential for M&A activity to continue as well as become more frequent in the smaller exploration and production (E&P) and OFS companies; ● our belief that capital discipline has and should generally reduce the volatility of the…
- FY2025 10-K: …for technological innovation and new product development to drive growth; ● our ability to continue to monitor factors that impact current and expected customer activity levels, such as the prices of oil and natural gas, changes in pricing for our services and equipment, and utilization of our equipment and…
- NESR (NATIONAL ENERGY SERVICES REUNITED CORP.)
- FY2025 10-K: …which could adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of operations, cash flows and prospects. With respect to national oil company ("NOC") customers, we are also subject to risk of policy, regime, currency and budgetary changes, all of which may affect our customers' capital expenditures. Our…
- FY2025 10-K: …financial condition. ● Our assets require capital for maintenance, upgrades and refurbishment and we may require significant capital expenditures for new equipment. ● The geographic concentration of our operations and customers exposes us to the risks of the regional economy and other regional adverse conditions. ●…
- XPRO (Expro Group Holdings N.V.)
- FY2025 10-K: …to their approved annual budgets and higher or lower activity in the first quarter of the year based on whether the new year's budget has been approved. Customers We derive our revenue from services and product sales to customers primarily in the oil and gas industry. No single customer accounted for more than 10% of…
- FY2025 10-K: …specific engineering costs associated with a project. We also procure products and services on behalf of our customers that are provided by third parties for which we are reimbursed with a mark-up or in connection with an integrated services contract. We also design, manufacture and sell equipment, which is typically…
- WTTR (SELECT WATER SOLUTIONS, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …Further, Accommodations and Rental's margins declined due to customer and activity mix. This was partially offset by improved gross margins in our Fluids Hauling business line, favorably impacted by the divestment of lower margin operations in connection with the Omni transaction. Chemical Technologies . Costs of…
- FY2025 10-K: …by a $17.4 million increase in our Chemical Technologies segment and a $16.0 million increase in gross profit from our Water Infrastructure segment. Gross margin as a percentage of revenue was 14.4% and 15.1% during the years ended December 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024, respectively. Selling, General and…
- OII (OCEANEERING INTERNATIONAL INC)
- FY2025 10-K: …and energy markets. We believe the reduction in capacity by some of our competitors over the last few years, coupled with an increase in demand, should help with balancing a historically over-supplied market. Within our mobility solutions business, there are many niche competitors offering specialized services and…
- FY2025 10-K: …quality standards enable us to compete effectively in our selected asset integrity and inspection services market segments. Aerospace and Defense Technologies. Engineering services is a very broad market with a large number of competitors. We compete in specialized areas in which we can combine our extensive…
- HLX (Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …well control purposes. Our Production Facilities segment also includes acquired mature deepwater offshore wells and related subsea infrastructure. 7 Table of Contents GEOGRAPHIC AREAS We primarily operate in the Gulf of America (deepwater and shelf), Brazil, North Sea, West Africa and Asia Pacific regions. Our North…
- FY2025 10-K: …types of services. All material intercompany transactions between the segments have been eliminated. See Note 1 for more information on our business segments. Our chief operating decision maker ("CODM") is the chief operating officer. The CODM uses segment operating income or loss as the measure of segment profit or…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.