PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION (PRK): what the price requires

At today's price, PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION (PRK) is priced for 14.4% return on equity. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.

Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/PRK

Headline

FieldValue
TickerPRK
CompanyPARK NATIONAL CORPORATION
Current price$185.42/sh

What The Price Requires (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basisfinancials
Price-to-book1.97x
Return on equity now13.3%

The implied return on book is non-physical at this price-to-book and is suppressed as misleading. The price sits beyond a 13.3% return on equity sustained for 40 years and is not resolvable as a sustainable-ROE point. The rarity read below is the honest signal.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.3% cost of equity; ROE searched up to the 13.3% ROE ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: extreme

ReferenceValue
vs own history+2.41σ
cohort percentile (of 119 peers)81
sustained it ~10 years at this level62%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value, while asset-based lands below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.56x3expensive
Earnings1.09x2expensive
Relative1.21x3expensive
Growth0.86x1justifies

Families that justify the price: Earnings, Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=9)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
Bank Fair Value (P/TBV)$96.241.93xyesTBVPS $80.03 × 1.20x (ROE (TTM) 10.6% / CoE 9.3%, g=5.0% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption), credit 1.14% allowance/loans → ×0.93, NPL 0.84% → ×0.99)
Relative ValuationRelative$153.261.21xyesP/E 12.41x (blended: static sector reference 10x + trailing (TTM) 18x), scenarios: 9.9x / 12.4x / 14.9x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$111.221.67xyesBV/sh $97.37, ROE (TTM) 10.6%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$118.601.56xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$215.530.86xyesRev $0.7B, growth 27% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.7x / 4.7x / 5.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$133.501.39xyesEPS $10.90, growth 12% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.47 (Fair)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAsset$154.531.20xyes√(22.5 × EPS $10.90 × BVPS $97.37) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativeno
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$301.420.62xyesEPS $10.90 × (8.5 + 2×12.2%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativeno
PEG Fair ValueRelative$200.250.93xyesEPS $10.90 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 12.2% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 18.4x
Earnings YieldEarnings$117.841.57xyesEPS $10.90 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Solvency

FieldValue
Share count CAGR (dilution)1.7%

Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The moat for a bank like Park National is the deposit franchise, and it is a real, if quiet, advantage. A community bank earns its premium by funding itself cheaply with sticky local deposits and lending that money carefully, and Park has done both for decades. The filing describes the competitive battleground plainly, where the primary factors in competing for deposits are "interest rates paid on deposits, account liquidity, convenience and hours of office locations" (FY2025 10-K), and Park's dense branch presence and relationship model in its markets give it an edge in gathering low-cost funding. That funding advantage shows up in a net interest margin near 4.80% in the first quarter of 2026, well above what most banks earn.

The First Citizens Bancshares merger scales that franchise. The all-stock deal lifted total assets to about $13 billion from under $10 billion at year-end, with loans up 20.1% and deposits up 33.4%, extending the footprint across Ohio, Kentucky, and the Carolinas. Net interest income rose 20.5% to $125.8 million on higher loan volumes, and adjusted net income reached $53.5 million once the $15.5 million of merger-related expense is set aside. A larger deposit base and loan book, run with the same credit discipline, is more earning power on the same conservative model.

The credit quality and capital return underpin the quality case. Net charge-offs were just 0.12% of average loans, an exceptionally clean number, and the allowance sits at 1.12% of loans after a day-one provision for the acquired portfolio. Park earns a return on equity around 13%, comfortably above its cost of capital, and pays a $1.10 quarterly dividend yielding about 3.2%, with a history of special dividends. For investors who want a well-run, well-capitalized regional bank with a clean loan book and a growing dividend, Park is a textbook example, and the earnings-power method supports the current price on that basis.

Bear Case

The competitive threat to a community bank is slow but relentless, and it is eroding the deposit advantage that justifies Park's premium. Larger national banks compete on rate and technology, and the filing is candid that deposits are leaking to non-bank channels: customers "may also move money out of bank deposits in favor of other investments, including digital or cryptocurrency," and "have increasingly used bill payment services that do not utilize banks," trends that "may result in losses of deposits" (FY2025 10-K). The branch-and-relationship moat that funds Park cheaply is exactly what fintech and big-bank apps are chipping away at. A community bank's net interest margin near 4.80% is enviable now, but the structural pressure on low-cost deposits is the slow erosion the premium valuation does not price.

The valuation is the more immediate problem. A bank is worth the return it earns on its capital, and at about 1.9 times book, Park's price-to-book sits at the very top of its peer group and prices in a return on equity above the 12.5% elite tier sustained for decades. The model flags this as elevated, well above the roughly 13.3% the bank has actually earned recently, and the rarity read shows the price stretched against the bank's own history. Only about 63% of firms earning this return sustained it for ten years. When a community bank trades at a premium to book on a peak return, the downside from any normalization is meaningful.

The integration and cycle risks compound it. The First Citizens merger is recent, and merger integration carries execution risk, cost overruns, and the possibility that acquired credit proves weaker than underwritten, which is why the company took a day-one allowance. Bank earnings are also cyclical and rate-sensitive: the filing warns that economic deterioration could hurt earnings "through declines in deposits, quality of investment securities, loan demand, our borrowers' ability to repay loans" (FY2025 10-K). If the margin normalizes, integration stumbles, or credit costs rise from today's pristine levels, a price at the top of the peer multiple has little support, and the fair-value methods cluster well below the current quote.

Valuation

Park National is valued as a bank, so the price is read off price-to-book rather than an operating multiple, because a bank is ultimately worth the return it earns on its capital. At about 1.9 times book, the earnings-power method supports the $176.74 price (June 28, 2026), but most other methods land below it: the relative-multiple, dividend-discount, and excess-return frames cluster in the $110s to $130s, and the price-to-tangible-book method sits far below near $96. A reasonable-growth re-pricing puts the base near $137 with a range to about $146, so the current price sits above that band.

Inverting the price into the assumption it embeds, the market is paying about 1.9 times book, which prices in a return on equity beyond the 12.5% elite tier sustained for a very long time. That is a bound, not a solved point: the bank has recently earned about 13.3%, but the assumed return runs above what it has typically delivered, the price-to-book is at the very top of the peer group, and the rarity read flags the price as stretched against the bank's own history. The model labels the priced-in assumption elevated, above what the fundamentals comfortably support.

The honest conclusion is that Park is a high-quality bank trading at a full price. The quality is real, clean credit, a strong margin, a growing dividend, but the premium-to-book valuation already credits that quality and then some, assuming a return on equity above the bank's own track record. The dividend near a 3.2% yield anchors part of the return, but the upside is limited unless the merged franchise can sustain a peak return that history says is hard to hold. This is a good bank at a price that leaves little margin for error.

Catalysts

The dominant catalyst is the integration of the First Citizens Bancshares merger. The all-stock deal closed and drove total assets to about $13 billion, with loans up 20.1% and deposits up 33.4% year over year, but it also carried $15.5 million of merger-related expense that weighed on reported first-quarter 2026 EPS, which came in at $2.39 versus $2.60 a year earlier, against adjusted net income of $53.5 million. Evidence that cost synergies are realized, the acquired credit performs, and the combined franchise delivers the targeted returns is the key thing to watch over the next several quarters.

The margin and credit trends are the second driver. Net interest margin was a strong 4.80% and net interest income rose 20.5% to $125.8 million, while net charge-offs stayed low at 0.12% of loans with the allowance at 1.12%. The direction of the margin as deposit costs and loan yields move, and any deterioration in credit from today's pristine levels, will shape earnings.

Capital return is the supporting thread. Park raised its quarterly dividend to $1.10, a roughly 3.2% yield, and has a history of paying special dividends, so capital distribution is a steady feature. Analyst sentiment is a Hold, with price targets clustered near the high $180s, modestly above the current price, reflecting respect for the franchise balanced against a premium valuation. The risks to monitor are integration execution, deposit competition, and the rate environment.

Sources:

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Park National (consolidated financial services) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

View the full interactive PRK report on boothcheck