IMPINJ, INC. (PI): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $163.22, IMPINJ, INC. (PI) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~22.4 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-08-08.

Generated: 2026-08-08 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/PI

Headline

FieldValue
TickerPI
CompanyIMPINJ, INC.
Sector / IndustryTechnology
Current price$163.22/sh
CompositionEndpoint ICs 83% / Systems 17%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basisrevenue-multiple
EV / sales paid14.0x
Steady-state operating margin assumed21.0%
Must persist for22.4y

The company earns no operating profit yet; the inversion runs on the revenue multiple and an assumed steady-state margin.

Solve inputs: computed at a 13.3% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~3.1 years.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~12 years; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: elevated

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.66σ
sustained it ~10 years at this level15%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0
Earnings12.78x1expensive
Relative2.72x2expensive
Growth3.03x3expensive

Families that call it expensive: Earnings, Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=6)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$21.637.55xyesFCF base $0.1B, growth 3% (input: historical growth), terminal g 3.2%, WACC 8.7%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$98.801.65xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 471.8x / 473.8x / 475.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelative$59.912.72xyesP/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 5.0x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$7.4721.85xyesReference only (book value floor): BV/sh $7.47, ROE negative (excluded from median)
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$6.7224.29xyesReference only (book value with convergence): BV/sh $7.47, ROE converges to ke (excluded from median)
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$53.833.03xyesRev $0.4B, growth 3% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 6.7x / 8.0x / 9.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$0.00noNegative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAssetno
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$0.0116321.50xyesEBITDA $0.01B × sector EV/EBITDA 16.0x (excluded from median)
FCF YieldEarnings$12.7712.78xyesFCF $63.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$0.0116321.50xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.00B (FCF $0.06B − SBC $0.06B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median)
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsno
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$1.38118.27xyesBV $7.47 × (ROIC 1.6% / WACC 8.7%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelative$59.912.72xyesRevenue $0.37B × sector P/S 5.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarningsno
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Impinj (consolidated)operatingenterprise0.4B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$108.9m
Interest coverage-2.0x
Share count CAGR (dilution)5.1%
Burning cashno

Operating profit is negative or near zero and the company has no demonstrated through-cycle (mid-cycle) operating margin to normalize against, so years-to-repay cannot be computed honestly.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Between 2010 and 2025 the number of Impinj chips going into the world compounded at 26% a year. Revenue did nothing of the sort. The 2025 top line landed slightly below 2024, and the four quarters through June 2026 close on an operating loss. Both facts hold at once, and the space between them is the whole business.

An endpoint IC is the small piece of silicon printed into an inlay, which a manufacturer then laminates into an apparel tag, a luggage label or a carton sticker. The FY2025 10-K describes these chips as "consumable silicon and are a reoccurring revenue source for us". That is the plain version of the economics. The tag leaves the building with the box, and the next box needs another one. Volume compounds because consumption compounds, and the company states the volume record directly: "From 2010 to 2025, our overall endpoint IC sales volumes increased at a 26% compounded annual growth rate". Price per unit is the part that does not hold, because prices are renegotiated with the large endpoint customers every year. The bull argument is that a business shaped this way eventually gets paid on scale instead of on price.

The June quarter is what that looks like when volume cooperates. Revenue reached 108.4 million dollars, gross margin came in at 58.6%, and the company reported net income of 12.2 million dollars, each a quarterly record on its own measures. Operations generated 35.6 million dollars across the first half of the year. One half-year is not a trend. It is, though, the shape of the leverage: an extra chip costs wafer and test, and most of what sits above that falls through to the operating line.

The platform is wider than the chip. As the 10-K puts it, "Our systems comprise our finished readers, reader ICs; software and services; and tag production systems", and those systems are what let a retailer read an entire carton at a doorway rather than one label at a time. Selling the reading infrastructure is how a chip supplier makes the chips get used. Competition is real but partial. The same filing notes that "Each of our competitors competes with some, but not all, of our products", naming NXP, Alien Technology and several Chinese suppliers on the endpoint side.

Whether the operating margin ever arrives is the entire question, and the cohort establishes that it exists in this industry. CRUS earns a 23.0% operating margin on just under two billion dollars of revenue. MTSI earns 16.0% on about 1.07 billion. LSCC holds a 68.4% gross margin on a base close to Impinj's own. These are different mixes serving different end markets, but together they show that a fabless design house at scale does convert gross margin into operating margin. Impinj's gross margin already sits inside that band. Its operating expense does not.

So the bull case does not require a new market to appear. It requires the existing one to keep consuming tags while the cost side stops growing alongside them.

Bear Case

Across the four quarters through June 2026, Impinj earned no operating profit. Not a thin one. None. Revenue of 371.5 million dollars produced a small operating loss, and the equity carries a market value of about 5.1 billion dollars. Everything that value is paying for therefore sits in front of the company rather than behind it.

Where the profit goes is not a mystery. Stock compensation ran 16.3 million dollars in the June quarter and 31.0 million across the first half, against 12.2 million of reported net income in June and a loss over the six months. Staff are being paid in shares, the count of those shares has compounded at about 5% a year since mid-2022, and the existing holder funds it. Management's adjusted measures remove that expense. The share count does not.

What the price requires is specific. Valued against sales at about 14 times, it needs the business to reach roughly a 21% operating margin and to grow revenue at its self-funding limit for better than two decades. Impinj has never posted a 21% operating margin. Its strongest recent quarter, the three months to June 2026, still converted less than a tenth of revenue into operating profit, and it did so on a mix and a volume the company itself calls uneven.

The 10-K names the mechanism that keeps pulling the margin back. On price: "ASPs can decline quickly for a number of reasons such as demand for older products declining, competition increasing, or during times of oversupply or overcapacity". On competition, the same filing warns that "the Chinese government has made developing the Chinese semiconductor industry a priority, potentially increasing competition for us globally while possibly restricting our ability to participate in the Chinese market". A commodity chip sold into a market where a state has declared the category strategic is not a setting in which pricing power improves.

The systems half of the revenue arrives in projects, and projects do not repeat on schedule. The company gives its own example: "we generated 14% of total 2019 revenue from a gateway deployment at a large North American SC&L provider", with nothing comparable in the year that followed. On the endpoint half, the reset is annual. The 10-K states that the yearly negotiation "typically resulted in reduced revenue and gross margins in the first quarter compared to prior periods". March 2025 and March 2026 both landed in operating loss, and March 2026 did it on revenue that was flat against the year before. The pattern is working exactly as described, which is the problem: the design puts a hole in the start of every year, and the rest of the year has to fill it before anything accrues to the owner.

The balance sheet is not the fragile part here. Impinj held more in short-dated and long-dated investments than the 241.9 million dollars of convertible notes it carries, and the first half funded itself from operations. The company can afford to wait for the market to arrive. The bear case is that the price cannot.

Valuation

None of the standard ways of valuing a company reaches this price. Peer-multiple methods come closest, and the price still sits roughly 2.7 times above where that family lands. The forward-growth family, which credits future expansion, leaves the price about 3 times above it. Capitalize the free cash flow the business generates today at no growth at all, the earnings-power view, and the price stands nearly thirteen times above that reading. Against book value the distance is wider than twenty times. The families are not arguing with each other about what the company is worth. They agree, and today's price is describing something other than today's company.

What that distance buys is a particular future. Valued against sales at about 14 times, the price implies the business eventually earns roughly a 21% operating margin and grows revenue at its self-funding ceiling for better than two decades. Those figures are approximate and should be read that way. They come from a single solve under fixed assumptions about the cost of capital and the rate at which growth fades, and they move meaningfully when those assumptions move.

Two references frame how unusual the assumption is. Measured against Impinj's own record, the near-term growth rate is inside what the company has recently delivered; the stretch is in how long it has to persist, not how fast it has to run. Measured against the wider record, only about 15% of comparably fast-growing companies held that pace even a decade. That is a narrow evidentiary base for the judgment, and a narrow base makes the reading weaker rather than gentler.

The concrete version of the demand is a 21% operating margin against a trailing year that delivered none. The cohort says the number is reachable in this industry: CRUS earns 23.0% on just under two billion dollars of revenue, and MTSI earns 16.0% on about 1.07 billion. Both are larger, and both sell into end markets Impinj does not serve. Impinj's gross margin in the June quarter is competitive with either of them, which places the entire distance in operating expense. Closing it means revenue growing much faster than headcount and the stock compensation attached to it.

Solvency is not what bounds the downside here. At the end of June the company held more in investments than the 241.9 million dollars of convertible notes on its books, and operations covered themselves through the first half. The live cost is dilution rather than leverage: the share count has compounded at about 5% a year since mid-2022, and each additional year of waiting adds another turn of it. Units have compounded since 2010. Profit has not followed them yet.

Catalysts

Impinj reported June-quarter results on July 29, 2026: revenue of 108.4 million dollars, GAAP gross margin of 58.6%, and net income of 12.2 million dollars, each a record on the company's own measures. The figure worth holding onto is the guide that came attached to it.

For the September quarter the company guided revenue of 105.5 to 108.5 million dollars, GAAP net income of 2.2 to 3.7 million, and GAAP diluted earnings of 0.07 to 0.12 per share. Revenue therefore holds roughly flat while reported profit gives back most of its June level. The company's own reconciliation of that outlook forecasts 16.4 million dollars of stock compensation for the quarter, which accounts for essentially the whole gap. That is a compensation-driven step rather than a demand signal, and it is the clearest recent illustration of why the reported and adjusted versions of this company look so different.

The other date that matters is not announced as an event. Endpoint IC prices are renegotiated annually with an effective date in the first quarter, and the 10-K says that negotiation has typically reduced first-quarter revenue and gross margin before both normalise later in the year. March 2025 and March 2026 both landed in operating loss. Whatever the September and December quarters produce, the March 2027 print will be read against that pattern.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Impinj (consolidated) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q2 2026 results release, July 29, 2026 · Q3 2026 outlook, Q2 2026 results release, July 29, 2026 · Q3 2026 outlook reconciliation, July 29, 2026 · FY2025 Form 10-K, filed February 9, 2026

View the full interactive PI report on boothcheck