PHINIA INC. (PHIN): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $68.65, PHINIA INC. (PHIN) is priced for +1.6% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-28.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/PHIN

Headline

FieldValue
TickerPHIN
CompanyPHINIA INC.
Current price$68.65/sh
CompositionFuel Systems 63% / Aftermarket 38%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)4.0%
Operating margin today7.0%
Margin compression (value-band)-3.0pp
Implied growth1.6%
Multiple paid13x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.36σ
cohort percentile (of 212 peers)26

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.77x5expensive
Earnings1.31x5expensive
Relative1.08x2expensive
Growth0.69x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.4%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$219.720.31xyesFCF base $0.3B, growth 8% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.4%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$100.120.69xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 5.7x / 7.7x / 9.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelative——noP/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.7x / 20.0x / 23.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x
Simple DDMGrowth——no—
Two-Stage DDMGrowth——no—
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$39.831.72xyesBV/sh $42.06, ROE (TTM) 8.8%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$38.771.77xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$56.771.21xyesRev $3.6B, growth 8% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.6x / 0.7x / 0.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$41.761.64xyesEPS $3.48, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=9.70 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowth——no—
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$52.361.31xyesNormalized EBIT (4y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.32B × (1−40%) / WACC 7.4% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$38.591.78xyesBV $42.06 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 8.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 5.7%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$57.391.20xyes√(22.5 × EPS $3.48 × BVPS $42.06) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative——noEBITDA $0.41B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$54.881.25xyesFCF $250.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$48.391.42xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.23B (FCF $0.25B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$112.290.61xyesEPS $3.48 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$12.235.61xyesBV $42.06 × (ROIC 2.1% / WACC 7.4%)
P/Sales SectorRelative——noRevenue $3.62B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$130.500.53xyesEPS $3.48 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$37.621.82xyesEPS $3.48 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelative——no—
Clinical Phase NPVGrowth——no—
MertonAsset——no—
V5 Mechanical———no—

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Fuel Systemsoperatingenterprise$2.4b—withheldunresolved no unit value
Aftermarketoperatingenterprise$1.2b—withheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$653.0m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)4.34x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)2.59x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-5.5%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The surprising thing about PHINIA is that a company selling components for combustion engines, a technology the world is supposedly leaving behind, is one of the more shareholder-friendly cash generators in its sector. The market treats it as a declining business, and the price reflects that skepticism, but the cash flow tells a different story. PHINIA generates about $204 million in free cash flow on roughly $3.6 billion of revenue, and it has been returning that cash decisively, shrinking its share count about 5% a year through buybacks on top of a dividend. A management team buying back a meaningful slice of the company annually is signaling that the cash flows are more durable than the narrative implies, and every repurchase concentrates the remaining holders' claim on those cash flows.

The durability comes from two structural features the bear narrative underrates. First, the Aftermarket segment, about 38% of revenue, sells replacement parts for the enormous installed base of combustion vehicles already on the road. The 10-K describes it as selling "products to independent aftermarket customers and OES customers" across a wide portfolio, and that installed base does not disappear when new-vehicle mixes shift; the roughly 1.5 billion combustion vehicles in service worldwide need parts for years to decades. Aftermarket revenue is a long-tail annuity that runs well past the point where new-engine sales decline. Second, the transition to electric vehicles is slower and more uneven globally than the headlines suggest, particularly in commercial vehicles and emerging markets where combustion remains dominant.

PHINIA is also actively diversifying the runway. Management has won new contracts in alternative fuels and aerospace, broadening the revenue base beyond traditional gasoline and diesel toward hydrogen, fuel-agnostic systems, and adjacent markets. The company reaffirmed full-year 2026 guidance for net sales of about $3.52 billion to $3.72 billion and net earnings of about $165 million to $195 million, and Q1 2026 beat with net sales of $878 million. The relative-multiple and growth methods reach the price, and analysts have been constructive, with one firm raising its target citing the lower share count. For an investor who believes the combustion-decline timeline is longer than feared, the bull case is a cash-rich business harvesting a long-lived market while returning capital and seeding new ones.

Bear Case

The bear case is the sector's secular cycle, and PHINIA's own filing names the threat without flinching. The company faces, in the 10-K's words, "regulations that require a reduction or phase-out of sales of, certain commercial and light combustion-powered vehicles" as the market accelerates toward electrification. That is the structural truth: the core market for fuel systems, 63% of the business, is in a long-term decline mandated by policy in much of the developed world. New combustion-vehicle production is the leading indicator of future fuel-system demand, and as that production gives way to electric powertrains, the original-equipment side of PHINIA's business faces a shrinking addressable market. A business whose largest segment is structurally fading cannot grow its way out of the problem; it can only manage the decline, and the price has to be a bet on how slow that decline is.

The valuation does not fully embrace that fade. At today's price the asset-based and earnings-power methods both read expensive. Capitalizing the company's free cash flow at the cost of capital lands far below the price, and the book-value methods, anchored on a book value of about $40 per share, sit below it as well. The stock trades around 22 times trailing earnings, which is a growth-company multiple for a business the regulators are legislating against. The price embeds modest operating-income growth, around 9%, that requires the aftermarket annuity and the new alternative-fuel contracts to more than offset the combustion decline, an offset that is not guaranteed and depends on the slower-transition thesis holding. If electrification accelerates, or if a global auto-production downturn hits the cyclical original-equipment side, the earnings power the price capitalizes erodes faster than the aftermarket can cushion.

The cyclicality compounds the secular risk. Auto-parts suppliers are exposed to the production volumes of their automaker customers, which swing with the economic cycle, and PHINIA carries about $668 million of net debt at over two times operating income, real leverage for a cyclical business in a declining end-market. The buyback that supports the per-share story consumes cash that could otherwise reduce that debt or fund the diversification into aerospace and alternative fuels, so capital allocation is a genuine trade-off, not a free win. The bear case is that PHINIA is being valued on the optimistic end of the transition timeline: a leveraged, cyclical supplier to a structurally shrinking market, priced as if the aftermarket and new-fuel offsets fully bridge the decline, with little margin if the combustion phase-out arrives faster than hoped.

Valuation

The price is making a timeline bet: that the decline of combustion engines is slow enough, and the aftermarket annuity plus new alternative-fuel and aerospace contracts strong enough, for PHINIA to grow operating income modestly rather than shrink. The inversion frames the bet as roughly 9% operating-income growth against a current operating margin around 7%, which is a demanding assumption for a business whose largest end-market faces a regulated phase-out. The whole valuation hinges on how you weigh the secular decline against the long-tail aftermarket.

The methods split predictably. The relative-multiple lens and the growth methods reach the price, crediting the modest forward growth and a sector earnings multiple. The static earnings-power and asset methods land well below: capitalizing free cash flow with no growth, or anchoring on book value and the current single-digit return on equity, both produce values far under the price. That divergence says the market is paying for the offsets, the aftermarket durability and the diversification, to outrun the combustion fade, rather than for the demonstrated trailing economics, which a no-growth lens values much lower. The honest read is that this is a melting-ice-cube debate priced toward the slow-melt end: the forward methods believe the runway is long, the static methods see a declining cash flow, and the price sides with the optimists.

Solvency is a manageable constraint but a real one. Net debt of about $668 million at over two times operating income is moderate leverage, and the company is not burning cash, generating positive free cash flow it splits between buybacks, the dividend, and reinvestment. The share count falling about 5% a year is the clearest positive in the capital structure, direct evidence of buyback deployment concentrating the per-share claim. What the buyer is underwriting is the decline curve: at this price the bet is that the aftermarket annuity and the alternative-fuel and aerospace pivot keep cash flow durable for long enough that the buyback compounds value before the combustion market shrinks materially. The downside is bounded by the cash the installed base still generates; the risk is that the secular fade and the auto cycle arrive together.

Catalysts

PHINIA reaffirmed full-year 2026 guidance for net sales of about $3.52 billion to $3.72 billion and net earnings of about $165 million to $195 million, implying low-single-digit to mid-single-digit growth. Q1 2026 beat expectations, with net sales of about $878 million and net income of about $37 million, both up year over year, driven by growth in Fuel Systems and Aftermarket. The next quarterly prints are the read on whether the aftermarket and new-contract growth continue to offset any softness in the original-equipment combustion business.

The catalysts that will define the thesis are the diversification wins and the capital-return cadence. Management has highlighted new contracts in alternative fuels and aerospace, the offsets meant to extend the runway beyond traditional combustion, so the pace of those wins is the key signal that the company can grow as its core market matures. On capital allocation, the ongoing buyback is the lever driving per-share value, with one analyst raising its price target specifically on the lower share count; the rate of repurchase against the debt level is worth watching. The external variable is the speed of the electric-vehicle transition and global auto-production volumes, since both determine how quickly the combustion end-market fades. The developments to monitor are alternative-fuel and aerospace contract announcements, the aftermarket revenue trend, and the buyback pace, since those are what turn a declining-market supplier into a durable per-share compounder.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Fuel Systems (reported)

Aftermarket (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

PHINIA Q1 2026 results, 2026 · PHINIA FY2026 guidance and Q1 results, 2026 · Northland analyst note, 2026 · PHINIA FY2026 guidance, 2026

View the full interactive PHIN report on boothcheck