PATRICK INDUSTRIES, INC. (PATK): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $87.50, PATRICK INDUSTRIES, INC. (PATK) is priced for +4.7% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/PATK

Headline

FieldValue
TickerPATK
CompanyPATRICK INDUSTRIES, INC.
Current price$87.50/sh
CompositionRecreational Vehicle 45% / Marine 15% / Powersports 10% / Manufactured Housing 17% / Industrial 13%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)2.8%
Operating margin today7.0%
Margin compression (value-band)-4.2pp
Implied growth4.7%
Multiple paid16x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.4% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~6.5pp.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.97σ
cohort percentile (of 214 peers)37
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.76x5expensive
Earnings2.08x5expensive
Relative1.50x2expensive
Growth0.99x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$122.620.71xyesFCF base $0.2B, growth 4% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.5%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$88.750.99xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 8.0x / 10.0x / 12.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.9x / 20.0x / 23.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$44.801.95xyesBV/sh $36.13, ROE (TTM) 11.5%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$49.661.76xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$65.581.33xyesRev $3.9B, growth 4% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.6x / 0.7x / 0.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$48.561.80xyesEPS $3.89, growth 12% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.69 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$66.061.32xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.33B × (1−15%) / WACC 7.5% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$50.611.73xyesBV $36.13 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 11.5% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 7.5%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$56.231.56xyes√(22.5 × EPS $3.89 × BVPS $36.13) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.45B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$15.975.48xyesFCF $193.7M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$9.459.26xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.17B (FCF $0.19B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$109.110.80xyesEPS $3.89 × (8.5 + 2×12.5%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$9.689.04xyesBV $36.13 × (ROIC 2.0% / WACC 7.5%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $3.94B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$72.841.20xyesEPS $3.89 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 12.5% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 18.7x
Earnings YieldEarnings$42.052.08xyesEPS $3.89 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Manufacturingoperatingenterprise$3.0twithheldunresolved no unit value
Distributionoperatingenterprise$1.0twithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$1.3b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)5.76x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)4.90x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.9%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The bear case writes itself for a company like this: it sells into recreational vehicles and boats, the most discretionary purchases a household makes, and those markets are deep in a shipment downturn. RV and manufactured-housing volumes fell in the most recent quarter on lower wholesale unit shipments. So the obvious read is a cyclical supplier caught in a cyclical trough. The data complicates that read in two ways that matter.

First, the diversification is working as designed. While RV and housing softened, marine revenue grew 14% and powersports grew 28% in the first quarter of 2026, enough that total sales held near flat at $997 million against $1,003 million a year earlier. Patrick has spent years deliberately spreading itself across markets that do not all trough at once, focusing on acquiring companies with strong management in its primary markets "The Company is focused on driving growth in its primary markets through the acquisition of companies with strong management teams", and the recent quarter is a live test it passed: five end markets, several pulling while others push, net result roughly flat through a genuine volume recession.

Second, content per unit is the growth engine that runs independent of the unit cycle. Even with fewer RVs and boats being built, Patrick is selling more dollars of parts into each one: RV content per unit rose 8% and marine content per unit rose 17% on a trailing-twelve-month basis. That is share gain inside a shrinking pie, and it is what lets revenue hold when shipments fall. The acquisitions feed the same flywheel, RecPro and the powersports expansion add product lines that raise the content opportunity per vehicle. The bull case is that the cyclical fear is real but already in the price, while the structural levers, diversification and rising content, are doing exactly what management built them to do, and the company is growing its dividend, up about 14% over the past year, while it does it.

Bear Case

The fragility in this story lives on the balance sheet, and it is the kind that only shows up when the cycle turns hard. Patrick Industries carries roughly $1.3 billion of net debt against trailing operating income, which puts leverage at nearly 5 times operating profit on the report's measure. The company's own measure, on an earnings-before-charges basis, is lower, but either number is the leverage of a roll-up acquirer, and the denominator is cyclical. In a deep RV and marine downturn, operating income compresses while the debt stays fixed, and a leverage ratio that looks manageable at the top of the cycle can become the dominant fact at the bottom.

That matters because the end markets are squarely discretionary and squarely cyclical. The company itself signals the timing risk, telling investors to expect the revenue-mix effects to persist into the first half of the year "We expect to continue to feel the effects of our revenue mix through the first half of 2025", a pattern that has carried into 2026 as RV and housing shipments stay soft. The bet embedded in the price is undemanding on its face, roughly 4.3% annual operating growth for five years, well within what the company has delivered. But that is the average across a cycle, and the price asks for it to be sustained without a serious volume air pocket. A levered supplier needs the units to keep coming; if a recession deepens the shipment decline beyond what content gains can offset, the same operating leverage that flatters good years bites in bad ones.

The valuation methods split in a way that confirms the tension. The relative-multiple and forward-growth lenses reach the price, but the asset and earnings-power methods read it as expensive, the company is not cheap on book value or on capitalized current earnings. That is the signature of a stock being valued on continued execution and continued acquisition, not on what the existing business is worth standing still. The dividend and the buyback are evidence of management confidence, but they also compete with debt service and acquisition spending for the same cash, and in a downturn that competition tightens. The bear does not need the company to break; it needs the cycle to do what cycles do to a levered, discretionary-demand supplier.

Valuation

The price asks for steady, ordinary growth, which is the right starting frame for a cyclical supplier. Inverting today's quote, the market pays about 16 times company-wide operating income, implying roughly 4.3% annual operating growth over five years. Against the company's own recent record, that pace is unremarkable; the demand it makes is on duration, that the growth persists across the next several years without a cyclical interruption that a discretionary-goods supplier cannot rule out.

The methods disagree along a familiar fault line. The relative-multiple lens, anchored on peer multiples in the auto-and-RV-supplier cohort where LCI Industries is the closest comparable, and the forward-growth cash-flow models both reach the price. The asset-value and earnings-power families sit below it, reading the stock as expensive on book value and on capitalized current earnings. The pattern says the price is justified by where the business is going and by what peers fetch, not by what the existing asset base or trailing profit is worth today. For a serial acquirer, that is internally consistent: the value is in the platform's ability to keep buying and integrating content, which the static methods cannot credit.

Solvency is where the cyclicality earns its scrutiny. Net debt of about $1.3 billion against trailing operating income puts leverage near 5 times on the report's basis, and while the company is not burning cash and the share count is roughly flat to lower, that leverage is the variable that governs the downside. The ratios are comfortable at mid-cycle volumes and tighten quickly in a trough, because the operating income in the denominator falls with shipments. The street's targets sit well above the quote, crediting a continuation of content gains and acquisition-driven growth that this frame treats as the bet rather than the base case. The decisive question for the price is not the multiple; it is whether the diversification and content levers can hold revenue steady through a soft-shipment stretch the company has told investors to expect.

Catalysts

The first quarter of 2026 was the diversification thesis on display. Net sales were $997 million, essentially flat against $1,003 million a year earlier, and earnings came in at $1.10 a share, a few cents ahead of expectations, while the revenue line fell just short. Underneath the flat headline, the mix shifted: marine revenue rose 14% and powersports rose 28%, offsetting lower RV and manufactured-housing volumes that reflected weaker wholesale industry shipments. Operating income held near $65 million and net income edged up to $39.5 million. The company also completed two small acquisitions in the quarter, continuing the bolt-on cadence.

Content per unit is the metric that turned a volume decline into flat revenue. On a trailing-twelve-month basis, RV content per unit rose 8% and marine content per unit rose 17%, the dollar value of Patrick parts in each vehicle climbing even as fewer vehicles were built. That is the structural offset to the cycle, and it is the figure that decides whether the company can hold the line through a soft first half.

Sentiment is constructive. The covering analysts carry a buy-leaning consensus, and several firms raised price targets into early 2026, citing earnings resilience through macro headwinds and growth in the RecPro and powersports lines. The company raised its dividend roughly 14% over the past year, with the most recent quarterly payment at $0.47 a share. The industry backdrop frames the timing debate: RV wholesale shipments are forecast to rise modestly in 2026 for a third straight year, with a stronger second half than first. The next two prints will test whether marine and powersports can keep carrying the load until RV volumes recover.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Manufacturing (reported)

Distribution (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

PATK Q1 2026 earnings release, April 2026 · PATK Q1 2026 earnings call, April 2026 · analyst notes from Truist, Baird, Benchmark and KeyBanc, early 2026 · PATK dividend declaration, February 2026

View the full interactive PATK report on boothcheck