PAR PACIFIC HOLDINGS, INC. (PARR): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers PAR PACIFIC HOLDINGS, INC. (PARR) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/PARR

Headline

FieldValue
TickerPARR
CompanyPAR PACIFIC HOLDINGS, INC.
Current price$69.78/sh
CompositionGasoline 40% / Distillates 40% / Other refined products 20% / Merchandise 1% / Transportation and terminalling services 4% / Other revenue 3% / Eliminations and other -8%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)2.3%
Operating margin today8.2%
Margin compression (value-band)-5.9pp
Multiple paid7x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 9: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.1% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.13σ
cohort percentile (of 46 peers)13
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and relative-multiple value, while growth-DCF lands below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0.71x5justifies
Earnings1.29x5expensive
Relative0.43x2justifies
Growth1.55x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Asset, Relative Families that call it expensive: Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$45.071.55xyesFCF base $0.3B, growth -2% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 6.9%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$64.121.09xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 4.0x / 6.1x / 11.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 10x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 7.5x / 10.0x / 12.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 6x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$98.940.71xyesBV/sh $30.54, ROE (TTM) 30.0%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$183.750.38xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$37.691.85xyesRev $7.5B, growth -2% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.3x / 0.5x / 0.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$105.960.66xyesEPS $8.83, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=3.81 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$54.131.29xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.36B × (1−21%) / WACC 6.9% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$150.840.46xyesBV $30.54 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 30.0% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$77.900.90xyes√(22.5 × EPS $8.83 × BVPS $30.54) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.76B × sector EV/EBITDA 6.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$31.862.19xyesFCF $255.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$28.182.48xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.24B (FCF $0.26B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$284.910.24xyesEPS $8.83 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$8.458.26xyesBV $30.54 × (ROIC 1.9% / WACC 6.9%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $7.54B × sector P/S 1.2x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$331.130.21xyesEPS $8.83 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$95.460.73xyesEPS $8.83 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Refiningoperatingenterprise$7.2b$487.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Logisticsoperatingenterprise$298.4m$97.6m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Retailoperatingenterprise$576.7m$74.7m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$789.1m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)1.61x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.27x
Interest coverage8.1x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-4.4%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

What a cash-flow model misses about Par Pacific is that the business is not a stream of smooth earnings to discount, it is a set of physical refineries and retail sites whose value is the throughput they push and the margin they capture, both of which swing with the market. Standard valuation models try to project a growth rate; for a refiner the question is closer to what these assets earn across a cycle and what they cost to replace. On that reading the price looks undemanding. The market pays roughly 7 times company-wide operating income, a multiple that sits below what even a 5%-a-year decline in operating profit would justify. The methods are not asking the business to grow; they are asking it not to fall apart, and the assets themselves answer that.

The operating reality behind the cheapness is leverage to refining margins, and that leverage works in both directions. In the first quarter of 2026 the refining segment swung from a $24.7 million loss a year earlier to a $56.3 million profit, with total throughput rising to 184.3 thousand barrels a day and adjusted gross margin per barrel widening to $11.16. Hawaii throughput set a record at 89.8 thousand barrels a day. When the spreads cooperate, a mid-cap refiner with this asset base throws off cash quickly, and the company has been turning that cash into a smaller share count: shares outstanding have fallen at about 4% a year, with $28.0 million of stock repurchased in the first quarter alone at an average price of $37.96.

The growth that the asset-value frame does not capture is the optionality on top. The Hawaii renewable fuels facility began commercial operations in April 2026, reaching on-specification renewable diesel late that month and beginning the transition toward sustainable aviation fuel. That is a new product line bolted onto an existing refinery footprint, using throughput and logistics the company already owns. The retail business is the quiet ballast underneath: retail adjusted gross margin was about $164.7 million in 2024, up from $155.3 million "our retail Adjusted Gross Margin was approximately $164.7 million, an increase of $9.4 million compared to $155.3 million", a steadier margin pool that softens the refining swings. The bull case is that the market is pricing the assets cheaply because it distrusts the current margin, while the through-cycle earnings power, the buyback, and the renewable option are all real and unpriced.

Bear Case

The valuation methods all agree the price is supported, and that agreement is exactly where the bear should be suspicious. Every family of approach, asset value, earnings power, peer multiples, and even the cash-flow models, lands at or above today's quote. But the methods are fed by trailing results, and trailing results for a refiner are a snapshot of where the cycle happens to sit. The more conservative read is that the earnings powering those models are near a peak, not a midpoint. Refining margins have surged on supply disruptions, and the same disclosures that show this year's strength also show how fast it reverses: the Hawaii Index fell $5.85 a barrel, a 45% drop, in 2024, and the Washington refinery's adjusted gross margin per barrel collapsed from $9.41 to $3.25 in a single year "Adjusted Gross Margin for the Washington refinery decreased by $6.16 per barrel from $9.41 per barrel during the year ended December 31, 2023, to $3.25 per barrel during the year ended December 31, 2024". A 7x multiple on peak earnings is not the bargain it looks like; it is an average multiple on an unsustainable number.

The macro variable with the most leverage on the thesis is the crack spread, and it sits entirely outside the company's control. The current strength rests on refinery cutbacks and geopolitical supply shocks; when those normalize, the operating leverage that delivered the first-quarter swing runs in reverse, turning a profit back toward the loss it came from. The company's geographic concentration sharpens this. Hawaii is its single largest exposure, and Hawaii's economics tie to jet-fuel demand, tourism, and the cost of importing crude to an island, none of which the company sets.

The balance sheet is the part that keeps a cyclical downturn from becoming an existential one, but it is not pristine. Par Pacific carries net debt of about $789 million, leverage near 1.3 times trailing operating income, and interest coverage around 8 times. That is manageable while margins are wide. It tightens fast if a margin trough arrives, because the operating income in those coverage and leverage ratios is the same cyclical figure that can halve. The conservative methods are honest here: a refiner trading on peak margins should be valued on what it earns through the cycle, and the disagreement is not between bull and bear models, it is between the trailing year and the average year.

Valuation

The price asks very little of the business, which is the first thing to understand about Par Pacific. Inverting today's quote, the market pays about 7 times company-wide operating income, a multiple so low that the price sits below what even a 5%-a-year decline in operating profit would warrant. This is a bound rather than a solved forecast: the price is not betting on growth, it is betting against meaningful deterioration. Against the company's own recent results, that near-term pace is well within what it has delivered; the stretch, such as it is, lives in how long the current margins persist, not in the rate.

Unusually for the reports in this product, every family of valuation method supports the price rather than sitting below it. The peer-multiple lens, anchored on a sector P/E near 10x and EV/EBITDA near 6x, lands above the quote. The cash-flow methods, even with modestly negative recent revenue growth fed in, reach the price comfortably. The asset and earnings-power lenses agree. When all four families clear the price, the report's own read is that this is a value or asset-supported name, not a growth bet. The honest caution is not that the methods are too low; it is that they are fed by a trailing year that a cyclical business cannot be assumed to repeat.

Solvency is where the cyclicality earns its respect. Net debt of roughly $789 million against trailing operating income puts leverage near 1.3 times, with interest coverage around 8 times, and the company is not burning cash. Those ratios are comfortable at today's margins and would tighten in a margin trough, because the denominator is itself cyclical. The share count working steadily lower, down about 4% a year, is direct evidence of capital return rather than dilution, and it is the management decision the value case rests on: buying back stock while the market discounts the assets. The street's mean target sits well above the quote, which credits a continuation of strong refining margins that this asset-and-through-cycle frame deliberately does not assume; the gap between the two is the cycle, not a contradiction.

Catalysts

The first quarter of 2026, reported in early May, was a clean margin-recovery print. Par Pacific posted net income of $54.5 million, or $1.10 in diluted earnings per share, with adjusted EBITDA of $91.5 million. The refining segment did the work, swinging from a $24.7 million operating loss a year earlier to a $56.3 million profit as throughput climbed to 184.3 thousand barrels a day and per-barrel adjusted gross margin reached $11.16. Hawaii throughput hit a record 89.8 thousand barrels a day. The quarter also carried a smaller adjusted figure than the headline, $38.5 million of adjusted net income, the difference being items the company strips out of its core measure.

The structural development is the Hawaii renewable fuels facility, which began commercial operations in April 2026. The plant reached on-specification renewable diesel late in the month and started transitioning toward sustainable aviation fuel mode. It is built onto the existing Hawaii refining footprint, so it adds a product line without a greenfield build, and it is the clearest growth lever the company has outside the refining cycle.

Sentiment is constructive but split on durability. The covering analysts lean toward buy ratings with a mean price target meaningfully above the current quote, in the high-$60s to low-$70s range, while skeptics argue the current crack spreads are a cyclical peak that mean-reverts and creates downside. The two camps are debating the same fact: refining margins are wide right now. The next several quarters of crack-spread direction, and the renewable facility's ramp, will decide which camp was reading the cycle correctly.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Refining (reported)

Logistics (reported)

Retail (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

PARR Q1 2026 earnings release, May 2026 · PARR Q1 2026 earnings disclosures, May 2026 · analyst consensus tallies and published refiner notes, 2026

View the full interactive PARR report on boothcheck