Penske Automotive Group, Inc. (PAG): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $217.01, Penske Automotive Group, Inc. (PAG) is priced for -2.6% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.

Generated: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/PAG

Headline

FieldValue
TickerPAG
CompanyPenske Automotive Group, Inc.
Current price$217.01/sh
CompositionRetail Automotive 89% / Retail Commercial Truck 11%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)1.5%
Operating margin today3.8%
Margin compression (value-band)-2.3pp
Implied growth-2.6%
Multiple paid14x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7.9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-1.25σ
cohort percentile (of 212 peers)34

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.31x5expensive
Earnings13.10x5expensive
Relative0
Growth2.57x4expensive

Families that call it expensive: Earnings, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=14)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$53.734.04xyesFCF base $0.6B, growth 1% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.6%, WACC 7.7%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$205.991.05xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 11.7x / 13.7x / 15.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.9x / 20.0x / 23.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$56.743.82xyesStage 1: -10% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$149.131.46xyesBV/sh $88.56, ROE (TTM) 15.6%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$191.121.14xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$165.391.31xyesRev $32.2B, growth 1% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.4x / 0.4x / 0.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$140.191.55xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.39B × (1−26%) / WACC 7.7% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$195.091.11xyesBV $88.56 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 15.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$165.591.31xyes√(22.5 × EPS $13.76 × BVPS $88.56) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $1.42B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$16.5613.10xyesFCF $592.1M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$11.7018.55xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.56B (FCF $0.59B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$11.5318.82xyesEPS $13.76 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$25.678.45xyesBV $88.56 × (ROIC 2.2% / WACC 7.7%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $32.20B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$148.761.46xyesEPS $13.76 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Retail Automotiveoperatingenterprise$27.5b$847.8m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Retail Commercial Truckoperatingenterprise$3.4b$174.7m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Otheroperatingenterprise$922.6m$48.9m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Non-Automotive Investmentsoperatingenterprise$0$192.3m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$2.4b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.71x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)2.00x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-3.5%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Lead with the balance sheet, because for Penske it reveals what management thinks of its own business. Book value per share sits around $86 against a $174.71 price (June 27, 2026), so the market is paying roughly two times the equity of a company that owns real, sellable assets: dealership real estate, franchise rights, and inventory. Management has been shrinking the share count at about 3.9% a year through buybacks and just raised the dividend to $1.40, a roughly 3.4% yield it describes as the highest in its peer group (Penske Q1 2026, Yahoo Finance). A management team buying back stock and raising the dividend at this valuation is signaling confidence that the asset base is worth more than the market is paying.

The revenue mix is more defensive than the auto-dealer label suggests. Penske is a premium-brand retailer (heavy in BMW, Mercedes, Audi, and Toyota/Lexus) plus the largest US commercial-truck dealer through Premier Truck Group, and the highest-margin, most recurring slice is service and parts. In Q1 2026 retail automotive service and parts revenue rose 4.6% to a Q1 record of $863.9 million (Penske Q1 2026, stocktitan). The filings emphasize a multi-channel model letting customers buy on site or remotely and the quality of the customer experience (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001628280-26-012830). Service and parts is the annuity that smooths the cyclicality of vehicle sales, and it set a record even in a softer quarter.

The valuation reflects a business priced for decline that is still executing. At about 12x operating income, below what even a modest profit decline would justify, with asset-based methods clustering around the price (Simple Excess Return $150, Graham Number $164, Earnings Power Value $142, Two-Stage Excess Return $195), Penske screens as value-and-asset-supported rather than a growth bet. The company is also still growing by acquisition, recently adding Toyota and Lexus stores expected to contribute hundreds of millions in annualized revenue, and it holds a stake in Penske Transportation Solutions that adds earnings the dealership multiple ignores. The bull case is a well-capitalized, premium-skewed retailer with a recurring service annuity, trading near book, returning cash, and priced as if its profits are about to fall.

Bear Case

The structural truth a holder has to face is cyclicality, and the commercial-truck segment just demonstrated it. Q1 2026 EPS fell to $3.56 from $3.86, and retail commercial-truck dealerships retailed 3,583 new and used units, down 953 from a year earlier, driven by reduced order intake in late 2025 following tariff implementation and weakness in the freight market (Penske Q1 2026, stocktitan). Auto and truck retailing are deeply cyclical: unit volumes, and the finance-and-insurance and gross-per-unit economics that ride on them, swing with the consumer, with interest rates, and with freight demand. The cheap 12x multiple is partly the market correctly pricing that the current earnings may be closer to a cyclical peak than a sustainable base.

The balance sheet that looks reassuring also carries real leverage. Net debt is about $2.6 billion, and that excludes the substantial floor-plan financing dealers use to carry inventory, which is a constant interest cost that rises with rates. Interest expense is not separately broken out in the filings, so coverage cannot be cleanly computed, but a rate environment that stays high pressures both floor-plan costs and the affordability of the vehicles Penske sells. A leveraged retailer in a rate-sensitive, cyclical business has its margins squeezed from both ends in a downturn.

The structural threats to the franchise model are the longer-term overhang. The traditional dealership depends on the franchise system and on internal-combustion service revenue; a faster shift to electric vehicles (fewer moving parts, less routine service) and any move by manufacturers toward direct-to-consumer sales would erode the two most valuable parts of the business at once. Tariffs are an immediate margin and demand risk, as the truck segment already shows. The peer cohort of Asbury, AutoNation, Lithia, and Group 1 are all competing for the same acquisitions and facing the same EV and direct-sales questions. The valuation methods that project forward (DCF Perpetual Growth at $47, Two-Stage DDM at $61) sit far below the price because trailing growth was negative, a reminder that the cheap multiple may reflect a business whose growth has stalled. The bear case is a cyclical, leveraged, structurally-challenged retailer near a possible earnings peak, where the asset-based floor near book is the only real protection.

Valuation

Penske is a value-and-asset-supported name, and the methods cluster in a coherent way around that. The asset-based methods land near or above the $174.71 price (Simple Excess Return $150, Two-Stage Excess Return $195, Residual Income $198, Graham Number $164, Earnings Power Value $142), and the EV/EBITDA-anchored relative read is higher still at $218. A few methods are distorted by negative trailing growth and a low-margin pass-through revenue base, the DCF Perpetual Growth at $47, the FCF-yield figures, and the P/Sales figure near $723 should all be ignored as artifacts. The credible cluster says Penske is worth roughly its current price to a modest premium on an asset and normalized-earnings basis.

The inversion sharpens it. At $174.71 the market pays about 12x company-wide operating income, computed at a 7.5% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth, a multiple so low it sits below what even a 5%-a-year operating-profit decline would warrant. That is a bound, not a solved growth rate: the price embeds an assumption that operating profit slowly erodes, which is the market discounting the cyclical and structural risks. The honest summary is that Penske is cheap on its assets and on normalized earnings, with the dividend and buyback adding support, but the cheapness is the market's verdict on cyclical and EV-related risk. For a value buyer comfortable with the cyclicality, the asset floor near book is the attraction; for everyone else, the low multiple is a warning, not a bargain.

Catalysts

Penske reported Q1 2026 results with revenue of $7.9 billion (down slightly from $8.0 billion) and EPS of $3.56, down from $3.86, with adjusted EPS of $3.05 (Penske Q1 2026, stocktitan). Retail automotive service and parts revenue rose 4.6% to a Q1 record of $863.9 million, while commercial-truck unit sales fell 953 units on tariff-driven order weakness and a soft freight market. The company raised its dividend to $1.40 (about a 3.4% yield) and continued acquiring premium stores, including Toyota and Lexus dealerships (Penske Q1 2026, Yahoo Finance).

The forward setup blends a cyclical recovery hope with steady capital return. Management said it is encouraged by commercial-truck market trends and expects an increase in new truck orders to be delivered in the second half of 2026, so the truck-segment recovery is a key swing factor. The catalysts to watch are interest rates and consumer affordability (which drive vehicle unit volumes and floor-plan costs), the freight-market and tariff backdrop for the truck business, the pace of accretive acquisitions, the service-and-parts annuity that smooths cyclicality, and the dividend and buyback as direct returns. Longer term, watch the EV transition and any manufacturer moves toward direct sales, since both bear on the franchise model. The second-half truck-order pickup and the next quarterly print are the near-term tests.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Retail Automotive (reported)

Retail Commercial Truck / Other / Non-Automotive Investments (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

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