OTIS WORLDWIDE CORPORATION (OTIS): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $73.12, OTIS WORLDWIDE CORPORATION (OTIS) is priced for -1.1% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-08-08.

Generated: 2026-08-08 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/OTIS

Headline

FieldValue
TickerOTIS
CompanyOTIS WORLDWIDE CORPORATION
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$73.12/sh
CompositionNew Equipment 35% / Maintenance and Repair 53% / Modernization 13%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)7.1%
Operating margin today15.4%
Margin compression (value-band)-8.3pp
Implied growth-1.1%
Multiple paid16x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7.5% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~6.4pp.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~8.6%/yr; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.26σ
cohort percentile (of 221 peers)26
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0
Earnings3.02x3expensive
Relative0
Growth0

Families that call it expensive: Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=3)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$135.250.54xnoFCF base $1.8B, growth 5% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 6.9%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$81.720.89xnoExit EV/EBITDA: 14.3x / 16.3x / 18.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.1x / 18.0x / 20.9x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAssetno
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAssetno
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$56.261.30xnoRev $14.9B, growth 5% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.6x / 1.9x / 2.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$46.681.57xnoEPS $3.89, growth 10% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.93 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$43.061.70xnoNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $2.18B × (1−18%) / WACC 6.9% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAssetno
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $2.29B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$24.243.02xyesFCF $1712.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$22.123.31xyesSBC-adj FCF $1.64B (FCF $1.71B − SBC $0.07B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$90.330.81xyesEPS $3.89 × (8.5 + 2×9.6%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $14.91B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$56.041.30xnoEPS $3.89 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 9.6% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 14.4x
Earnings YieldEarnings$42.051.74xnoEPS $3.89 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
New Equipmentoperatingenterprise$5.0b$240.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Serviceoperatingenterprise$9.4b$2.4b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$8.8b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)4.69x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)3.85x
Interest coverage10.0x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-2.5%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The frightening number in the June quarter came out of China. New Equipment orders fell 5% at constant currency, with low-teens growth in the Americas more than cancelled by a decline of over 20% across Asia Pacific and a high-teens drop in China. Elevators are a construction product. When construction stops, orders stop, and that segment's margin duly contracted 220 basis points to 3.1%.

Now look at what the segment actually contributes. In 2025 New Equipment sold 4.99 billion dollars of equipment and earned 240 million doing it. Service sold 9.44 billion and earned 2.37 billion. One line is a third of the revenue and under a tenth of the profit; the other is the company. Read that way, selling an elevator is closer to customer acquisition than to a sale, and a bad year for orders is a bad year for acquisition, not for earnings.

What the sale acquires is a contract on a machine that must be inspected by law, cannot be relocated, and lasts for decades. The 10-K sets out the ladder without ceremony: "A basic maintenance contract provides for inspection consistent with local regulatory needs. We offer incremental, tiered maintenance and service offerings, with varying levels of coverage up to and including comprehensive component replacement coverage." Roughly 2.5 million units sit on that basis. Revenue is booked evenly across the year because the obligation is continuous, which is another way of saying it behaves like a subscription with a legal mandate behind it.

Aging is the second engine, and it is running. Modernization takes an installed elevator and replaces its machine, its ropes, its controls or the car itself. The 10-K records that "the Company recognized $5.0 billion and $1.9 billion of revenue from new equipment and modernization contracts, respectively, for the year ended December 31, 2025", and in the June quarter modernization orders rose 9% at constant currency with backlog up 26% on the same basis. Backlog is the useful half of that: work already sold, not work hoped for.

The margin comparison is where the aftermarket stops being a story and becomes economics. Service ran a 23.2% segment margin in the June quarter. Across the building-systems cohort the market measures Otis against, ALLE runs a 20.8% operating margin, LII 19.7%, NVT 17.1%, FIX 16.5%, EME 10.4%, CARR 8.2% and ABM 3.5%. Installing and servicing building equipment is not usually a rich trade. Holding the maintenance right to your own installed base is a different trade entirely.

Capital allocation has been consistent with that reading. The share count has fallen about 2.5% a year since mid-2022. In the first half of 2026 the company put roughly 800 million dollars into repurchases and paid 330 million of dividends. Management has lifted its own outlook on five separate occasions since 2020. None of that needed the Chinese property market to come back.

Bear Case

Every elevator installed is a service contract awarded for the life of the building, which is why the machine itself is sold at something close to cost. Otis turned 1.28 billion dollars of June-quarter New Equipment sales into 40 million of segment operating profit, a 3.1% margin, and named the causes plainly: lower volume, unfavorable price, and mix. Unfavorable price, in a business that sells the machine to win the decades of maintenance behind it, is not a discounting problem. It is a competitor buying the annuity. Whoever installs the unit holds the maintenance right on it for the next thirty years, and Otis is installing fewer of them where the units are.

The channel makes that worse rather than better. The 10-K states that "We sell our New Equipment directly to customers, as well as through agents and distributors." and lists among its risks that "Adverse changes in our relationships with, or the financial condition, performance or purchasing patterns, or compliance practices of, key distributors and agents could adversely affect us." The same filing describes the buyers as "real-estate and building developers and general contractors who develop and/or design buildings for residential, commercial, retail or mixed-use activity". Those are the customers most exposed to a property downturn, reached partly through intermediaries Otis does not control.

The aftermarket is not immune either, which is the part a bull tends to skip. Service revenue rose 11% in the June quarter, to 2.58 billion dollars. Service segment operating profit rose 21 million, from 578 million to 599 million. The margin gave up 170 basis points to 23.2%, and the company attributed that to higher labor cost, higher material cost, and an unfavorable mix of work. Modernization grew 24% organically against 6% for maintenance and repair.

That is the tell. Service revenue grew at more than twice the pace of Service profit in that quarter. Modernization is real revenue, but it is project work quoted job by job, and it does not behave like the straight-line maintenance contract the 10-K describes.

The consolidated line flattered all of this. Company-wide operating profit rose 28 million dollars in the quarter, which reads as improvement until you ask where it came from. The release attributes the increase to the absence of the prior year's transformation costs, separation-related adjustments and other non-recurring items. Both segments compressed. The total rose because last year's charges did not repeat.

None of this is a stretched-multiple argument, and it would be dishonest to dress it as one. The market is paying about 16 dollars for each dollar of company-wide operating profit, and worked backwards that is consistent with operating profit sliding roughly 1.1% a year over the next five. The bar is low. The trouble is that both profit engines moved against it on margin in the same quarter, and a business does not need a demanding assumption to miss a modest one.

There is also nothing underneath. Otis carries a shareowners' equity deficit of 5.75 billion dollars, a legacy of the 2020 separation and of years in which repurchases ran ahead of retained profit. Book-value methods have nothing to measure here, and the standard fragility screens read a company that on paper holds no equity at all. Operating profit still covers the interest bill about ten times over, so this is a capital-structure fact rather than a distress signal. It does mean the downside has no asset floor beneath it. In the first half the company returned roughly 1.1 billion dollars to shareholders while operations generated 603 million after capital spending, and in May it priced 700 million dollars of 4.488% notes due 2029. The gap between those two figures gets funded somewhere.

Valuation

Two figures set the frame. Otis produced 2.29 billion dollars of operating profit on 14.91 billion of revenue in the twelve months through June 2026, a 15.4% operating margin. The market values the business at roughly 16 dollars for every dollar of that profit.

Run that backwards and the embedded assumption is unusually undemanding. The current level is consistent with company-wide operating profit shrinking about 1.1% a year across a five-year stretch, under a 7.5% cost of capital. It does not ask Otis to grow. It asks Otis not to erode. Each percentage point of movement in the discount rate swings that implied pace by roughly six points, so treat the figure as a direction rather than a measurement.

The methods that can be run here disagree, and the reason is worth stating plainly. Book equity is negative, so anything starting from balance-sheet value has nothing to work with. What remains splits in two. Approaches that assume no growth at all, capitalizing the last twelve months of free cash flow at the cost of equity, land far below where the shares trade. The approach that credits the earnings growth of recent years against the level of long-term rates lands above. The distance between those two is what is being paid for durability, not for expansion: the belief that a maintenance annuity does not decay.

Segment economics explain why that belief is not unreasonable. Otis recognized 4.99 billion dollars of New Equipment revenue in 2025 for 240 million of segment profit, and 9.44 billion of Service revenue for 2.37 billion. Against the cohort, the company-wide 15.4% operating margin sits well ahead of CARR at 8.2% and EME at 10.4%, and a little under ALLE at 20.8%. The spread inside that group is the useful part. Firms that sell and install building equipment earn single digits; firms holding recurring service rights keep a much larger slice of each sales dollar.

The balance sheet is the part that most needs translating. Operating profit covered the interest bill about ten times over in the twelve months through June 2026, on an interest charge of 230 million dollars. Operations generated 680 million in the first half. That is not a fragile company. It is a company with no book equity and a funding cost that is changing. Otis termed out at the bottom of the rate cycle, and the 10-K records what that looked like: "The proceeds from the August 2023 issuance of $750 million notes listed above were used to fund the repayments of Otis' commercial paper and €500 million 0.000% notes that were due in November 2023, with the remainder used for other general corporate purposes." In May 2026 the company priced 700 million dollars of 4.488% notes due 2029. Zero-coupon euro paper does not get refinanced at zero. Every maturity from here lifts the interest line, and the coverage that looks comfortable today was set by a rate environment that has gone.

Catalysts

The June quarter landed on July 22, 2026. Net sales came in at 3.86 billion dollars, up 7% with organic sales up 6%, driven by Service, where organic sales rose 9%. The company described that as matching its best Service growth since the 2020 separation. GAAP earnings per share rose 13% to 1.12 dollars. Modernization orders rose 9% at constant currency and modernization backlog rose 26% on the same basis, which is the clearest forward indicator in the release: backlog is work already contracted.

The full-year outlook was revised the same day. Management now guides to net sales of 15.1 to 15.3 billion dollars, with organic New Equipment sales down low single digits to flat and organic Service sales up mid to high single digits. The shape of that guide is the whole company in miniature: the equipment line is expected to shrink or hold, and the service line carries the year. Chief Executive Judy Marks framed the second half as a measured outlook resting on what she called a Service-led growth model.

Two things are worth tracking into the third-quarter report. The first is whether New Equipment orders outside China keep growing at the low-teens pace reported for the Americas, because the order book is what feeds the maintenance portfolio years later. The second is the Service margin, which has now given ground for two consecutive reported periods as modernization takes a larger share of the mix. Financing is the quieter item: the company priced 700 million dollars of 4.488% notes due 2029 in May, and repurchases ran about 400 million dollars in the June quarter alone.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

New Equipment (reported)

Service (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q2 2026 earnings release, July 22, 2026 · Q2 2026 earnings release and Q2 2026 Form 10-Q · Q2 2026 Form 10-Q balance sheet · prospectus supplement filed May 2026 · Q2 2026 Form 10-Q · prospectus supplement filed May 2026; Q2 2026 earnings release

View the full interactive OTIS report on boothcheck