Oshkosh Corporation (OSK): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $152.73, Oshkosh Corporation (OSK) is priced for +8.9% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/OSK

Headline

FieldValue
TickerOSK
CompanyOshkosh Corporation
Current price$152.73/sh
CompositionAccess 43% / Vocational 36% / Transport 20% / Corporate and Other 1%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.2%
Operating margin today8.1%
Margin compression (value-band)-4.9pp
Implied growth8.9%
Multiple paid13x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 10.5% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~5.6pp.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~2.2%/yr; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.39σ
cohort percentile (of 214 peers)23
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.32x5expensive
Earnings1.50x5expensive
Relative0
Growth0.99x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=13)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$154.030.99xyesFCF base $0.8B, growth -1% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 8.7%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$174.770.87xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 7.8x / 9.8x / 11.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 17.0x / 20.0x / 23.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$98.701.55xyesBV/sh $70.56, ROE (TTM) 12.9%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$115.781.32xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$106.701.43xyesRev $10.4B, growth -1% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.8x / 0.9x / 1.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$101.831.50xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.74B × (1−21%) / WACC 8.7% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$119.391.28xyesBV $70.56 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 12.9% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.4%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$120.391.27xyes√(22.5 × EPS $9.13 × BVPS $70.56) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $1.08B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$125.981.21xyesFCF $820.6M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$118.901.28xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.78B (FCF $0.82B − SBC $0.04B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$7.6519.96xyesEPS $9.13 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$9.8115.57xyesBV $70.56 × (ROIC 1.2% / WACC 8.7%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $10.43B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$98.701.55xyesEPS $9.13 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Accessoperatingenterprise$4.5b$502.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Vocationaloperatingenterprise$3.7b$547.1m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Transportoperatingenterprise$2.1b$77.8m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$969.5m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)1.45x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.15x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-1.2%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The most counterintuitive thing in Oshkosh's numbers is that the backlog is enormous and rising while the headline earnings are falling. The company carries about $14.54 billion of consolidated backlog, including a $6.6 billion vocational backlog, and the Access segment reported a 1.6x book-to-bill on strong order activity from megaprojects and rental-channel customers (Oshkosh Q1 2026, StockStory). A backlog of that size against roughly $11 billion of expected annual sales is more than a year of visible demand already on the books. The weak Q1 was a timing problem, not a demand problem: weather and travel delays pushed fire-truck shipments out of the quarter. The orders did not disappear; they moved right.

The valuation reflects a business priced on its earnings power rather than a growth story, which is the comfortable place to be for a cyclical. At $139.87 (June 27, 2026) the price implies about 8% annual operating growth for five years, a pace within what Oshkosh has delivered, and the methods support it. Earnings Power Value, which values the business at normalized operating earnings with no growth, lands at $102, DCF Perpetual Growth at $155, DCF Exit Multiple at $165, and the FCF-yield methods near $119 to $126. When the earnings-power, growth-DCF, and cash-flow families all sit at or near the price, the downside is anchored by what the business already earns. Oshkosh generates roughly $820 million of free cash flow, which funds the dividend, buybacks that have shrunk the share count, and reinvestment.

The segment mix is the durability argument. Oshkosh spans Access (aerial work platforms and telehandlers), Vocational (fire trucks, refuse, and the NGDV postal program), and Defense, three demand cycles that rarely trough together. The filing notes the AUSA acquisition added incremental sales and that the company sources roughly 20% of net sales from the United States across recent years (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001193125-26-054061). Management maintained its full-year outlook for adjusted EPS of about $11.50 on roughly $11.0 billion of sales, with the year explicitly back-half weighted as fire-truck throughput rises, NGDV production ramps, and higher-margin defense contracts contribute. If that ramp lands, the depressed Q1 is the buying window, not the trend.

Bear Case

Open on where Oshkosh sits in its cycle, because that is the real risk. This is a heavy-equipment maker, and the Q1 print showed exactly how a cyclical rolls over: net sales were roughly flat at about $2.3 billion, but adjusted EPS fell to $0.85 from $1.92 on unfavorable sales mix, higher manufacturing overhead, and lower volume (Oshkosh Q1 2026, stocktitan). Peak-cycle earnings and sustainable earnings are different numbers, and a single weak quarter can mark the inflection. The filings already show gross margin pressure from higher sales discounts of $118 million (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001193125-26-054061). Discounting to move product is the classic late-cycle tell.

The whole year hinges on a back-half ramp that is not yet proven. Management's $11.50 adjusted-EPS target requires fire-truck throughput to accelerate, NGDV postal-truck production to climb, and defense contracts to kick in, all in the second half. The NGDV run rate is guided only to the low end of 16,000 to 20,000 units and is tied to United States Postal Service delivery schedules the company does not control. Vocational margins were trimmed to 16% to 18% from an originally forecast 17% on capacity timing and adverse mix. A back-end-weighted plan carries execution risk by construction: if the ramp slips, the full-year number misses and a year of guidance unwinds in a single quarter.

The demand-cycle and customer-concentration exposure compound it. Access depends on construction and rental-fleet capital spending, which is rate-sensitive and turns down quickly; Vocational depends on municipal budgets and the single large USPS program; Defense depends on government procurement timing. The peer cohort here, auto-supplier and truck names like Aptiv, PACCAR, Lear, and Visteon, shares the same cyclical demand and pricing pressure, and PACCAR's filing even notes it no longer discloses truck order backlog because most of it has a duration under a year (PACCAR FY2025 10-K, accession 0001193125-26-057025), a reminder that backlog comfort can be shorter-lived than it looks. The price already implies steady 8% operating growth; in a cyclical downturn the realized number can be negative, and the methods that ignore growth, like Earnings Power Value at $102, are the floor the stock falls toward.

Valuation

Oshkosh is priced as a cyclical on its earnings power rather than a growth premium, and the methods agree across families. The growth and cash-flow methods cluster near the price (DCF Perpetual Growth $155, DCF Exit Multiple $165, FCF Yield $126, SBC-adjusted FCF Yield $119), the asset methods sit a bit lower (Two-Stage Excess Return $116, Residual Income $119, Simple Excess Return $99), and Earnings Power Value anchors the floor at $102. One caution: GAAP EPS turned negative in the trailing window on charges, which knocks out the EPS-based methods and pushes the ROIC-Justified figure to an artificially low $10; that is a measurement artifact of a write-down year, not a statement that the business earns nothing.

Inverting the price gives the clearest read. At $139.87 the market pays about 12x company-wide operating income, implying roughly 8% annual operating growth over five years, computed at a 10.5% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth, where each point of cost of capital moves the implied growth about 5.5 points. The priced-in assumption reads as within range and, if anything, conservative: the price is broadly supported by earnings power and asks for growth Oshkosh has historically delivered. The valuation case is therefore a cyclical-timing one. If the back-half ramp lands and the cycle holds, the price is undemanding against the methods; if the cycle rolls over, the realized growth undershoots and Earnings Power Value near $102 is the gravity.

Catalysts

Oshkosh reported Q1 2026 results with consolidated sales of about $2.3 billion (up 0.2%) and adjusted EPS of $0.85, down from $1.92, on unfavorable mix, higher manufacturing overhead, and lower volume, as weather and travel delays pushed fire-truck shipments out of the quarter (Oshkosh Q1 2026, stocktitan). Despite the drop, management maintained its full-year outlook for diluted EPS of about $10.90, adjusted EPS of about $11.50, and roughly $11.0 billion of net sales, with consolidated backlog of $14.54 billion (Oshkosh Q1 2026, Yahoo Finance).

The forward setup is explicitly back-half weighted, so the next two prints carry outsized weight. The catalysts are the fire-truck throughput recovery in Vocational (a $6.6 billion backlog waiting on capacity), the NGDV postal-truck production ramp toward the low end of 16,000 to 20,000 units, the timing of higher-margin defense contracts, and the Access book-to-bill, last reported at a strong 1.6x. Watch vocational segment margins against the trimmed 16% to 18% guide and any further sales-discount pressure, since both are the early signals of cycle softening. The full-year target depends on the second-half ramp arriving on schedule, which makes the mid-year quarterly results the key test of the thesis.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Access (reported)

Vocational (reported)

Transport (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

View the full interactive OSK report on boothcheck