Oracle Corporation (ORCL): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $150.95, Oracle Corporation (ORCL) is priced for +16.0% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-08-07.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ORCL

Headline

FieldValue
TickerORCL
CompanyOracle Corporation
Sector / IndustryTechnology
Current price$150.95/sh
CompositionCloud applications 24% / Cloud infrastructure 27% / Software license 7% / Software support 29% / Hardware 5% / Services 9%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Implied growth16.0%
Multiple paid22x operating income

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+1.11σ
cohort percentile (of 188 peers)35

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.77x5expensive
Earnings2.82x3expensive
Relative0.86x2justifies
Growth0.75x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.8%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=13)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$313.800.48xyesFCF base $34.2B, growth 17% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.8%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$200.150.75xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 18.1x / 20.1x / 22.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 35x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 28.5x / 35.0x / 41.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 25x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$54.532.77xyesBV/sh $14.76, ROE (TTM) 34.2%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$111.281.36xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$137.941.09xyesRev $67.4B, growth 17% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 5.3x / 6.5x / 7.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$167.620.90xyesEPS $4.95, growth 34% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.88 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$42.453.56xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $16.16B × (1−21%) / WACC 8.8% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$84.711.78xyesBV $14.76 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 34.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$40.563.72xyes√(22.5 × EPS $4.95 × BVPS $14.76) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $21.96B × sector EV/EBITDA 25.0x
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$159.870.94xyesEPS $4.95 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$16.808.99xyesBV $14.76 × (ROIC 10.0% / WACC 8.8%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $67.36B × sector P/S 8.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$185.790.81xyesEPS $4.95 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$53.562.82xyesEPS $4.95 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Cloud and licenseoperatingenterprise$49.2bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Hardwareoperatingenterprise$2.9bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Servicesoperatingenterprise$5.2bwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$33.0b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.02x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.60x
Interest coverage4.5x
Share count CAGR (dilution)1.4%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

One number decides this argument, and it is neither a multiple nor a growth rate. It is the size of the business Oracle has already signed and not yet delivered. The fiscal 2026 annual report states it without ornament: "Remaining performance obligations were $638 billion and $138 billion as of May 31, 2026 and 2025, respectively." Twelve months earlier that book ran a little over twice one year's sales. It now runs close to ten times them. Management expects to recognize roughly 12% of it over the following twelve months, which on its own exceeds the 67.4 billion dollars of revenue the whole company produced in fiscal 2026.

The engine underneath is infrastructure, not applications, and that flip happened fast. The 10-K reports that "Our cloud infrastructure revenues represented 53%, 42% and 35% of our total cloud revenues during fiscal 2026, 2025 and 2024, respectively." In dollars, that line went from 10.2 billion to 18.1 billion in a single year while total cloud reached 34.0 billion. In fiscal 2024 the larger share of that cloud revenue was applications; by fiscal 2026 it was raw compute, which is precisely what AI training and inference consume.

What makes the bet fundable rather than merely large is how a chunk of the hardware is being paid for. Management disclosed that most of the third and fourth quarter bookings increase came from large AI contracts in which the customer either prepaid for the GPUs or supplied them directly, and that those prepaid and customer-supplied portions now total 75 billion. Customer money arriving before Oracle's own money goes out is an unusual feature in a capacity build, and it lowers how much outside financing the same delivery schedule requires.

Beneath the growth sits an annuity most infrastructure competitors do not have. Oracle's 10-K notes that "Substantially all customers opt to purchase software support contracts when they purchase an Oracle software license." Software support is still the single largest revenue line in the company at roughly 29% of fiscal 2026 revenue, and it renews on a base of database installations that enterprises reorganize around rather than replace. Software revenue overall slipped 1% to 24.5 billion in fiscal 2026, which is the sound of a slow migration, not a collapse.

The combination shows up in the reported profit. Operating income was 20.6 billion dollars on 67.4 billion of revenue in the year ended May 31, 2026, an operating margin of 30.6%, and operating income grew 17%. That sits far above what CRM converts at just over 20 cents on the sales dollar, and far above what NOW converts at roughly 11 cents, though it remains well under what MSFT manages. Oracle is running an AI capacity business on profitability that most of its application peers have never reached, and it is doing so while spending 10.3 billion a year on research and development.

Guidance puts a number on where this goes next. Management confirmed a fiscal 2027 revenue target of 90 billion, against 67.4 billion delivered in fiscal 2026. If the backlog converts anything like the schedule the filing lays out, the growth the price needs is not a hope. It is a delivery problem.

Bear Case

Follow the funding rather than the bookings. In fiscal 2026 Oracle spent 55.7 billion dollars on property and equipment while operations threw off 32.0 billion, and the company reported free cash flow of negative 23.7 billion for the year. It filled that hole, paid 5.8 billion of common dividends, and kept building, by raising 43 billion in debt and 5 billion in equity during the same year. For fiscal 2027 management expects to raise roughly 40 billion more, including a 20 billion at-the-market common stock program whose prospectus supplement was filed on June 23, 2026. A shareholder reading that sentence is reading their own dilution schedule.

The evidence of who is being asked to pay is already in the share count. Diluted shares went from 2,823 million in fiscal 2024 to 2,866 million in fiscal 2025 to 2,914 million in fiscal 2026, and repurchases fell from 1,202 million dollars two years ago to 95 million in fiscal 2026. Buybacks were not paused for a quarter; they were effectively switched off while the dividend was maintained and a mandatory convertible preferred was added to the capital structure, listed as a separate NYSE line. Mandatory convertibles do exactly what the name says. They arrive as preferred and leave as common.

The borrowing is not modest either. Notes payable stood at 129.5 billion dollars on May 31, 2026, split 7.2 billion current and 122.3 billion long term, against 92.6 billion a year earlier, with 31.3 billion of cash and equivalents on the other side. On top of that sit 41.9 billion of undiscounted operating lease payments, plus further leases the company says are "generally expected to commence between the first quarter of fiscal 2027 and fiscal 2029 and for terms of fifteen to nineteen years that were not reflected on our consolidated balance sheet as of May 31, 2026". Interest expense was 4.6 billion in fiscal 2026, up from 3.6 billion, and the operating profit covered it a little over four times over. That is comfortable today. It is comfortable because the assets bought with the borrowing have not yet been asked to earn anything.

Oracle names the specific failure mode itself. Its risk factors warn that "we could be locked into multi-year commitments for excess data center space and related capital expenditures, as well as associated financings, without receiving corresponding revenue." The mismatch is structural: the leases run fifteen to nineteen years, and the filing separately notes that lease terms and pricing "typically do not align with the duration and pricing of customer" contracts. A ratings action would tighten the same screw from the other side. The company warns that a downgrade "could also reduce our access to, or increase the cost of, commercial paper or other short-term financing, affect the terms or availability of certain long-term commitments (including data center leases), limit eligibility to contract with certain customers".

Now connect that to what the price is asking for. Today's price requires company-wide operating profit to compound at roughly a mid-teens pace for about half a decade. Oracle delivered 17% operating profit growth in fiscal 2026, so the rate is not exotic. The persistence is. Of comparable fast growers, only about half have sustained that pace over a stretch that long. And the concentration inside the backlog is not diversified demand: management attributes most of the increase to large AI contracts, which means a small number of counterparties whose own capital plans decide whether the contracted revenue actually arrives. The 10-K puts the operational version of that plainly: "If our cloud infrastructure buildout takes longer than expected, our cloud revenue forecasts will be affected."

The bull is right that the backlog is real. The bear's point is narrower and harder to argue away. Book-value and current-earnings-power methods land at roughly a third of today's price, which means the price already credits the conversion. If mid-teens growth slips toward the high single digits, there is no static support underneath to catch it, and the equity issuance schedule keeps running regardless.

Valuation

Start with what the market is underwriting. Today's price pays for company-wide operating profit to compound at roughly a mid-teens rate and to keep doing it for about half a decade, on a business that delivered 17% operating profit growth in the year ended May 31, 2026. Against Oracle's own recent record the required pace is unremarkable. The demand is for duration, not for a step change.

That distinction matters because the historical record on duration is thin. Among companies that have grown at this pace, only about half sustained it across a comparable stretch. Set against its own peer group the multiple Oracle carries sits in the lower half of the range, which is the part of the picture that argues the price is not obviously stretched.

The methods used to triangulate the business split cleanly, and the split is the information. Peer-multiple approaches and the forward cash-flow approaches both reach today's price. The asset-value approaches and the earnings-power approaches do not come close: the price sits about 2.7 times above where each of those families lands. That is a coherent pattern rather than a contradiction. Book value plus current profitability describes a company whose assets are largely already installed and earning; Oracle's assets are largely still being installed. The premium is the market paying for a buildout to become an earning base, and the static approaches structurally cannot frame that.

The build itself is where a reader should apply pressure, because it is filing-sourced rather than modeled. Purchases of property and equipment were 55.7 billion dollars in fiscal 2026 against 32.0 billion of operating inflows. The annual report says the direction continues: "we expect this trend to continue during fiscal 2027 and in the next few fiscal years as we increase our existing data center capacity and establish data centers in new geographic locations in order to meet current and expected customer demand." Revenue recognition follows installation, so the profit that has to justify today's price is on the far side of spending that has already happened.

Segment economics explain why the blended read is hard to place. Cloud infrastructure reached 18.1 billion in fiscal 2026 growing 77%, cloud applications 15.9 billion growing 11%, and software revenue slipped 1% to 24.5 billion. Those are three different businesses with three different peer sets. The support annuity behaves like IBM's installed base; the infrastructure line behaves like nothing in the cohort, because no peer in it grew a line of that size at that rate.

The balance sheet is what bounds the downside, and it has moved. Notes payable reached 129.5 billion dollars at the fiscal year end against 92.6 billion twelve months earlier, with 31.3 billion of cash and equivalents. Interest expense of 4.6 billion was covered a little over four times by operating profit. The common dividend was set at 0.50 dollars a share for the July 2026 payment, and dividends absorbed 5.8 billion during fiscal 2026. None of that is fragile. All of it is committed, and it is committed against a capacity plan whose returns are still in the backlog rather than in the income statement.

What the buyer gets, then, is a delivery schedule. Roughly 12% of a 638 billion dollar contracted book is scheduled to become revenue over the twelve months following the May 2026 year end, and the fiscal 2027 revenue target of 90 billion is the same claim stated forward. Every number in the growth case ties back to whether that conversion lands on time.

Catalysts

Oracle closed fiscal 2026 on June 10, 2026 with quarterly revenue of 19.2 billion, up 21%, and cloud revenue of 9.9 billion, up 47%, with cloud infrastructure alone up 93% in the quarter. The headline of that release was not the quarter, though. Bookings rose 85 billion sequentially, from 553 billion to 638 billion, and management attributed most of the third and fourth quarter increase to large AI contracts in which customers prepaid for GPUs or supplied the hardware themselves.

Two forward markers sit in the same release. Management confirmed a fiscal 2027 revenue target of 90 billion, and guided first-quarter fiscal 2027 revenue growth of 27% to 29% with cloud revenue growth of 58% to 64% in USD. The next scheduled test of both is the fiscal 2027 first-quarter report, which covers the quarter ending August 31, 2026.

The financing calendar is the other thing worth tracking, and it is unusually specific. Oracle said it expects to raise roughly 40 billion in fiscal 2027 through a mix of debt and equity, including the previously announced 20 billion at-the-market common stock issuance, and that it does not expect to issue additional debt in calendar 2026. The prospectus supplement for that equity program, adding fifteen further sales agents, was filed on June 23, 2026. How much of the 40 billion arrives as stock rather than bonds is a decision that lands directly on existing holders, and the filings will show it as it happens.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Cloud and license (reported)

Hardware (reported)

Services (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

FY2026 Form 10-K, filed June 22, 2026 · Q4 FY2026 earnings release, June 10, 2026 · Q4 FY2026 earnings release, June 10, 2026; prospectus supplement filed June 23, 2026 · FY2026 Form 10-K · Oracle prospectus supplement, June 23, 2026 · Oracle Form 8-K, June 10, 2026 · FY2026 Form 10-K balance sheet · FY2026 Form 10-K statement of cash flows

View the full interactive ORCL report on boothcheck