Opera Ltd (OPRA): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $19.94, Opera Ltd (OPRA) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~8.3 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/OPRA
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | OPRA |
| Company | Opera Ltd |
| Current price | $19.94/sh |
| Composition | Advertising 64% / Query 35% / Other revenue 0% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 7.0% |
| Operating margin today | 14.7% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -7.7pp |
| Must persist for | 8.3y |
| Multiple paid | 18x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 6: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 12.9% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~1.8 years.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~13.6%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: elevated
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.27σ |
| cohort percentile (of 187 peers) | 25 |
| sustained it ~8.3 years at this level | 19% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.42x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.42x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.55x | 5 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.68x | 4 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=18)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $55.33 | 0.36x | yes | FCF base $0.1B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.2%, 7yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $30.17 | 0.66x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 13.1x / 15.1x / 17.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $36.01 | 0.55x | yes | P/E 27.6x (blended: static sector reference 35x + trailing (TTM) 16x), scenarios: 22.2x / 27.6x / 33.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 25x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $28.18 | 0.71x | yes | Stage 1: 20% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $13.07 | 1.53x | yes | BV/sh $11.29, ROE (TTM) 10.7%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $14.03 | 1.42x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $25.66 | 0.78x | yes | Rev $0.6B, growth 25% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.3x / 2.9x / 3.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $14.52 | 1.37x | yes | EPS $1.21, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=8.24 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $7.47 | 2.67x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.06B × (1−14%) / WACC 9.2% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $14.21 | 1.40x | yes | BV $11.29 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 10.7% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 7.0%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $17.53 | 1.14x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $1.21 × BVPS $11.29) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $31.99 | 0.62x | yes | EBITDA $0.11B × sector EV/EBITDA 25.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $15.12 | 1.32x | yes | FCF $112.2M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $39.04 | 0.51x | yes | EPS $1.21 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $10.99 | 1.81x | yes | BV $11.29 × (ROIC 9.0% / WACC 9.2%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $54.92 | 0.36x | yes | Revenue $0.61B × sector P/S 8.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $45.38 | 0.44x | yes | EPS $1.21 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $13.08 | 1.52x | yes | EPS $1.21 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net cash | $144.9m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | -1.86x (net cash) |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | -1.61x (net cash) |
| Interest coverage | 147.7x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -6.1% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
The decisive number for Opera is ARPU. Annualized revenue per user rose 25% year over year in Q1 2026, driven by higher engagement and AI integration. Opera is not chasing user count; it is monetizing the users it has, and that single line is what the thesis rests on.
Unlike most names in this batch, Opera does not look stretched. At $18.51 the blended estimate sits above the price near $28, and the price is justified by the relative-multiple and growth-DCF families. The implied-expectations read backs out a roughly 7.6 year duration, moderate by comparison.
The quarter was strong across the board: revenue up 23% to $175.8 million, advertising revenue at an all-time high, adjusted EBITDA up 30%, and raised full-year guidance. The balance sheet is clean, with about $155 million of net cash, no debt, and a shrinking share count. The risk is a small browser competing against giants for the engagement that monetization depends on.
Bull Case
Anchor on the metric that decides Opera: revenue per user. In Q1 2026 annualized ARPU rose 25% year over year, and that number is the whole story. Opera is a browser company, but the bull case is not about winning browser market share against Chrome and Safari, a battle it cannot win. It is about taking a stable, valuable user base, concentrated in higher-monetizing Western markets, and extracting more revenue per user through advertising and search. A 25% ARPU increase means the monetization engine is working, and because the user base is roughly stable, almost all of that flows to revenue and profit.
The Q1 2026 results show the engine humming. Revenue rose 23% to $175.8 million, above guidance, with advertising revenue up 24% to a new all-time high of $117 million and search-related query revenue up 23% to $58.3 million. Adjusted EBITDA grew 30% to $42 million, lifting the margin to 24%. The growth is balanced across the two revenue streams, advertising and search, which means the business is not dependent on a single monetization lever. Management raised full-year 2026 guidance to $727 to $740 million in revenue, a sign of confidence that the ARPU trajectory continues.
The AI angle is the new accelerant, and it fits the monetization thesis. Opera has introduced AI features such as Browser Connector that increase engagement, and more engagement is the raw input to more advertising and search revenue. Crucially, the valuation does not require heroics. At $18.51 (June 27, 2026) the blended estimate sits above the price near $28, the price is justified by the relative-multiple and growth-DCF families, and the implied duration is a moderate 7.6 years. The balance sheet is pristine, about $155 million in net cash, no debt, and the share count is shrinking about 6% a year through buybacks.
Bear Case
Start with the qualitative reality, not a ratio: Opera is a small browser in a market owned by giants. Chrome, Safari and Edge are defaults on the world's devices, backed by Google, Apple and Microsoft. Opera survives by being a niche alternative with a loyal base, and its entire monetization story depends on keeping those users engaged. That is a precarious foundation. The browser is not a product users must use; it is one they choose, and choices erode. If engagement slips, even gradually, the ARPU gains that drive the thesis reverse, because there is no large or growing user count to fall back on.
The revenue concentration sharpens the risk. Search-related query revenue, more than a third of the total, depends heavily on the relationship with the search provider that pays to be Opera's default. That economic arrangement is set by a far larger counterparty, and a change in terms, a lower revenue share or a shift in how search traffic is monetized, would hit Opera directly with little it could do in response. The advertising side, while growing strongly, is exposed to the broader digital-ad cycle; ad budgets tighten in downturns, and a small publisher feels it faster than a dominant platform. The all-time-high advertising quarter reflects a strong ad market as much as Opera's own execution.
The AI wave that the bull case counts on cuts both ways. Generative-AI assistants and AI-native browsing experiences could just as easily disintermediate a traditional browser as enhance it; if users start their queries in an AI tool rather than a browser, the search and advertising real estate Opera monetizes shrinks. The valuation is more reasonable than many names, sitting near or below the blended estimate, but the implied 7.6 year duration still assumes the monetization keeps compounding and the user base holds. The static frames, asset-based and the lower peer-multiple reads, sit below the price for a reason: they are pricing the risk that a small browser cannot indefinitely raise revenue per user against the platform power and the technological shifts arrayed against it.
Valuation
Opera's valuation is more grounded than most growth-tech names, with the methods bracketing rather than rejecting the price. The blended central estimate is near $28, above the $18.51 price, and the price is justified by the relative-multiple and growth-DCF families. The individual reads spread in a readable way: a DCF perpetual growth near $55 and relative valuation near $36 sit well above the price, a DCF exit multiple near $29 and two-stage DDM near $28 are above it, while the asset-based and earnings-power methods, excess return near $13 to $14 and earnings power value near $7, sit below. The mix means the price is supported by the methods that capture Opera's growth and monetization, while the static frames that ignore growth read it as full.
The inversion is comparatively benign. With a current operating margin around 15.7%, backing out the price implies sustaining growth for about 7.6 years, a moderate duration next to the multi-decade assumptions embedded in the richer names. The rarity check is elevated with the fade assumption tripped, a reminder that even 7.6 years of sustained monetization growth is not guaranteed, but the bar is far lower than for a name priced at thirty years of compounding. The reliability is limited by the absence of a single tight point estimate, but the direction is clear: on the methods that weigh growth, Opera looks reasonably priced to cheap.
The balance sheet reinforces the case rather than complicating it. About $155 million in net cash, no debt, interest coverage near 7x, and a share count shrinking about 6% a year mean Opera funds itself and returns capital without strain. There is no leverage risk and no dilution. The valuation question here is not whether the price embeds an impossible assumption, it does not, but whether Opera's monetization engine and user base hold up for the moderate duration the price assumes. The methods say that if ARPU keeps climbing and engagement holds, the stock is undervalued; if the browser loses relevance or the search economics turn, the static frames below the price are where it lands.
Catalysts
Opera reported Q1 2026 on April 28, 2026, with revenue up 23% to $175.8 million, above guidance, advertising revenue up 24% to an all-time high of $117 million, query revenue up 23% to $58.3 million, and adjusted EBITDA up 30% to $42 million at a 24% margin (Opera IR). Annualized ARPU rose 25%, driven by engagement and AI integration (GuruFocus).
The catalysts ahead are ARPU durability and the AI roadmap. Management guided Q2 2026 to $176 to $178 million of revenue with 23% to 25% growth, and raised full-year 2026 guidance to $727 to $740 million in revenue and $170 to $174 million in adjusted EBITDA (StockTitan). Watch three things over the coming quarters: whether ARPU keeps rising at a double-digit rate, since that is the engine of the thesis; whether advertising growth holds as the digital-ad cycle moves; and whether new AI features like Browser Connector lift engagement rather than letting AI-native tools pull users away. Continued ARPU and advertising growth would support the moderate duration the price assumes, with the methods sitting above the price; a stall in engagement, a change in search economics, or an AI-driven shift away from the browser would pull the stock toward the static valuation frames below.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- MQ (Marqeta, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …Galileo, i2c, and Visa DPS; and emerging providers, such as Adyen and Stripe. We believe that the principal competitive factors in our market include: pricing; multiple program types (debit, prepaid, credit); multinational reach; complete solutions at scale; flexibility and configurability; reliability; compliance…
- FY2025 10-K: …three primary categories: (1) providers with legacy technology platforms, (2) modern API-based providers, and (3) emerging providers. We compete primarily on the basis of our platform's depth and breadth, offering a more configurable and complete solution for innovators. We believe that the principal competitive…
- FSLY (FASTLY, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: . Over the long term we expect cost of revenue to decrease as a percentage of revenue as we continue to drive efficiencies in our operations. However, our cost of revenue may fluctuate as a percentage of our revenue from period to period due to the timing and extent of these expenses. Our gross margin has been and…
- FY2025 10-K: …revenue growth to be dependent on an expanding customer base and continued adoption of our edge cloud delivery, security, and other products and services. In anticipation of winning new customers and staying ahead of our customers' needs, we plan to continue to invest in order to expand the scale and capacity of our…
- FROG (JFrog Ltd.)
- FY2025 10-K: …is a reduction in demand caused by decreased customer acceptance, technological challenges, weakening economic conditions, privacy, data protection and data security concerns, governmental regulation, competing technologies and products, or decreases in information technology or other spending, the market for our…
- FY2025 10-K: …and allocated overhead. We expect our cost of subscription and SaaS revenue to increase in absolute dollars as our subscription and SaaS revenue increases. License-Self-Managed Cost of license self-managed revenue consists of amortization of acquired intangible assets. Operating Expenses Research and Development…
- INTA (Intapp, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …administrative at the consolidated level to manage the Company's operations, which are identified as significant segment expenses. Since the Company operates as a single operating and reportable segment, these significant segment expenses are the costs and expenses presented on the consolidated statements of…
- FY2025 10-K: …Many of the companies with which we compete for experienced personnel have greater resources than we have. We may incur significant costs to attract, train and retain such personnel, and we may lose new employees to our competitors or other technology companies before we realize the benefit of our investment after…
- VRNS (VARONIS SYSTEMS, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …of certain acquired intangible assets; travel expenses; and allocated overhead costs for facilities, IT and depreciation. We recognize expenses related to these costs as they are incurred and expect that these costs will increase in absolute dollars as we continue to invest in our customer success, support and MDDR…
- FY2025 10-K: …number of platforms and applications that we support. However, we do face competition from a select group of software vendors that provide standalone solutions similar to those features embedded in our comprehensive platform, particularly in the markets we serve. We also face direct competition in specific use cases,…
- LIF (Life360, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …("AI") and other emerging technologies, are rapidly evolving. If our competitors gain an advantage by using such technologies, our ability to compete effectively and our results of operations could be adversely impacted. We face significant competition in every aspect of our business, and competitors include both…
- FY2025 10-K: …by several factors, including timing of capital expenditures and related depreciation expense, increases in infrastructure costs, component costs, tariffs, contract manufacturing and supplier pricing, and foreign currency exchange rates. Gross profit and gross profit margin may fluctuate over time based on the…
- APPN (APPIAN CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …accounted for more than 10% of our total revenue in 2025, 2024, or 2023. Our Competition Our main competitors fall into four categories: (1) providers of custom software solutions that address, or are developed to address, some of the use cases that applications developed on our platform target; (2) providers of…
- FY2025 10-K: …to desire to differentiate themselves through software-enabled process automation, increasing their reliance on process automation solutions, changes in the competitive landscape, technological changes, including due to advancements in AI, budgetary constraints of our customers, and changes in economic conditions. If…
- BRZE (Braze, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …and for professional services upfront. Cost of Revenue Cost of revenue consists of direct costs related to providing platform access to our customers and to performing onboarding and professional services including consulting services. These costs primarily include payments to third-party cloud infrastructure…
- FY2025 10-K: …Teams, customers can create groups to manage individual regions or subsets of their businesses while restricting the ability of specified users to view or manage data outside of their assigned region. We also integrate with a variety of identity providers for single-sign-on or user account provisioning and provide…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.