OMNICELL, INC (OMCL): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $37.20, OMNICELL, INC (OMCL) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~9.1 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/OMCL
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | OMCL |
| Company | OMNICELL, INC |
| Current price | $37.20/sh |
| Composition | Connected devices, software licenses, and other 48% / Consumables 8% / Technical services 22% / SaaS and Expert Services 22% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 4.7% |
| Operating margin today | 2.7% |
| Margin expansion (value-band) | +2.0pp |
| Must persist for | 9.1y |
| Multiple paid | 49x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 9% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~2.1 years.
How unusual the bet is: elevated
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.45σ |
| cohort percentile (of 187 peers) | 77 |
| sustained it ~9.1 years at this level | 17% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 12.65x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 2.62x | 5 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.05x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.95x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=18)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $55.93 | 0.67x | yes | FCF base $0.1B, growth 8% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.6%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $39.34 | 0.95x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 13.1x / 15.1x / 17.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $35.29 | 1.05x | yes | P/E 44.69x (blended: static sector reference 28x + trailing (TTM) 84x), scenarios: 37.2x / 44.7x / 52.2x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 20x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $4.81 | 7.73x | yes | BV/sh $27.35, ROE (TTM) 1.6%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $2.64 | 14.09x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $26.61 | 1.40x | yes | Rev $1.2B, growth 8% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.2x / 1.4x / 1.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $15.40 | 2.42x | yes | EPS $0.44, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.39 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $3.60 | 10.33x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.02B × (1−33%) / WACC 8.6% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $1.90 | 19.58x | yes | BV $27.35 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 1.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 1.1%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $16.46 | 2.26x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $0.44 × BVPS $27.35) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $49.13 | 0.76x | yes | EBITDA $0.11B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $27.68 | 1.34x | yes | FCF $114.2M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $17.51 | 2.12x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.07B (FCF $0.11B − SBC $0.04B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $14.20 | 2.62x | yes | EPS $0.44 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $2.94 | 12.65x | yes | BV $27.35 × (ROIC 0.9% / WACC 8.6%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $159.99 | 0.23x | yes | Revenue $1.23B × sector P/S 6.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $16.50 | 2.25x | yes | EPS $0.44 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $4.76 | 7.82x | yes | EPS $0.44 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net cash | $71.3m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | -3.16x (net cash) |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | -2.12x (net cash) |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -1.0% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
The counterintuitive part of Omnicell is that trailing operating margin is only about 2.7%, yet Q1 2026 non-GAAP operating margin reached 10.1% as the company swung from loss to profit. The valuation is reading the recovering trajectory, not the depressed trailing figure.
The price at $39.16 sits above the supported range. The methods land between roughly $14 and $24, with relative-multiple and growth-DCF the only families that reach the price; asset and earnings-power frames call it expensive. Backing the price out implies a higher sustained margin held for nearly thirteen years.
The balance sheet is clean: liquid assets near $239 million against $168 million of debt, a modest net cash position, and a slightly shrinking share count. There is no solvency question. The question is whether the margin and growth improvement that began this year proves durable enough to support a price that already assumes it does.
Bull Case
The surprising number is the speed of the margin turn. Omnicell's trailing operating margin is only about 2.7%, the kind of figure that suggests a struggling business, yet Q1 2026 told a very different story: revenue of $309.9 million up 15%, a swing from a prior-year loss to $11.4 million of GAAP net income, and a non-GAAP operating margin of 10.1%. Profitability is not creeping up; it is stepping up, which is why the methods that read the forward trajectory value the company far above the ones anchored on trailing results. The trailing 2.7% is a rear-view-mirror number for a business whose engine just re-engaged.
The mix shift behind that turn is the durable part. The growth in Q1 came disproportionately from technical services, consumables, and the high-margin SaaS and Expert Services lines, the recurring revenue that compounds rather than re-selling hardware each cycle. Omnicell describes its position as "an industry-leading medication management infrastructure which includes storage and dispensing automation powered by an intelligent" platform across care settings (FY2025 10-K, accession 0000926326-26-000006). As more of the revenue base becomes subscription and consumable, margins structurally rise and the earnings become more predictable, which is exactly what a market paying a forward multiple wants to see.
The runway is long because the category is under-penetrated. The filing notes that many providers "still use traditional approaches to medication and/or supply management in some form that do not include fully automated methods" (same 10-K). That is the bull case in one sentence: the addressable conversion from manual to automated medication management is far from complete, and Omnicell is the scale leader. Management raised full-year 2026 guidance to $1.215 to $1.255 billion in revenue and $1.80 to $2.00 in non-GAAP EPS, with the Titan XT hardware cycle and the OmniSphere platform ahead. A clean balance sheet, rising recurring revenue, expanding margin and a large conversion runway is the combination that justifies paying ahead of the trailing numbers.
Bear Case
Name the structural truth a holder would rather not face: the multiple is pricing margin expansion and durable growth that have only just begun to appear. At $39.16 (June 27, 2026) the price sits above the entire supported valuation range, which tops out near $24. The trailing operating margin is 2.7%, and even the implied-expectations read, which requires only about 4.6% sustained margin, demands that the company hold and grow that profitability for nearly thirteen years to justify the price. The Q1 jump to a 10.1% non-GAAP margin is encouraging, but one strong quarter after years of inconsistency is an invitation to extrapolate, not yet a proof of durability.
The demand side is cyclical in a way the price does not discount. Omnicell sells capital equipment and software into hospital budgets, and the 10-K warns that shifts "in spending priorities by healthcare facilities or increased financing costs" can "decrease demand" for its products (FY2025 10-K, accession 0000926326-26-000006). Hospital capital spending tightens when budgets are squeezed, and large dispensing-automation purchases are exactly the kind of project that gets deferred. The same filing acknowledges that many providers "still use traditional approaches" to medication management, which is bullish for the runway but bearish for the sales cycle: converting them is slow, capital-intensive work with long lead times.
That leaves the valuation exposed on both ends. The asset and earnings-power families value the company in the mid-teens to low twenties, because on current normalized earnings the price is hard to support; the blended-multiple read is extreme precisely because trailing profit is thin. The rarity check is elevated with the fade assumption tripped, meaning the durable high-margin trajectory the price assumes is not the base-rate outcome for this kind of business. If the margin recovery plateaus, or a hospital-spending soft patch interrupts the product cycle, the price has a long way to fall back toward the methods, none of which currently reach it.
Valuation
Omnicell's valuation is a forward-trajectory bet, and the method scatter shows it. The relative-multiple and growth-DCF families reach the price, with DCF perpetual growth near $57 and EV/EBITDA relative near $47, while the asset and earnings-power families sit far below: excess-return methods in the low single digits, earnings power value near $2, and residual income near $2. The blended central estimate is near $25, and the supported range runs from roughly $14 to $24. At $39.16 the price is above the top of that range, which is why the characterization reads elevated.
The inversion explains what is being underwritten. Trailing operating margin is 2.7%, and to justify the price the model needs a sustained margin near 4.6% held for about 12.9 years. That is a duration-and-margin assumption: the market is pricing both a higher steady-state margin than the trailing figure and a long persistence of growth. The recent results make that more plausible than it would have been a year ago, with non-GAAP operating margin reaching 10.1% in Q1, but the methods are clear that the price already assumes the improvement is permanent. The rarity assessment is elevated with the fade check tripped, flagging that sustaining those returns is above the base rate.
The balance sheet removes the downside tail without changing the central estimate. Liquid assets near $239 million against $168 million of debt leave a modest net cash position, and the share count is slightly shrinking. There is no financing risk forcing a re-rate. What the balance sheet cannot do is shorten the duration the price requires or guarantee the margin holds. The reliability flag is ok, meaning the methods agree enough to be useful, but the price sits above all of them, so the read is straightforward: pay $39.16 and you are paying for a margin-and-growth story that has started to deliver but has not yet proven it will last the dozen years the price assumes.
Catalysts
Omnicell reported Q1 2026 on April 28, 2026: revenue of $309.9 million, up 15%, a swing to $11.4 million of GAAP net income, non-GAAP EBITDA of $44.7 million, and a non-GAAP operating margin of 10.1% (Motley Fool transcript). On the strength of the quarter the company raised full-year 2026 guidance to $1.215 to $1.255 billion in revenue, $153 to $168 million in non-GAAP EBITDA, and $1.80 to $2.00 in non-GAAP EPS (StockTitan).
The catalysts ahead are the product cycle and the recurring-revenue mix. Hardware shipments for Omnicell Titan XT are planned to begin in the second half of 2026, with phased OmniSphere functionality rolling out from the first half of 2027 (Grafa). Watch three things over the next two quarters: whether revenue growth stays in the low-to-mid teens, whether the non-GAAP operating margin holds near or above 10% rather than slipping back toward the trailing figure, and whether the SaaS, Specialty and Consumables recurring lines keep outgrowing hardware. Sustained margin and recurring-revenue growth would support the durable improvement the price assumes; a margin give-back or a hospital-spending soft patch interrupting the Titan XT ramp would pull the stock back toward the valuation methods, which all sit below the current price.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- NATL (NCR ATLEOS CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …Our future competitive performance and market position depend on a number of factors, including our ability to: • execute our ATM as a Service strategy to grow our software and services revenue, as well as our recurring revenue; • improve margin expansion while successfully reacting to competitive product and pricing…
- FY2025 10-K: TMs, cause us to reduce the revenue generated by transactions at our ATMs, or cause us to pay higher merchant fees, thereby reducing our profits. In addition to our current competitors, new and less traditional competitors may enter the market. Vertically integrated competitors, such as expanded product and service…
- BDX (BECTON DICKINSON & CO)
- FY2025 10-K: …be competitive. Our ability to compete effectively depends upon our ability to attract and retain executives, key employees and other associates. Competition for experienced employees, particularly for persons with certain technical competencies in some geographies, can be a challenge. Additionally, we need qualified…
- FY2025 10-K: …acquisition date, as well as the impact from amortization of intangibles acquired in the transaction which occurred on September 3, 2024. 45 Table of Contents The favorable impact on gross margin from specified items in 2024 compared with 2023 primarily reflected a favorable comparison to specified items recorded in…
- BAX (BAXTER INTERNATIONAL INC)
- FY2025 10-K: …and regional competitors continue to expand their manufacturing capacity and sales and marketing channels. We believe customer purchasing decisions are primarily focused on cost-effectiveness, price, service, product performance and technological innovation. There has been consolidation in our customer base and by…
- FY2025 10-K: …providers, which may cause us to experience downward pricing pressure. Certain portions of the Healthcare Reform Act could negatively impact the demand for our products, and therefore our results of operations, financial position, and cash flows. The Center for Medicaid Services (CMS) has proposed the expansion of…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.