Origin Bancorp, Inc. (OBK): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $54.88, Origin Bancorp, Inc. (OBK) is priced for 11.2% return on equity. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/OBK
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | OBK |
| Company | Origin Bancorp, Inc. |
| Current price | $54.88/sh |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | financials |
| Return on equity needed | 11.2% |
| Return on equity now | 6.0% |
| ROE gap | +5.2pp |
| Price-to-book | 1.35x |
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.3% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 10-year stage, on common book equity (FY2026); each 1pp of cost of equity moves the implied ROE ~1.4pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +1.81σ |
| cohort percentile (of 166 peers) | 49 |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 72% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.97x | 3 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.97x | 1 | expensive |
| Relative | — | 0 | — |
| Growth | — | 0 | — |
Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=4)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Bank Fair Value (P/TBV) | — | $16.60 | 3.31x | yes | TBVPS $35.24 × 0.47x (ROE (TTM) 6.4% / CoE 9.3%, g=4.2% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption), credit 1.28% allowance/loans → ×0.94) |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | — | — | no | P/E 13.38x (blended: static sector reference 10x + trailing (TTM) 21x), scenarios: 11.1x / 13.4x / 15.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $27.88 | 1.97x | yes | BV/sh $40.39, ROE (TTM) 6.4%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $22.76 | 2.41x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | — | — | no | Rev $0.3B, growth 11% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 4.2x / 5.0x / 5.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | EPS $2.58, growth 13% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.65 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | $48.42 | 1.13x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $2.58 × BVPS $40.39) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | — | — | no | EPS $2.58 × (8.5 + 2×12.9%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | EPS $2.58 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 12.9% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 19.4x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $27.89 | 1.97x | yes | EPS $2.58 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 7.0% |
Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).
Bullet Takeaways
- Origin Bancorp is a Texas and Louisiana community bank, and the surprising number is the gap between what it earns and what it costs: return on equity ran 6.0% in fiscal 2025, below a roughly 9% cost of equity, yet the stock trades at a premium to tangible book value of about $34.58 per share.
- The biggest risk is that the profitability gap persists: a bank earning less than its cost of equity is destroying value on the margin, and the price assumes the in-progress turnaround closes that gap.
- What to watch is the Optimize Origin program, where management targets a return on assets of 1% or better by year-end and aims for top-quartile profitability, the catalyst the premium depends on.
Bull Case
The counterintuitive thing about Origin Bancorp is that the market is paying up for a bank that currently earns below its cost of capital, and the reason is a turnaround the static numbers do not yet show. Return on equity ran just 6.0% in fiscal 2025 against a cost of equity near 9%, the kind of spread that normally sends a bank below tangible book value. Instead the stock trades at a premium to its roughly $34.58 of tangible book per share. The bull case is that this is a transitional valuation: the market is pricing the bank it is becoming, not the one the trailing year shows.
The operating momentum supports that read. Net interest margin expanded to 3.65% in the most recent quarter, and net interest income rose 10.2% year on year on loan growth and margin gains. For a community bank, the spread between what it earns on loans and securities and what it pays on deposits is the entire engine, and that engine is widening. The bank funds itself the ordinary way, taking "interest expense on deposits and other borrowed funds" and earning "on loans and investments, service charges and fees on deposit accounts," a plain net-interest model where margin expansion flows straight to profitability.
The self-help is the catalyst. Management's Optimize Origin program is an explicit efficiency and profitability push, targeting a return on assets of 1% or greater by the fourth quarter and ultimately top-quartile profitability among peers, with noninterest expense already trending down year on year as cost controls take hold. The geographic position helps: management has described market disruption from bank M&A across Texas as creating an unusual opportunity to win both talent and loan demand. If Optimize Origin lifts ROA toward 1% and ROE toward the cost of equity, the premium to tangible book stops being a stretch and starts being justified. The bull is buying the execution of a credible plan in a growing market.
Bear Case
The structural truth a holder has to face is that, right now, Origin Bancorp earns less than its cost of capital. A 6.0% return on equity against a cost of equity near 9% means every dollar of retained earnings is, on the margin, worth less than a dollar to shareholders. That is the textbook reason a bank trades below tangible book value, and Origin trades above it. The price is not cheap on what the bank earns; it is expensive on it, and the gap is entirely an expectation that the profitability turnaround works. Strip out the turnaround optimism and the static methods are unanimous: on tangible book, on earnings power, and on peer multiples, the stock reads as richly valued.
The turnaround itself carries execution risk that the price does not discount. Optimize Origin is a plan, not a result; lifting ROA to 1% and ROE to the cost of equity requires sustained margin expansion, disciplined expense control, and loan growth that does not bring credit problems with it. That last point matters for a community bank concentrated in commercial lending. The filing is direct that credit costs can move against the bank, that "factors, both within and outside of our control, may require us to increase our allowance for loan credit losses and additional expenses may be incurred," and that it is "likely to have loans in our p"ortfolio under stress at any time. A growth push into a softening commercial real estate or business-loan market is exactly when allowance builds eat the profitability gains the plan is supposed to deliver.
The macro sensitivity compounds it. The 10-K names the exposure plainly: "financial stress on borrowers (consumers and businesses) as a result of fluctuating interest rates or an uncertain economic environment" and "adverse developments in the banking industry." A regional bank that grew its share count about 7% a year while earning a sub-cost-of-capital return is asking shareholders to fund growth that has not yet paid its way. The bear case does not require Origin to fail; it requires only that the profitability gap close more slowly than a premium-to-tangible-book price assumes, in which case the stock re-rates back toward what the bank actually earns.
Valuation
A bank is valued on what it earns relative to what its equity costs, not on net margin, and on that test Origin sits in an awkward place. Return on equity of 6.0% falls short of a cost of equity near 9.3%, and the standard bank-valuation lens, warranting a price-to-tangible-book multiple from the ROE-to-cost-of-equity relationship, lands well below today's price (it justifies roughly half of tangible book given the current return). The stock trades at a premium to its $34.58 of tangible book per share instead. That gap is the whole valuation question: the price embeds a return the bank does not yet earn.
The methods agree on the direction. The asset-based lenses, tangible book and excess-return models, read the stock as expensive; the earnings-power and peer-multiple methods do too; only a growth-based method reaches the price, and it gets there by extending recent revenue growth forward. When only the forward-growth lens reaches a bank's price and every profitability-anchored method says expensive, the price is paying for a future return rather than the current one. The implied bet is that ROE climbs toward and past the cost of equity, which is precisely what the Optimize Origin program is designed to deliver and precisely what has not happened yet.
For a bank, solvency is read as regulatory capital and payout capacity, not net debt; deposits are funding, not leverage, so the corporate-debt and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The relevant cushion is capital and credit quality, and the risk is that allowance builds in a credit downturn would set back the very profitability the price requires. Net interest margin expanding to 3.65% and net interest income up 10.2% are real progress on the earnings side, but the valuation rests on those gains compounding into a cost-of-capital-clearing return. The price is a vote on execution; the static economics say the bank has to earn that vote.
Catalysts
Optimize Origin is the catalyst the whole thesis turns on. Management has framed it as a company-wide efficiency and profitability transformation, targeting a return on assets of 1% or greater by the fourth quarter and top-quartile profitability among peers over time, with noninterest expense already down year on year as the cost initiatives take effect. Each quarterly ROA and efficiency-ratio print is a direct read on whether the program is closing the gap between what the bank earns and what its capital costs.
The margin trajectory is the second signal. Net interest margin expanded to 3.65% in the most recent quarter, and management guided full-year NIM in the mid-3.40s to 3.50% range, with net interest income up 10.2% year on year on loan growth and securities-portfolio optimization. Sustained margin expansion is the cleanest path to the higher ROE the price assumes.
The Texas market dynamic is the opportunity to watch on the growth side. Management has pointed to disruption from bank M&A across Texas as an unusual chance to win bankers and loan customers, accelerating organic loan demand. The risk paired with that growth is credit: the pace of loan growth, the trend in nonperforming loans, and any change in the allowance for credit losses are the metrics that determine whether the expansion adds profitable assets or future loss content.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- FSUN (FIRSTSUN CAPITAL BANCORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …and improving profitability through centralized efficiencies. We maintain a high-degree of scalability to control costs in the event of a downturn in our mortgage business. Our mortgage loan office leases are primarily shorter-term in nature and the majority of our mortgage-related compensation is in the form of…
- FY2025 10-K: …which are not subject to the same extensive federal regulations that govern bank holding companies and banks, may have certain competitive advantages. We compete for loans principally through the quality of our client service and our responsiveness to client needs in addition to competing on interest rates and loan…
- STBA (S&T BANCORP INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …impact our future prospects and results of operations. 23 Table of Contents S&T BANCORP, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES We are subject to competition from both banks and non-banking companies. The financial services industry is highly competitive, and we encounter strong competition for deposits, loans and other financial…
- FY2025 10-K: …and national financial services providers, such as other financial holding companies, commercial banks, credit unions, finance companies, brokerage and insurance firms and financial technology companies, including competitors that provide their products and services online and through mobile devices. Some of our…
- TCBK (TriCo Bancshares)
- FY2025 10-K: …to significant environmental liabilities or if our contingency reserve estimates are incorrect, our business, financial condition and results of operations could be materially adversely affected. We face strong competition from financial services companies and other companies that offer similar services, which could…
- FY2025 10-K: The chief operating decision maker uses revenue streams to evaluate product pricing and significant expenses to assess performance and evaluate return on assets. The chief operating decision maker uses consolidated net income to benchmark the Company against its competitors. The benchmarking analysis coupled with…
- TFIN (TFIN)
- FY2025 10-K: …that are not subject to the same rules and regulations as the Company and our subsidiary depository institution. These institutions, because they are not so highly regulated, have a competitive advantage over us and our subsidiary depository institution and may continue to draw large amounts of funds away from…
- FY2025 10-K: …absent such acquisitions. Consequently, predictions and forecasts about our future revenue and expense may be impacted by future acquisitions, the terms of such acquisitions, and the specific attributes of the acquired companies, each of which are subject to factors outside of our control and which may vary…
- NBHC (National Bank Holdings Corp)
- FY2025 10-K: …maintains a granular and well-diversified loan portfolio with self-imposed concentration limits. At December 31, 2025, loans totaled $7.4 billion, compared to $7.8 billion at December 31, 2024. Our commercial and industrial loan portfolio is highly diversified across industry sectors and geography. At December 31,…
- FY2025 10-K: …expertise with new fintech operations or systems. Competitors may also exhibit a greater tolerance for risk and behave more aggressively with respect to pricing in order to increase their market share. In addition, the effects of disintermediation can also impact the banking business because of the fast-growing body…
- TBBK (TBBK)
- FY2025 10-K: …financial condition and results of operations. 25 Competition We operate in highly competitive markets, and our partnership marketing strategy has been adopted by other institutions with which we compete. We face substantial competition in all areas of our operations from a variety of different competitors, including…
- FY2025 10-K: …loans: Real estate bridge lending; institutional banking comprised of security-backed lines of credit (SBLOC), cash value insurance policy-backed lines of credit (IBLOC) and advisor financing; and commercial loans comprised primarily of Small Business Administration (SBA) loans and direct lease financing. The Company…
- TFSL (TFS FINANCIAL CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …30, 2025 (the latest date for which FDIC data is publicly available), the Association had $2.92 billion of deposits in the State of Florida, and ranked 34th among all financial institutions in terms of deposits, with a market share of 0.34%. This market share data excludes deposits held by credit unions, whose…
- FY2025 10-K: …which has awarded the Association its highest rating for more than 100 consecutive quarters. Lending Activities The Company's principal lending activity is the origination and acquisition of up to 30-year fixed-rate and adjustable-rate, first mortgage loans used to purchase or refinance residential real estate. Also,…
- BY (BYLINE BANCORP, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …which is reported on the Consolidated Statements of Operations as loan servicing revenue, is recorded for fees earned for servicing loans. The fees are based on a contractual percentage of the outstanding principal. Late fees and ancillary fees related to loan servicing are not material. The Company has elected the…
- FY2025 10-K: …pressures from other financial services firms for deposits and changes in interest rates and returns on other investment classes, which could result in significant outflows of deposits within short periods of time or significant changes in pricing necessary to maintain current deposits or attract additional deposits.…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Origin Bancorp 2025 earnings commentary