Novartis AG (NVS): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $154.44, Novartis AG (NVS) is priced for +3.2% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/NVS
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | NVS |
| Company | Novartis AG |
| Current price | $154.44/sh |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 12.7% |
| Operating margin today | 32.4% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -19.7pp |
| Implied growth | 3.2% |
| Multiple paid | 18x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7.9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~7pp.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~12.6%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.34σ |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.98x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.90x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.17x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.93x | 4 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=18)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $247.00 | 0.63x | yes | FCF base $18.6B, growth 6% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.5%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $195.96 | 0.79x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 16.4x / 18.4x / 20.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $158.10 | 0.98x | yes | P/E 24x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 20.1x / 24.0x / 27.9x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 16x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $115.62 | 1.34x | yes | Stage 1: 15% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $77.87 | 1.98x | yes | BV/sh $24.01, ROE (TTM) 30.0%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $144.75 | 1.07x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $143.03 | 1.08x | yes | Rev $54.5B, growth 6% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 4.6x / 5.5x / 6.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $105.47 | 1.46x | yes | EPS $7.21, growth 15% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.47 (Fair) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $56.78 | 2.72x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $11.99B × (1−15%) / WACC 8.5% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $118.74 | 1.30x | yes | BV $24.01 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 30.0% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $62.41 | 2.47x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $7.21 × BVPS $24.01) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $132.35 | 1.17x | yes | EBITDA $17.64B × sector EV/EBITDA 16.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $84.86 | 1.82x | yes | FCF $17596.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $228.14 | 0.68x | yes | EPS $7.21 × (8.5 + 2×14.6%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $58.78 | 2.63x | yes | BV $24.01 × (ROIC 20.9% / WACC 8.5%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $112.50 | 1.37x | yes | Revenue $54.53B × sector P/S 4.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $158.20 | 0.98x | yes | EPS $7.21 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 14.6% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 21.9x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $77.95 | 1.98x | yes | EPS $7.21 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $17.3b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 1.15x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 0.98x |
| Interest coverage | 15.4x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -3.6% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- Novartis is a focused, branded-pharma company running an operating margin around 26%, with a growing roster of newer drugs offsetting the loss of its biggest legacy product to generics.
- The defining risk is the patent cliff: heart drug Entresto fell 42% in Q1 2026 as generics entered, and the company's own full-year guidance points to low-single-digit core operating income decline.
- Watch the growth brands: Kisqali, Pluvicto, Kesimpta, Scemblix, and Leqvio all grew sharply, and whether they can outrun the generic erosion is the question that defines the next two years.
Bull Case
Valuing a branded-pharma company comes down to a single tension: the in-market drugs are losing patent protection on a known schedule, and the question is whether the newer products grow fast enough to fill the gap. Novartis is a clean test of that, because the gap is already opening and the replacements are already arriving. Even with its biggest legacy drug rolling off patent, the company runs an operating margin around 26%, which is the kind of profitability that funds a deep pipeline and a steady buyback at the same time.
The replacement engine is the heart of the bull case, and it is firing. In Q1 2026, a cluster of newer drugs posted the kind of growth that defines the next decade of the franchise: Kisqali grew 59% to $1.5 billion, Pluvicto 73% to $642 million, Kesimpta 29% to $1.2 billion, Scemblix 82% to $433 million, and Leqvio 76% to $452 million. These are not minor products; Kisqali alone now rivals the legacy drugs in scale, and several address large oncology, cardiovascular, and immunology markets where Novartis has built genuine clinical leadership. A pipeline that produces multiple drugs growing 50% or more is the asset the trailing income statement understates.
The balance sheet gives the company room to manage the transition on its own terms. Novartis carries net cash of about $10 billion, interest coverage above 13 times, and has reduced its share count by roughly 3.6% a year through buybacks. That financial strength means it can absorb the generic erosion, keep investing in research, and pursue acquisitions to bolster the pipeline without strain. The valuation methods agree the price is reasonable: the relative-multiple and growth-based methods justify it, which for a pharma company navigating a patent cliff is a sign the market is pricing the transition fairly rather than demanding heroic growth.
Bear Case
The fact a holder cannot wish away is that Novartis is shrinking right now. Net sales fell 5% in constant currency in Q1 2026, operating income dropped 9%, and core operating income fell 12%, because the company's largest products are losing their patents and generics are taking the volume. Entresto, the heart-failure drug that had been a cornerstone, fell 42% as generic competition arrived, and the erosion extended to Promacta, down 66%, and Tasigna, down 59%. When a company's biggest cash generators lose 40% to 60% of their sales in a single year, the growth drivers have to run extraordinarily fast just to keep the total from falling, and in this quarter they did not quite manage it.
Management's own guidance frames the bear case honestly. The company reaffirmed that full-year 2026 net sales will grow only in the low single digits and that core operating income will actually decline in the low single digits. That is a company telling investors that, even with all its new drugs, this is a flat-to-down year for profit. The bet embedded in the price is that the growth brands eventually overwhelm the patent losses and reaccelerate the whole company, but that inflection is in the future, and the path there runs through more years of legacy erosion.
The valuation reflects the tension rather than a clean bargain. The relative-multiple and growth-based methods justify the price, but the asset-based and earnings-power methods read it as expensive, sitting well above where each lands. That split is the bear's reminder that the price is not cheap on the conservative lenses; it requires the growth brands to deliver. Solvency is not the worry, with $10 billion of net cash and strong coverage, so this is not a balance-sheet bear. It is a transition bear: the question is whether Novartis can grow through its patent cliff before the cumulative erosion of its legacy portfolio outpaces the new launches, and a year of declining core profit is not yet proof that it can.
Valuation
Novartis is priced for a managed transition rather than for acceleration, and the methods reflect that balance. The relative-multiple and growth-based methods justify the current price, while the asset-based and earnings-power methods read it as somewhat expensive. The pattern is a moderate one: the price sits a touch above the conservative lenses and is reached only by the methods that credit forward growth, which is the appropriate shape for a pharma company whose newer drugs are expected to outgrow its legacy erosion over time.
The inversion states the bet in plain terms. At today's price, the implied growth is around 8% against a trailing operating margin near 26%. The price is therefore asking Novartis to return to mid-single-digit-or-better growth while sustaining its high profitability, which is exactly the proposition the company is working toward as its growth brands scale and its patent losses run their course. The right lens for a branded-pharma leader is the durability of the in-market portfolio plus the probability-weighted pipeline, and cash-flow models tend to understate that pipeline value because they cannot easily price the binary outcomes of drug development. The relevant peer set is the large drug-manufacturer cohort, where patent cliffs and replacement pipelines are the central valuation dynamic for every name.
Solvency is a clear strength and frames the downside firmly. Net cash of about $10 billion, interest coverage above 13 times, and a share count falling about 3.6% a year mean the company can fund research, weather the legacy erosion, and keep returning capital all at once. There is no distress risk in the picture. The decisive variable is the pace of the growth brands against the patent cliff: the price is justified if Kisqali, Pluvicto, and the rest keep compounding fast enough to turn the current low-single-digit decline in core profit back into growth. If the erosion outruns them, the methods that justify the price today reset lower with the earnings.
Catalysts
The Q1 2026 report in late April captured the patent-cliff transition in real time. Net sales of $13.1 billion fell 5% in constant currency, operating income dropped 9%, and core operating income fell 12%, as generic competition hit the legacy portfolio. Entresto led the erosion, down 42%, with Promacta down 66% and Tasigna down 59%, the textbook pattern of branded drugs losing exclusivity.
The offsetting story was the growth portfolio, which is the catalyst that matters most for the next two years. Kisqali grew 59% to $1.5 billion, Pluvicto 73%, Kesimpta 29%, Scemblix 82%, and Leqvio 76%, alongside multiple new approvals during the quarter. The pace at which these brands scale, and the cadence of pipeline approvals behind them, will determine whether the company reaccelerates. Management reaffirmed full-year 2026 guidance of low-single-digit sales growth and a low-single-digit decline in core operating income, setting a clear bar against which each quarter can be measured.
Analyst sentiment is constructive but the targets span a wide range, reflecting differing views on how quickly the growth brands fill the gap. Estimates run from a low near $118 at Goldman Sachs to a high of $170 at Morgan Stanley, with consensus readings clustering in between, against a recent price near $147. The next several quarters of growth-brand sales, the trajectory of the legacy erosion, and any pipeline or acquisition news are the developments most likely to move the stock.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- GSK (GSK plc)
- FY2025 20-F: Group turnover by business Specialty Medicines (S) £13.5bn AER growth +14% CER growth +17% Vaccines (V) £9.2bn AER stable -% CER growth +2% General Medicines (G) £10.0bn AER decline -4% CER decline -1% S G V Group turnover by geographic region US Int US £16.9bn AER growth +3% CER growth +6% Europe £7.5bn AER growth…
- FY2025 20-F: …of £488 million (2024: £1,839 million) principally arising from the remeasurement of CCLs and the liabilities for the Pfizer, Inc (Pfizer) put option, primarily reflecting the net impact of discount unwind, updated sales and milestone forecasts and foreign currency movements. Other net operating income at £504m…
- BMY (Bristol-Myers Squibb Company)
- FY2025 10-K: …consolidation and integration of pharmacy chains, wholesalers and pharmacy benefit managers will increase competitive and pricing pressures on pharmaceutical manufacturers, including us. Third-party royalties represent a significant percentage of our pretax income and operating cash flow. We have entered into several…
- FY2025 10-K: …in more efficient operations and putting us at a competitive disadvantage. These risks may result in an adverse impact on our business, financial condition or results of operations. 31 Strategic, Business Development and Employee Attraction and Retention Risks We depend on several key products for most of our…
- PFE (Pfizer Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …to patents covering products for which we have patent rights, licenses or co-promotion rights. See Note 16A1 . We may become subject to competition from biosimilars referencing our biologic products if competitors are able to obtain marketing approval for such biosimilars. We also commercialize biosimilar products…
- FY2025 10-K: …us for the development of technologies and processes or greater experience in particular therapeutic areas, and technological innovation and/or consolidation among certain pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies can enhance such advantages. These advantages may make it difficult for us to compete with them…
- MRK (Merck & Co., Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …include other worldwide research-based pharmaceutical companies, smaller research companies with more limited therapeutic focus, generic drug manufacturers, and animal health care companies. The Company's operations may be adversely affected by generic and biosimilar competition as the Company's products mature, as…
- FY2025 10-K: …and the Health Care Environment," global efforts toward health care cost containment continue to exert pressure on product pricing and market access worldwide. Changes to the U.S. health care system as part of health care reform, as well as increased purchasing power of entities that negotiate on behalf of Medicare,…
- AZN (ASTRAZENECA PLC)
- FY2025 20-F: …that there is not the clear link that exists in many manufacturing businesses between the revenue generated on an individual product sale and the associated cost and hence margin generated on a product. Consequently, the profitability of individual drugs or classes of drugs is not considered a key measure of…
- FY2025 20-F: …conditions could adversely affect supply and/or distribution in affected countries and the ability or willingness of customers to purchase our medicines, putting pressure on price and/or volumes. This could adversely affect our business or results of operations, for example, those healthcare systems most severely…
- ABBV (AbbVie Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …future periods. The CODM regularly reviews net revenues, net earnings and significant segment expenses and uses net earnings as its principal measure of segment profit or loss. Net earnings and significant segment expenses reviewed by CODM are reported on the consolidated statement of earnings for the years ended…
- FY2025 10-K: …from lower priced generic or biosimilar products. The expiration or loss of patent protection for a product typically is followed promptly by substitutes that may significantly reduce sales for that product in a short amount of time. If AbbVie's competitive position is compromised because of generics, biosimilars or…
- LLY (ELI LILLY & Co)
- FY2025 10-K: U.S. continue to significantly impact the market for pharmaceuticals through negotiation of access, manufacturer price or rebate concessions and pharmacy reimbursement rates. Restrictive or unfavorable pricing, coverage, or reimbursement determinations for our medicines or product candidates by governments, regulatory…
- FY2025 10-K: …with other pharmaceutical companies. For additional information, see Item 8, "Financial Statements and Supplementary Data-Note 3: Collaborations and Other Arrangements." Competition Our products compete globally with many other pharmaceutical products in highly competitive markets. Important competitive factors…
- JNJ (Johnson & Johnson)
- FY2025 10-K: 2025, representing an increase of 10.1% as compared to the prior year. Growth of SPRAVATO (esketamine) was driven by continued increased physician and patient demand. Growth was partially offset by the sales decline of INVEGA SUSTENNA / XEPLION / INVEGA TRINZA / TREVICTA primarily due to the impact of Medicare Part D…
- FY2025 10-K: …product advantages, pricing and availability and rate of reimbursement. The Company also competes with other market participants in securing rights to acquisitions, collaborations and licensing agreements with third parties. Competition for rights to product candidates and technologies may result in significant…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Novartis Q1 2026 results, April 2026 · analyst data via MarketBeat and Public.com, 2026