The Bank of N.T. Butterfield & Son Limited (NTB): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $61.88, The Bank of N.T. Butterfield & Son Limited (NTB) is priced for 16.2% return on equity. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-06-29.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/NTB
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | NTB |
| Company | The Bank of N.T. Butterfield & Son Limited |
| Current price | $61.88/sh |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | financials |
| Return on equity needed | 16.2% |
| Return on equity now | 20.3% |
| ROE gap | -4.1pp |
| Price-to-book | 2.16x |
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.6% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 10-year stage, on common book equity (FY2025); each 1pp of cost of equity moves the implied ROE ~2.2pp.
How unusual the bet is: elevated
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.43σ |
| cohort percentile (of 166 peers) | 89 |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 57% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 0.99x | 3 | justifies |
| Earnings | 1.05x | 1 | expensive |
| Relative | — | 0 | — |
| Growth | 1.12x | 1 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=5)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Bank Fair Value (P/TBV) | — | $89.25 | 0.69x | yes | TBVPS $27.95 × 3.19x (ROE (TTM) 20.3% / CoE 9.3%, g=5.0% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption), credit 0.58% allowance/loans → ×0.89) |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | — | — | no | P/E 10x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 8.4x / 10.0x / 11.6x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $55.13 | 1.12x | yes | Stage 1: 14% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $62.77 | 0.99x | yes | BV/sh $28.58, ROE (TTM) 20.3%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $92.12 | 0.67x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | — | — | no | Rev $0.6B, growth 5% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.4x / 4.1x / 4.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | EPS $5.47, growth 14% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.74 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | $59.31 | 1.04x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $5.47 × BVPS $28.58) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | — | — | no | EPS $5.47 × (8.5 + 2×14.3%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | EPS $5.47 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 14.3% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 21.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $59.14 | 1.05x | yes | EPS $5.47 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).
Bullet Takeaways
- Butterfield is the dominant bank in Bermuda and the Channel Islands, and that franchise shows up in the numbers: a return on common equity of 22.1% in Q1 2026 and a core efficiency ratio of 56.4%, both elite for a bank.
- The chief risk is rate-driven: net interest margin of 2.75% rests on a low-cost deposit base while central banks cut rates, so the tailwind that lifted earnings can reverse and compress the very margin the premium-to-book price is paying for.
- What to watch next is the shift toward fee income and capital return: the Rawlinson & Hunter Guernsey trust acquisition closed in April 2026, and the bank pays a $0.50 quarterly dividend while buying back stock, returning nearly all of its earnings.
Bull Case
Start with what Butterfield does with its earnings, because the capital-return picture is the cleanest part of the story. This is a bank that retains almost none of its profit; it pays it out. In Q1 2026 it declared a $0.50 quarterly dividend and repurchased 0.8 million shares for $42.4 million, and across a full year the combination of dividends and buybacks returns the overwhelming majority of net income to shareholders. A bank can do that safely only if it does not need to retain earnings to fund growth, which is itself a statement about the business: Butterfield's markets are mature and its capital generation exceeds its reinvestment needs, so the excess flows back to owners rather than being plowed into riskier loan growth to chase a number.
What funds that return is an unusually profitable franchise. Butterfield earned a return on common equity of 22.1% in Q1 2026 with a core efficiency ratio of 56.4%, meaning it spends well under sixty cents to generate a dollar of revenue, a level most banks never reach. The engine is a low-cost deposit base in markets where Butterfield is the incumbent: net interest margin rose 6 basis points to 2.75% as the cost of deposits fell to 124 basis points and investment yields rose. Cheap, sticky deposits in a dominant position are the closest thing to a moat in banking, and Butterfield has them in Bermuda and the Channel Islands where the competitive field is small and the bank's brand is decades deep.
The third leg of the bull case is the pivot toward fee income, which makes the franchise less dependent on rates. The bank closed the acquisition of Rawlinson & Hunter Guernsey in April 2026, strengthening its private-trust business and supporting a longer-term push toward fee-driven revenue. Fee income does not swing with the interest-rate cycle the way net interest margin does, so building it dampens the single biggest source of earnings volatility for a bank like this. For a financial, the right solvency frame is capital adequacy and payout capacity rather than leverage, and on that frame Butterfield is strong: it generates more capital than it needs, returns the surplus, and is using a portion to buy fee-based franchises that make the next cycle less rate-dependent.
Bear Case
The advantage being chipped away is the rate tailwind, and the data already shows where. Butterfield's profitability rests on net interest margin, the spread between what it earns on assets and what it pays on deposits, and that spread is rate-sensitive in a way the recent results begin to reveal. Net interest margin did rise to 2.75% in Q1 2026, but the drivers are telling: the gain came from falling deposit costs and higher investment yields, partially offset by lower treasury and loan yields as central banks cut rates. That is the cut working its way through the balance sheet from two directions, and management itself guided net interest margin to be only "broadly stable" with a "slight positive bias" for the rest of the year. The elite 22.1% return on equity was partly built by a rate environment that is now turning, and as rates fall further, the low-cost-deposit advantage that powers the franchise becomes worth less, because the spread it can earn on those cheap deposits narrows.
That matters because of what the price assumes. At roughly two times book value, the price embeds a continuation of returns on equity well above a bank's cost of capital for a long time. Butterfield earns about a 20% return on equity on a trailing basis, against a cost of equity near 9.7%, and the price requires it to sustain a return in the mid-teens for many years before fading toward that cost of capital. The standard methods actually support the price here; this is not an overvaluation argument. The bear is about durability: if net interest margin compresses as the rate cycle plays out, the return on equity drifts down toward the level the methods can defend, and a multiple that pays two times book for a 20%-return bank does not hold if that return becomes a mid-teens return. The premium is paying for the elite profitability to persist, and the most recent quarter shows the conditions that produced it beginning to shift.
The structural risks compound the rate risk. Butterfield's home markets are small: Bermuda and the Channel Islands are mature, low-growth economies, and Cayman is entering a slower-growth phase after years of rapid expansion. A dominant share of a market that is not growing limits organic loan growth, which is why the bank returns capital rather than reinvesting it, but it also means earnings growth has to come from rates, fees, or acquisitions rather than from the core lending book expanding. Acquisitions like the Guernsey trust deal carry integration and price risk, and a fee-income pivot takes years to move the mix. None of this is a solvency concern; the capital position is strong. The bear case is narrower and harder to dodge: a high-return bank in small, mature markets is priced for the high return to last, just as the rate environment that produced it turns.
Valuation
Butterfield is read the way a bank should be read: on price-to-book against return on equity, with the cash-flow and operating-margin lenses set aside because deposits are funding, not corporate debt, and a bank's operating cash flow follows loan flows rather than profitability. The stock trades at about two times book value, and the disciplined translation of that multiple is a question about how long an elite return on equity lasts.
What stands out is that the methods support the price. Every family of valuation method reaches it: the asset-based lens anchored on book value and the return, the earnings-power lens, which actually reads the stock as inexpensive, the peer-multiple lens, and the forward-growth lens. This is a value-and-asset-supported name, not a stock floating on a single optimistic frame. The reverse lens reframes the same picture as a durability question: the price assumes Butterfield sustains a return on equity in the mid-teens for many years before fading toward its cost of equity near 9.7%. Against a current trailing return near 20% and a Q1 2026 return on average common equity of 22.1%, there is headroom, but the required return still sits above the level its regional-bank peer group typically holds over a long horizon, which is the engine noting the bet leans on the elite return persisting.
The peer comparison and the solvency frame complete the picture. Butterfield's core efficiency ratio of 56.4% and net interest margin of 2.75% are strong against regional-bank peers, and that profitability is the source of the premium-to-book multiple. For a bank the solvency frame is regulatory capital and payout capacity, not leverage or cash burn, and on that frame Butterfield is comfortable: it generates more capital than it reinvests, returns nearly all of its earnings through dividends and buybacks, and funds acquisitions from the surplus. The valuation question is not whether the bank is sound. It is whether the return that justifies two times book survives a falling-rate environment, since that return, more than the balance sheet, is what an investor is underwriting at today's price.
Catalysts
The catalyst that matters most for Butterfield is the path of net interest margin, because the multiple is paying for the elite return that margin produces. In Q1 2026 net interest margin rose 6 basis points to 2.75% as deposit costs fell to 124 basis points, and management guided it to stay broadly stable with a slight positive bias through the year. With central banks cutting rates, the offset between lower asset yields and lower deposit costs is the variable to watch; each quarter's margin print is the clearest read on whether the rate cycle is compressing the spread or whether Butterfield's deposit franchise is holding the line.
The strategic catalyst is the fee-income pivot. The bank closed its acquisition of Rawlinson & Hunter Guernsey in April 2026, strengthening its private-trust franchise and supporting a longer-term shift toward fee-driven revenue that is less sensitive to interest rates. Further acquisitions in trust and wealth, and the pace at which fee income grows as a share of the total, would reduce the bank's rate dependence and are worth tracking through the year.
The capital-return cadence is the third catalyst. Butterfield declared a $0.50 quarterly dividend and repurchased $42.4 million of stock in Q1 2026, and because it returns nearly all of its earnings, the steadiness of that dividend and the pace of buybacks are a direct signal of management's confidence in forward earnings as the rate environment shifts.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- BY (BYLINE BANCORP, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …which is reported on the Consolidated Statements of Operations as loan servicing revenue, is recorded for fees earned for servicing loans. The fees are based on a contractual percentage of the outstanding principal. Late fees and ancillary fees related to loan servicing are not material. The Company has elected the…
- FY2025 10-K: …pressures from other financial services firms for deposits and changes in interest rates and returns on other investment classes, which could result in significant outflows of deposits within short periods of time or significant changes in pricing necessary to maintain current deposits or attract additional deposits.…
- TCBI (TEXAS CAPITAL BANCSHARES INC/TX)
- FY2025 10-K: …overall market interest rates, and tend to peak at the end of each month. The Company originates a substantial majority of all loans held for investment. The Company also participates in shared national credits, both as a participant and as an agent. As of December 31, 2025, the Company had $6.2 billion in shared…
- FY2025 10-K: …state, regional and national commercial banks, savings and loan associations, consumer finance companies, credit unions, securities brokerages, insurance companies, mortgage banking companies, money market mutual funds, asset-based non-bank lenders, government sponsored or subsidized lenders, financial technology…
- EFSC (ENTERPRISE FINANCIAL SERVICES CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …of operations and cash flows. We face significant competition. The financial services industry, including, but not limited to, commercial banking, mortgage banking, consumer lending, and home equity lending, is highly competitive, and we encounter strong competition for deposits, loans, and other financial services…
- FY2025 10-K: …primarily due to an $11.5 million increase in other income. Other income increased primarily due to higher BOLI income ($3.7 million), an increase in gains on the sale of SBA loans ($2.8 million), and an increase in net gain on OREO ($3.2 million). Private equity and community development income are not consistent…
- WBS (WEBSTER FINANCIAL CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …lack a physical presence within our geographic footprint, but actively pursue business through digital channels and other remote means. Competition could intensify in the future as a result of industry consolidation, the increasing availability of products and services from non-bank organizations, including financial…
- FY2025 10-K: …risk pertaining to specific industries, geographies, property types, and other characteristics that may exist in its loan and lease portfolio. At both December 31, 2025, and 2024, commercial non-mortgage, commercial real estate, and multi-family loans comprised approximately 75% of the Company's loan and lease…
- WSFS (WSFS FINANCIAL CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …due to rate cuts . Net interest margin increased 5 bps to 3.87% in 2025 from 3.82% in 2024. The increase was primarily due to deposit repricing actions, continued wholesale funding optimization, and higher cash balances, partially offset by lower loan yields. The following table provides certain information regarding…
- FY2025 10-K: …• Current underwriting policies, staffing and portfolio concentrations, • Risk rating accuracy and credit administration, • Internal risk emergence (including internal trends of delinquency, and criticized loans by segment), • Economic forecasts and conditions - locally and nationally (including market trends…
- BKU (BankUnited, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …depends on a number of factors, many of which are outside of our direct control. Some of the factors that impact our ability to execute on our strategic priorities are (i) our ability to attract and retain talent; (ii) competition in our markets; (iii) fiscal, monetary and regulatory policy and the macro-economic…
- FY2025 10-K: …CAO Chief Accounting Officer CCA Cloud Computing Arrangements CDARS Certificate of Deposit Account Registry Service CECL Current expected credit losses CEO Chief Executive Officer CET1 Common Equity Tier 1 capital CFPB Consumer Financial Protection Bureau CFO Chief Financial Officer CIO Chief Information Officer CISO…
- BANR (Banner Corporation)
- FY2025 10-K: …by developing long-term client relationships and delivering a relationship-based banking model tailored to local markets. We continue to invest in technology and digital delivery channels to enhance client experience and remain competitive. Certain nonbank competitors are not subject to the same regulatory framework…
- FY2025 10-K: …competing for market share. Our efforts, including acquisitions, branch relocations and renovations, and targeted marketing campaigns, are primarily aimed at expanding deposit client relationships and balances. In addition, our electronic and digital banking services, such as debit card and ATM programs, online…
- NBHC (National Bank Holdings Corp)
- FY2025 10-K: …Colorado MSAs: Denver, Boulder, Colorado Springs, Fort Collins and Greeley. (4) Salt Lake City is a population weighted average of the following Utah MSAs: Salt Lake City, Ogden and Provo-Orem. (5) Top 3 competitor combined deposit market share based on U.S. Top 20 MSAs (determined by population). Source:…
- FY2025 10-K: …maintains a granular and well-diversified loan portfolio with self-imposed concentration limits. At December 31, 2025, loans totaled $7.4 billion, compared to $7.8 billion at December 31, 2024. Our commercial and industrial loan portfolio is highly diversified across industry sectors and geography. At December 31,…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 2026 earnings release · Q1 2026 earnings call · Q1 2026 earnings release; Q1 2026 earnings call