NOV INC. (NOV): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers NOV INC. (NOV) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/NOV

Headline

FieldValue
TickerNOV
CompanyNOV INC.
Current price$19.51/sh
CompositionEnergy Products and Services - Services & rental 22% / Energy Products and Services - Capital equipment 14% / Energy Products and Services - Product sales 8% / Energy Products and Services - Intersegment revenue 1% / Energy Equipment - Capital equipment 34% / Energy Equipment - Aftermarket 22% / Energy Equipment - Intersegment revenue 1% / Eliminations -2%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)4.8%
Operating margin (mid-cycle)18.2%
Margin compression (value-band)-13.4pp
Trailing margin (depressed year)4.5%
Multiple paid5x mid-cycle operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.5% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.08σ
cohort percentile (of 221 peers)1
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset10.25x4expensive
Earnings1.63x4expensive
Relative0
Growth0.83x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=11)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$26.470.74xyesFCF base $0.7B, growth -1% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 7.3%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$23.440.83xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 8.5x / 10.5x / 12.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 36.01x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 78x), scenarios: 30.6x / 36.0x / 41.4x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$2.707.23xyesBV/sh $17.07, ROE (TTM) 1.5%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$1.4713.27xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$12.191.60xyesRev $8.7B, growth -1% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.7x / 0.8x / 0.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$9.152.13xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.49B × (1−40%) / WACC 7.3% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$1.0518.58xyesBV $17.07 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 1.5% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 1.0%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$9.801.99xyes√(22.5 × EPS $0.25 × BVPS $17.07) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.75B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$19.700.99xyesFCF $734.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$17.411.12xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.66B (FCF $0.73B − SBC $0.08B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$0.2192.90xyesEPS $0.25 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$0.9520.54xyesBV $17.07 × (ROIC 0.4% / WACC 7.3%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $8.69B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$2.707.23xyesEPS $0.25 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Energy Products and Servicesoperatingenterprise$4.1bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Energy Equipmentoperatingenterprise$4.7bwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$632.0m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)0.70x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)0.40x
Interest coverage18.0x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-1.5%
Burning cashno

Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 18.2%); the trailing year was depressed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The obvious fear with NOV is that it is a leveraged bet on the oil cycle at exactly the wrong time: trailing margins are thin, revenue is declining, and the Middle East conflict knocked an estimated $54 million off the most recent quarter's sales. The data complicates that fear. The order book is not behaving like a business heading into a downturn. Energy Equipment bookings reached $520 million in the first quarter of 2026, up $83 million year over year and the strongest first-quarter intake since 2019, and the capital equipment backlog stood at $4.23 billion at quarter-end. The 10-K confirms the scale of that order book, citing a backlog of capital equipment to be manufactured, assembled, tested and delivered by Energy Equipment in the amount of $4.34 bill at year-end 2025. Customers do not place multi-year equipment orders into a falling cycle; they place them when they see a multi-year build coming.

The second thing the fear misses is the quality of the balance sheet for a cyclical. NOV carries only about $632 million of net debt, well under half a year of mid-cycle operating income, and interest is covered roughly eighteen times over. That is not a company that has to survive the trough; it is one that can buy back stock and pay dividends through it. In the first quarter alone NOV returned $100 million to shareholders, $67 million in repurchases and $33 million in dividends, retiring about 3.5 million shares. The share count has been falling about 1.5% a year. A cyclical that shrinks its share base at the bottom of the cycle is loading the spring for the recovery.

The business mix is sturdier than the oilfield label suggests. A large slice of revenue is aftermarket and services, the spare parts and repair work on an enormous installed base that customers cannot defer indefinitely, plus a growing presence in offshore wind and other energy infrastructure. Mid-cycle, the operating margin runs near 18%, four times the trailing figure. The bull case is simply that NOV is a high-quality industrial franchise priced as if the trough is permanent, when its own backlog says otherwise.

Bear Case

The price embeds one assumption: that NOV's earnings recover toward mid-cycle from today's depressed level. Strip that assumption out and the cheapness disappears. At a 4.5% trailing operating margin the business is earning a fraction of what it does in a good year, and the entire value case rests on margins climbing back toward the high teens. That is the most fragile thing in the thesis, because it does not depend on NOV's execution. It depends on oil and gas prices and customer capital budgets, which the company is candid it cannot control. The 10-K is blunt that demand depends on drilling and remediation activity, which depends in turn upon oil and gas prices, the general outlook for economic growth worldwide. A prolonged period of low oil prices, or a structural plateau in upstream spending as capital shifts elsewhere, and the mid-cycle recovery the price assumes simply does not arrive.

The geographic concentration sharpens that risk. About 66% of 2025 revenue came from outside the United States Approximately 66% of our revenues in 2025 were derived from operations outside the, much of it in regions where geopolitics, not market demand, sets the pace. The Middle East disruption that cost an estimated $54 million in revenue and $32 million in EBITDA in a single quarter, partly through freight costs that ran three to four times normal, is a concrete example of how an international order book turns into delayed shipments and stranded margin when a region destabilizes. A diversified footprint reads as a strength until several regions wobble at once.

The near-term direction is still down. Management guided second-quarter revenue to decline 4% to 6% year over year, so the backlog conversion is fighting a softening current market. The valuation methods reflect the tension: the relative-multiple and growth-discounted lenses support today's price, but the methods anchored on static earnings power read it as expensive, because a 4.5% margin does not generate much earnings to value. The bear case is that the trough is longer and shallower than the bull expects, and a buyer waiting for the mid-cycle margin to return spends years collecting a thin dividend while the cycle takes its time.

Valuation

Begin with the central distortion: NOV's trailing operating margin is about 4.5%, near a cyclical trough, and any multiple built on that number is misleading in both directions. Value the business on the earnings it produces in a normal cycle, where the operating margin runs near 18%, and the picture changes completely. At today's $18.64 (June 27, 2026) the stock trades at roughly 5 times blended earnings, a level that prices in almost no recovery at all. The market is treating the trough as the run rate.

The methods split along the line you would expect for a depressed cyclical. The relative-multiple and growth-discounted lenses support the price, and the methods built on static earnings power read it as expensive, simply because a 4.5% margin throws off little earnings to capitalize. The asset-based lens looks distorted for the same reason: when current returns on capital are far below mid-cycle, the asset multiples flag the stock as expensive even though the replacement value of NOV's equipment and installed base is substantial. The honest interpretation is not that NOV is expensive; it is that none of the static methods can see past the trough year. The recovery case lives in the backlog and the mid-cycle margin, not in the trailing income statement.

Solvency removes the usual cyclical danger. Net debt of about $632 million sits at roughly 0.4 times operating income, interest is covered around eighteen times, and the company is buying back stock and paying a dividend rather than husbanding cash to survive. That is a balance sheet built to wait out the trough, not endure it. The bet the buyer underwrites is patience: that the $4.23 billion backlog converts, that mid-cycle margins return, and that the global energy capital spending NOV serves resumes its build. The downside is bounded by the assets and the cash; the upside requires the cycle to cooperate.

Catalysts

The first quarter of 2026 showed a business holding revenue steady while absorbing an external shock. Consolidated revenue was $2.05 billion, down 2% year over year, with net income of $19 million, or $0.05 per diluted share, and adjusted EBITDA of $177 million at 8.6% of sales. Management attributed an estimated $54 million revenue and $32 million EBITDA hit to the Middle East conflict, through delayed capital-equipment shipments, freight costs at times three to four times normal, and reduced manufacturing.

The order data ran the other way. Energy Equipment bookings of $520 million were up $83 million year over year and the strongest first-quarter intake since 2019, leaving a capital equipment backlog of $4.23 billion, with management framing the demand as the start of a multi-year capital-equipment cycle. Capital returns continued through the soft patch: NOV returned $100 million to shareholders, $67 million in buybacks retiring about 3.5 million shares and $33 million in dividends.

The near-term guide tempers the order momentum. NOV expects second-quarter consolidated revenue to decline 4% to 6% year over year, so the backlog is converting against a still-softening market. The markers to watch are straightforward: the trajectory of Energy Equipment bookings quarter to quarter, whether the backlog grows or is drawn down, and any easing of the Middle East disruption that would let delayed shipments flow. Each tells you whether the multi-year cycle management describes is materializing or receding.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Energy Products and Services (reported)

Energy Equipment (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

NOV Q1 2026 earnings release · NOV Q1 2026 earnings call · NOV Q2 2026 guidance

View the full interactive NOV report on boothcheck