NORTHERN OIL & GAS, INC. (NOG): what the price assumes
boothcheck covers NORTHERN OIL & GAS, INC. (NOG) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-06-27.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/NOG
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | NOG |
| Company | NORTHERN OIL & GAS, INC. |
| Current price | $19.76/sh |
| Composition | Oil Sales 78% / Natural Gas and NGL Sales 22% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 9.7% |
| Operating margin (mid-cycle) | 29.0% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -19.3pp |
| Trailing margin (depressed year) | -34.0% |
| Multiple paid | 8x mid-cycle operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 5: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.1% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.31σ |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple value, while growth-DCF lands below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.24x | 2 | expensive |
| Earnings | 0.32x | 2 | justifies |
| Relative | 0.93x | 2 | justifies |
| Growth | 3.29x | 3 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative Families that call it expensive: Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 4.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=9)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $148.75 | 0.13x | yes | FCF base $1.4B, growth -10% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 4.9%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0 |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $21.31 | 0.93x | yes | P/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 1.2x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus |
| Simple DDM | Growth | $2.48 | 7.97x | yes | DPS $1.68, g=-34.9% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3% |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $-20.77 | — | no | Stage 1: -200% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $16.87 | 1.17x | yes | Reference only (book value floor): BV/sh $16.87, ROE negative |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $15.18 | 1.30x | yes | Reference only (book value with convergence): BV/sh $16.87, ROE converges to ke |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $6.00 | 3.29x | yes | Rev $1.9B, growth -15% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.8x / 1.1x / 1.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0 |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $41.11 | 0.48x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.51B × (1−21%) / WACC 4.9% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $121.49 | 0.16x | yes | FCF $1421.5M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $21.31 | 0.93x | yes | Revenue $1.88B × sector P/S 1.2x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $2.5b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 5.84x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 4.61x |
| Interest coverage | 3.2x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 6.4% |
| Burning cash | no |
Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 29.0%); the trailing year was depressed.
Bullet Takeaways
- Northern Oil and Gas owns non-operated minority stakes in wells run by other companies, so it funds its share of drilling and collects its share of production without operating anything itself, a structure that keeps overhead light but leaves the drilling pace in others' hands.
- The Q1 2026 GAAP loss of $522.8M was almost entirely non-cash, driven by a $539.1M derivative loss and a $268.3M full-cost ceiling-test impairment, while operating cash flow stayed strong at $323.6M, so the headline loss and the cash reality point in opposite directions.
- The next markers are the Utica integration (a $464.5M, 40% interest closed February 2026), pro forma leverage drifting toward 1.6x, and the $0.45 quarterly dividend that sets an 8%-plus yield.
Bull Case
Start with the balance sheet and cash, because that is where the bull case for an oil and gas name lives or dies. NOG carried about $2.5B of net debt into the most recent quarter, and management projects pro forma leverage near 1.4x to 1.6x after the Utica deal, with interest covered roughly three times over by operating profit. That is moderate leverage for an exploration and production company, and it is backed by cash that keeps coming regardless of the accounting. Despite the reported quarterly loss, cash from operations held at $323.6M, which funded the heavy investment program rather than draining the company. The headline number screamed distress; the cash account said business as usual.
The model itself is built for capital efficiency. As a non-operated owner, NOG buys fractional working interests in wells that other operators drill and run. It pays its share of the bill and takes its share of the barrels, without the field staff, the rigs, or the operating headcount that a traditional producer carries. That lets it spread capital across many wells and many basins, and it lets it grow by acquisition rather than by building an operating organization. The Utica purchase, a 40% interest closed for $464.5M in February 2026, is the strategy in action: write a check, add gas-weighted production and reserves, diversify out of the Bakken and Permian without standing up a new operating team.
The shareholder return is the part that makes the asset value tangible today. The quarterly dividend of $0.45 sets a yield above 8%, and the company has kept paying it through commodity swings. For an investor, the question is whether the cash flow that funds that dividend is durable, and the mid-cycle economics say yes: strip out the non-cash hedge marks and impairment, and the underlying operating margin runs near 29%. That is the business the price is actually buying, not the impaired trailing year. The price sits near the levels that asset value, earnings power, and peer multiples all support, which is a different and steadier footing than a pure growth bet.
Bear Case
The structural truth a holder has to face is that NOG does not control its own destiny. It owns minority, non-operated interests, which means other companies decide when wells get drilled, how fast, and at what cost. NOG funds its share and hopes the operators are disciplined. In a downturn, that lack of control cuts the wrong way: a non-operator cannot slow its own capital program independently, and it inherits whatever decisions the operating partners make. The growth lever is acquisition, and acquisition requires either cash the company is also paying out as dividends or new shares, and the share count has climbed about 6.4% a year. Dilution is the quiet cost of growing this way.
The commodity exposure is the real risk, and the latest quarter showed how violently it moves through the financials. The $268.3M ceiling-test impairment was not an accident of one bad quarter; it is structural to full-cost accounting. The filing spells out the mechanism: the carrying value of properties is capped at the discounted value of proved reserves priced off the trailing twelve-month unweighted average of the first-day-of-the-month price, so when oil prices fall, the cap falls and the company writes assets down. The 10-K warns plainly that we may be required to record further writedowns of our oil and natural gas properties in the future. A sustained slide in oil and gas prices does not just compress earnings here; it forces accounting losses and pressures the reserve base that backs the borrowing.
Leverage is the amplifier. Net debt near $2.5B sits at roughly 4.6 times mid-cycle operating income, and pro forma leverage is drifting up toward 1.6x after the Utica deal rather than down. The dividend yield above 8% is attractive precisely because the market is pricing real risk into it: an 8% yield on an E&P is the market saying the payout could be cut if prices break. The bear case is not that NOG fails. It is that an investor here is underwriting commodity prices staying firm enough to cover a rising debt load, a growing share count, and a dividend that competes with both for the same cash. The hedge book smooths the ride, but the $539.1M derivative loss in the quarter is a reminder that hedges cut both ways.
Valuation
The trailing financials are the wrong lens here, and it is worth saying why before any multiple. The most recent year ran a negative operating margin because of a non-cash ceiling-test impairment and large derivative marks, neither of which reflects the cash the wells actually produce. Value NOG on what it earns through a normal cycle, and the operating margin runs near 29%. That is the figure the price is built on, not the impaired headline.
On that mid-cycle basis, the methods line up in NOG's favor more than against it. Asset value, earnings power, and relative multiples all support today's price near $19, and only the growth-discounted cash-flow methods read it as expensive, which is exactly what you would expect for a mature, cash-generative producer that is not promising acceleration. The price sits at roughly 8 times blended earnings, a level that says the market is paying for the existing reserves and cash flow rather than for a growth story. This is a value-and-asset-supported name, and the spread among the methods says the downside is anchored by the assets, not floating on a multiple the market has to keep granting.
Solvency is where the caution belongs. Net debt of about $2.5B runs near 4.6 times mid-cycle operating income, interest coverage sits around three times, and the Utica acquisition nudges pro forma leverage up toward 1.6x rather than down. The dividend, at $0.45 a quarter and a yield above 8%, is covered by the operating cash flow the wells generate today, but it competes with debt service and the acquisition appetite for the same dollars. The bet the buyer underwrites is straightforward: commodity prices hold near a level that keeps mid-cycle economics intact, and the assets do the work the trailing accounting obscured.
Catalysts
The first quarter of 2026 was a study in the gap between accounting and cash. NOG reported a net loss of $522.8M, or negative $5.31 per diluted share, as a $539.1M loss on commodity derivatives and a $268.3M ceiling-test impairment overwhelmed oil and gas sales of $539.9M. Both the revenue and the EPS missed consensus, which had looked for about $516M of revenue and positive EPS, and the stock fell on the print. The signal under the noise was cash: operating cash flow held at $323.6M and production set a record, up 6% sequentially.
The defining strategic move is the Utica expansion. NOG closed a joint acquisition of Ohio Utica Shale interests on February 23, 2026, taking a 40% stake for $464.5M in cash alongside a partner holding the other 60%. The deal is gas-weighted and adds a third core area, but it pushes pro forma 2026 leverage from about 1.4x toward 1.6x and lifts debt-to-equity toward 1.43, the financing cost of growing by acquisition.
Analyst opinion splits on exactly that trade-off. Targets range from a Buy at $27 tied to the production and reserve growth from Utica, to a Hold at $16 citing the volatility and the complexity of the financials. The dividend, held at $0.45 a quarter for an 8%-plus yield, anchors the income case, and the question the next few prints answer is whether the acquired Utica volumes convert to the cash flow that covers a rising debt load and the payout at once.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- SM (SM ENERGY CO)
- FY2025 10-K: …of and transport fresh and produced water, own drilling rigs or production equipment, or generate electricity, all of which, individually or in the aggregate, could provide such companies with a competitive advantage. 19 We also compete with other oil and gas companies in securing drilling rigs and other equipment…
- FY2025 10-K: …risks. • Competition in our industry is intense, and many of our competitors have greater financial, technical, and human resources than we do. • Our ability to sell oil, gas, and NGLs, and/or receive market prices for our production, may be adversely affected by constraints on gathering systems, processing…
- PR (PERMIAN RESOURCES CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …The oil and natural gas industry is intensely competitive, and we compete with other companies that have greater resources than us, particularly following recent consolidation within the industry. Many of our larger competitors not only drill for and produce oil and natural gas, but they also engage in refining…
- FY2025 10-K: …cases are adjusted for contractual differentials, and the majority of our revenue contracts have terms greater than twelve months. We normally sell production to a relatively small number of customers, as is customary in our business. The table below summarizes the purchasers that accounted for 10% or more of our…
- PARR (Par Pacific Holdings, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …drivers impacting our refining segment's financial performance and is calculated as the throughput-weighted average of each regional index for periods under our ownership. As such, the throughput weighted index contemplates the Montana index following June 1, 2023. (9) Beginning in 2025, crude oil prices have been…
- FY2025 10-K: …Item 6. [RESERVED] 31 Item 7. MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL CONDITION AND RESULTS OF OPERATIONS Overview We are a growing energy company based in Houston, Texas, that provides both renewable and conventional fuels to the western United States. For more information, please read "Part I -Item 1. -…
- CRC (California Resources Corp)
- FY2025 10-K: …includes operating lease costs and asset impairment. (b) Other profit or loss includes the margin we earn from marketing activities and the margin we earn on sales of electricity from our Elk Hills power plant to customers. (c) Unallocated amounts include net gain from commodity derivatives, net loss on natural gas…
- FY2025 10-K: Segment operating revenues 2,967 - 2,967 Other revenues and income (a) 749 749 Total operating revenues $ 3,669 (a) Other revenues and income includes net gain from commodity derivatives, revenue from marketing of purchased commodities, electricity sales and unallocated interest and other revenue. 136 Year ended…
- RRC (RANGE RESOURCES CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …natural gas, NGLs and oil properties, securing and retaining personnel, conducting drilling and field operations and marketing production. Competitors in exploration, development, acquisitions and production include the major oil and gas companies as well as numerous independent oil and gas companies, individual…
- FY2025 10-K: …in software, office facilities and other. This plan is expected to achieve modest growth of 2026 production relative to 2025 production volumes, while also supporting our longer-term operational plans. As has been our historical practice, we will periodically review our capital expenditures throughout the year and…
- CHRD (Chord Energy Corp)
- FY2025 10-K: …flowback and produced water on economic terms may increase our operating costs and cause delays, interruptions or termination of our operations, the extent of which cannot be predicted but that could be materially adverse to our business and results of operations. Competition in the oil and gas industry is intense,…
- FY2025 10-K: …to be the Company's Chief Operating Decision Maker ("CODM"), to make key operating decisions, such as the allocation of resources and the evaluation of operating segment performance. The primary measure of profit and loss evaluated by the Company's CODM for its single reportable segment is consolidated net income.…
- AR (ANTERO RESOURCES CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …competition for equipment, supplies and personnel during the spring and summer months, which could lead to shortages and increase costs or delay our operations. Competition The oil and natural gas industry is intensely competitive, and we compete with other companies in our industry that have greater resources than…
- FY2025 10-K: …and other operating expenses attributable to our exploration and production segment increased from $5 million for the year ended December 31, 2024 to $28 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, an increase of $23 million. This increase was primarily due to loss contingencies recorded during the year ended…
- MNR (Mach Natural Resources LP)
- FY2025 10-K: …reserves will decrease, and our business, financial condition and results of operations would be materially and adversely affected. Competition in the oil and natural gas industry is intense, making it more difficult for us to acquire properties, market natural gas, secure trained personnel and raise additional…
- FY2025 10-K: …to continue exploration activities during periods of low natural gas market prices. Our ability to acquire additional properties and to discover reserves in the future will be dependent upon our ability to evaluate and select suitable properties and to consummate transactions in a highly competitive environment. In…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
NOG Q1 2026 earnings release · NOG Q1 2026 results · NOG Q1 2026 earnings call · NOG 8-K, February 2026 · NOG acquisition disclosure, 2026 · analyst notes, 2026